Sir Frank Lascelles : a diplomat of the Victorian empire, 1841-1920 by Bourne, Patrick James
Sir Frank Lascelles - a diplomat of the 
Victorian Empire, 1841-1920 
Mr Patrick James Bourne (M.A.) 
Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy. 
The University of Leeds 
School of History 
October 2010 
The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit 
has been given where reference has been made to the work of others. 
This copy has been supplied on the understanding that copyright material and that no 
quotation from the thesis may be published without acknowledgement. 
1 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis would only have been possible with the aid of a Doctoral Award from the 
Arts and Humanities Research Council, which enabled me to complete three years of 
research without financial worries. 
I am most indebted to Professor Keith Wilson of the University of Leeds, for 
steering me through my first year as a Doctoral student, and to Professor Holger 
Afflerbach and Dr. Owen Hartley for taking up the reigns thereafter as my supervisors 
and guiding me to completion of my thesis. I am also indebted for the advice at 
various stages of Professor Roy Bridge, and Dr. Richard Whiting of the University of 
Leeds, and Dr. Gaynor Johnson of the University of Salford, to all the staff of the 
School of History and the Brotherton Library at the University of Leeds and of the 
numerous archives I have visited, especially to Robert Harc~urt Williams of Hatfield 
House; to the staff of the National Archives, Kew; Churchill College Archive Centre, 
Cambridge University Library and the Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge; the British 
Library, News International Archive and Imperial War Museum in London; and of the 
Bodeleian Library and Balliol College, Oxford. 
Lastly but by no means least lowe an immeasurable debt of gratitude to my 
parents, Andrew and Mary Bourne, and my partner Lisa Baxter for their unstinting 
encouragement throughout four often very trying years. 
For any errors in the mansuscript, I alone bear the responsibility. 
11 
Abstract 
Sir Frank Cavendish Lascelles (1841-1920) was a typical British diplomat, born into 
an aristocratic family, educated at Harrow and serving in the diplomatic service from 
the age of twenty to his retirement at sixty-seven. He was in Paris at the time of the 
Franco-Prussian war (1870-1), in Egypt in the run up to British occupation (1878-9), 
and was at Prince Alexander of Battenberg's side at the time of the Bulgarian crisis of 
1885-86. From here he moved to the forefront of defending Britain's Imperial 
interests, as Minister to Teheran (1891-94), and then as Ambassador to St Petersburg 
(1894-5), before finally arriving at Berlin in the last third of his diplomatic life. His 
career can tell us much about the priorities in British foreign policy, and how they 
changed throughout the period 1870-1914. 
Although previous studies of Lascelles's life have tended to focus on the last 
years of his career and his estrangement from the growing 'anti-German' trend at the 
British Foreign Office before the Great War, this work, by examining his Berlin post 
in the context of his broader diplomatic experience, aims to build up a picture of Sir 
Frank Lascelles as a Victorian diplomat as distinct from the Edwardian generation, 
focussed on a policy of concilhltion and protecting Britain's interests as he conceived 
them, and avoiding sources of possible antagonism. For the main part, this meant 
co,llaboration where allowable with Britain's rivals, but also a recognition of the value 
to Britain otthe Triple Alliance powers who proved a valuable safeguard against the 
threat of Russia and France arguably up until shortly before 1907, when Britain came 
to terms with them. This fact among others explains the ambassador's seemingly 
disproportionate focus on retaining the friendship of Europe's largest Power and its 
ruler, the wisdom of which many contemporaries were increasingly inclined to 
dispute. 
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Introduction 
Although in the words of Matthew Seligmann, 'there is some debate as to exactly 
when and why it occurred;) in the last years of the nineteenth and early years of the 
twentieth century, British foreign policy turned away from what is generally termed 
Great Britain's 'splendid isolation', towards a policy of alignment with other Powers, 
in an attempt to meet mounting challenges posed to the British Empire's global 
interests. The phrase 'isolation' brings with it problems of definition; it has generally 
.. 
- been taken to mean the eschewing of commitments to, or alliances, with other Powers, 
or as AJ.P. Taylor puts it, an 'aloofness from the European Balance of Power' 
although whether it was a policy, or simply a frame of mind, is open to debate, with 
one historian ·simply concluding that the use of the term isolation 'vanished' with the 
signing of the Anglo-Japanese alliance treaty in February 1902 and was little heard of 
thereafter 'except by way of retrospect and, occasionally, of nostalgia' .2 
This change in policy was a response to a confluence of circumstances which 
dramatically altered the 'long peace' of the Victorian era to the detriment of Great 
Britain. The hardening of alliances between Britain's Great Power rivals with the 
conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance of 1894 meant that Britain had to review 
her traditional Mediterranean role of seeking, by maritime means, to protect the 
Ottoman Empire from dissolution. The late-nineteenth century eruption of 
enthusiasm for imperialism among European powers meant that Britain's own 
imperial interests, primarily centred around India and the protection of overland and 
1 Matthew S. Seligmann, Spies in uniform: British military and naval intelligence on the eve 
of the First World War (Oxford, 2006), p.l. 
2 C.H.D. Howard, Splendid Isolation: A study of Ideas concerning Britain's inter-national 
position and foreign policy during the later years of the third Marquis of Salisbury (London, 
1967), p xiii; ibid, pp.96-97. 
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overseas routes to the sub-continent, were put under increased pressure, by Russia in 
Asia and by France in Egypt, a threat which was greatly magnifie<!-between 1899 and 
1902 when Britain became enmeshed in a colonial war in South Africa and was 
unable to free up resources to defend significant parts of her empire. As the South 
African war proceeded, Russia advanced in Persia, France made gains in North 
Africa, and Germany also took advantage of Britain's difficulties to extract colonial 
concessions for herself and build a powerful fleet to rival that of the Royal Navy. The 
opening up of the Far Eastern Question between 1894 and 1900, centring on China 
(where Britain had hitherto enjoyed a monopoly of trade but no~ faced competition 
from European rivals), provided an additional challenge to Britain's authority as a 
Great Power. It was against this background that a re-orientation occurred in British 
foreign policy from around 1900 if not before (for there is a growing case for locating 
the seeds of this change in the last Foreign Office administration of Lord Salisbury, 
1895-1900), and she apparently abandoned her isolation.3 The tangible results were 
that Britain aligned herself with another maritime power in the Far East, Japan (1902), 
in an attempt to redress the alteration in the naval balance of power, and subsequently 
redistributed her own naval forces (1904); concluded a colonial settlement with 
France (1904), demarcating spheres of influence in, among other places, Morocco and 
Egypt, and reached a similar agreement with Russia, agreeing zones of influence in 
Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet (1907). This was all the outcome of intense soul-
searching on the part of the diplomatic, military and naval institutions. 
3 See e.g. G.W. Monger, The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900-1907 (London, 
1963); C.J. Lowe,Salisbwy and the Mediterranean 1886-1896 (London, 1965); C.H.D. 
Howard, Splendid Isolation; Aaron L. Friedberg, The weary titan: Britain and the experience 
of relative decline, 1895-1905 (Princeton, 1988); Zara S. Steiner and Keith Neilson, Britain 
and the origins of the First World War, 2nd edn. (Basingstoke, 2003). On the latter point, and 
a cautious revision of the supposed abandonment of isolation, see T.G. Otte, The China 
Question: Great Power Rivalry and British Isolation, 1894-1905 (Oxford, 2007). 
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In the welter of books on this subject, the historiography of the period has 
tended to concentrate overtly on the link between the ending of Britain's isolation and 
./ 
the deterioration of Anglo-Gennan relations as the main driving force for this 
occurrence. The authoritative academic work on Anglo-Gennan relations in the 
period prior to 1914 is Paul Kennedy's compendious tome, The Rise o/the Anglo-
German antagonism, 1860-1914, which traces the onset of Anglo-Gennan tension, 
especially from the 1890s, a phenomenon Kennedy puts down to a mixture of feuds 
between dynasts, differences in ideology, in foreign policy goals, domestic politics, 
imperial interests and above all to economic rivalry. Kennedy'~ approach to the 
subject is perfectly valid within the carefully prescribed confines of his analysis- he 
has little time for what he tenns the' "red herring'" of earlier studies asking whether a 
clas~ between Britain and Germany was '" inevitable"', to which he responds that 
'the forces and personalities which detennined events moved, consciously or 
unconsciously, in a certain direction which the historian obviously wishes to study 
and understand better' and that 'it is idle to speculate upon the alternatives which 
were'not chosen.,4 
This is too detenninist for many to swallow.5 What T.G. Otte calls the 'focus 
on Gennany, with its implicit teleology centred on 1914,6 proceeds from the 
knowledge that Britain and Gennany did go to war in 1914 (albeit each on behalf of 
an ally or entente partner) and that therefore the historian's examination of nineteenth 
century diplomacy has been coloured by starting from a predetennined outcome. Otte 
4 Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914 (London, 1980), 
pp.465-6. 
5 As Keith Neilson has written: 'by linking Great Britain's long-term fall from the ranks of the 
great powers with the known fact that she went to war against Germany in 1914, a coherence 
is imposed on the events ofthe period from 1895-1914.' Keith Neilson, "'Greatly 
Exaggerated": The Myth of the Decline of Great Britain before 1914', The International 
History Review, XIII, 4, (1991), p. 696. 
6 T.G. Otte, The China Question, p.5. 
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has convincingly argued that the over-emphasis on Anglo-German relations in 
historiography masks longer term trends in British foreign policy - for example, 
----
overlooking the fact that up to 1904 or 1907 at least (if not beyond) France and Russia 
respectively were Britain's great rivals in the Imperial sphere. This is not to suggest 
that Germany did not of course constitute a growing concern for Britain 7 but suggests 
that more attention should be diverted to the 'geo-strategic periphery' in accounting 
for these changes.8 While historians like George Monger acknowledged the broader 
context Britain's global concerns, he too concentrated too much on the threat to 
Britain from Gernlany. Otte's work on the role of the Far Eastel)l crisis (1894-1905) 
in the reorientation of British foreign policy has pointed to broader, deeper 
timeframes for analysis of change's, and wider geographical horizons, and his 
empqasis on the influence of 'membership of different political generations' in 
shaping outlooks also points to a useful tool for examination the attitudes of British 
foreign-policy makers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 9 In this 
connection, another recent study, painting 1900-1907 as a 'hinge era' when a loss of 
flexibility of and hardening of diplomatic ties occurred, has used the example of 
family networks and individual case studies, and in particular the influence of a 
'wendegeneration' or transitional generation of British diplomats, to demonstrate how 
perceptions of Germany changed and led to a gravitation away from Germany 
towards association with other Powers, particularly with the much-neglected United 
7 Few would go so far as K.M. Wilson, who asserts that the German threat was 'invented' by 
the Foreign Office, who were '''painting the German devil on the wall'" to justify their 
policy objectives Keith M. Wilson, The Policy of the Entente: Essays on the Determinants of 
British Foreign Policy, 1904-1914 (Cambridge, 1985), p.108. 
8 The use ofthe term is common to all works by T.G. Otte, but see e.g. Otte, The China 
Question, p. 103. 
9 Ibid, p.5-6. 
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States. 10 Brechtken's work suggests that by examining individual attitudes a far more 
variegated picture of the complex attitudes of historical actors may emerge, paying 
attention to differentiation in outlook; position, and experience. 
In his exhaustive work on the rise of the Anglo-German antagonism, Paul 
Kennedy is quite dismissive of 'detailed character-analysis' as a tool for examining 
international relations. Speaking particularly about Paul Wolff von Metternich 
(German ambassador to London, 1903-1912), and Sir Frank Lascelles, he writes: 
'since their unenviable and at times unhappy careers were chiefly affected by larger 
processes, it is to the latter that attention should be focused ... The 'stream oftime', to 
use Bismarck's phrase, possessed currents affecting the Anglo-German relationship 
which few if any individuals could steer against.' 11 He thus happily subordinates 
individual human agency to such larger forces as socio-economic factors. Mainly for 
reasons of space Kennedy's impressive work indulges in what he terms 'The 
"lumping" process' to understand 'the overall balance of forces' in both countries, 
which he says were pointing towards war 'well before the actual events of 1914' . 12 
. While not wishing to detract from the merits of Kennedy's work, recent 
historians have encountered a problem with his methodology. Frank McDonough, 
historian of the Conservative Party's views on Anglo-German relations attitudes 
before 1914, criticises what he terms the 'indiscriminate lumping together of different 
views on Anglo-German relations' in relation to political parties, going on to argue 
that a detailed study reveals a more intricate diversification of views on foreign affairs 
10 Magnus Brechtken, Scharnierzeit, 1895-1907: Personlichkeitsnetze und internationale 
Politik in den deutsch-britisch-amerikanischen Beziehungen vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg 
(Mainz, 2006) 
II Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise o/the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914, p. 434. 
12 Ibid, p.435. 
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than even a monolith of the scope of Kennedy's would allow.13 It is feasible to argue 
a similar case for the role of diplomats in the pre-1914 era. 
The researches of Zara Steiner into the role of officials at the Foreign Office 
prior to 1914 have already gone a long way to breaking down the perception that 
, "officials do not make policy ... they carry out the policy ofthe foreign secretary" , .14 
Steiner has issued a clarion call for international historians to identify the actors, the 
'human beings' at the heart of'any .. .institution engaged in international affairs' to 
find out 'what roles our actors took,' placing them within their environment, and 
dominant belief frameworks of the time, and to learn 'something about their 
assumptions, both spoken and unspoken', and how their perceptions were shaped by 
'class, education, generation, department and international assignments' .15 In the past 
few ~ecades historians such as Steiner, D.C. Watt, and more recently Keith Neilson 
and T.G. Otte have paid increasing attention to the role of individual human agency in 
nineteenth century diplomacy, which was formally conducted by just a few 
individuals. 16 Sir Frank Lascelles and his colleagues were part of a 'small group of 
men, 'who constituted the foreign-policy- making elite', a term first coined by D.C. 
Watt and now used widely by international historians. 17 This elite were 'united by 
class, wealth, upbringing, and schooling', 18 and together they constituted what has 
13 Frank Mc Donough, The Conservative Party and Anglo-German Relations, 1905-1914 
(Basingstoke, 2007), p.l O. 
14 Quoted in Zara Steiner, 'On Writing International History: Chaps, Maps and Much More', 
International Affairs 73 (1997), pp. 532-3. See the still seminal work, Z.S. Steiner, The 
Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1969). 
15 Zara Steiner, 'On Writing International History: Chaps, Maps and Much More', pp. 536-8. 
16 The Foreign Office itself, numbered just eighty-five souls in 1851. K. Theodore Hoppen, 
The Mid-Victorian Generation 1846-1886 (Oxford, 1998), p.45. 
17 Keith Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia, 1894-1917 (Oxford, 
1995), p.3. See D.C. Watt, Personalities and Politics: Studies in the Formulation of British 
Foreign Policy in the 20th Century (London, 1965), pp. 1-15. 
18 Keith Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar, p.50; see also Steiner, The Foreign Office and 
Foreign Policy, p.173. 
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been called either the 'official' or 'Foreign Office mind' 19. It was such individuals-
the diplomats, Foreign Office mandarins, and of course their political masters, who 
----
helped shape foreign policy. They saw themselves as free actors, not victims of 
historical forces (albeit they were naturally confined by their social, cultural, 
economic and political environment), and they operated within the context of 
Britain's worldwide imperial concerns, as well as dealing with the ebbs and flows of 
European diplomacy. Thus the multiplicity of experiences by these officials may help 
instruct us in trying to unravel the nature and meaning of the changes in foreign 
policy around 1900. Work on Foreign Office officials has been complemented more 
recently by a natural broadening out of the study of individual agents in foreign· 
policy, which has seen the publication of monographs on the role of political parties, 
the ~.ress, and naval and military attaches at Berlin before the Great War.20 
By contrast to their Foreign Office counterparts, there have been relatively few 
studies on the role of British diplomats in foreign capitals. The relative lack of interest 
can easily be explained. By the tum of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
ambassadorial independence had been sharply curtailed and few heads of mission 
contradicted instructions directly. Edwardian ambassadors were 'expected to report 
intelligently, represent his country's interests and conduct whatever negotiations the 
foreign secretary deemed necessary ... ' ,21 but beyond this their role was apparently 
circumscribed, to the extent that even Britain's forthright ambassador to Paris from 
1905, Sir Francis Bertie, lamenting his lack of influence, complained that he was seen 
as 'only a d-d marionette'. However these men were important in providing 
19 See, e.g., Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, chapter 21, pp. 432-441; 
T.G .. Otte, The Foreign Office Mind: The Making of British Foreign Policy, 1865-1914 
(Cambridge, forthcoming 2011). 
20 Linda B. Fritzinger, Diplomat without portfolio: Valentine Chirol, His Life and The Times, 
(New York, 2006); Matthew S. Seligmann, Spies in Uniform; Frank Mc Donough, The 
Conservative Party and Anglo-German Relations, 1905-1914. 
21 Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, p. 173. 
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information on the country they were assigned to, a 'mental map' which informed 
perceptions and decisions in the metropolis, and in acting as the 'partner' of the 
~ 
foreign secretary abroad.22 Though hot hermetically sealed from external and 
domestic factors, the diplomatic corps formed a group with its own assumptions, 
interacting with elites with similar views, while holding its own individual 
viewpoints, and its members are worthy of further study. 
Sir Frank Lascelles: a suitable case for treatment? 
There are several reasons why Sir Frank Lascelles (1841-1920) stands out as a good 
case study of a diplomat of Victorian and Edwardian diplomacy. Although Sir Frank 
Las~~lles lived into and beyond the Edwardian age, both his formative and his 
diplomatic experiences were forged in the Victorian era, during which he served over 
eighty per-cent of his professional life. Born just after the accession of Queen 
Victoria, Sir Frank was inducted into the diplomatic service when Germany had yet to 
unite~ France was still Britain's most serious foe in Europe, and Russia, recently 
defeated in the Crimean war, was making her presence felt in Asia just as Britain was 
assuming more control over India and had renewed her pledge to uphold the integrity 
of the Ottoman Empire. When Lascelles ended his career Britain's traditional 
Mediterranean policy had been abandoned, Russia and France had become the entente 
partners of Britain, a united Germany rather than a revived France was perceived as 
the greatest threat to the balance of power in Europe, and despite deals with her rivals 
Britain's ability to defend her Empire was in serious question, especially because of 
22 Keith Neilson, '''Only a d ... d marionette?" The influence of ambassadors on British foreign 
policy, 1904-1914', in M. Dockrill & B. McKercher, Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in 
British Foreign Policy 1890-1950 (Cambridge, 1996), p. 56-57. 
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the transformation of European countries into Imperial powers, and her maritime 
preponderance was challenged. Lascelles thus stands Janus-like at a crucial watershed 
----" 
in Britain's diplomatic history. 
In addition, the geographical range of Lacelles's career is illustrative of the 
scope of Britain's power and interests. His career was spent in the vanguard of 
Britain's Imperial problems - after witnessing the German occupation of Paris (1870-
1), he was discharged to Egypt in the run up to British occupation (1878-9), was at 
Prince Alexander of Battenberg's side at the time of the heightened Near Eastern 
tension of the Bulgarian crisis (1885-86), and from here moved on into the forefront 
of defending Britain's Imperial interests, as Minister to Teheran (1891-94), and then 
as Ambassador to St Petersburg (1894-5), before finally arriving at Berlin in the last 
third .. ofhis diplomatic life (1895-1908). His career can tell us much about priorities in 
British foreign policy, how they changed throughout the period of 1870-1914, by 
serving as a prism through which prevailing foreign policy principles can be 
glimpsed. 
. Lascelles's final posting at the Berlin embassy where the burgeoning Anglo-
German antagonism of the pre-war years took centre stage has naturally received 
treatement before now. This period has been the topic of two earlier D Phil theses, the 
first by Cornelia Brooke,23 and the second, more recently, by Willem-Alexander 
Van't Padje?4 Cornelia Brooke's thesis dealt exclusively with the first five years 
Lascelles's Embassy, but W.A. Van't Padje's work has tackled Lascelles' entire 
23 Cornelia E. Brooke, 'The Queen's Ambassador to Her Grandson Sir Frank LasceIIes: A 
Study of Anglo-German Relations from 1895-1900' (0 Phil thesis Vassar CoIIege, New 
York,1971). 
24 Willem-Alexander Van't Padje, 'At the heart of the growing Anglo-German Imperialist 
Rivalry: Two Ambassadors at Berlin 1884-1908' (0 Phil thesis, St John's CoIIege, Oxford, 
2001). 
XIV 
career at Berlin in the context of the growing 'imperialist rivalry' between Great 
Britain and Germany. 
Van't Padje's thesis seems to implicitly accept the prevailing narrative on the 
inevitability of the drift towards deteriorating Anglo-German relations by painting 
Lascelles as the casualty of forces beyond his control, and as such Lascelles is 
criticised for his failure to see that his endeavours in Berlin to improve relations 
would ultimately be fruitless. He is portrayed as a lone voice in the wilderness in the 
twilight years of his diplomatic life. Yet this picture does little justice to other parts of 
the diplomat's career, for although Lascelles' professional life is often 
(understandably) examined chiefly for its relevance to Anglo-German relations, this 
highlights the underlying bias in the historiography. Berlin accounted for thirteen 
years of a remarkably colourful and varied forty-seven year career. 
This thesis therefore will seek to examine Lascelles not exclusively within the 
framework of an inevitable drift towards the irreversible event of war in August 1914, 
but on his own terms, as a diplomat ofthe Victorian age. There has been no sustained 
attempt made to examine Lascelles' diplomatic career from 1861 up to and through 
his time in Germany, and no attempt to study his career as an agitator for great Anglo-
German understanding from 1911-1914, despite the fact that Lascelles did leave 
behind a vast collection of private papers, and that correspondence bearing his name 
is extant in the private papers of many other statesmen, not to mention of course on 
the vast pile of official papers in the National Archives, Kew. 
Regrettably, Lascelles left no memoirs or extensive diaries, beyond a short 
extract from his time as a young diplomat in Paris in 1870-1. To some extent the 
course of events from July 1914 onwards determined that Sir Frank's voice remained 
muffled thereafter, although he came tantalisingly close to writing down his 
xv 
diplomatic experiences. According to his close friend, the former Times Editor 
Ignatius Valentine Chirol, in the autumn of 1917 the ageing diplomat conducted 'one 
----
or two "interviews" , with a man who eventually 'showed himself to be utterly 
incompetent and merely a literary hack out for making a bit of money.' Sir Frank had 
given him 'to say the least some encouragement to write a book of sorts about his 
diplomatic career.' Realising his mistake but hesitant to put his foot down, Sir Frank 
was persuaded by Chirol to extricate himself from the project, whose verdict was 
telling ofthe disrepute into which the 'old' pre-war diplomacy had already begun to 
sink: 'anything is better than a book which would - at best - have made him and the 
diplomatic service, which has enough hostile critics any how nowadays, look 
extraordinarily foolish. ,25 
In addition to drawing on Lascelles's own personal correspondence with 
successive Foreign Secretaries, this work will incorporate documents from the official 
archives of the Foreign Office, Lascelles's often candid correspondence with, among 
others, Ignatius Valentine Chirol (The Times' correspondent and Foreign Editor) Sir 
Thomas Sanderson (Permanent Under-Secretary of the British Foreign Office 1895-
1905), Sir Nicholas O'Conor and Cecil Spring-Rice (both fellow diplomats and 
friends) Wilfrid Scawen Blunt (the famous poet and anti-Imperialist), as well as 
taking into account observations of Lascelles's character and views from individuals 
such as George Saunders, the Times' Correspondent at Berlin, and the until recently 
little consulted diaries of the naval attache at Berlin between 1906-1908, Admiral 
Philip Wylie Dumas. 
The study will seek to answer the question of whether Lascelles really saw 
Anglo-German conflict as inevitable or even as a likely corollary of a reorientation in 
25 Chirol to Florence Spring Rice, 12 July 1918, Spring Rice MSS, C.C.A.C., CASR I 1117. 
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British foreign policy. It will ask how important this phenomenon was within the 
context of Britain's larger concerns? What were the key priorities of British foreign 
.~ 
policy as glimpsed through his eyes up to and including the 'end of isolation'? How 
did generational factors shape his views? To what extent was he a free actor and to 
what extent did his advice contribute to the decisions in British foreign policy up to 
1908? And what does his career tell us about the priorities of British foreign policy in 
the Victorian and Edwardian eras? 
The following study adopts a chronological approach. An initial chapter will 
look at Sir Frank Lascelles's upbringing and the formative influences - his education, 
early diplomatic career, and in particular the experience of Franco-Prussian war and 
Paris Commune - that shaped his outlook. 
Chapter two looks at Lascelles's first senior role, as agent and consul-General 
in Cairo in the last years before British occupation, and asks whether he endorsed the 
'new imperialism' which was emerging towards the beginning of the 1880s, and what 
view he took of Britain's increasing imperial commitments . 
. Chapters three to five all detail Lascelles's role in and views on the great 
nineteenth century 'Eastern Question' from his standpoint as Agent at Sofia, during 
the turbulent era of Alexander von Battenberg's rule, examining especially how he 
reconciled what he understood to be Britain's interests in Bulgaria with the policy of 
the Gladstone administration, and what role he took in the Eastern crisis of 1885-6. 
Chapter six takes a look at Lascelles's brief tenure first in Teheran and then at 
8t Petersburg and his attempts to secure an Anglo-Russian understanding in both 
posts, explaining why this was feasible and desirable. 
A final, seventh chapter (split into two parts) will examine Sir Frank 
Lascelles's role in his last, longest and debatably most important post, Berlin. While 
XVll 
paying heed to the existing work on this subject (and thus without making claim to 
exhaustive treatment) the aim of this chapter will be to locate Sir Frank's views on 
/ 
Germany within the shifting scene ofIate nineteenth and early twentieth century, but 
also against background of Lascelles's outlook, and prior diplomatic experience. The 
conclusion will attempt to use Lascelles's career to reflect on the existing debate on 
the nature of the change in Britain's foreign policy in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. 
1 
An 'aristocrat of aristocrats': Frank Cavendish Lascelles' family background, 
upbringing and early career in the diplomatic service, 1841-1878 
Frank Cavendish Lascelles was born on 23 March 1841, the third son of William 
Saunders Sebright Lascelles and Lady Caroline Howard, and one of nine children, 1 
and had all the ready-made advantages that an aristocratic pedigree could bestow. His 
father (b. 29 October 1798) was the third son of Henry Lascelles, 2nd Earl Harewood 
(1767-1841), of Harewood House in West Yorkshire, and Henrietta Saunders Sebright 
(1770-1840).2 The family's exalted position sprang from wealth made in the 
. eighteenth-century colonial trade, chiefly in imports from Barbados where the family 
owned plantations,3 and thus Sir Frank was a direct beneficiary of the economic 
activity that had helped forge Britain's Empire. William himself was however 'far 
from affluent,' being a younger sibling and one of nine children.4 In 1817 he joined 
the Army, and became Lieutenant in the Coldstream Guards, although he retired on 
half pay in 1820, and sold his commission in 1837.5 From 1820 until his death he was 
chiefly occupied as an M.P. 
1 Frank's siblings were: Georgiana or 'Georgy' (1826 -1911), Henrietta (1830 - 1884), Claud 
(1831-1903), Edwin (1833 -1877), Mary Louise, or 'May' (1836 -1917), Emma (1838-
1920), Henry Arthur (1842 - 1913) and Beatrice (?- 1915). Lady Caroline's first child, Dacre, 
(b. 1824), had died in infancy, as did two other siblings, (The Gentleman's Magazine, 1851, 
p.194). See Lady Maud Leconfield (ed.) and John Gore (rev.), The Three Howard Sisters: 
Selections from the writings of Lady Caroline Lascelles, Lady Dover and Countess Gower 
1825 to 1833 (Loridon, 1955) p. 40 & 50. 
2 H.C.G. Matthew & Brian Harrison, (ed.) Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. 32 
(Oxford, 2004), p.591. 
3 See Richard Pares 'A London West India Merchant House, 1740-69' in idem, The 
Historians Business and Other Essays, ed. R.A. and Elisabeth Humphreys, (Oxford, 1961), 
pp.198-226. 
4 Lady Leconfield, The Three Howard Sisters, p. 32. 
5 Henry Schroeder, The Annals of Yorkshire: From the Earliest Period to the Present Time 
(Leeds, 1851), p. 417. 
2 
In August 1823 William married a fellow aristocrat, Caroline Howard, the 
eldest daughter of George Howard, the 6th Earl ofCarlisle.6 William was 'too 
estimable a man' for her 'to refuse' although love happily entered into the equation 
too.7 Caroline has been described rather bluntly by those who knew her: she was 
'slow and stolid ... the least good-looking [of her siblings], less quick at the uptake 
than her sisters,' and apparently she 'had little of that indefinable quality known as 
charm,' but' "pleasing and unpretending" were the adjectives applied to her 
appearance and manners ... ,8 William Lascelles, though less fully coloured in, is 
sketched in his obituary as 'a man of respectable parts' in public life, 'a highly 
honourable gentleman', and 'deservedly much respected' in his private life.9 
Frank's immediate ancestors were a mixture of liberal-Tories and Whigs. Lord 
Harewood, a Tory peer, was a moderate reformer, (although he stopped short of 
supporting the 1832 Reform Act),10 but while the elder Harewood son followed his 
father, William's political sympathies were more liberal, foreshadowing an eventual 
conversion to the Whig cause, when he contested Knaresborough as a 'liberal and a 
free trader' in 1847 and subsequently took a post in Lord John Russell's first 
Government (1846-1852).11 Caroline Lascelles also had Whig sympathies. Her father, 
Lord Morpeth, had served in Pitt the Younger's Tory administration but under the 
influence of his wife Lady Georgina Cavendish (1783-1858), daughter of the fifth 
Duke of Devonshire (a close ally of Charles Fox) he served under the liberal-Tory 
administrations of Canning (1827) and Goderich (1827-1828) as Lord Privy Seal, 
6 Leconfield, The Three Howard Sisters, p. 31. 
7 Ibid, p. 32. 
8 Ibid, p.3; pp. 10- II. In later life Caroline was also, in the words of her nephew, 'like most 
of the Howards an enormous eater'! George Leveson Gower, Mixed Grill, (London, 1948), 
p.188. . 
9 Henry Schroeder, The Annals of Yorkshire, p. 417. 
10 H.C.G. Matthew & Brian Harrison (ed.) Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. 32 
(Oxford, 2004), pp. 591-2. 
II Schroder, Annals of Yorkshire, p. 417. 
3 
before joining Earl Grey's Whig Government (1830-1834) as Minister without 
portfolio and then Lord Privy Seal. 12 
In the late 1820s politics had become a divisive issue within the Lascelles 
family, against the backdrop ofthe Reform debate. In the 'Tory hotbed' there were 
some heated exchanges 'in which even the placable Caroline sometimes joined', 
although more often she restrained her husband from talking about politics. 13 The 
strained atmosphere was exacerbated by Lord Harewood's bad temper, referred to as 
the 'gloom,' partially brought on by his eldest son's reckless behaviour which had 
caused his father to disinherit him, and bequeath the family title and their plantations 
in the West Indies to the second eldest son, Henry.14 
The Liberal affiliations of the family were strengthened by the marriages of 
Sir Frank's sisters; in 1849 Henrietta-Frances married the later 2nd Baron Chesham 
William George Cavendish, a Liberal M.P.; 15 Georgina (or 'Georgy') married the 
Liberal MP Charles Grenfell in 1852, and in 1865 Emma married the Whig Lord 
Edward Cavendish. 16 Frank's youngest sister Beatrice married the politically Liberal 
Frederick Temple, Bishop of Exeter and later Archbishop of Canterbury, in 1876. 
These familial ties possibly influenced Frank's outlook. In his forties, Frank could 
describe himself as a 'good liberal,' despite misgivings he had developed about the 
conduct of foreign policy by Gladstone's Liberal administration, and at sixty-five, on 
the brink of retirement he was described by one junior colleague as 'more or less 
12 Leconfield, p. 68; 'George Howard, sixth earl of Carlisle (1773-1848)' in H.C.G. Matthew 
& Brian Harrison (ed.) Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. 28 (Oxford, 2004), pp. 
351-2. 
13Leconfield, p. 70; ibid, pp. 94-95. 
14 Ibid, p. 52, 65, & 155. 
15 Only son of Hon Charles Compton Cavendish (Liberal M.P. for Buckinghamshire, 1857-
1863). 
16 Emma and Edward were first cousins, and their engagement was private disapproved of by 
the family. Devonshire diary, Vol. 17, p's. 76-8, 82, 87, & 93-103, 7th Duke of Devonshire 
MSS, Chatsworth House. ' 
4 
belong[ing] to the entourage of the broad minded Devonshire set in England,;17 he 
remained faithful to the free trade cause throughout his life. IS 
In August 1830 the Lascelles'moved to the new and fashionable Wilton 
Crescent, Belgravia, London,19 and took their 'official place in London society' ,20 
engaging in 'endless rounds of visits from and to notable figures, and a succession of 
'entertainments.' 21 William could count such noteworthies as Sir Robert Peel, Lord 
Aberdeen, William Gladstone, and Thomas Babington Macaulay as friends, 
. d 22 acquamtances or correspon ents. 
William's political career was however only intermittently successful. Lord 
Harewood was initially reluctant for his son to enter politics and refused to assist him 
in his ambitions.23 After being elected for the family seat of North allerton in 1820, 
William stood down in favour of his brother in 1826 and was elected for Looe in 
Comwall,24 a seat he lost in 1830. Depite being re-elected for Northallerton in 1831, 
in the following year's election he was not 'brought in' again for the seat by his 
17 Selby to father, 8 Feb 1907, Selby MSS, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Add. MSS 6615. 
18 Many of Frank's siblings were inclined to support Whigs. Both Emma (who married a 
Cavendish) and her brother Henry supported the Liberal Unionist cause after the Liberal split 
of 1886. (See Emma Cavendish to Lord Hartington, 27 March 1887, 7th Duke of Devonshire 
MSS, Chatsworth House, 378.8; H.A. Lascelles to Hartington 24 Dec 1886, ibid, 340.2069). 
Henry was also on the personal staff of the 8th Duke of Devonshire 'at various times' after 
1885. Bernard Holland, The Life o/Spencer Compton, Eighth Duke o/Devonshire, Vol. ii 
(London, 1911),p.222. 
19 Leconfield, p. 74 & 137. 
20 Ib'd I ,p.42, 45 & 280. 
21 Ibid, p. 66; and see ibid, pp. 75-6 for a description of an elaborate fete attended by William 
Lascelles. 
22 The Peel-Lascelles correspondence is at the British Library, Add MSS 40406, 40409 & 
40503. A copy of a letter from Gladstone to Lascelles is at B.L. Add. MS 44527. See Thomas 
Pinney (ed.) The letters o/Thomas Babington Macaulay, Vol. i: 1807-Feb 1831 (London, 
1974), p. 232; John Bailey (ed.), The diary o/Lady Frederick Cavendish, Vol. i (London, 
1927), p. 252. 
23 Leconfield, p.59. 
24 The Gentleman's Magazine, 1851, pp.193-4. 
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father. 25 In 1835 he lost a contest for Wakefield, winning the seat in 1837 only to have 
to contest it again in 1841 against the victorious candidate, who was also the returning 
~ 
officer. Finally, after winning Knaresborough in 1847, he entered Lord John Russell's 
Government as Privy Councillor and Comptroller of Her Majesty's household, 
although his Ministerial career was foreshortened by his death. 
When not in London the Lascelles mixed with other great families in their 
country houses. They retained their Yorkshire connections with Harewood and Castle 
Howard, and through Caroline's sister Blanche Howard's marriage to the Seventh 
Duke of Devonshire, Chatsworth in Derbyshire, Devonshire House and Holker Hall 
became regular family haunts. 
The leisure pursuits of the Lascelles family were also typically aristocratic. 
William and Caroline attended the York and Doncaster races,26 and the male members 
of the family, including Frank's elder brothers, Claud and Edwin, would shoot grouse 
on the moors of Derbyshire and Yorkshire. 27 Frank too shot rabbits and pheasants in 
his lifetime, a pastime he had however given up by 1909,28 and the New Year hunt 
also met at Harewood.29 
The company kept by the family was virtually exclusively aristocratic. Rarely 
did they encounter the working classes, except as servants or through acts of charity. 
On 1 January 1828, Caroline aloofly recorded her own children's 'amusement at 
seeing the boys from the village scramble for their pence. ,30 While driving down 
Bond Street in April 1827, Caroline and William accidentally ran over a child, who 
25 Georgiana wrote to her sister Caroline (20 Dec 1832) 'I cannot help feeling angry with Ld 
Harewood for not bringing William in for North Allerton, which I believe he might have 
done.' Leconfield, p. 255. 
26 Three Howard Sisters, Caroline's diary entry for 9 Aug and 10 Aug 1826, pp. 54-55; ibid, 
~. 93 & p. 116' . 
7 Leconfield, p. 55, & 93-94. Devonshire diary, Vol. 7, p.5 & 162 & Vol. 3, p. 236. 
28 Lascelles to Blunt 15 Oct 1909 Blunt MSS, West Sussex Record Office, Box 33. 
29 ' Leconfield, p. 96. 
30 Ibid. 
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they later discovered was one often children in a poor family. On visiting the boy's 
abode Caroline described it as 'a most wretched habitation, at the end of a dirty alley 
,-~ 
out of Bond St.' However as his mother appeared to be 'a respectable person,' the 
couple 'took charge' of the boy with the intention of placing him at a school in South 
Audley St. as soon as he was well enough.' 31 Lady Caroline also donated baby 
clothes for the 'poor Irish, ,32 and the couple helped to raise funds for the building of a 
local Church in 1839, and donated money towards the School of the Yorkshire 
Society 33 and to the Women's Employment Society,34 both of which they personally 
visited. 
It was in this privileged, patrician, socially conservative but politically liberal, 
and well-connected culture that Frank and his siblings were born, and raised in the 
nurser~ until school age, and Caroline, although 'much involved' in her children's 
welfare, could also afford to pass time reading, embroidering, or making afternoon 
calls to her neighbours.35 
The family adhered to the Church of England faith; Caroline was drawn to the 
High Church ritual promoted by the Oxford movement of the 1830s,36 and the two 
eldest boys, Edwin and Claud, were educated by a certain Revd. C. Bickmore, who 
had a living near Chester and whom William deemed to be 'a good scholar and an 
excellent man. ,37 The time outside of school the elder boys spent with their parents in 
31 Ibid, p. 68. 
32 Ibid, p. 71. 
33 Devonshire diary, Vol. 1, p.170; Vol. 2, p.62; Vol. 3, pp. 120-121. 
34 C. Lascelles, Extractsfromjournals kept by George Howard, earl o/Carlisle: selected by 
his sister, lady Caroline Lascelles (1864), p. 376. 
35 L econfield, p.51 & 45. 
36 Ibid, pp.48-9. 
37 William Saunders Sebright Lascelles to Sir Robert Peel, 4 March 1842, Peel MSS, B.L., 
Add MSS. 40503, ff. 57-58; Peel to WSS Lascelles, 24 March 1842, ibid, f.59. 
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London and on their relatives' country estates. 38 The sheer number of Frank's 
relations and the constant comings and goings of various important personalities left 
/ 
little room for the indulgence of an awkward or shy personality, and must have 
impacted on his outlook considerably. 
In July 1851, aged just 53, William Lascelles died of bronchitis. 39 The Duke 
of Devonshire who attended the funeral wrote of the 'heavy burthen' placed on Lady 
Caroline, with 'so many children not yet grown Up,,40 Frank Lascelles was, at the 
time, just ten years old. At Easter 1853, aged twelve, he went to Harrow School, 
following in the footsteps of his elder brother Edwin Agar Lascelles.41 Frank's 
education was as aristocratic and exclusive as his family life. Harrow had become 
'virtually an upper-class boarding school' in the late eighteenth century, and was the 
favoured school of the Whig aristocracy, a trend which continued into the 1860's, and 
earlier generations of relatives had gone there from the Howard side. 42 
This was the era when Thomas Arnold's gospel of converting the public 
schools, in Asa Briggs' words, into a 'training ground for character' was spreading 
out amongst old and new institutions. The central aim of the reform movement of the 
1850's and 1860's was not 'mere intellectual acuteness',43 but, as Frank Lascelles 
stated in a speech at Repton School later in his life, 'the development of character and 
self-reliance. ,44 In Frank's schooldays, an indulgence in 'athletic sports such as 
38 See Devonshire diary, Vo1.2, p.103; also C. Lascelles, Extractsfrom the journals, pp.133-
34. See for example Devonshire diary, Vol. 1, p.140; C. Lascelles, Extractsfrom the journals, 
p. 109; The Diary of Lady Frederick Cavendish, p. 246. 
39 Schroeder, The Annals of Yorkshire, pp. 417-418. 
40 Devonshire diary, Vol. 8, pp. 118-119. 
41 I am grateful to Rita M. Boswell, Archivist at Harrow School, for this information. 
42 Brian Simon Studies in the History of Education, (London, 1960), p. 301-02; Leconfield, p. , . 
208. 
43 Asa Briggs, 'Thomas Hughes and the Public Schools,' in Asa Briggs, Victorian People: A 
Reassessment of People and Themes (London, 1971), pp. 151-152. 
44 The Times, 29 June 1912, pA. . 
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cricket and football' took precedence over academic study.45 Although in the 1850s 
Harrow had a reforming headmaster, Charles J. Vaughan, 46 Lascelles's time there 
---
was primarily a 'a process of initiation into a social caste', and would have been spent 
" . h h f d 47 assocIatmg WIt t e sons 0 peers an statesmen. 
On leaving Harrow at 1858, aged seventeen, Frank prepared to enter the 
diplomatic service. This was not an unnatural decision; seven other old Harrovians 
chose to enter this small, socially homogenous profession between 1857 and 1879, 
and although Frank bypassed University by entering the service at the youngest 
possible age, this too was the norm generally at the time, and also among Frank's 
family; of his brothers, only Edwin attended Oxford, subsequently pursuing a career 
in law.48 Frank's other brothers pursued military careers. His eldest brother Claud was 
an Officer in the Royal Artillery, while his younger brother Henry Arthur served as an 
aide-de-camp in the Indian Mutiny of 1857,49 and joined the rifle brigade in 1859, 
eventually becoming a Lieutenant Colonel. 50 
In an age where diplomacy and war were still the preserve of the ruling class, 
Lascelles, as an 'aristocrat of aristocrats' to use the epithet later given to him by the 
45 Lascelles, 'England and Germany', in Stein, England and Germany, p. 19. 
46 Charles Vaughan was Headmaster at Harrow from 1844 to 1859. 
47 Robert T. Nightingale, The Personnel of the British Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service, 
1851-1929, (London, 1930), p. 17. 
48 Of the 216 recruits for the diplomatic service between 1851 and 1929 one hundred (42%) 
did not go on to university. Ibid, p.9. See also T. G. Otte, 'Old Diplomacy: Reflections on the 
Foreign Office before 1914,' Contemporary British History Volume 18, Issue 3, (2004), pp. 
34-35. I am again grateful to Rita M. Boswell, archivist of Harrow School, for the information 
on Edwin Lascelles. Edwin died a bachelor, like his older brother Claud. While at University 
he had befriended Charles Rivers Wilson, who was later Frank's colleague in Cairo as 
Minister of Finance. Wilson recalled Edwin as a keen smoker, which earned him the 
nickname 'honeydew,' 'from the tobacco which he affected.' Sir C. Rivers Wilson, Chapters 
from my Official Life (London, 1916), p.17. 
49 National Archives; WO 76/269, f.79. 
50 Major Claud Lascelles (1833-1903), remained unmarried. Henry Arthur Lascelles was Lt. 
Colonel in the Rifle Brigade, and received the Royal Victoria Order. He married Caroline 
Maria Gore (14 August 1883) and had three sons. He was later the owner of Wool be ding 
House, Surrey. 
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naval attache at Berlin Admiral Philip Wylie Dumas,5! was entering what was still 
considered a 'stronghold of the aristocracy.' In 1870 Lascelles's colleague in Berlin, 
---
Nicolas O'Conor, could write that while 'in the War Office, Treasury &c. one may 
find themselves in a Department with [a] Tailor's son,' the diplomatic service was 
'still, notwithstanding the liberalism of the day, a closed service' and the Foreign 
Office was 'the only public office where gentlemen alone are to be found' and 'an 
acquaintance of or interest with the men in power is undoubtedly of use'. 52 
Lascelles's aristocratic connections eased his nomination into the service. In 
contemporary practice, candidates had to be nominated by a social or family 
connection who personally knew the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,53 at this 
time Lord John Russell. At Harrow Frank had befriended Russell's son Johnnie, and 
had be~ome acquainted with the rest of the family through visits to Pembroke Lodge 
.54 There were plenty of other connections too: his sister Henrietta (Lady Chesham), 
entertained statesmen and diplomats such as Count d' Apponyi and Stratford de 
Redc1iffe, at her stately home in Latimer,55 and Frank also commented that his brother 
Edwin knew 'most people' in Society. 56 
Lascelles undertook some preparatory travel in Europe in the summer of 1858, 
living in Zurich with a German professor who had taken part in the Revolution of 
51 Dumas autobiography, Imperial War Museum, London, 65/23/1, p. 15. 
52 O'Conor to mother, 18 June and 1 July 1870, O'Conor MSS, C.C.A.C., OCON 2/2/9. 
53 This was the rule up unti11919. Robert T. Nightingale, The Personnel of the British 
Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service, 1851-1929, p. 3. 
54 See F. Russell to Lascelles, 16 Nov 1895, Lascelles MSS, National Archives, Kew, FO 
800/16, asking the now ambassador at Berlin to assist a young Bertrand Russell in his studies 
in Germany. Might Countess Russell have been calling in a favour from many years before? 
55 See Cecil Y. Lang (ed.), The Letters of Matthew Arnold, Vol. 3 1866-1870 (Charlottesville, 
1998), p. 390. 
56 Frank Lascelles to Mary Lascelles, 16 April 1871. Sir Frank Lascelles MSS, C.C.A.C., 
LASC 1. 
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1848, and also in this year he visited Berlin for the first time.57 On 9 July 1861 he 
entered the diplomatic service,58 passing an entrance examination which included 
>---
writing French and English from dictation, precis, French translation, geography and 
modem history59 and which, according to Zara Steiner, was more exacting than the 
qualifying exam for the Foreign Office.60 Subsequently on 22 July 1861 he received 
his first official assignment, as attache to the Court of Madrid. 
A diplomat in Europe: 1861-1878 
Little information survives on Lascelles' diplomatic life prior to 1878, but 
previously unused material at Churchill College Archive Centre and letters to his 
friend Wilfrid Scawen Blunt from Blunt's private papers at West Sussex Record 
Office ~ake clear that Lascelles' early career served as an extension of his 
gentlemanly upbringing and education, an induction into diplomatic life in the foreign 
Courts and Chanceries of Europe, into diplomatic protocol and the amusements of 
Society, but also -in the case of his time in Paris in 1870-1 - a salient lesson in the 
consequ'ences of diplomacy's failure. 
Lascelles' job description as an attache was only loosely framed. The Minister 
at Madrid was instructed to employ Frank 'in the business of the Legation in whatever 
way you may deem most beneficial for Her Majesty's service' ,61 and as Wilfrid 
Scawen Blunt, who served with Lascelles as third secretary in Spain, recollected with 
S7 'England and Germany' by Sir Frank Lascelles, G.C.B. in Ludwig Stein, (ed.) England and 
Germany (London, 1912), p. 18. 
S8 The official entry in the Civil Service records at the National Archives, Kew (C.S.C 2/5) 
states '9th July' as the date of the exam. 
S9 Certificate of Civil Service Commissioners (for Wilfrid Scawen Blunt), 1 Feb 1859, West 
Sussex Record Office, L YTTON/33. See Ray Jones, The Nineteenth Century Foreign 
Office:An Administrative History (London, 1971) p. 43 for a description of the Foreign Office 
exam, which was very similar. 
60 Zara S. Steiner The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (London, 1969), p.16. 
61 ' Lord John Russell to Sir John F Crampton, 19 Oct 1861, FO 366/316. 
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some degree of bitterness, the role of the foreign attache in Queen Isabella's Spain 
involved 'purely formal,' duties 'of standing in front of the throne in uniform 
,/ 
watching the high officials military and civilian defile before their Majesties in 
interminable procession. ,62 
Surviving letters written from Lascelles in his final year at Madrid to Blunt 
(by then in Paris) suggest that the work was routine, uninteresting, and unsurprisingly 
the young diplomat cared little for it. 8 February 1864 - messenger day- brought 
Lascelles 'lots of work,' and on 22 August the same year he complained of 'Mr 
Forbes' (the Head of Chancery) being an 'intense bore' and assigning lots of work, 
despite having been kept away from the Chancery by an attack of gout.63 
However work was usually intermittent and the leisurely Chancery hours 
encour~ged Lascelles to cultivate a lifelong habit of rising late in the morning. In 
February 1864, he wrote of an intention to 'tum over a new leaf by getting up 'at 8 
every day' and reading and writing 'immensely.' Over thirty years later, he was 
renowned as the latest riser in Berlin.64 
. This lack of discipline was fostered by the distinctly Bohemian atmosphere 
of the British Legation, the head of which, Sir John F. Crampton, had made a 'foolish 
marriage' to a professional singer, meaning the normal authority provided by a British 
Minister's wife was also lacking, 'the house being a rendezvous of certain pretenders 
to her favour who monopolised her interest.' Only 'on official occasions,' did the 
diplomats dine at Sir John's table; the Legation being 'no home,' to Blunt or 
Lascelles, who felt 'socially poorer for the lack of it. ,65 
62 Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, Alms to oblivion, Vol. ii, Part 2: 'Esther', Chapter I: '1863 -
Madrid' Blunt MSSFitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge, MS 41-1975, pp. 178-180. ~' , 
. Lascelles to Blunt, 8 February and 22 August 1864, Blunt MSS, West Sussex Record 
Office, Box 33. 
64 Lascelles to Blunt, 8 Feb 1864, ibid. 
65 Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, Alms to oblivion, Vol. ii, op cit, pp. 138-140. 
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Unsurprisingly the younger members ofthe Legation turned elsewhere to 
alleviate their boredom, 'wasting their time on card playing' and - being 'desperately 
.. ..--
poor' and unable to cover their losses -·borrowing from the Legation's Church fund, 
until the legal repercussions deterred them from doing SO.66 Other entertainments 
included the bullfight,67 while Blunt and Lascelles 'played battledore and shuttlecock 
in the Chancery, and shared many other pleasures.'68 (According to the former's 
recollections all the attaches, including Lascelles, 'engaged in love adventures of a 
venal kind'. 69) In 1862, Blunt procured a twenty-three year old 'respectable' Spanish 
mistress called Lola, who had been deserted by her husband, was living with her 
mother and desperately poor, to be his 'instructress in her Castillian tongue, and,' he 
later recalled, 'what other things might be to our mutual liking.' Lola became 
Lascelles' mistress when Blunt briefly left for Paris.7o 
It is clear from Blunt's recollections that though he counted Lascelles as his 
'best friend', he felt a lack of 'intellectual companionship' -his assessment of 
Lascelles' character as a young man- as 'a good fellow, well bred and amiable but of 
little originality or special talent,' 71 tallies with many later descriptions of him, and 
seems to suggest that it was Lascelles' winning personality, rather than any special 
ability, which arguably made him a successful diplomat. 
Nevertheless Frank was skilled enough to pass his probationary period as 
attache, and by early 1864 was keen to leave Madrid. No doubt from a mixture of 
boredom and a longing to see Blunt, who had since permanently departed for Paris. 
66 Lascelles to Blunt, 28 Aug 1864, Blunt MSS, West Sussex Record Office, Box 33. 
67 Lascelles to Blunt, 8 Feb, 28 Aug 1864, ibid. 
68 w. S. Blunt, My diaries, Part Two 1900-1914 (London, 1920), p.230. Entry for 24 Oct 
1908. 
69 Ib·d 1 ,p.l28. 
70 Blunt, Alms to oblivion, Vol. ii, p.l28 & 178. 
71 Ibid, pp.l34-136. 
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By the summer Lascelles accepted a move to the French capital. 72 As Lascelles was 
impoverished by 'heavy losses at cards', other members of the Embassy 'clubbed 
together to feed him' for his round of farewell dinners. 73 
There was a more tragic side to Lascelles' departure from Madrid, 
symptomatic of the social mores of the day. With Blunt having abandoned his Spanish 
mistress, Lola pined to accompany Lacelles to Paris, which he was reluctant to allow 
her to do. 74 By late August 1864 a combination of Lola's pestering, rowdy 
colleagues preventing him from sleeping, and financial concerns, combined to make 
Lascelles 'low and out of spirits,75 For her part Lola had to abandon travelling to Paris 
when her child died. Frank was depressed enough by news of the death of the 'poor 
thing' to dread a scheduled dinner with old acquaintances which would 'call up 
memories of the happy past and make me still more miserable than I am now!,' and 
he intended to 'go to L 'Hardy's and eat a cake and drink a glass of sherry to revive 
me', warning Blunt to 'practice Tennis and beware of women' . 76 After Frank's 
transfer to Paris on 17 December 1864, Blunt never learned from him whether any 
provision had been made for the unfortunate Lola. 77 
Lascelles' posting to Paris necessitated living on a grander scale than at 
Madrid, and no doubt stretched the young attache's resources further still. At that time 
the city was regarded as the most coveted overseas posting. In 1865 Napoleon's 
Second Empire was at the height of its fame. When Lascelles arrived in Christmas 
1864, the picture Blunt painted was of a leisurely Chancery, 'breakfasting at Durand's 
Restaurant playing Tennis at the court in the Tuileries Garden, cards in the afternoon 
72 Lascelles to Blunt, 22 Aug 1864, Blunt MSS, West Sussex Record Office, Box 33. 
73 Blunt, Alms to oblivion, Vol. ii, p.134. 
74 Lascelles to Blunt, 8 Feb & 22 Aug 1864, Blunt MSS, West Sussex Record Office, Box 33. 
75 Lascelles to Blunt, 28 Aug 1864, ibid. 
76 Lascelles to Blunt, 22 Aug and 28 Aug 1864, ibid. 
77 Blunt, Alms to oblivion, Vol. ii, Part II, Chapter II: Paris 1864-1865, pp.182-184. 
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and a theatre at night. ... '78 This picture of high-living is corroborated by the 
reminiscences of another Chancery member, Wellesley, who many years later recalled 
to Lascelles 'the very jolly times' in Paris, 'when we used to go to an Offenbach 
premiere and immediately afterwards you would repeat the performance on your 
piano! ,79 Yet leave was also strict and the staff of the Chancery were kept at work by 
Lord Cowley, Britain's Ambassador to Paris of fifteen years standing, described by 
Blunt as 'a curiously silent man, stiff and awkward, typically British in his anti-social 
manners, and ill at ease even in the bosom of his own family. ,80 
After nine months at the Embassy, Frank was appointed to the post of third 
Secretary, on 11 September 1865. While at Paris he was afforded the opportunity of 
meeting many eminent people the then Liberal Chancellor of the Exchequer, William 
Gladstone, who visited the Embassy in September 1866 the Embassy and with whose 
daughter, Mary, Frank shared a dance. 81 One afternoon, as Lascelles later recalled, he 
was tasked by Lord Cowley with fetching Gladstone from his hotel for an audience 
with the Emperor: 
On Sir Frank's arrival he saw Miss Mary Gladstone who said father is in bed but come & see 
him & they went in to his room where they found Mr G in bed & the clothes drawn over him. 
Sir Frank gave his message & said "But Sir as I see you are in bed perhaps I had better not 
wait but go & tell the Ambassador you will be some time." "Oh no["] said Mr G ["] I have 
only to put on my hat, I am ready now. I'll come with you & turning back the bed clothes he 
emerged fully dressed even to his boots.["] Sir Frank naturally looked astonished & Mr 
78 Blunt, Alms to Oblivion, Vol. ii, p.196. 
79 Wellesley to Lascelles, 4 Nov 1894, Lascelles MSS, National Archives, Kew, FO 800/15. 
Lady Frederick Cavendish recorded dining with Frank & Mary at the Cafe Durand, and going 
to the Theatre Fran<;:ais. John Bailey, The diary of Lady Frederick Cavendish, Vol. II 
(London, 1927), p.40. 
80 Blunt, Alms to Oblivion, Vol. ii, p.190. 
81 See Lucy Masterman (ed.), Mary Gladstone (Mrs Drew): Her diaries and letters, (London, 
1930), p. 43. 
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Gladstone munnured something about finding it much more restful to get between the sheets, 
that as he was crumpled & dirty he went to see the Emperor. 82 
It was also while in Paris that Lascelles met his wife. On 25 June 1867, he 
married Mary Emma Olliffe, the daughter of Sir Joseph Olliffe, the highly regarded 
Embassy physician.83 The Olliffes were very well connected. Sir Joseph numbered 
among his eminent patients the Count De Morny, Napoleon Ill's stepbrother (and a 
former Minister of the Interior), with whose help, in 1860, he had embarked upon 
ambitious property development to construct the city-cum-resort of Deauville on the 
Northern coast of France, although the venture ultimately proved an 'unremunerative 
speculation' .84 Mary Lascelles' mother, Laura Olliffe, was a daughter of the 
prominent building and civil engineering contractor and Conservative M.P. Sir 
William Cubitt (1791-1863), and the family were close friends of Charles Dickens.85 
However in tenns of social standing, Blunt thought that Lascelles had made 'a poor 
marriage',86 a judgement seemingly endorsed years later by Queen Victoria who 
described Mary to be 'a clever agreeable person but...not a grande dame.'87 Indeed, 
personality and physical attraction played a fair part in the marriage. Mary was termed 
82 Dumas diary, entry for 18 October 1906, Leeds Special Collections, Liddle Collection, 
HCCMI DUMAS. Gladstone stayed in Paris between 28 Sept and 2 Oct 1866. H.C.G. 
Matthews (ed.) The Gladstone Diaries, Vol. vi 1861-1868, (Oxford, 1978), pp. 467-8. See 
Mastennan (ed.), Mrs Drew, p.27-28 
83 The Era (London, England), 30 June 1867; Joseph Olliffe, (1808-1869). Born Cork. 
Educated in Paris; MA 1829; MD 1840. Married Laura (d.l898) in 1841. Fellow of 
Anatomical Society of Paris, one time President of the Paris Medical Society. Knighted 1853. 
Nominated by Board of Trade as juror for hygiene, phannacy, surgery and medicine in 
French international exhibition (April 1855). Nominated to committee for sanitary appliances 
in international exhibition (1862). Fellow of Royal College of Physicians of London (1859). 
d. 14 March 1869. Dictionary o/National Biography, p. 783. 
84 H.C.G. Matthew & Brian Harrison (eds.) Oxford Dictionary o/National Biography, Vol. 41 
(Oxford, 2004), p.783. 
85 Ibid, Vol. 12, p. 555. See The Letters o/Charles Dickens, VoL's V-XII (Oxford, 1965-
2002),passim, but especially Vol. VIII, p.713. 
86 Blunt, Alms to Oblivion, Vol. ii, p.214. 
87 G.E. Buckle (ed.), The letters o/Queen Victoria: Third Series. A Selection from Her 
Majesty's Correspondence and Journal Between the Years 1886 and 1901, Vol. 2 (London, 
1932), p.561. 
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a 'great beauty. ,88 Nicholas O'Conor, who got to know the Lascelles at Berlin, wrote 
on encountering them again in Sofia in 1886, that the couple were 'just as happy & 
just as fond of each other' as in 1867.89 Mary Lascelles' tragic passing in April 1897, 
after a brief illness of one week, was mourned deeply by those who knew her, and 
profoundly affected Sir Frank,9o and left a social hole in the Berlin Embassy which Sir 
Frank's sister, Emma Cavendish came to fulfil. 
After three years in Paris, Frank was transferred to Berlin, where he arrived in 
mid-October 1867.91 The newly-wed couple proved to be a social success. The 
Ambassador, Lord Augustus Loftus, remembered them as being 'popular in society, 
and agreeable to our small circle. ,92 Whilst there the Lascelles also befriended the 
young attache O'Conor, later Ambassador to Russia and to Turkey.93 One gains the 
impression that the Berlin Embassy was a tightly-knit group. The junior diplomats 
frequently visited the Opera together,94 and O'Conor recorded theatre trips 'four or 
five times a week,' with 'generally a whist party afterward,' at Lascelles' or one of 
the other young diplomats' residences.95 There were also occasional excursions to 
Bad Schandau or to Potsdam,96 where Lascelles stayed at the villa of Lord Brabazon 
his Embassy colleague. There the 'Embassy four,' comprising Lascelles, O'Conor, 
Brabazon and a foreign office clerk, rowed an outrigged four-oared boat, christened 
'Victoria' by the Crown Princess of Prussia, on the Spree and Havel, and raced 
88 Otago Witness, 25 March 1908, p.78. 
89 Nicholas O'Conor to Minna Hope Scott, 11 Dec 1886, O'Conor MSS, C.C.A.C., OCON 
3/111. 
90 See Spring-Rice to Chirol, 7 April 1897, Spring-Rice MSS, C.C.A.C., CASR 11118. 
91 Hammond to Lascelles 25 July 1867, National Archives, FO 366/327. O'Conor diary, 
entry for 17 Oct 1867, O'Conor MSS, C.C.A.C., OCON 11115 
92 Reginald Brabazon, 1ih Earl of Meath, Memories o/the Nineteenth Century, (London, J. 
Murray, 1923) p. 147. O'Conorto mother 18 Feb 1870, OCON 2/2/9. 
93 0 'Conor to mother, 12 Jan 1870, ibid. 
94 See for example, O'Conor diary, 18 Oct, 1 Nov & 10 Dec 1867, OCON 1/115. 
95 O'Conor diary, 17 April 1869, O'Conor MSS, C.C.A.C., OCON 11116 
96 He made these trips on 20 May 1868 and 27 July 1868, ibid. 
, 
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steamers 'to the various pleasure-resorts on the banks of the river,' to the admiration 
of on-looking Germans.97 
For his part, Lascelles, found the Embassy to be 'composed of very good 
fellows,' and told Blunt that 'altogether Berlin is not such a bad place as it is 
supposed to be. ,98 Indeed Lascelles later recalled these days 'as the happiest of my 
life.' 99 He also experienced 'the pleasures of paternity' for the first time; 100 on 2 
March 1868 his son Billy was born, and a second son, Gerald, was born at Potsdam 
on 19 July 1869. 
For Lascelles, involved in secretarial duties, interesting work was sporadic. As 
Augustus Loftus later recalled 'war [between France and Germany] was 
spasmodically in everyone's mouth,' but it was 'as changeable as the barometer, 
according to the pressure of events.' 101 In one such 'complete lull in politics,' 102 in 
September 1868, Lascelles was briefly placed in charge of the Embassy, when Loftus, 
went on leave. 103 Besides the extra income,104 Lascelles pointed out the 'very 
unexpected advantage ... for one so young [twenty seven] to be ... Charge d'Affaires 
for a period of three weeks'; He was 'brought in contact with important persons 
whose acquaintance I might not otherwise have had the opportunity of making,' and 
later deemed the training to have been 'of inestimable advantage to me in later life.' 105 
97 Meath, Memories of the Nineteenth Century, pp. 148-149. Lascelles later recalled these 'old 
times' to O'Conor when made ambassador to Berlin. Lascelles to O'Conor, 21 August 1896, 
O'Conor MSS, C.C.A.C., OCON 6/117. 
98 Lascelles to Blunt March 1868, Blunt MSS, West Sussex Record Office, Box 33. 
99 ' Lascelles, 'England and Germany', p.l9. 
100 Lascelles to Blunt, March 1868, Blunt MSS, West Sussex Record Office, Box 33. 
101 Lord Augustus Loftus, The Diplomatic Reminiscences of Lord Augustus Loftus, Vol. i 
(London, 1894), p. 211. 
102 Augustus Loftus to Stanley, 13 July 1867, Derby MSS, Liverpool RO, 920 DER (15) 
12/1/16, p. 59. 
103 Augustus Loftus to Stanley 2 Sept 1868, ibid, 12/117, p.41. 
104 O'Conor to his mother 2 Oct 1868, O'Conor MSS, C.C.A.C., OCON 2/217. 
105 Sir Frank Lascelles, 'England and Germany,' p.19. 
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After three years in Berlin, the Lascelles were transferred back to Paris, in 
January 1870,106 where they again encountered the Blunts. Slipping back briefly into 
the leisured lifestyle of the upper classes, Frank and Wilfrid played whist while Mary 
and Lady Anne lunched, shopped or went on excursions together. The Lascelles 
frequently dined out, either at the Blunts' apartment or at restaurants, visited the races 
at Bois de Bolougne, picnicked at Versailles, and journeyed by steamer from the 
Place de la Concorde to St Germaine, with Mrs Milner Gibson, wife of the Liberal 
MP, and her daughter, and on 2 June day tripped to Fontainebleau where Wilfrid and 
Frank 'played tennis from two till half-past six' while Lady Anne sketched. Back in 
Paris, the Lascelles partook in private amateur dramatics at the hotel of Mrs Parnell 
on the Champs Elysees, acting in Woodcock's Little Game, by John Maddison Morton 
and The silent couple by Pierre Courtois. 107 
Such light amusements were however rudely curtailed by the real-life drama 
which unfolded with the outbreak ofthe Franco-Prussian war in July 1870. Blunt later 
recalled how on 4 July the news of the declaration of war was delivered by Lascelles, 
'or some other diplomatist of our party,' 
and how in the beautiful summer's night we walked upon the terrace after dinner, and looked 
across the river towards Paris, and how someone suggested, though we none of us had much 
misgiving as to the fortunate issue of the war, the possible trouble there might for the fair city 
which we loved .... 108 
106 Hammond to Lascelles, 21 Jan 1870, FO 366/327. 
107 Lady Anne Blunt, pocket diary for 1870 (Vol. XVI), May - July passim, B. L., Add MSS, 
53832; Lady Anne Blunt to Francis Blunt, 9 & 14 June 1870 Blunt MSS, West Sussex 
Record Office, Box 63, 2C.; Blunt, Alms to oblivion, Vol. iii, Part N: marriage, Chapter 3: 
the war of 1870, Blunt MSS, Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge, MS 42-1975, p.83; W.S. 
Blunt, My diaries, Part One, 1888-1900 (London, 1919), p.4 72; and 'The Ladies' Column' of 
Manchester Times, 2 July 1870. 
108 Blunt, My diaries, Part One, p. 476. 
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Following news of the French defeat at Sedan in September, the British Embassy 
were moved to Tours by the last train to leave Paris before its investment by the 
Prussians. From here they fled to Bordeaux, where they stayed until it was safe to 
return to Paris 109 , 
England remained officially neutral in the war, but both Lascelles and his 
colleague, Sir Edward Malet, Second Secretary at the Embassy, were personally 
'staunch Frenchmen' 110. Possibly Lascelles shared the opinion of the British diplomat 
Robert Morier, who accused the British Government oflacking a backbone in 
abstaining from support for France. 111 From the outset, LasceI1es took a 'brighter view 
ofthings,1J2 than many of his colleagues including Lyons' Private Secretary, Mr. 
Sheffield, and the Secretary of Embassy Lionel SackviIIe-West. 113 Lascelles had early 
on predicted that 'a defeat would not end the war, but that a Republic will be 
proclaimed under Gambetta or Jules Simon and the war carried on,' (such as 
happened after Sedan) and that if the Prussians entered Paris they would find a 
Republic, and would place the Comte de Paris on the throne. I 14 Even as news trickled 
in of French military setbacks Lascelles maintained this optimistic tone. 115 By 10 
January 1871 word had been received 'that the Prussians had dropped shells into Paris 
itself' which Lascelles admitted was 'very serious, for as he told Blunt: '1 fancy food 
is getting very scarce in Paris, and that if the Parisians find that they can be 
109 • See Lascelles' diary, Dec 1870 -Jan 1871, Lascelles MSS, C.C.A.C., LASCI (hereafter 
simply: 'Lascelles diary'); Thomas Woodhouse Legh Newton, Lord Lyons: A Record of 
British Diplomacy (London, n.d.), pp. 226-30. See Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, The Life of 
Granville George Leveson Gower, Second Earl Granville KG. 1815-1891, Vol. ii (London, 
1905), pp. 44-47 
110 • 
Blunt, My diaries, Part One, p. 480 
III Richard Millman, British foreign policy and the coming of the Franco-Prussian war 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), p.196. 
112 Blunt, My diaries, Part One, p. 482. 
113 • See Lascelles diary, 17 & 31 Dec 1870. 
114 
Blunt, My diaries, Part One, p. 482 
lIs L' 0 ascelles diary, 19, 22, 23 & 24 Dec 187 . 
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bombarded - they will soon give in.' 116 He was clearly moved by news that the 
Prussians, impatient for victory, had begun to 'shell the town & kill women & 
children & kill combatants,' and concluded: 'I suppose a more barbarous procedure 
has never been heard of.' 117 While admitting the game would be 'all up' if Paris 
fell, 118 he did not despair, so long as Generals Chanzy and Bourbaki held out in 
Northern France, but on 27 January came news of French defeat and Bourbaki's 
suicide. 119 The annistice was signed the following day, and at Bordeaux Lascelles 
. f . d . ···,120 
wItnessed flags 'hung out 0 wm ows m ... reJOlcmg . 
Lascelles was critical of the decision of the British Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Granville, to allow a London Conference on the issue of Russia's repudiation of the 
Black Sea Clauses of the Treaty of Paris to open without the French plenipotentiary, 
Jules Favre, who was besieged in Paris and for whom Bismarck refused safe 
passage. 121 Granville talked of being unable to postpone the Conference meeting due 
to appeals from Turkey and other Powers, but Lascelles lamented the Government 
had bowed to Turkish pressure and not 'held out' longer - France was a signatory to 
the Treaty of Paris and it was 'absurd & preposterous' to meet for 'business'in the 
b 1 ·' 122 a sence of the French P empotentIary. 
1" . f h db' d 123 L 11 fi After the pre Immanes 0 peace a een sIgne , asce es was Irst to 
arrive back at the Embassy. 124 Paris looked much as before - save the bullet holes on 
116 Lascelles to Blunt, 10 & 12 Jan 1871, Blunt MSS, West Sussex Record Office, Box 33. 
l17 Lascelles diary, 17 Jan 1871. 
118 Lascelles to Blunt, 12 Jan 1871, Blunt MSS, West Sussex Record Office, Box 33. 
119 Lascelles to Blunt, 10 & 12 Jan 1871,ibid. Newton, Lyons, p. 254. Lascelles diary, 28 Jan 
1871. 
120 Lascelles diary, 29 Jan 1871. 
121 Ibid, 22 Dec 1870' Fitzmaurice, Granville, ii, pp. 76-7; Newton, Lyons, pp, 251-4. 
In ' Lascelles diary, 17 Jan 1871. 
123 Newton, Lyons, p.267. 
124 Lascelles to wife, 27 Feb 1871. Lascelles MSS, LASe1. 
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the Hotel de Ville, the' scarcity of carriages & the great amount of dust', 125 although 
surveying the damage in the surrounding areas, he found plenty of pieces of shell to 
take away as souvenirs and was dismayed to find that in one spot the Prussians had 
not only 'cleaned out' an entire house but 'had amused themselves with tearing the 
papers off the walls destroying the fire places & grates ... & in some places tried to set 
fire to the house.' 126 He also discovered the Embassy servant Edmond, had got into 
'bad company' and run up debts, sold some of the coals and 'committed all sorts of 
[other] enormities,' which made it necessary to dismiss him: 'it appears he has drunk 
all my wine (luckily there was very little) and committed sundry petty thefts,' he 
I · d h' ·c 127 comp ame to IS Wl1e. 
On 28 February, Lascelles witnessed what he termed, 'the great event of the 
Century,' - the German occupation of the city. 128 Lascelles worried that the Prussians, 
Who he witnessed 'galloping about with drawn swords,' were 'likely to take severe 
measures' ifresistance was shown. 129 It was considered 'a crime' for Parisians to 
speak to Germans, and those that did were 'rather roughly handled' including 
Lascelles' companion, the newspaper correspondent Laurence Oliphant, who was 
jostled for shaking hands with a Prussian Officer. Soon after this, Lascelles told his 
wife: 
Oliphant & I being very hungry went into a Cafe at the comer of the Champs Elysees ... 
Soon after we got there some Prussian Officers came in & asked for beer which was brought 
them. This enraged the French populace outside who remonstrated angrily with the proprietor. 
At last the lady of the house requested the Prussians to go which they did immediately as 
125 Lascelles diary 10 March 1871. 
126 Lascelles to wife, 7 March 1871, LASC 1. 
127 Lascelles to wife 8 April 1871, ibid. 
128 ., •• 
Lascelles to wife, 1 March 1871, IbId. 
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quietly as possible. No sooner had they gone out than the French mob rushed out the doors & 
tried to get into the place. They smashed the windows and threw stones into the place. l3O 
Once the siege was over, Frank witnessed crowds of Gennan soldiers and Gennan 
bands playing in the streets, and officers riding around 'touching their caps exactly as 
they used to do in the Thiergarten,' but natives were scarcely to be seen, 'the 
respectable Frenchmen not liking to see the exultation of their conquerors.d31 
On 3 March the troops quietly left Paris,132 but this merely preceded the 
beginning of fresh drama, as the National Guard, aided by Parisians smarting at the 
humiliation of defeat and suspicious of the new Republican Government, immediately 
began to organise themselves into an alternative centre of power. Favre had 
mistakenly let the National Guard retain their anns after the siege of Paris. 133 
Lascelles -clearly feared the incipient Communist insurgency, and regretted that 
Government troops, sent from Versailles to deal with the National Guard, had not 
done more to 'frighten them'. 134 But even after the Commune was officially 
.. proclaimed on 28 March, Lascelles thought Paris very quiet. 135 Despite nearly being 
caught in the 'middle of a row' when, on his way dine at a Paris restaurant with Philip 
Currie (the future Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office) he passed some 
insurgents, just as the order was being given to 'load with ball' 136 he was generally 
surprised to find members of the National Guard were 'altogether very polite' in 
person, 137 that individual members of the Commune 'very well behaved individually' 
and thought it 'extraordinary that now that the whole town is in possession of these 
130 Lascelles to wife, 1 March 1871, ibid. 
131 Lascelles to wife, 3 March 1871, ibid. 
132 lbid. 
133 
13 Newton, Lyons, p. 259. . 
4 Lascelles to wife 4 March 1871, LASe 1. 
135 ' . 'd Lascelles to wife 21 March 1871, lbl . 
136 ' • 'd Lascelles to wife 19 March 1871, lbl . 
137 ' • 'd Lascelles to wife, 4 March 1871, lbl . 
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people, there should be absolutely no pillage, and no danger in the streets,' 138 despite 
reported looting of wine shops and bakeries. 139 
However from the outset Lascelles'held few illusions about how the 
Commune would end- if it succeeded, he told his wife, 'we shall probably see the 
Prussians in Paris again in a very short time'. 140 Lascelles worried that the Prussians 
would be 'only too happy' to quell the revolution but thought it 'most 
disgraceful. .. that Paris should have to be put down by Prussian bayonets'. 141 
When in March most of the Embassy staff relocated to Versailles to follow the 
French Government,142 Lascelles remained in Paris, with Malet as charge d'affaires, 
James Saumarez (another Secretary) and Colonel Claremont, the Embassy's military 
attache assisting him. 143 Lascelles was relieved not to have to 'pack up and be off in a 
hurry,' 144 but as the !ension increased, he warned Mary from coming to Paris, 145 and 
wrote of his 'relief...to think that you & the children are safe in London. 146 He was 
clearly pained at being apart from his family, reassuring Mary not to be nervous 'if 
there were no letters should the railways be cut' asked her to 'kiss the children' and to 
wish his son Billy a happy birthday. 147 
On 2 April the fighting commenced,148 and on 6 April Lascelles took 
advantage of good weather to go up to the Arc de Triomphe and gain a view of the 
combat. 149 He witnessed 'crowds of people looking through their Opera-glasses with 
138 Lascelles to wife, 1 April 1871, ibid. 
139 Lascelles to wife, 21 March 1871, ibid. 
140 71 'b'd Lascelles to wife, 18 March 18 ,1 1 . 
141 Lascelles to wife, 1 April 1871, ibid. 
142 Lascelles to wife 19 March 1871, ibid. 
143 Newton Lyons ~p. 272-3: Lascelles to his wife, 16, 17 & 20 Mar 1871, LASe 1. 
144 " 'b'd Lascelles to wife 21 March 1871, 1 1 . 
145 ' 'b'd Lascelles to wife, 7 & 19 March 1871, 1 1 . 
146 71 'b'd Lascelles to wife, 18 March 18 ,1 1 . 
147 71 'b'd Lascelles to wife, 20 March 18 ,1 1 . 
148 Lascelles to wife 2 April 1871, ibid. 
149 Lascelles to wife: Good Friday 1871, ibid. 
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about as much indifference as they look at a race. ,150 Two days later he dared to get 
even closer by climbing on top of an empty house in a nearby street, but could not see 
much beyond smoke and shells bursting inthe air. 'The excitement of hearing two or 
three shells whistling through the air,' he recorded, was an experience which was 
't d I h' 151 b . . h new 0 me an not peasant to ear, ut III tIme e grew so accustomed to the 
noise, 'that when the firing ceases for a short time (which it does very rarely by the 
way) I feel quite to miss it.,I52 Lascelles deplored the Government's bombardment of 
the city, which did 'much if not more harm to the peaceable people as to the National 
Guards' 153and deemed the interminable fighting a 'horrible state of things' .154 
In consequence of orders issued by the Commune, many hostages were taken, 
including the Archbishop ofParis,I55 arid countless British subjects whom the 
Embassy staff worked busily trying to free, including one man reportedly condemned 
to death. 156 Lascelles himself spent the morning of Easter Sunday getting a certain Mr 
John Stanley out of prison, as he exasperatedly told his wife: 
He was arrested last night & from what he tells me I think it was entirely his own fault. He 
went out last evening to the forts Maillet, which was in itself a foolish thing to do as that part 
of the town is being shelled. After stopping there some time, he went along the road close to 
the fortifications, and got into conversation with a Sentry, who at first was very civil but 
afterwards got suspicions and arrested him. He was then taken off ..... and had to pass the 
night in a casket, with a quantity of other people, & he describes the state of dirt and filth as 
something quite abominable. I sincerely hope he will soon leave Paris, as he talks of doing 
150 Lascelles to wife (; Apri11871, ibid. 
151 Lascelles to wif~, 9 & 16 April 1871, ibid. 
. 152 Lascelles to wife 16 April 1871, ibid. \ 
. 153 Lascelles to wif~, 9 April 1871, ibid. 
154 Lascelles to wife, 12 April 1871, ibid.. . . ' . . 
155 Lascelles to wife Good Friday 1871, IbId. The Commumsts took hIm wlth a VIew to 
exchanging him with the Communist leader, Blanqui. Newton, Lyons, p. 279. 
156 Lascelles to wife, Good Friday 1871, LASC 1. 
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so[,] because he is so reckless that he is almost certain to get into another scrape if he 
remains. 157 
It became increasingly difficult for British subjects to flee, in consequence of 
measures designed to stop-able bodied Frenchmen who could be conscripted from 
leaving the city. Lascelles lamented these restrictions as 'a terrible nuisance,' as the 
Embassy were advising British subjects to leave imminently. 158 As a consequence, 
they were 'besieged by people of all sorts wanting protection,' including not only 
British subjects but Priests and Jesuits. 159 Many Frenchmen came to seek protection 
which it was impossible to grant them. Despite the workload, on the evening of 20 
April Lascelles and Malet contemplated going to the theatre 'but,' the former wearily 
noted, 'it will depend upon how we feel after dinner.' 160 
Indeed, it is surprising the extent to which life continued to function amidst the 
chaos. In May the two remaining inhabitants of the Embassy who now barely dared 
leave the building, were invited to a concert given by the musiques militaires a Paris 
on the Place de la Concorde. Malet, writing to his friend Lillie de Hegermann-
Lindencrone and enclosing two extra tickets, called his hosts 'mad as March hares,' 
for thinking he and Lascelles would be 'pleasantly attuned to music on that day.' 161 
Nevertheless on Sunday 21 May these 'creatures' of polite society dined 'as usual' 
together at Grand Cafe, one of the few still open, and afterwards played a game of 
billiards 'in the deserted halls till about ten o'clock.' Upon returning to the Embassy, 
they found a letter from Bingham, Paris correspondent of the Pall Mall Gazette, 
inviting them to spend the evening with him to witness the firing of a battery which 
157 . 8 1 'b'd 
" Lascelles to wife 9 Apnl 1 7 ,1 1 . 
158 • 71 "bOd Lascelles to wife, 11 Apnl 18 ,1 1 . 
159 . 71 "b'd Lascelles to wife, 10 Apnl 18 ,1 1 . 
160 Lascelles to wife, 20 April 1871, ibid. 
161 Lillie de Hegennann-Lindencrone, In the courts a/memory 1858-1875, (New York & 
London, 1912), pp. 330-331. 
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had been newly erected on the Arc de Triomphe. Lascelles, as Malet recalled, 
persuaded him to go on this 'nocturnal expedition,' and after an evening passed 
quietly in games with 'no sound from the b;ttery' the pair 'groped' their way back to 
the Embassy at 2 a.m. 162 along the Champs Elysees, deserted except for 'one very 
drunken Garde Nationale.' 163 
At 7 a.m. the next day Lascelles was awoken to be informed by Malet that 
Government troops had entered Paris' & that the Tricolor flag was flying from the 
Arc de Triomphe.' Lascelles had surprisingly slept through the clamour! The fighting 
was now so close that Malet and Lascelles were 'prisoners in the Embassy.' 164 
The following day, (23 May), a Colonel of the Versailles troops asked Malet for 
permission to take possession of the Embassy garden, and the latter skilfully skirted 
the issue of Britain's official neutrality by answering that 'he could not prevent' an 
occupation-unfortunately, the Colonel himself was later mortally wounded. 
Meanwhile, Lascelles himself, keen to gain a good view of the battle, only narrowly 
escaped being hit by a bullet after peeping out of the shutters of a top floor window at 
precisely the wrong moment. 165 Around two that afternoon, Malet and Lascelles, 
'heard a tremendous clatter, and immediately afterwards [someone] on the other side 
shrieked out that the house was on fire.' Rushing upstairs they found Malet's room 
'full of smoke, the windows smashed - & a big hole in the wall just above the fire 
place.' 166 On Malet's suggestion, they wisely retreated to the cellars, taking the 
Embassy archives and other valuables with them. In the evening they dined, as Malet 
162 Sir Edward Malet, Shifting Scenes (London, 1901), pp. 316-7. Las~elles, writing to his 
wife, says they walked back at 1 a.m., Malet says 2a.m. Lascelles to WIfe, 23 May 1871 ,LASe 
1. 
163 Lascelles to wife, 23 May 1871, ibid 
164 Ibid. 
165 Ibid. See also Malet's version in Shifting Scenes p .. 316 ff, partly quoted from here and 
Meath, Memories of the nineteenth century, pp.181-183. 
166 Lascelles to wife, 23 May 1871, LASe 1. 
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later recalled 'the table laid for dinner with its white tablecloth and silver candlesticks , 
and, to crown incongruities, Frank Lascelles and myself in evening dress and white 
" ties, waited on by the stately butler and Embassy servants ... prisoners for the time 
being, but quite first class.' 167 Despite the damage suffered to the Embassy, both 
men survived, 168 and by 27 May the ordeal was over though the fighting continued. 
'It is something to have lived through,' Lascelles reflected, 'but I dare say that Billy's 
children will be sometimes rather bored by their grandfather's reminiscences of the 
destruction of Paris. ,169 
Lascelles was deeply shaken by the 'horrors' perpetrated during the siege of 
Paris, and what he saw had a profound effect on him.17o In addition to the gunfire and 
the burning buildings, set ablaze by the Communards as they abandoned them, he 
witnessed 'several dead bodies lying still in ... pools of blood,' and heard rumours, 
possibly exaggerated, of Communards 'pouring Petroleum into ... cellars and then 
throwing in lighted matches' and concealing themselves in ambulances to murder 
wounded soldiers. 171 As the ring closed in around the insurgents, the fighting became 
more 'desperate' and they began to shoot hostages, including the Archbishop of Paris, 
priests and gendarmes. Still more were killed by the fires, although the exact numbers 
were hard to calculate: Lascelles heard stories that 'whole families had been found 
suffocated in the cellars of Rue Royale. ,172 Lascelles was also distressed by the 
human tragedy of those caught up in the middle: one man had been obliged to join the 
National Guard 'to save himself & his family from starving' although he was against 
,167 Malet, Shifting Scenes, p. 225. See also Meath, Memories o/the nineteenth century, p. 182. 
168 Lascelles to wife, 24 May 1871 (b), LASe 1. 
169 Lascelles to wife, 27 May 1871, ibid. 
170 Lascelles to wife, 24 May 1871(a), ibid. 
171 Lascelles to wife, 24 May 1871 (b), ibid. 
172 Lascelles to wife, 28 May 1871, ibid. 
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the Commune, but would now probably be shot for doing so, and there were 
thousands in the same position. 173 
In this situation, Lascelles' frustration at the reckless behaviour displayed by 
the British subjects he was tasked with safeguarding only increased. One man was 
escorted to the Embassy by corporal and four men of the line. 'The stupid idiot had 
been walking about last night & of course was taken up,' he wrote to Mary; the man 
had been 'lucky that he was not shot, as when he was first challenged he walked on 
without paying any attention.' Lascelles had tried 'to impress upon the idiot the folly 
of his proceedings, and asked him whether he had not seen the notice warning people 
to remain at home.' He replied that 'he had, but the he thought it applied only to 
House holders.' [I] 174 Another British subject who had been walking about had been 
taken prisoner but was recognised by the Secretary of the Belgian Legation as he was 
marched along the Champs-Elysees. Not long after this eighty of the same batch of 
. I b 175 pnsoners were shot random y y appearance. 
Lascelles also dealt with plenty of people angry to find they were 'obliged to 
remain' in Paris despite having had 'plenty of warning' that if they did so it was 'at 
their own and peril,;176 only once it had become 'excessively difficult to leave Paris,' 
did they appear 'in shoals to apply for passes which we cannot give them'. 177 
The staff ofthe Embassy received much applause for their stoic behaviour; 
Lord Lyons praised Malet's level-headedness and civil co-operation with members of 
the Commune and also the conduct of the staff generally. 178 In recognition of his , 
services Lascelles received a commendation from Lord Granville for his 'willing' and 
In 1 °bod 
. Lascelles to wife, 29 May 187 ,1 1 ° 
174 1 °bod Lascelles to wife, 27 May 187 ,1 1 ° 
175 Lascelles to wife, 29 May 1871, ibid. Lascelles called the random shootings 'as barbarous 
a proceeding' as could be conceived. 
176 1 °bod Lascelles to wife 30 May 187 ,1 1 . 
177 ' °bOd Lascelles to wife 31 May 1871, 1 1 ° 
178 ' Newton, Lyons, po278, 280-281. 
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'unwearied' work, his 'courage, judgement and discretion' and the 'intelligence and 
ability with which he discharged his duties. ,179 
~, 
Lascelles had already been informed of his promotion to Second Secretary in 
February,180 and his departure from Paris had only been delayed by the Commune. 181 
In July 1871 he finally left,182 the high cost of living in Paris having 'reduced [his] 
balance to almost nothing,' so he was glad to hear that 'Copenhagen is a cheap 
place' .183 
After leaving Paris, Lascelles' appointments were short and again are not well-
documented. He remained at Copenhagen until October 1873.184 While there, he 
learned Danish to a standard which enabled him to translate and publish the epic 
poem Jarl Hakon, gaining favourable reviews in the newspapers and in private by his 
Danish colleague Kildgard. Lascelles was 'proud as Punch,' of his achievement and 
sent a copy of Kildgard's praise to his mother at Castle Howard. 185 After transferring 
to Rome, in February 1875 he and his wife found time to act again in a private 
production, this time of A Merchant of Venice which was apparently 'very well done,' 
although the couple, 'dressed in black velvet, played the married couple to the life, 
but did not look at all Italian.' 186 Mary Lascelles gave birth to a daughter, Florence, 
179 Granville to Lyons 9 June 1871 Despatch No. 401, and Granville to Lyons 28 June 1871. 
No. 460. Copies of these are in the Spring Rice papers at Churchill College Archive Centre. 
180 Ibid. . 
181 Lascelles was officially appointed to Copenhagen on 1 April 1871. 
182 Blunt, Alms to Oblivion, Vol. iii, part iv, Chapter 5 - Madeira & Southampton, p.209. 
183 Lascelles to wife 21 March 1871, LASC 1. Lascelles was grateful when not put to the 
expense of paying for his own dinner (see 27 Feb, ibid), and happily beat the Messenger 
Conway Seymour at cards, enabling him to pay the cook and rent a piano. However the 
following night Lascelles 'played atrociously' and reduced his winnings considerably . 
. Lascelles to wife 7 & 8 March 1871, ibid. 
184 Enfield to Lascelles, 27 Oct 1873, National Archives, Fa 366/328. 
185 Lascelles to mother 7 September 1874 and enclosure. Lascelles MSS, National Archives, 
Kew, Fa 800/8. 
186 Lillie de Hegermann-Lindencrone, In the courts of memory, p. 427. 
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in January 1876. 187 The same month, Lascelles was appointed to Washington, and 
from there briefly transferred to Athens in Apri11878, before being appointed as 
Second Secretary to Rome in December the same year, but in the meantime, he acted 
as charge d'affaires in Cairo. 
\ 87John Bailey, The Diary afLady Frederick Cavendish, Vol. ii, p.l95. 
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An agent of imperialism? Lascelles in Egypt, 1878-1879.1-----/ 
The timing of Lascelles's first senior diplomatic posting, as acting Agent and Consul-
General at Cairo (August 1878), coincided with a set of events that signalled the 
beginning of an era of 'new imperialism,' as rivalry between the European Powers 
increased across the globe. Great Britain's mounting involvement in Egypt from 
1875, which culminated in her occupation of the country in 1882, has become 'one of 
the classic case studies of the partition of Africa and of late-nineteenth century 
imperialism in general.,2 In examining Lascelles' role, one might ask how far he, as a 
diplomat of this late Victorian Empire, and a member of her ruling class, shared in an 
un~poken assumption about Britain's developing hegemony in Egypt, and also how 
far his ideas about Britain's policy in Egypt reflected those of other foreign policy 
makers at a critical point in Britain's diplomatic history, as well as examining 
Lascelles' contribution to the outcome of British policy itself. 
Unlike many Englishmen in Egypt at this time, Lascelles unfortunately left 
behind no memoirs from his tenure at Cairo, and only a fragmentary private 
IOn Great Britain's Egyptian policy in this period see for example: David S. Landes, Bankers 
and Pashas: International Finance and Economic Imperialism in Egypt (London, 1958); the 
relevant chapter ofR.E. Robinson and J. Gallagher Africa and the Victorians,(London, 1962) 
provides an overwhelmingly traditional interpretation of the reasons for British intervention; 
head-on criticism of their interpretation can be found in PJ. Cain & A.G. Hopkins British 
Imperialism, 1688-2000 (Harlow, 2002), and more specifically A.G. Hopkins, 'The 
Victorians and Afi·ica: A Reconsideration of the Occupation of Egypt, 1882', The Journal of 
African History 27, (1986), pp.363-91 ;see also A. Ramm, 'Great Britain and France in 
Egypt,' in P. Gifford and W.R. Louis (eds.) Britain and France in Africa, ed. (New Haven, 
. CT, 1971); A.R. Atkins, 'The Conservatives and Egypt, 1875-1880,' in Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History 2,2, (1974), pp.l90-205. The Earl of Cromer's Modern Egypt 
(London, 1908), for all its inherent bias, is still the most detailed narrative of events known to 
this author. 
2 Hopkins, 'The Victorians and Africa,' p. 364. 
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correspondence. 3 He also rarely appears in the vast secondary literature on Egyptian 
affairs, which mainly reflects his subordinate role, but nonetheless, any character 
study would be incomplete without taking into account this episode which was also a 
turning point in Lascelles' life; as he later asserted, it was his 'vast & splendid work,' 
in Cairo, and his acceptance of the new post of Minister at Sofia thereafter, which had 
advanced his diplomatic career.4 
In 1878 Lascelles had served only once outside of Europe (in Washington), 
and had no experience of 'oriental' countries. He was sent to Cairo partly because he 
was at close proximity at the Rome Embassy and partly 'because there was nothing to 
do' at Cairo while the resident Agent and Consul-General, Hugh Vivian, was on 
leave, and so a senior diplomat was not needed to fill in. 5 Nevertheless, as locum 
tenens he proved his worth to the extent that when in March 1879, the foreign 
secretary, Lord Salisbury, saw fit to remove Vivian, who increasingly disapproved of 
Britain's high-handed methods, Lascelles was reappointed and remained there until 
November 1879, meaning he was in place during the critical transition period running 
from the crisis of rule of the Khedive, Ismail Pasha, through to the establishment of 
the Anglo-French Dual Control. Without laying claim to any new interpretation of the 
reasons for Britain's increased role in Egypt, this chapter will seek to examine 
3 Individual personal accounts from the period 1876-1882 abound: To Cromer's Modern 
Egypt must be added Charles Frederic Moberly Bell, Khedives and pashas: sketches of 
contemporary Egyptian rulers and statesmen, (London, 1884); Viscount Alfred Milner, 
England in Egypt (London, 1894); Sir Auckland Colvin, The Making of Modern Egypt 
(London, 1909); Sir Edward Malet, Egypt, 1879-1883 (London, 1909); Sir Charles Rivers 
Wilson, Chaptersfrom my official life (London 1916); W.S. Blunt, A Secret History of the 
British Occupation of Egypt (London, 1907), provides a rare corrective to the 'official' 
version of events. The majority of this chapter is based on Lascelles' remaining private 
correspondence in FO 800/8. 
4 Dumas diary, entry for 16 August 1907, Liddle Collection, University of Leeds library 
. Special Collections, RNMN/DUMAS (hitherto simply referred to as 'Dumas diary'). 
5 Ibid. One can only speculate whether Lascelles' appointment was also due to his prior 
acquaintance with Philip Currie, who as Salisbury's private secretary now handled personnel 
matters. Keith Neilson and T.O. Otte, The Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. 
(Palgrave, 2009), p. 81. 
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Lascelles's role and attitudes within the framework of events, and to understand how 
events in Egypt both reflected and shaped his outlook on British diplomacy and 
foreign policy. 
! 
Lascelles' appointment may have stemmed from commonplace personnel 
problems, but the post demanded an occupant sympathetic to the protection of British 
interests. He came to Cairo just as Britain was increasing her stake in Egypt's 
governance. The country had long been of strategic interest to Britain as a stepping 
stone to India, an importance which increased after the opening of the Suez Canal 
(1869), reflected in the British Prime MinIster Disraeli's purchase of 44 per cent of 
Canal shares in November 1875. Britain's policy hereafter was influenced by an 
intersection of strategic and financial concerns. Between 1850 and 1875, Western, 
and more especially British and French, investors had loaned money at extortionate 
rates of interest to Egypt's Khedives Said (1854-1863) and Ismail Pasha (1863-1879), 
who wanted credit in order to help modernise their country along Western lines.6 By 
late 1876 Ismail, thanks also to an unchecked profligate streak, was deeply indebted 
to European speculators to the tune of £68 million, forcing him to seek foreign 
assistance in managing his finances, which led to the setting up of the European-run 
Commission of Public Debt (Caisse de la Dette Publique) in May 1876.7 The 
payment of the interest alone strained Egypt's resources, and a trade depression, the 
financial repercussions of the Russo-Turkish War, and an exceptionally bad harvest 
~ John Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian relations, 1800-1953, (London, 1954), p. 90-1. 
Ibid, p. 91. Cromer, Modern Egypt, pp.11-13. 
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meant that by 1878, Egypt had defaulted on her financial obligations. 8 By this time, 
Russia's victory over Turkey in the Balkans, which menaced Britain's Mediterranean 
" supremacy, added impetus to British efforts to co-operate with France in taking 
further steps towards measures for greater financial control over Egypt's finances, to 
enable her to repay the debts she owed to Western investors. So in May 1878 a 
Commission of Enquiry, which numbered among its members the future Consul-
General Sir Evelyn Baring (who later, as Lord Cromer, became de/acto British 
Governor of Egypt), was instituted to report on the financial situation, and which 
pointed the finger of blame for the situation squarely at Ismail's failure to distinguish 
between state and private expenditure, recommending (among other things) the 
limitation of the Khedive's absolute powe~ through the appointment of Europeans to a 
Council of Ministers, and the surrender of all the Khedive's property in return for a 
Civil List. 9 Ismail officially accepted the Commissions' recommendations on 28 
August; and the following day Lascelles, having just arrived in Egypt, found Ismail 
still visibly reeling from the shock of the report. IO That blow however was a triumph 
for British influence; Nubar Pasha, a man '"profoundly''' servile to British policy, was 
appointed to preside over the new Council of Ministers, also taking the Justice and 
Foreign Affairs portfolios, while Charles Rivers Wilson, an Englishman with 
experience in the British Treasury, took the influential Finance portfolio, with the de 
facto patronage of the British Cabinet. II 
8 Ibid, p. 34; pp. 37-38. Eighty-five per cent of the country's total revenue was devoted to 
paying off the debt. Andrew Roberts, Salisbury: Victorian Titan, (London, 2000), p. 226. 
9 Cromer, pp.42-45; 55-61; A.R. Atkins, 'The Conservatives and Egypt, 1875-1880,' p.l98; 
John Marlowe Cromer in Eo-upt, (London: Elek, 1970) p.32. 
10 ' b./', 
Lascelles to Layard, 9 Sept 1878, FO 800/8. 
II Atkins, p.198; 196. Sir Charles Rivers Wilson (1831-1916), was a British civil servant and 
financier. He had been vice-president of the Commission to enquire into Egypt's financial 
position 1878. 
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Lascelles role was a subordinate one in this first tenure; power lay with 
Wilson, who dealt directly with Nubar, and Lascelles was ordered to avoid 'all 
official interference' with Wilson's work and merely relay the Foreign Office's 
consent to his actions. 12 
Yet Salisbury also needed a loyal and tactful diplomat at the Cairo Agency to 
translate his cautious policy. While Britain's financial stakes in Egypt were 
'enormous', Salisbury wished to 'steer clear' of further foreign entanglements, not 
least because of troop commitments in India and Afghanistan, and thus pursued a 
'largely opportunistic' policy in Egypt. 13 While hoping to preserve the gains for 
British influence in Egypt, he avoided the French Government's forthright approach 
of acting as '''sheriff s officer'" for her creditors. 14 The success of this policy was 
proved by the fact that Nubar favoured the ostensibly more reserved British to the 
hectoring French. 15 
On the other hand, Salisbury sought to avoid alienating the French,16 for this 
might equally force physical intervention to safeguard British interests. For this 
reason, when, in autumn 1878 Egypt applied for another foreign loan to help her 
service her existing debt, he acquiesced in the appointment of a Frenchman, Monsieur 
de Blignieres (who alongside Wilson and Baring had served on the Commission of 
Inquiry), as Minister for Public Works in the Egyptian Cabinet, in return for French 
12 Vivian to Lascelles, 6 Sept 1878, FO 800/8. 
B.Roberts, Salisbury, p. 228;T.G. Otte, "'Floating Downstream"? Lord Salisbury and British 
Foreign Policy, 1878-1902,' in idem (ed.), The Makers of British Foreign Policy from Pitt to 
Thatcher (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p.l07. 
14 Salisbury quoted in Robinson and Gallagher, AfNca and the Victorians, p. 84. 
15 ' Lascelles to Salisbury, 19 Sept 1878, FO/800/8. 
16 Cromer, op cit, p. 40. 
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financial assistance. Lascelles was fully appraised of the importance of upholding the 
Anglo-French entente in Egypt. 17 
He was also shrewd enough to befriend the amenable Prime Minister. Nubar 
knew of the urgent need to keep the Powers lending credit. Lascelles deduced his 
pragmatic motives in co-operating closely with Britain; sensitive to (not to say 
resentful of) foreign interference, 18 Nubar knew Salisbury was reluctant to occupy 
Egypt, but feared nonetheless lest Britain be forced to take 'serious measures' to 
protect her interests and secure the route to India and so 'attempted to content the 
English by securing their influence in Egypt' .19 
Nubar had also to contend with Ismail, who skilfully obstructed the attempts 
to turn him from an absolute into a constitutional monarch, (for example refusing to 
cede his pers~mal property as security for the new loan until his civil list was settled)2o 
and, convinced that Nubar intended to depose him and 'give the country up entirely to 
the English,', sought to embarrass him and arouse the jealousy of France and Britain 
by backing Italian ambitions for a Ministerial pOSt.21 
Nubar solicited British help in the form of 'consular support against the 
khedive in the form of threats and warnings,' and treated Lascelles as a confidante, 
calling on him to consult him for his advice 'as a private English gentlemen'. 22 It 
17 Atkins, p. 198; See Vivian to Lascelles, 6 Sept 1878, Lascelles to Layard, 9 Sept 1878, 
Vivian to Lascelles 22 and 25 Sept 1878, and Layard to Lascelles, 8 Oct 1878, FO 800/8. 
18 ' See for example Lascelles to Layard, 9 Sept 1878, Memo by Lascelles,16 Sept 1878 
Lascelles to Layard 3 Nov 1878, FO 800/8. 
19 ' Lascelles to Salisbury, 15 Nov 1878, FO 800/8. See also Lascelles to Layard, 3 Nov 1878, 
ibid. 
20 Salisbury to Lascelles, 16 Sept 1878, FO 800/8. 
21 F Robert Hunter, Egypt under the Khedives, 1805-1879: From Household Government to 
Modern Bureaucracy, (London, 1984), p.204 -205. Memorandum by Lascelles, 16 Sept 1878, 
Lascelles to Salisbury, IS Nov 1878, FO 800/8. On Italy's Egyptian aspirations see Lucien E. 
Roberts, 'Italy and the Egyptian Question 1878-1882,' The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 
18, No.4 (Dec., 1946), pp. 314-332. 
22 Hunter, Egypt under the Khedives, 1805-1879, p.202.Memo by Lascelles, 16 Sept1878, 
FO/800/8. See also Lascelles to Layard, 9 Sept 1878, ibid. . 
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was a role which greatly suited Lascelles' affable personality, added to which was a 
notable sympathy for Nubar, whose trials with the Khedive (to the point where Ismail 
~-.... 
refused to receive Nubar and instead conducted business in writing) he thought 
'almost incredible,' and whom he greatly admired, to the point oflater owning that 
Nubar was the cleverest man he had ever met. 23 He was also convinced of the 
necessity of the Nubar-Wilson Ministry to stabilise Egypt's financial position, and to 
retain British preponderance, and although officially he was 'careful to avoid 
committing H[er]] M[ajesty's] Gov[ernmen]t,' beyond wishing for the 'establishment 
ofa strong & lasting Gov[ernmen]t in Egypt,' privately he encouraged Nubar not to 
let the Khedive jeopardise his Ministry'S survival by making difficulties over the 
raising of the European loan. 24 Contrastingly, there is no evidence that Lascelles 
showed mucq compassion for Ismail, for whom Nubar said the 'blow' oflosing his 
property was 'so severe' it had 'taken the soul out of him,' and painted a sorry scene 
ofa ruler seemingly on the verge ofa breakdown, 'throwing himself weeping on a 
sofa & ask[ing] whether some one has not got a dagger to plunge into his heart so that 
his misery may be ended.' 25 By late 29 October the Khedive had finally relinquished 
control over his property, in return for a loan of £8.5 million.26 
In his cautious support of the Nubar Ministry, Lascelles went no further than 
his instructions allowed but this faithful execution of duty coupled with the , 
conscientious execution of his routine duties (for the Consulate General at Cairo was 
'never an idle Post,' 27) earned him praise from colleagues, including Salisbury, 
23 Lascelles to Salisbury, 19 Sept 1878 FO/800/8; Dumas diary, 3 March 1906. He qu~lified 
t~is praise however by adding that Nubar 'was most dangerous when he was most lUCId' and 
was a good intriguer (ibid). . 
24 Lascelles to Salisbury, 19 Sept 1878 FO/800/8. 
25 Memo. by Lascelles, 16 Sept 1878, FO 800/8. 
26 Cromer, op cit, p. 63. 
27 Vivian to Lascelles, 25 Sept 1878, FO/800/8. 
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Vivian and Nubar, for his 'discretion and industry,' and 'ability and sound 
judgement', and quickly paid dividends. 28 
II 
Upon returning from leave, Vivian showed a striking contrast with Lascelles's 
conduct by showing himselfunsupportive of his superiors' policy,29 and openly 
questioning the high-handed manner in which Nubar and Wilson were attempting to 
govern without the Khedive; he warned that they overestimated their own strength 
and ability to defy Ismail, and urged Salisbury to co-operate with the Khedive. Vivian 
was proved right when, in February 1879, (quite probably with Ismail's connivance) 
numerous army officers, who had been placed on half-pay due to the stringent 
financial measures assembled in Cairo, attacked and took hostage both Nubar and 
Wilson. Nubar subsequently resigned, which the British Government meekly accepted 
despite Wilson's protests. Ultimately however France and Britain chose to strengthen 
Ministerial against Vice-regal authority, overruling protests from Vivian and his 
French counterpart, Godeaux. Ismail was excluded from Cabinet Councils, his more 
pliant son Tewfik replaced Nubar as President of the Council and France and Britain 
gained a right of veto in the Cabinet. On 15 March Vivian was also recalled and 
Lascelles was sent out to replace him.30 
Contemporary accounts bear out Lascelles' later assertion that he readily 
seized the 'chance' to return to Egypt.3) The Ambassador to Rome Augustus Paget, 
who already thought his second secretary was an 'excellent fellow', also notified 
28 Salisbury to Lascelles 27 Dec 1878, FO 800/8; Salisbury to Vivian, 3 January 1879, ibid. 
29 • ' Atkms, p.200 .. 
30 C romer, pp.69-90. 
31 Obituary of Sir Frank Lascelles in the Westminster Gazette, 1920, Sir Frank Lascelles MSS, 
C.C.A.C., LASC 5. . 
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Salisbury of his 'proper alacrity' in setting off within twelve hours of the summons.32 
Lascelles had also kept an eye on developments during his short sojourn ~. Rome, 
worrying for the welfare of his 'Cairo friends' Wilson and Baring in the February 
revolt. 33 
In return for being 'packed off at such short notice, Lascelles was assured by 
Salisbury's private secretary Philip Currie of a 'liberal treatment', and that the post 
represented a 'really a good chance' for him, and his Treasury allowance (which had 
been parsimonious at first) was increased. 34 Lascelles' return on the surface 
symbolised victory for the Nubar-Wilson camp. Nubar even accompanied Lascelles 
on his journey from Alexandria to Cairo, although LasceIIes was disappointed in his 
wish of seeing Nubar return to office.35 Salisbury wanted someone who supported 
Wilson 'thor~)Ughly,' unlike the 'irreconcilable' Vivian, and Currie warned Lascelles 
not to repeat Vivian's mistake of falling 'under the influence of the Khedive'; he 
should essentially treat Ismail like a disobedient child; 'keep[ing] the power from him 
of doing mischief and giving him to understand 'that we do not mean to stand any 
-
nonsense from him, and he would suffer for 'any tricks' he might play.36 
There is no doubt that in re-appointing LasceIIes the Foreign Office believed 
they were sending a signal to the Khedive that they would not be trifled with, and they 
were confident Lascelles would not be as sympathetic to the Egyptians as Vivian had 
proven. A memorandum written in June 1879 by Lord Tenterden, the Permanent 
Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, for the attention of Lord Salisbury, amply 
32 Paget to Salisbury, 19 March 1879, Paget MSS, B.L., Add MSS. 51228, f.70. 
33 Lascelles to Vivian, 27 Feb 1879, FO 800/8, 
34 Currie to Lascelles, 21 March 1879; Tenterden to Lascelles, 21 and 28 March 1879, FO 
800/8. 
35 Hunter, p.221; Lascelles to Currie, 30 March 1879, Salisbury Papers, Vol. 6/16. 
36 Salisbury to Lascelles, 22 March 1879, and Currie to Lascelles, 21 March 1879, FO 800/8. 
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demonstrates this. Whereas Ismail had successfully played off Wilson against Vivian, 
he argued, the Khedive was: 
quite shrewd enough to know that with Vivian's departure on leave circumstances have 
changed and that Lascelles is by no means on his side and does not seem likely to be 
wheedled into a belief in "Egypt for the Egyptians". 
I think that there is no fear of his being led to rely any longer on a covert sympathy at 
the English Agency in who he probably put more faith than he was entitled, and that ifhe is 
not already disabused of that notion he soon will be now that the Agency is in different hands. 
In short so far as Lascelles is concerned I am convinced that the matter is in good 
hands. 
Salisbury minuted his concurrence with this view,37 and Lascelles was assured that 
the Foreign Office had 'great confidence in your tact and judgement.,38 For his part, 
Lascelles appreciated the necessity of working with Wilson to prevent 'the whole 
arrangement. .. go[ing] to mash.' 39 The two men were on good terms; Wilson later 
told Lascelles that had he and not Vivian been in Cairo over the winter, 'Blignieres 
and I would have succeeded without any material force,.4o Unlike Vivian Lascelles, 
while not uncritical of Wilson's ostentatious lifestyle (he appreciated Wilson's 'big 
house & large salary,' had 'produced a bad impression, & it might have been wiser if 
he had not lived so magnificently and entertained so much,') got on 'cordially' with 
him and also his wife, and he wrote that the latter's 'intense swagger has the effect of 
amusing & not irritating me.,41 
37 Memo by Tenterden 23 June 1879, and undated minute by Salisbury, The National 
Archives, FO 363/1. 
38 Jervoise to Lascelles, 11 Apri11879 FO 800/8. 
39 Lascelles to Currie, 30 March 1879, Salisbury Papers, Hatfield House (SP hereafter), SP 
6/16. 
40 Wilson to Lascelles, 25 July 1879, FO 800/8. 
41 Lascelles to Currie, 30 March 1879, SP 6/16. 
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However Salisbury, who admitted the viability of some of Vivian's warnings, 
also wanted Lascelles to exercise some moderating influence on Wilson, by pressing 
on him the 'necessity of conciliating ... ratherthan of effacing the Khedive,' for 
Salisbury was painfully aware that Britain was 'not strong enough to defy him' alone 
and as a British occupation was materially impossible and a French one undesirable, 
he was perturbed by Wilson's policy of' acting as if he were the master of many 
legions' without physical force behind him, as Ismail, though 'a very timid 
man ... frightened by the appearance of ships of war which cannot possibly hurt him,' 
might one day 'take advantage of some outbreak of Mussalman fanaticisms to shake 
off the European concert.' Salisbury regretted that Wilson had cut down Ismail's Civil 
List and wanted him to feel 'comfortable' 'and that his position was more 'tolerable' 
acting with th~ Europe~n Ministers than against them.42 Lascelles essentially 
concurred with Salisbury's opinions about Wilson, although he wearily conceded the 
Khedive's worrying track record in attempting to escape European contro1.43 
These attempts soon came to test Lascelles' resolve. By early April, the 
Commission of Inquiry had drawn up a report which would conclude that Egypt could 
only escape her financial difficulties by a declaration of bankruptcy and Wilson 
devised a financial plan including proposals to halve Ismail's civil list, and to penalise 
the 'privileged' elements in Egyptian society.44 Lascelles hoped that, with the help of 
Baring who he dubbed 'a tower of strength,' Wilson's plan could be pushed 
through.45 However, plans were superseded by events. The Khedive, refusing to 
declare bankruptcy, countered Wilson's plan with his own. 46 Within ten days of 
41 Salisbury to Lascelles, 22 March 1879, FO 800/8. 
43 All the foregoing is Lascelles to Salisbury, 5 April 1879, FO 800/8. 
44 Hunter, p.218. 
45 Lascelles to Currie, 30 March 1879, SP 6116. 
46 Lascelles to Salisbury 30 Mar 1879, FO 78/2999. Quoted in Hunter, p.219. 
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arriving, Lascelles was essentially warning that instructions to conciliate Ismail might 
have come too late.47 He warned Ismail had the backing of his Chamber of Notables, 
and nationalist elements who, under the direction of their leader Sheikh-el-Bekri, 
were fomenting 'considerable agitation', and attempting to incite religious extremism 
against the European Ministers. The Minister of the Interior, Riaz Pasha, was 
'denounced' as a friend of these Christians and warned that his life was endangered, 
which led Lascelles to press Salisbury to give him British protection. 48 Ismail was 
also joined by the 'wealthy portion of the population' who stood to lose by Wilson's 
financial measures, and those who apparently 'dared not refuse' to sign his petition 
against Wilson's plan.49 Lascelles took the aloof but perhaps not inaccurate view that 
the remainder had signed Ismail's petition'without understanding it, and was cynical 
about whether 'this famous plan,' was really an 'expression of the will of the 
people.'5o 
Lascelles's overriding concern was with the survival of the Tewfik-Wilson 
Ministry. Taking Wilson's advice on board, he despaired ofre-establishing harmony 
between the Khedive and his Ministers, and with the resignations of at least Wilson, 
de Blignieres and Baring hanging in the balance, by early April Lascelles was 
proposing to Salisbury the radical solution of deposing the Khedive by means of a 
decree from the Ottoman Sultan, still nominally Ismail's master. His decision 
acknowledged the 'palpable objections' to a full-blown occupation of the country on 
the one hand, and a scepticism that the Khedive might wriggle out of 'mere summons' 
to Constantinople by conjuring up an excuse ofill health, on the other. Lascelles was 
47 Lascelles to Currie, 30 March 1879, SP 6116. 
48 Hunter, op cit., p.221; Lascelles to Salisbury 1 April 1879, quoted in Cromer, p.99; 
Lascelles to Salisbury, 12 April 1879, FO 800/8. 
49 Lascelles to Salisbury 4 April 1879, quoted ibid, pp. 99-100 
50 Lascelles to Malet, 7 April 1879 FO 800/8. 
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convinced the measure would find favour with the general populace, excepting those 
with vested interests. 51 
The Khedive confirmed European fe-ars when on 9 April he announced his 
financial plan, and proposed a wholly Egyptian ministry, abruptly dismissing the 
European ministers, and appointing the pliant Sharif Pasha as the new President of the 
Counci1.52 Baring and de Blignieres resigned in protest, alongside other high-ranking 
financial officials. 53 
Salisbury typically hesitated before resorting to action. Vivian told Lascelles 
the British Government were in a 'serious dilemma' for they had never intended to· 
'interfere actively in Egyptian affairs,' and lacked popular support. As Wilson was 
'purely an Egyptian official', Britain could only 'remonstrate strongly with the 
Khedive for hjs flagran~ act of discourtesy,' and threaten him with action from 
Constantinople.54 In late April Lascelles was instructed to warn the Khedive that ifhe 
continued to ignore their advice, he renounced 'all pretension' to European friendship, 
and the Powers might take action to defend their Egyptians, and to secure 'the good 
government and prosperity of the country' ,55, but as a sign of Salisbury'S uncertainty, 
Vivian was also sent back to assist Lascelles.56 
In the meantime, Lascelles' reports and private letters put the case for 
intervention. In decided language he concluded Ismail had 'complete victory' and that 
51 Lascelles to Currie, 30 March 1879, SP 6116; Lascelles to Salisbury, 5 April 1879, FO 
800/8. 
52 • ' Cromer, p. 100-103 
53 These included Sir Gerald Fitzgerald, a financial expert who was assisting Wilson in 
working out a new accounts system for Egypt. (See Sir C. Rivers Wilson, Chapters fi-om my 
ojficiaiiije p.183-184), Blum Pasha, (the Secretary of the Finance Ministry), and Sir 
Auckland Colvin (Head of the Cadastral Survey). 
54 Vivian to Lascelles, 18 April 1879, FO 800/8. 
55 Salisbury to Lascelles, 25 April 1879 , reproduced in Cromer, p.132-133 
56 Currie to Lascelles, 25 April 1879 , FO 800/8. 
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'the enemies of Reform' were 'triumphant', but still maintained the tide would tum 
against Ismail if the Porte could be induced to act. 57 
However, Lascelles wanted Ismail to be induced to abdicate, in order that his 
son Tewfik might succeed. Lascelles thought Tewfik, whom he termed 'a nice boy', 
was personally inclined 'to run straight & act honestly' and would be an acceptable 
ruler, if only surrounded by 'decent men' whom he deemed to be 'well intentioned', 
rather than having to accept the Ottoman Sultan's son Halim, who Lascelles thought 
would 'not be a great improvement' on Ismail and who would again place Egypt 
'under the thumb of the Porte' .58 By mid-May the German Consul General had taken 
the lead in urging Ismail's abdication59, but Salisbury was characteristically more 
reserved and risked a rift with the other Po'wers through hesitating to act.60 By late 
May Vivian was again ~ecalled, leaving Lascelles in sole charge, Salisbury not 
deeming it 'worth while ... under present circumstances to send Englishmen of high 
position,' to Egypt while Ismail remained in power and English authority ebbed so 
low. Vivian thought Salisbury was inclined to 'let the Viceroy stew in his own juice,' 
and to 'let things slide.' However, a deciding factor was Salisbury'S desire to keep in 
step with France who was demanding 'more drastic remedies.' 61 
On 19 June Lascelles and his French colleague, M. Tricou, officially appealed 
to Ismail to abdicate in Tewfik's favour to secure the succession in exchange for a 
57 Lascelles to Salisbury, 12 April 1879, FO 800/8. He also reported heavy-handedness in the 
implementation oflsmail's plans for tax collection by the Minister of War Shahin Pasha, who 
had a notorious reputation in his former role as Inspector-General in Lower Egypt' as one of 
the harshest and most successful tax-gatherers in the country' and noted the discontent was 
such that even anti-European Army officers held Ismail 'responsible for the disasters that 
have fallen upon the country.' Lascelles to Salisbury, 19 April 1879 in Cromer, p. 126; same 
to same, 26 Apri11879, ibid,pp.133-34. 
58 For these reflections see Lascelles to Currie, 30 March 1879, SP 6/16; Lascelles to 
Salisbury, 12 April and 23 June 1879, FO 800/8. 
59 Hunter, p.224. 
60 Wilson to Lascelles, 23 May 1879 FO/ 800/8. 
61 Vivian to Lascelles, 30 May 1879, FO 800/8. 
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Civil List. 62 Ismail however refused the offer. The events of the meeting were 
recounted by the future Times Foreign Editor, Charles Moberley Bell, who was 
present in Egypt at the time. Bell's reconstruction iftrue is revealing about Ismail's 
skill but also Lascelles' diplomatic technique, for it stresses his conciliatory qualities 
over the reportedly 'loud and noisy' French Agent, which had ambiguous results. 
Tricou began by accusing Ismail of having "'acted twenty times in defiance of the 
Sultan.''' Ismail challenged his 'bully' to '''name one instance!"'. Lascelles, more 
taciturn in his approach, encouraged Ismail to show "'some independence of 
Constantinople, since the Porte may deceive you.'" Ismail having 'answered the bully 
after his kind,' apparently 'replied to Lascelles with the quiet humour that he knew 
would awaken a responsive echo, "Seeing, mon cher monsieur, that the first use you 
wish me to make of my}ndependence is to abdicate all my power, I hardly see the 
advantage to be gained.'" Lascelles told Bell that this answer 'knocked [him] over,' 
and he could barely reply.63 At the end of the meeting, Ismail only held out his hand 
to Lascelles, who himself noted that '2 or 3 people have since told me that the 
Khedive has remarked on the difference of manner between M. Tricou and me. ' Yet 
Lascelles was keen, despite the Khedive's endeavours, that there should not be a 
perceived split in the Anglo-French entente over the 'great question,' and gave 
everyone to understand that the Khedive's fate was sealed and it was now 'merely a 
question - between his abdication and deposition', and although Ismail's defiance 
temporarily frustrated the Powers, when on 25 June the representatives of Germany, 
Britain, and France again urged Ismail to abdicate and to nominate Tewfik in his 
62 Hunter"pp. 224-225; Cromer, pp.135-136. 
63 Moberly Bell, Khedives and Pashas, p. 15-17. As Bell put it, Ismail acted 'to a bluff man 
bluff, to a gentleman gentlemanlike.' Ibid. . 
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place, this time supported by Cherif who crucially had turned against his master, their 
entreaties were successful.64 
The official verdict suggests Lascelle;pleased his superiors in executing a 
'delicate and very difficult' task. Lord Salisbury sent him a telegram approving his 
conduct in the crisis, and Wilson, who had lobbied the leader of the Conservatives in 
the Commons, Stafford Northcote in favour of Lascelles's staying on at Cairo, 
commended him, and said 'everywhere I hear you well spoken of and it is generally 
understood that you did well when acting alone.' 65 
III 
Lascelles stayed in Egypt for a further five months, ensuring that Tewfik's 
administration was amenable to European interests and that he appointed those judged 
to be 'good and honest natives' from all parties, including Cherif and Riaz Pasha; the 
important thing for Britan was to see (in the blunt words of one diplomat) that Tewfik 
was not a 'chip of [t] the Ismail block' who would 'ruin the country'. 66 With Nubar 
pointedly excluded on Tewfik's wishes, Cherifwas appointed Prime Minister, with 
the Powers somewhat reluctantly acquiescing. Lascelles personally thought him 
'weak and vacillating,' and 'a vain indolent man' who would block reform, but with 
Nubar 'out of the question,' there seemed a lack of good candidates other than Riaz 
Pasha, who Tewfik initially distrusted.67 
Lascelles was pleased to find Tewfik receptive to European advice and that he 
seemed to show 'firmness' in shaking off his father's tutelage. 68 Lascelles and Tricou 
64 H ' " unter, p.226. 
65 Jervoise to Lascelles, 11 April 1879; Lascelles to Salisbury 28 June 1879 acknowledging 
receipt of telegram; Wilson to Lascelles, 20 June 1879 and 27 June 1879, FO 800/8. 
66 Vivian to Lascelles, 27 June 1879; J. Scott to Lascelles, 4 July 1879, FO 800/8. 
67 Baring to Lascelles, 2 July 1879; Lascelles to Salisbury, 6 July and 8 Aug 1879, FO 800/8. 
68 Lascelles to Salisbury, 6 July and 28 June 1879 FO 800/8. ' 
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successfully urged Tewfik to drop his father's financial plan and accept the 
appointment of a new Commission. To avoid further arguments however no European 
ministers were appointed. Britain insisted on appointing Controllers 'and nothing 
else', and beyond powers of inspection they abstained from official interference, 
although in the background hung the threat of increased control if European advice 
was rejected. 69 
Lascelles was further pleased in September when the Khedive dismissed the 
unreliable Cherif Pasha, and summoned Riaz Pasha, who had fled after Ismail's coup, 
to replace him. 70 He lauded this as proof that Tewfik might tum out to be of 'much 
stronger character than is supposed', and 'work for the good of the country,' and for 
financial reforms.71 In Salisbury's view, T~wfik's attitude was more amenable to 
'English interests'; he w~nted to keep Egypt neutral, 'and for that perhaps some self-
assertion and stubbornness are understandable in the native,' as 'a Native 
Gov[emmen]t strong enough to hold its own' and a Khedive strong and sensible 
enough to govern for himself suited Salisbury 'very well' if it prevented other 
Powers becoming ascendant. 72 
A new Commission of Liquidation was devised, comprised principally of members 
of the old one, which it was hoped would restore European confidence. De Blignieres 
returned, and Lascelles personally urged Baring's return based on his knowledge of 
Egyptian Finance, and the respect which was felt for him on account of his 
'straightforwardness and firmness of character,' which made him 'invaluable'; Baring 
was reluctant, but also accepted Lascelles' invitation 'after a sufficient number of 
69 Lascelles to Salisbury, 6 July 1879; Wilson to Lascelles, 25 July 1879; Baring to Lascelles, 
" 22 July 1879; Salisbury to Lascelles, 2 August 1879; Baring to Lascelles, 5 August 1879, FO 
800/8. 
70 Cromer, op cit, p.l51-154. 
71 Lascelles to Salisbury, 21 Aug 1879 FO 800/8; see also same to same, 31 Aug 1879, ibid. 
72 Salisbury to Lascelles, 17 September 1879, FO 800/8. 
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grouse have fallen to my gun.' 73 Lascelles was 'very firm and vigilant' as to securing 
British places, and encouraged by Vivian and Wilson, and Baring advised Cherif and 
Tewfik to reappoint Fitzgerald and worked to allay opposition to Wilson's return, as 
Controller General. 74 
Lascelles also fought hard to uphold the other key tenet in the pre-l 882 
system, Anglo-French co-operation, which showed signs of breaking down after the 
Khedive's deposition and manifested itself in battles over administrative postS.75 
What Salisbury termed bitter 'violent personal antagonisms and prejudices' were 
quick to resurface, despite the Consul-General's efforts.76 Lascelles found that the 
French Agent Tricou, whom he deemed to be 'a man of.. .. violent temper' with much 
of 'the character of a bully', tested his patience in trying to secure French 
appointments.?7 He was.determined to co-operate with his colleague, whose 'ideas on 
the subject of Egypt' he judged to be 'sound'. 78 Concern arose among British officials 
that Tricou's 'intense dislike and distrust ofNubar' was partially to blame for his 
extended exile, and there were fears that he would oppose the appointment of 
Fitzgerald as Director General of Accounts. 79 Lascelles, who attached 'the greatest 
importance to the complete harmony of between the French and English Consuls 
General,' did not press for Nubar's appointment, and the two men agreed to bury their 
differences for the sake of their mutual interests and to 'secure a good system of 
73 Lascelles to Salisbury, 20 June 1879 FO 800/8. Also Lascelles to Salisbury, 28 June 1879, 
ibid. Baring to Lascelles, 2 July 1879, ibid. Also Baring to Lascelles, 22 July 1879, ibid. 
74 Salisbury to Lascelles, 2 Aug 1879, and Lascelles to Salisbury [acknowledging receipt], 2 
Aug 1879; Fitzgerald to Lascelles, 4July 1879; Wilson to Lascelles, 25 July 1879; Baring to 
Lascelles 10 July 1879; Lascelles to Salisbury 20 June 1879; Baring to Lascelles, 22 July 
1879, Lascelles to Salisbury, 4 and 12 September 1879, FO 800/8. 
75 See for example Fitzgerald to Lascelles, 4 July 1879 FO 800/8. Cromer, p.l49-150. 
76 Salisbury to Vivian, 19 August 1879, FO 800/8 . 
. 77 Lascelles to Salisbury, 20 June 1879; Wilson to Lascelles, 20 June 1879, FO 800/8. 
78 Lascelles to Salisbury, 20 June 1879, FO 800/8. 
79 Cromer, p.l63. Fitzgerald to Lascelles, 4 July 1879, FO/800/l78. Baring and Wilson 
especially were incensed. Baring to Lascelles 10 July 1879, Wilson to Lascelles, 25 July . 
1879, Baring to Lascelles .22 July 1879, FO 800/8. 
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Gov[ernmen]t in Egypt,' rather than getting 'exceptional advantages for any of their 
subjects.'8o Lascelles told Tricou 'that I should look upon a rupture of the Franco-
English "Entente" as a great calamity, but that our interests in Egypt were of such 
vital importance to us that we should have to protect them at any risk.' For this 
reason, while admitting Tricou's 'high-handed manner: Lascelles was 'very careful' 
about believing the stories he heard, not wanting to gratify those who wished to see 
Britain and France 'at loggerheads,' and remained personally 'on the best possible 
terms' with his colleague. Some of Tricou's objections seemed well founded- he 
feared De Blignieres' appointment as Inspector General and Wilson's return as a 
member of the Commission would excite suspicion due to their association with 
European interference, but Lascelles countered that 'entirely new men' would slow 
down the work.8l However Tricou continued to violate his side of the bargain, 
becoming involved in intrigues to replace a British member of the Customs House 
Commission, Mr Archer Shee, with a Frenchman and Salisbury, anxious for Britain to 
hold key positions of the Customs houses and harbours, remonstrated at Paris about 
Tricou's alleged activities, ultimately leading to Tricou's recall in mid-August, which 
was looked on as 'a triumph for the English.' Lascelles was ultimately 'not sorry' that 
he had gone.82 
Lascelles did not stay to see the final institution of the new Dual Control in 
1880. It was never Salisbury's intention to leave him at Cairo indefinitely. His 
decision to replace him with Edward Malet, then Secretary of Embassy at 
Constantinople, was a sign the Foreign Office wanted to 'make a bigger place of it 
and send out someone higher in the service'; as early as July 1879, Baring gleaned 
80 Lascelles to Salisbury 6 July 1879, FO 800/8. 
81 Lascelles to Salisbury, 2 Aug 1879, FO 800/8. 
82 Salisbury to Lascelles, 2 August 1879, FO 800/8; Lascelles to Salisbury, 21 Aug 1879, FO 
800/8. 
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from Currie that this was the case but urged Lascelles 'not [to] be disappointed or 
think it any reflection on you,' as the Foreign Office were 'much pleased' with his 
" 
work. 83 Lascelles was rewarded for his 'judgement and tact' by being offered a 
promotion, either to the Secretaryship at Rio, or to the new post of Agent in Bulgaria. 
Salisbury privately counselled him that the latter was 'likely to be a field of active 
service during the next few years,' and Lascelles, displaying the same astuteness with 
which he had accepted Cairo, wisely replied that he 'infinitely prefer[ed]' Sofia. 84 
IV 
The fullest verdict of Lascelles' tenure at Cairo comes from Charles Moberly 
Bell, who wrote that he 'did his official work thoroughly well without brag or bluster, 
quarrelled with nobody,got all he wanted, wrote short despatches, and, with all his 
sense of humour, was never wanting in dignity.' Bell dubbed him the 'gentlest and yet 
best of Consuls-General,' a man so 'cordial' that 'one lost all thought of the Consul-
General. ,85 
Undoubtedly Bell pinpointed Lascelles' key virtues as a diplomat, namely an 
unassuming and consensual approach to diplomacy which would come to be seen as 
his hallmark, and which worked well for British diplomacy in the prevailing (if 
fragile) conditions ofthe Anglo-French entente in Egypt in 1878-79. Lascelles' most 
advantageous traits seem to have been charm, tactfulness and honesty, which allowed 
him to get on well with everyone. A colleague at Berlin nearly thirty years later 
83 Malet to Lascelles, 13 September 1879, FO 800/8. (Malet consoled Lascelles on not 
obtaining the post himself); Baring to Lascelles, 10 July 1879, FO 800/8 (see also A. Ramm, 
'Great Britain and France in Egypt,'p.85 - Ramm writes that Malet's appointment provided 
recognition of 'a new phase' in the Egyptian question.) 
.. 84 Salisbury to Lascelles, 17 September 1879, FO 800/8; Lascelles to Salisbury, 30 September 
1879, FO 800/8; Lascelles to Salisbury 18 October 1879, FO 800/8. Rio (and South America 
generally) was notoriously a graveyard for diplomatic careers. See Raymond A. Jones, The 
British Diplomatic Service, 1815-1914, p.189. 
85 Bell, Khedives and Pashas, p. 16; p.220-221 
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thought Lascelles 'must have owed his advancement at least as much to his charm of 
manner as to anything else',86 while in 1879 the Moniteur Egyptien's judgement was 
that the departing Consul-General had 'acquired the respect and esteem of all 
Colleagues' and a reputation for 'good faith and straightforwardness which must be of 
essential advantage to British interests in Egypt. ,87 His successor, Malet, also asserted 
that Lascelles was well liked, especially by Riaz Pasha, and that his departure was 
'heartily and deservedly regretted,88 His ability to co-operate with figures as diverse 
as Tewfik, Vivian and Wilson, Tricou and Nubar, in equal measure, counting all as 
'friends' and even winning Ismail's respect where his French colleague had failed to, 
attest to the truth of these tributes. 
More specifically, as Salisbury acknowledged, Lascelles endeavoured to 
promote 'cordi.al relations' between Britain and France.89 The European concert 
remained uppermost in Lascelles' mind even when confronted with blustery 
colleagues, albeit this co-operation was ultimately designed to secure British interests. 
A study of Lascelles' tenure confirms the view that Britain, while seeking to increase 
her share of influence over Egyptian finances; shirked formal imperialism, with 
occupation as the least desirable outcome, and co-operation with France was the 
means to this end. 
In Cairo, Lascelles worked to support Britain's imperial interests. He worked 
closely with Baring, (who would eventually succeed Lascelles as Agent and Consul-
General and was as strongly identified as any Victorian diplomat with the emergent 
'New Imperialism'), and his criticism of River Wilson's high-handed regime was 
. 86 Dumas diary, 16 August 1907. 
87 Malet to Salisbury, 13 Nov 1879 FO 800/8. 
88 Malet to Salisbury, 8 Nov 1879, SP 6/51. 
89 Salisbury to Tewfik, 27 Nov IS79 FO SOO/S. de Blignieres was also 'loud' in his praise of 
Lascelles. Baring to Lascelles, 10 July 1879, ibid. 
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more over the means than ends. He collaborated with elements within the Egyptian 
administration (Nubar, Tewfik, Riaz) who could be seen as 'sound' (i.e. amenable to 
European pressure), and ultimately pressed the case for the deposition of Egypt's ruler 
and the tightening of European controls at the expense of that country's 
independence.9o 
However one is on less sure ground in defining the nature of Lascelles' 
'imperialist' mindset. With his aristocratic bearing and reserved manner Lascelles 
certainly uncannily projected what Earl Cromer later typified as the diplomatic ideal: 
'the undemonstrative, shy Englishman, with his social exclusiveness and insular 
habits' as against the 'vivacious and cosmopolitan Frenchman'. Part of Britain's self-
appointed task in Egypt was to 'form [the Egyptian's] character'. Ismail's profligacy 
was said to shaw his weakness of character.91 Lascelles' thinking on the Egyptian 
problem clearly echoed the Victorian equation of financial probity with moral 
rectitude, and as PJ. Cain has recently argued was the case for officials and diplomats 
in Egypt around this time, Lascelles used this language of 'character' to justify the 
increased intervention of Britain in Egypt.92 The weakness of this approach is that it 
led Lascelles, like the officials around him, to focus too narrowly on the Egyptian 
question as a strictly self-contained problem of securing reliable Government, with 
little regard to the nationalist element and the people below. This also reflected his 
aristocratic aloofuess, for Lascelles was part of an international elite with common 
characteristics, and while often understanding individuals in the Egyptian ruling class, 
he perhaps misunderstood the groundswell of popular, anti-European opinion . 
.. 90 He also struck up a friendship with such an emblem of Dis rae Ii's foreign policy as the 
Ambassador at Constantinople Sir Henry Austen Layard. 
91 Quotes from Edward W. Said, Orientalism, (Harmondsworth, 1995) p.211; p.212. 
92 PJ. Cain, 'Character and Imperialism: The British Financial Administration of Egypt, 
1878-1914,' The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 34 (2006). 
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However, as a diplomat Lascelles was more in tune with Salisbury's policy-of 
cautious reserve, which shunned formal occupation, which Lascelles greatly 
sympathised with, and without overemphasizing the role of Lascelles's individual 
contribution, it can be seen that his actions were motivated by a desire not to hasten 
on a territorial imperialism, but merely to safeguard Britain's financial interests. 
From 1881 events in Egypt led rapidly to the nationalist revolt ofUrabi Pasha 
and Britain's reluctant move towards occupation, which Salisbury and his Agents 
including Lascelles had worked to avoid. Evidence shows however that Lascelles by 
no means sympathised with the nationalists. At the time of Gladstone's decision to 
respond militarily to the Urabi revolt, he was in England on leave from Bulgaria, 93 
and according to Wilfrid Blunt was still kept 'in the loop' over Egyptian affairs and 
consulted at the Foreign Office. As Lord Hartington's first cousin he now 'had his 
confidences about what was going on in the Whig section of the Cabinet.,94 Blunt, as 
a pro-Egyptian nationalist, hoped to tum Lascelles' mind and was convinced he had 
'more or less converted' him to his views over Egypt by summer 1882.95 Another 
source tells differently. Blunt's friend Rosalind Howard, Lady Carlisle (whose 
husband George Howard was a cousin of Frank Lascelles and later became 9th Earl of 
Carlisle) was like him a strong pro- Egyptian nationalist. She encountered Lascelles at 
Naworth Castle in September 1882 and complained to Blunt that: 
Frank Lascelles is here - & just as unsatisfactory as he can possibly be. Were he not such a 
pleasant good-natured fellow I should be in a rage with him for his talk must do infinite harm 
to the true cause. He says the Egyptians are utterly unfit to have Parliamentary Government & 
at the very best he damns them with faint praise. He has been vacillating throughout & it ruins 
93 w.s. Blunt, A secret history of the occupation of Egypt, p. 319 & .357. 
94 Lascelles also apparently told Blunt he had seen Malet's telegrams respecting affairs in 
Egypt. Ibid, pp. 296-7. 
95 Ibid, p.320,& .335. 
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a man politically to be a diplomat. Of course Frank has greatly encouraged my husband in his 
anti-Egyptian beliefs.96 
Lascelles' faithful adherence to Lord Salisbury's emerging foreign policy both in 
Egypt, and elsewhere, in what can broadly be defined as the 'Eastern Question' at 
least partially accounts for his success in the years that followed.97 Lascelles' 
reliability and willingness to execute Salisbury's policy, marked him out for 
promotion (although it is inaccurate to identify him with the High Imperialism of the 
late nineteenth century) and his role as a career diplomat made his support of Britain's 
Imperial policy implicit. How vigorously he would act to defend Salisbury's concept 
of Britain's interests in these areas, would be tested under the incoming administration 
of William Ewart Gladstone. 
96 Rosalind, Lady Carlisle to Blunt 24 Sept 1882, Blunt MSS, West Sussex Record Office, 
Box 10. 
97 Lord Salisbury was foreign secretary for thirteen of the twenty-two years from 1878 until 
his resignation in 1900. 
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'Superintending the growth of liberty'? Lascelles, Bulgaria and Liberal foreign 
policy 1880-1885. 
On leaving Egypt, Lascelles continued to be appointed to areas of key strategic 
concern for British interests. His posting to Bulgaria put him at the forefront of the 
great nineteenth-century Eastern Question, and the inexorable problem facing all the 
Great Powers (but especially Austria, Russia and Britain) of how to cope with the 
tenninal decline of the Ottoman Empire and the power vacuum which would result in 
Eastern Europe. Bulgaria was a recently fonned country which had emerged as a 
result of Russia's victory over Turkey in the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78). This 
Balkan state, which stretched from the Danube in the North to the Aegean in the 
South, had swiftly been perceived by Salisbury as a threat, because of its status as a 
'Russian province in an advanced stage of manufacture', 1 both to Turkey's remaining 
authority in Europe (which, as signatory to the Treaty of Paris of 1856 Britain was 
bound to defend) and, as importantly, to Britain's wider imperial interests and 
Mediterranean position.2 Through the Salisbury-Shuvalov agreement and the 
subsequent Congress of Berlin (1878), Salisbury had sought to diminish Russia's 
share of the spoils of war, and had invested considerable time and energy in reducing 
Bulgaria's size by specifically banning Bulgaria'S union with the province of Eastern 
Rumelia.3 
I Quoted in T.G. Otte, 'Lord Salisbury and British Foreign Policy, 1878-1902,' p.l09. 
2 See M.S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923 (London, 1966), p. 199-200. The 
British Government would not tolerate a Russian descent on Constantinople, which would 
'alann public opinion. See the Queen to Salisbury, 6 Oct 1885 in G.E. Buckle (ed.), The 
Letters o/Queen Victoria, Second series, Vol. iii: 1879-1885 (London, 1928), p. 698. 
3 C.J. Lowe, The Reluctant Imperialists, Vol. i (London, 1967), pp. 22-3; Michael Hurst (ed.) 
Key Treaties/or the Great Powers 1814-1914, Vol. 2: 1871-1914 (London, 1972), No. 113, 
pp. 553-554. 
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Salisbury's willingness to see Balkan national aspirations sacrificed to 
Britain's perceived security interests had not been fully appreciated by Britain's first 
Agent to Sofia after the Berlin Congress, the Arabic scholar William Gifford 
Palgrave, who was suspected of aligning himself with Liberal and Pan-Slav groups in 
Balkan politics rather than working to maintain the status-quo, and who was 
transferred to Bangkok after only a year in the post.4 Lascelles, by contrast, had 
'pleased his official superiors,' in Egypt, faithfully adhered to Salisbury's foreign 
policy there and distanced himself from indigenous Egyptian nationalism, and was 
perceived within the Foreign Office to be a safe pair of hands where British interests 
were concerned. 5 
Britain needed someone who would effectively act as their sole mouthpiece on 
the spot. Although Bulgaria was still nominally under Turkish suzerainty, the British 
Ambassador at Constantinople, Lord Dufferin (1881-1883), was soon distracted by 
troubles in Egypt, and not always up to the mark on Bulgarian affairs.6 The Agency 
also kept a minimal staff - Lascelles's sole colleague was Robert Wyndham Graves, a 
student interpreter employed to assist in routine consular and clerical duties, and when 
Graves was on leave his work was carried out by Frank's wife and eldest son.7 
Lascelles thus had less assistance and a larger degree of independence than hitherto. 
4 William Gifford Palgrave (1826-1888). Consul General at Sofia 1878-1879; see Lowe, The 
Reluctant Imperialists, i, p. 24. 
S Foreign Office, Foreign Office, Consular and diplomatic sketches (London, 1883), pp.l77 -
178; Although Currie initially suggested Lascelles' candidature, this is less important than it 
appears, for Currie was Salisbury's private secretary and they thought alike; Keith Neilson 
and T.G. Otte,.The permanent Under-Secretary for foreign affairs, p.81, 79. 
6 See Gladstone to Lord Granville, 13 Oct 1883, in Agatha Ramm, The political 
correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, 1876-1886, Vol. ii (Oxford, 1982), No. 
1123, p. 100. (Hereafter Ramin, ii). Also see e.g. Lascelles to Dufferin, 22 Nov 1881, 
.. Dufferin to Lascelles 30 Nov 1881, and Lascelles back to Dufferin, 16 Dec 1881, Lascelles 
MSS, National Archives, Kew, FO 80017. 
7 See Sir Robert Wyndham Graves, Storm Centres of The Near East: Personal Memories 
1879-1929 (London, 1933), p. 15 & 33. There were also two vice-consuls in Bulgaria: Alfred 
G Brophy at Varna and William H Dalziel at Rustchuk. 
57 
This independence also reflected Sofia's remoteness - it suffered from a poor 
reputation among diplomats, as a backwater where one would be socially 'buried,8, 
and in the words of Graves, was in 1880 only slowly transforming itself from 'a third-
rate Turkish provincial town to the capital of a modem European minor State ... the 
streets were ill kept, muddy in wet weather and dusty in dry, and lighted only by 
occasional oil lamps. There was no theatre nor concert hall, and the only place of 
public amusement was a very low class cafe chantant'.9 Lascelles' initial impressions 
seem to tally with this picture; he thought the place 'disagreeable' and 'exceedingly 
expensive', although he later admitted the climate was 'wonderful'. 10 Yet Bulgaria's 
remoteness masked its status as an 'important and interesting post' where a diplomat 
could distinguish himself, and Lascelles himselflater called Sofia a 'school for 
Ambassadors. ,~II 
In light of the ongoing political sensitivity of the region, it seems likely that 
Salisbury and Currie had selected a diplomat they felt could take a strong lead in 
defending British interests. However, barely had Lascelles arrived at his new post 
when, in May 1880, a Liberal administration took power in England with Gladstone 
as Prime Minister and the Earl of Granville as Foreign Secretary, which seemed to 
presage a change in the tone, and possible the direction, of British foreign policy. 
While in opposition, Gladstone had denounced other parts of Salisbury's 1878 
settlement as 'insane' (in particular the Cyprus Convention), and had railed against 
Salisbury and Disraeli's expensive Near Eastern policy in his Midlothian campaign 
8 Otte & Neils~n, p.81. 
9 Graves, Storm Centres of The Near East cpo 29 The description is corroborated in Duncan 
M.Perry Stefan Stambolov and the emergence of Modern Bulgaria, 1870-1895 (London, 
·1993) p. 126. 
10 Lascelles to Tenterden, 18 May 1880, FO 80017; Meriel Buchanan, Ambassador's daughter 
(London, 1958), p.53. 
11 Such was the opinion of Vivian; see Vivian to Lascelles, 9 & 24 October 1879, FO 800/8; 
Buchanan, Ambassador's daughter, p.53. 
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(1879).12 On coming to office he appeared to signal a break with 'Beaconsfieldism' 
by recalling the forthright Ambassador, Austen Henry Layard, from Constantinople 
(and, later, British military consuls from Turkey).13 The rhetoric employed by 
Gladstone prior to April 1880, suggested furthermore that this Government might be 
more sympathetic towards Bulgaria's liberal nationalist aspirations, than its 
predecessor. Gladstone had famously protested against the 'Bulgarian atrocities' 
Turkey had committed when suppressing an uprising in the province in 1876; 14 he 
had met the Bulgarian nationalist leader Zankov the same year, a fact which was not 
forgotten by the latter when Gladstone returned to power and which led him to form . 
'great hopes from the change of Ministry' 15; conveying Gladstone's thanks to 
Zankov's party for their congratulations on his return to office was a delicate matter 
for Lascelles, who worried about 'exciting their hopes' of British support in their 
aspiration of expanding Bulgaria's borders. Having been appointed by a Conservative 
Government, Lascelles served for five years under a Liberal administration, and it 
became his task to decide whether these contradictory schools of thought in British 
foreign policy could be reconciled, and if they could not, to choose whether to 
continue prioritising the stability of Bulgaria's ruler, Prince Alexander von 
B attenb erg, in order to maintain British interests and restrain Russian influence, or 
whether, as an Agent serving under a Liberal Government, to safeguard the growth of 
political freedom in Bulgaria. 
12 W.N. Medlicott, Bismack, Gladstone and the Concert of Europe, (London, 1956), p.132; 
.. Lowe, Reluctant Imperialists, i, p. 21. 
13 Paul Knaplund, Gladstone's Foreign Policy (London, 1970), p.138, 152. 
14 See for example Lowe, The Reluctant Imperialists, i, p. 2. 
15 Lascelles to Granville, 4 May 1880, FO 80017. See also Lascelles to Primrose, 21 May 
1880, B. L., Add MSS 44464, f.188; Lascelles to Tenterden, 18 May 1880, FO 80017. 
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I 
The situation which confronted Lascelles on his arrival in Bulgaria was that of an 
unstable fledgling state, passing through a troublesome period of internal disorder. 
Having been administered from Constantinople for five hundred years, the country 
lacked a cohesive indigenous governing class and, freed of Turkish patronage, leaned 
heavily towards its Russian liberator for assistance in governance: Russia had 
designed the country's constitution, sent officers to train her army and supplied her 
with successive Ministers for War, and perhaps most importantly of all, had supported 
the nomination of her ruler, the twenty-two year old Prince Alexander von 
Battenberg, who was a nephew of the Tsar. 16 The young Prince however was 
handicapped in his attempts at governing by his inexperience, and a desire to surround 
himselfby a small reactionary clique. 17 He resented Bulgaria's constitutional 
government, and only grudgingly co-operated with the predominant Liberal party 
grouping, which he suspected of harbouring Nihilist tendencies. Furthermore the 
Liberal leader and Prime Minister, Dragan Zankov, increasingly antagonised 
Alexander by pursuing independent and radical policies,18 and by open collusion with 
the Russian Agent in Bulgaria, Count Courmnay, who like all Russian Agents in 
Bulgaria up until 1886, represented the Pan-Slavist rather than the official strand of 
Russian policy, and who encouraged Zankov to exclude Alexander from policy 
making, Concerned with monitoring Russian influence in the region, Lascelles was 
deeply worried by the growing predominance of 'revolutionary' rather than 'official' 
Russian policy; and the fact that the Russian Agent seemed to act as the 'real 
16 8 M.S. Anderson, pp.l27-12 . 
17 Lascelles to Granville, 18 Oct 1883, FO 78/3529, No. 102. 
18 See Richard Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918 (New York, 1983), pp.45-47. 
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Governor of the country', 19 while Russia continued 'making presents in the shape of 
arms and ships' to Bulgaria even in peacetime.20 
A second problem was the 'general state of insecurity' in the country, caused 
mainly by the chronic problem ofbrigandage.21 Lascelles quickly surmised that, 
faced with a disorganized administration, the Bulgarian Liberals might try to 'divert 
attention from their want of power at home' by agitating for the union with Eastern 
Rumelia denied them under the Treaty of Berlin - in 1880 the introduction of 
measures including a militia bill and a vote for funds for the Government of Eastern 
Rumelia seemed to support this theory.22 Lascelles hoped that Zankov would be 
shrewd enough not to alienate the Great Powers by pressing the Unionist issue, but 
took the precautionary step of warning him off counting on British support. He 
advised him to -stick to the Berlin Treaty; and prove that Bulgaria was 'worthy of its 
independence & capable of Self Gov[ ernmen ]t, instead of alienating the sympathies of 
Europe by creating fresh complications'. 23 
Lascelles was able to understand the Prince's alarm and his fear that these 
developments might presage the establishment of a Bulgarian Republic,24 and he 
sympathised with his wish to rid himself of Zankov. Lascelles quickly grew to like 
Alexander, whom he termed 'one of the most charming men I have met', and who 
confided in the British Agent about the 'insults' he had suffered at the hands of 
19 Lascelles to Granville, 5 May 1881, and 1 June 1880, FO 80017. 
20 Lascelles to Granville, 4 May 1880 FO 80017. 
21 Lascelles to Granville, 3 May 1880, FO 78/3118, No. 76. And see generally 
correspondence throughout 1880 on this issue, FO 78/3116-19. 
22 Lascelles to Granville, 4 May 1880, FO 80017. See also PP (1880) Correspondence 
between Great Britain, Turkey, &c., respecting the Unionist Movement in Bulgaria and 
Eastern Roumelia:- May-July 1880, [C.2636], especially Lascelles to Granville, 14 June 
'1880, No.5; and Crampton, pp.46-47. 
23 Quote from Lascelles to Tenterden, 18 May 1880 FO 80017. See also Lascelles to 
Granville, 4 May & 1 June 1880, ibid. 
24 Lascelles to Granville, 31 May 1880, FO 78/3118, No. 89; Lascelles t6 Granville, 1 June. 
1880, FO 80017. 
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Russian officials in the country. 25 This background was important in deciding 
Lascelles' attitude when in May 1881, Alexander, having decided he was unable any 
longer to co-operate with the Liberal party, decided on the radical step of attempting 
to seize full power by asking the Bulgarians to go to the polls to choose 'between their 
Prince and a modification of the Constitution, ,26 a move which was supported by the 
new Tsar, Alexander III, and also (in contrast to his predecessor's policy of backing 
he Liberals), by the new Russian Agent, Mikhail Aleksandrovich Khitrovo. 
Lascelles' view of Alexander's decision was based on a pragmatic and 
unsentimental assessment ofthe situation in Bulgaria, which had much in common 
with the priorities of Conservative foreign policy He doubted whether Battenberg was 
'fit to be trusted with absolute Power,' but counselled Lord Granville that there was a 
stark choice 'between a temporary dictatorship', with all its faults, and the Prince's 
abdication,27 for he recognised the Prince would refuse to 'occupy a secondary 
position' in the country.28 In Lascelles' eyes, Battenberg's departure could lead to 
'serious complications', for it might - and this was crucial- result in a 'foreign 
occupation' of Bulgaria.29 
While Lascelles' concern about external complications outweighed any 
concern for constitutional government in Bulgaria, he had also seen enough of the 
Prince's failed experiments at government to deem the constitution unworkable. His 
attitude was informed by a year's experience in the country, which had not impressed 
on his Whiggish, aristocratic mind that Bulgaria, with its large, ill-educated peasant 
population, w~s as yet deserving or capable of effectively exercising such a privilege . 
.25 Lascelles to Granville, 2 June 1881 & 1 June 1880, FO 80017 
26 Lascelles to Granville, 4 May 1881, FO 78/3308, No.'s 35 &36. 
27 Lascelles to Granville, 2 June 1881, FO 80017. 
28 Lascelles to Granville, 5 Oct 1881, ibid. 
29 Lascelles to Granville, 5 May 1881, ibid. 
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As he argued to Granville, the country lacked a sufficiently well-educated class of 
indigenous administrators. In 1880 he had advised Zankov to seek foreign /assistance 
until such time as sufficient numbers of natives could be trained, and for these reasons 
also he favoured the Prince's proposal of appointing a Council of State composed of 
Slav-speaking foreigners, and a second chamber to counterbalance the legislature. 30 
By contrast Gladstone, in line with his Liberal principles, privately 
disapproved of the Prince's action. 31 Nor could he ignore the fact that Alexander's 
proposed constitutional amendments, accompanied by measures such as the 
appointment of military commissions to replace allegedly corrupt Liberal prefects, 
special military tribunals to investigate abuses by the previous administration and the 
tightening of scrutiny over the Press offended domestic public opinion. 32 The 
Government faced demands from Parliament for satisfaction that Zankov's case had 
been heard over the 'arbitrary suppression' of the Constitution, and the fact that 
Lascelles was not ordered at once to cease communication with the Prince also 
garnered public criticism. 33 As the British Agent warned Alexander, the 'very 
unfavourable opinion' produced in England made it 'impossible' for the British 
Government to approve his measures and Granville was, he said, 'refraining from 
expressing an opinion in order not to cause embarrassment to His Highness. ,34 
30 Lascelles to Granville,S May 1881, FO 800/7; Lascelles to Salisbury, 19 April 1880, FO 
78/3117, No.68; Lascelles to Granville, 19 May 1881, FO 78/3308, No. 50 and same to same, 
30 June 1881, FO 78/3309, No.1 00. Subsequently the idea of a Council of State composed of 
foreigners was dropped by the Prince. 
31 Gladstone to Granville 16 June 1881, in Ramm, i, pp.280-1. 
32 Lascelles to Granville 19 & 30 May, 7 & 9 June 1881, inPP (1881), Bulgaria No.1, No.'s 
20, 28, 29 & 57. Subsequently General Ehrenroth renounced some of the harsher measures -
see Lascelles to Granville, 15 June 1881, ibid, No. 62. Lascelles informed Granville privately 
in June that 'the Military Commissioners seem inclined to exercise their Authority very freely 
for the purpose of influencing the elections.' Lascelles to Granville, 2 June 1881, FO 800/7. 
33 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. CCLXI, Col. 269, 12 May 1881, & Col. 1653,30 May 1881. 
34 Lascelles to Granville, 15 June 1881, FO 78/3309, No.82. 
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Yet more pragmatic considerations made the British Government circumspect 
about voicing their ideological disapproval of Battenberg's coup. In office; . 
Gladstone's anxiety about upsetting the 'European Concert' had already led him to 
downplay his anti-Turkish and anti-Austrian rhetoric.35 In June 1881, the inauguration 
of the Three Emperor's League between Germany, Austria and Russia, by which the 
former two states effectively abstained from interfering in Russia's Balkan policy,36 
meant that none of these Powers were prepared to condemn the Prince's action, and 
Britain risked appearing out of step by doing so. 
Additionally, since 1880 Gladstone had pledged himself to the status quo of 
the Treaty of Berlin- his only concern was to maintain the 'freedom of Bulgaria 
against all foreign influence and subject only to its conditions of allegiance to the 
Porte,'37 and also like his predecessor he was keen, in the words of one historian, 'to 
keep the Bulgarian Liberals and Roumelians quiet'38 and avoid encouraging their 
wilder aspirations by appearing to sympathise with them. 
In 1880, Granville had, like Lascelles, been worried about the Unionist 
movement; he also came to be of the opinion that the Liberal leader, Zankov, had a 
35 See William Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890 (New York, 1950), 
p. 202; Granville acted, in Langer's phrase, as a 'brake' on Gladstone (ibid). Lord Edmond 
Fitzmaurice, The Life of Granville George Leveson Gower, Second Earl Granville K. G. 1815-
1891, Vol. ii (London, 1905), pp.202-206. Granville told Gladstone that he thought the 
essential difference between them was: 'you are more afraid of Austria, and I of Russia.' 
Granville thought Austria wanted to keep things 'quiet', and lacked a 'concentrated national 
force' to push her forward. Granville to Gladstone, 5 October 1883, ibid, pp. 205-06. 
36 See F R Bridge & Bullen, The Great Powers and the European States System 1814-1914 
(London, 2005), pp. 216 -217. The new system was really 'a practical agreement about the 
Near East.' A.J.P. Taylor The Struggle For Mastery in Europe 1848-1918 (Oxford, 1954), p. 
270. Italy's accession to the Triple Alliance in 1882 further shrank the number QfPowers 
Willing to oppose Russia in the Balkans. 
37 Gladstone to Granville, 4 Sept 1883, Ramm ii, p.82-83, No.1 094. 
38 Medlicott, Bismack, Gladstone and the Concert of Europe, p. 111. 
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'very indifferent character.' 39 These factors acted as a disincentive for Granville to 
express any 'precipitate opinion' on the Prince's attitude;4o and Gladstone,~ on 
receiving private solicitations for support over the constitution from Zankov, replied 
rather generally that Britain would 'always be found on the side of legality and 
liberty.' 41 
Britain's Foreign Secretary also concurred with much of Lascelles' advice on 
the impracticality of the constitution, a position also shared by Britain's Ambassador 
at Constantinople, the Marquess of Dufferin.42 As the constitution formed no part of 
the Berlin Treaty, he was spared the necessity of condemning its suspension. In a 
statement in the House of Lords, Granville expressed repugnance towards' coups 
d'etat, and to any but constitutional and legal changes of established system', but 
observed that the constitution was not part of international law and cited Lascelles' 
opinion that it was 'unfitted to a population unaccustomed to political life, and of 
whom only a small number were educated' .43 
However the tensions within Whitehall's policy meant Lascelles had to walk a 
precarious tightrope at Sofia. Following heavily supervised elections, accompanied by 
39 Granville to Lascelles, 24 June 1880, in [C.2636] Turkey. No. 12 (1880). Correspondence 
respecting the unionist movement in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia., No.7; Granville to 
Gladstone, 15 Oct 1883, in Ramm, ii, p. 103, No. 1128. 
40 Granville to Walsham, 26 May 1881, PP (1881) Bulgaria No.1, No. 16. 
41 Gladstone to Zankov, 26 May 1881, in H.C.G. Matthews (ed.), The Gladstone Diaries,Vol. 
x: Jan 1881-June 1883 (Oxford, 1990), p. 71. Also see: Granville to Lascelles, 20 June 1881, 
PP (1881) Bulgaria No.1" No. 52, and enclosures. Lascelles' private warning that Zankov 
might publish the letter (Lascelles to Granville [tel.], 2 June 1881, Fa 800/7) led Gladstone to 
pre-empt him by communicating it to the Commons. See also Walsham to Granville 11 June 
1881 & Granville to Walsharri, 18 June 1881, PP (1881) Bulgaria No.1, No.'s 39 & 47 . 
. 42 Granville to the Queen, 28 June 1881, in G.E. Buckle (ed.), The Letters o/Queen Victoria, 
Second series, Vol iii, p.223. Granville later cautioned Gladstone that 'Goschen & Dufferin 
were both of opinion that the Constitution was unworkable .. .' Granville to Gladstone, 15 Oct 
1883, in Ramm, ii, p. 103, No. 1128. 
43 Reported in The Times, Wednesday 22 June 1881, p. 8. 
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the arrest of Zankov, the Prince won a majority.44 Attention focused on how the Great 
Powers would formally recognise the constitutional changes which the new 
Assembly, due to meet at Sistova on 13 July, was sure to vote through. Russia 
proposed issuing an identical note stating that the Powers respected the independence 
of the Prince and of the people of Bulgaria; however in a second draft, this was 
changed to a hope 'that the Bulgarian National Assembly will avoid any decision of a 
nature to interfere with the union between the Bulgarian people and Prince 
Alexander.,45 The wording seemed to infer foreign comment on Bulgaria's internal 
affairs, and having consulted the Cabinet on 2 July, 46 Granville insisted on the 
original version being read out, despite Austrian and German efforts to induce him to 
change his mind. 47 Lascelles was instructed to join in the ceremonial with his 
diplomatic colleagues only if the first draft was used,48 and alongside his French and 
Italian colleagues he successfully secured the exclusion of the insinuation of 
interference from the speech. However, when the German Agent, as doyen of the 
Diplomatic Corp, read a speech of congratulation to the Grand National Assembly 
once the constitutional amendments had passed, Lascelles was damned by his 
presence. 49 Gladstone, still angry at the Prince's arbitrary measures during the 
elections, was 'staggered' by Lascelles' appearance, 50 and Granville duly cautioned 
the British Agent that his German colleague's speech went 'further in some of its 
44 Lascelles to Granville 7, 14,22 & 29 June 1881, PP (1881) Bulgaria No. I,No.'s 48,61 & 
77, & 90. 
45 Lobanow to Granville, 1 July 1881, ibid, No.7 4. Granville had thought the first draft vague 
enough, but acquiesced in its usage: Austrian and Gennan pressure made Russia revert to 
using the second draft. See Granville to Wyndham, 27 & 29 June 1881, ibid, No.'s 68 & 72. 
46 Gladstone to the Queen, 2 July 1881, Cabinet Reports by Prime Ministers to the Crown, 
1868-1916 (Sussex, 1977), CAB 411A53 . 
. 47 Granville to Lobanow, 2 July 1881, PP (1881) Bulgaria No.1, No. 76. 
48 Granville to Lascelles, 8 July 1881, ibid, No. 88. 
49 Lascelles to Granville 12 July 1881, 13 July 1881 and enclosure, PP (1881) Bulgaria No.1, 
No.'s 112& 115. 
50 Gladstone to Granville, 15 July 1881, in Ramm, i, p. 284, No. 513. 
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expressions' than could have been wished.51 The Agent's behaviour even drew the 
censure of the prominent radical parliamentarian Henry Labouchere who suggested he 
had displayed 'lively sympathy' with the Prince, and who in August attempted 
(unsuccessfully) to reduce the vote on the civil service estimates in the Commons by 
£1,600 (the amount of Lascelles' salary), because the diplomat had recognised 
Alexander's 'nefarious act.' 52 Lascelles' own defence of his actions suggests 
however that his approach had been balanced and judicious - by successfully 
removing the inference of direct interference in Bulgaria'S internal affairs from the 
speech, which he argued in itself was 'no easy matter', and by subsequently avoiding 
an act which 'would have been regarded as a proof of the break up of the European 
Concert so far as Bulgaria was concerned,53, he had essentially satisfied both 
requirements 0f Granville's policy. The Foreign Office agreed with Lascelles. They 
thought his action had been 'quite right'54 and in general his conduct in these delicate 
circumstances was warmly praised. Already, Granville had publicly lauded his 
'excellent judgement and tact.' At this stage, Lascelles had avoided appearing as a 
partisan of either side in Bulgarian politics - in Granville's words, he had earned 'the 
respect and confidence of both parties' in Bulgaria through his urging of 'prudence 
and moderation to both', but the incident highlighted for the first time the tensions 
between the Agent's pragmatic approach and the Liberal sensibilities of his political 
masters. 55 
51 Granville to Lascelles 30 July 1881, PP (1881) Bulgaria No.1, No. 122 . 
. 52 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. CCLXIII, 18 July 1881, columns 1132-1133; The Times, 8 
Aug 1881, p 4. . 
53 Lascelles to Tenterden, 30 July 1881, FO 80017. 
54 Granville to Gladstone, 18 July 1881, Ramm, i, p.285. 
55 The Times, Wednesday 22 June 1881, p. 8. 
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II 
Lascelles' advice up to 1881 had been influenced by a desire to see Bulgaria's 
stability guaranteed, ultimately in order to prevent external interference in the 
country; to him, securing the Prince's position was the best means to do this. Thus he 
had not condemned Alexander's essentially illiberal act while recognising, however, 
that the coup d'etat had lacked popular support, and hoping that it would prove a 
purely ad interim measure and that the Prince would soon by 'raising the state of 
siege, granting an amnesty, abolishing the military Commissioners and instituting a 
Council of State on a liberal basis,' thus disprove any 'gloomy predictions'. 56 The 
British Agent was therefore most alarmed when the measures of 1881 not only proved 
unsuccessful but ultimately brought increased Russian interference in Bulgaria. 
Alexander's dictatorial stance and his ill-advised determination to govern through a 
Conservative clique quickly raised new questions about his governance and 
significantly alienated Russia's Agent, Khitrovo, who switched back to supporting the 
Liberals.57 Lascelles deplored Alexander's decision to throw himself 'into the arnls' 
of a faction, and when Alexander also had Khitrovo recalled after the latter showed 
personal interest in obtaining railway concessions, he deemed him to be playing a 
'very dangerous game.' Wary that Alexander was too weak to rid himself of Russian 
influence altogether yet, and that the Tsar would not 'run the risk of destroying 
Russian influence,' by breaking with the Liberals,58 he feared that Russia might 
'desert the P~ince' to maintain the loyalty of the Liberals.59 When Alexander even 
.56 Lascelles to Granville, 5 Oct 1881, FO 80017. 
5? Lascelles to Granville, 12 Jan 1882, FO 78/3413, No.5; see also Lascelles to Dufferin, 22 
Nov 1881, FO 80017 Lascelles to Granville, 15 Jan 1882, FO 78/3413, No.8. 
5 ' . Lascelles to Granville, 15 Dec 1881, FO 80017. 
59 Lascelles to Granville, 13 Dec 1881, ibid. 
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alienated the Conservatives within his own clique, Lascelles formed a yet lower view 
of his statesmanship, leading him to lament Alexander's 'weak and vacillating' nature 
and lack of 'decision of character'. As early as December 1881, he warned Dufferin 
'that the state of things here will very soon call for the serious attention of Europe.' 60 
The p~tched-up resolution to this fresh crisis only came after a brief attempt to 
reconcile with the Liberals (probably on Russia's advice),61 and fell down after the 
Prince took fresh measures against Liberal constitutional agitation, including the 
arrest of Zankov,62 (which Lascelles thought to be another 'egregious blunder'). 63 
Thereafter, Alexander resigned himself to calling on the assistance of two Russian 
Generals; Sobolev (Minister President and Minister of the Interior) and President of 
the Council, and Kaulbars (Minister of War) to maintain himself in power, and 
Russian influence in Bulgaria reached its zenith. 
The period following the coup d'etat was thus a painful time for Lascelles. 
Inevitably the diplomat was conscious of Britain's (and thus his own) growing 
isolation in the region which, in the words of one historian, became 'obvious' after the . 
constitutional crisis. With the Dreikaiserbund firmly established, both traditional 
Anglo-Austrian co-operation in the Balkans and the Concert were 'over'; 64 and with 
the British Government's hands elsewhere tied by the occupation of Egypt, Graves' 
memoirs accurately summarize Lascelles' feelings at this time, for while holding a 
low estimate of Batten berg's suitability for his job, he deeply sympathised with the 
Prince's plight privately, but the lack of clear official support meant he was unable to 
60 Lascelles to·Dufferin, 13 Dec 1881, FO 80017. 
61 Lascelles to Granville, 26 Feb 1882, FO 80017; Khitrovo was accordingly ordered by the 
Tsar not to meddle in Bulgarian affairs. Crampton, p. 61. 
62 See Crampton, p. 62. 
63 Lascelles to Granville, 26 Feb 1882, FO 80017. 
64 Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone and the Concert, p.311-312. Lowe emphasises that it was 
really Bismarck's dominance and not necessarily Gladstone's attitude which determined 
British isolation. Lowe, Reluctant imperialists, i, p. 21, 25. 
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challenge Russia's 'preponderating influence' in Bulgaria, and thus: 'Lascelles had to 
content himself for the present with keeping his Government fully informed .. .in the 
hopes that events would justify the adoption of a somewhat more spirited attitude. ,65 
His exasperation was increased by other matters, specifically by his failure to 
obtain satisfaction for Britain's one significant business interest in Bulgaria in the 
prevailing political uncertainty. Under Article X of the Treaty of Berlin, the Bulgarian 
Government were forced to honour the Porte's outstanding financial obligations 
towards the British-built Varna-Rustchuk railway. 66 Lascelles, a middle man in the 
interminable talks between the railway company and the Bulgarian Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs,67 was unsuccessful in inducing the short-lived, politically unstable, 
and impecunious Bulgarian administrations to honour Turkey's old financial 
obligations. The railway company were equally if not more at fault in artificially 
inflating the value of the stock which, Lascelles fully realised, made the Bulgarian 
Government, also facing pressure from Russia and Austria to build other railway 
lines, disinclined to honour their debts.68 As Lascelles told one colleague, it was 
difficult to get Ministers to deal with other questions while they were 'so engrossed 
with the political state of the country.'69 By mid-I883 Lascelles even suggested to 
Granville that he might be instructed to leave Sofia if the Government continued their 
delaying tactics. 70 
In the first half of his period as Agent, Lascelles saw little chance of obtaining 
influence over Alexander which might enable him to advise a course which would 
65 . 
Graves, p. 52. 
66 For a history of the negotiations from 1878 to 1884, see PP (1884) Correspondence 
respecting Claims of Rustchuk and Varna Railway Company under Article X of Treaty of 
, Berlin[C.3931], passim. 
67 G ' raves, p. 63. 
68 See memo by Lascelles, 17 Oct 1883, FO 80017. 
69 Lascelles to Brophy, 19 Nov 1883, ibid. 
70 Lascelles to Granville, 13 Oct 1883, ibid. 
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satisfy Gladstonian Liberalism. After the Prince's failed attempt to conciliate 
Zankov's party in February 1882, Granville telegraphed his Agent to enquire whether 
he was 'able to give [the Prince] advice in a suitable manner' and whether the Prince 
was 'willing to take it',1' Lascelles replied that Alexander Prince was 'not .. .likely to 
listen willingly to anything which did not agree with his personal opinions.'72 
However, Lascelles' status as Her Majesty's representative in Bulgaria afforded 
him some notable compensations. Alone of the monarchs of Europe, Queen Victoria 
had continually shown sympathy for Alexander during the time following his coup 
d' etat, for which the Prince was highly grateful, 73 and this enabled Lascelles to build 
up a reserve of goodwill with the Prince who increasingly came to seek his advice. 
III 
In mid-1883, a sudden tum of events in Bulgarian politics reversed Lascelles' 
fortunes. The two Generals, whose assistance Alexander had sought in 1882, used 
their positions to assume a dictatorial style of governing and to advance Russian 
interests in Bulgaria, 74 while continuing the tradition of Russia's Agents by throwing 
their weight behind the Bulgarian Liberals, and supporting their demands for a return 
to constitutional Government .75 Their behaviour became increasingly galling to 
Battenberg who at first sought to encourage them into engineering their own 
downfall, (a tactic Lascelles deemed to be 'very short sighted' in the face of Russia's 
. 71 Granville to Lascelles [tel.], 10 Feb 1882, FO 80017. 
72 Lascelles to Granville, 26 Feb 1882, ibid. 
73 See Lascelles to Granville, 2 Nov 1880, ibid. 
74 Lascelles to Granville, 7 April 1883, ibid. 
75 Crampton, pp.66-67; see also Lascelles to Granville 16 May 1883, FO 78/3528, No. 40. 
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well-known influence over Bulgaria's army 76), and then, unsuccessfully, to request 
the Tsar to withdraw them, while he was on a visit to Moscow in May. 77 Tli~se tactics 
having failed, Alexander resolved that he 'might do better' to return to the old 
constitutional system, and in so doing ally with Liberals and Conservatives to 
overthrow the Generals and diminish Russia's influence.78 
In reality, the Prince faced little choice about returning to the constitution. 
Russia's new Agent at Sofia, Jonin, who arrived in late August and assumed a 
hectoring tone with the increasingly unreliable Prince, had demanded he relinquish his 
full Powers;79 but Alexander was no longer willing to act at Russia's behest -since 
1881, his relations with the new Tsar, Alexander III, had markedly deteriorated and, 
while in Moscow, he had openly criticised Russian policy. This added to the Tsar's 
existing personal antipathy towards Battenberg, and disapproval at his plans to marry 
a Gennan princess and tighten his Hohenzollern affiliations.8o 
Lascelles was aware that Alexander's dismissal of the Generals risked Russian 
retaliation, even an attempt to depose him.8) However, the Prince's volte face and his 
preparedness to adopt constitutional government while loosening Russian influence, 
was naturally to Britain's advantage. Thus Lascelles encouraged the Prince on his 
return to Sofia to acquiesce in a return to constitutional Government in exchange for 
support against the Generals 82 and to proceed in his plan to reduce the size of 
Bulgaria's anny and break Russia's influence by diminishing the authority of the 
76 Lascelles to Granville, 10 March 1883, FO 80017 .Lascelles also pointed out the Generals 
would only drag Alexander down with them and be replaced by other equally overbearing 
Ministers. Ibid. 
77 Crampton, pp. 67-68 Although the Tsar refused to oblige the Generals with Alexander's 
abdication, he was persuaded that the 1881 system was ripe for change. 
78 Crampton, pp.62-64. 
79 Lascelles to Granville, 30 Aug 1883, FO 78/3528, No. 67. 
80 M.S. Anderson, p.229. 
81 Lacelles to Granville, 7 April 1883, FO 80017. 
82 Lascelles to Granville, 2, 6 & 21 Aug 1883, FO 78/3528, No.'s 56,58 & 63. 
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Minister for War. He also urged the leading Liberals to work for conciliation between 
Bulgaria's parties. His reasoning was simple: as he told all concerned, Bulgaria had to 
resist becoming a 'Russian Province'. 83 
Yet, as in 1881, Lascelles' tone differed from that of his political masters. 
Naturally, given his past behaviour, a cloud hung over the sincerity of the Prince's 
intentions towards the constitution, especially after Alexander revealed his objections 
to a full return to universal suffrage and insisted on retaining powerful a second 
Chamber. Indeed Lascelles speculated that he might be planning to double-cross both 
sides, by ridding himself of the Generals on the pretext of a return to constitutional 
government, then make his own terms with the Generals over the constitution, which 
only led him to further urge Alexander to 'frankly accept' a return to the 
Constitution.84. He personally disbelieved that the Prince intended to go so far as 
this,85 but his words had an effect on Gladstone, who thought the Prince 'little better 
than a fool' for venturing to restore Bulgarian liberties merely 'under the pretext of 
opposing Russia' .86 He was dissatisfied with Alexander's system of double election 
and limited suffrage and argued 'that he can only fight the Russians ... by a frankly 
popular policy. ,87 For these reasons, Lascelles was instructed to say that Britain would 
only morally support Alexander ifhe had popular backing, and fostered 'freedom and 
justice' in Bulgaria.88 
Gladstone was especially disturbed that Lascelles's approach over Bulgaria 
did not appear to fully complement his own vie~s.89 Having for a long time failed to 
83 Lascelles to Granville, 1,2 & 3 Sept 1883, FO 78/3529, No.'s 68-70. 
84 Lascelles to Granville, 23 August 1883, FO 80017. 
85 Lascelles to Granville, 18 Oct 1883, FO 78/3529, No. 102 . 
• 86 Gladstone to Granville, 8 Sept 1883, Ramm, ii, p. 85, No.1 097. 
87 Gladstone to Granville, 12 Oct 1883, ibid, pp. 98- 99, No. 1120. 
88 Granville to Lascelles [tel.], 7 Sept 1883, FO 78/3527, No. 56, and Gladstone to Granville, 
21 Sept 1883, ibid, No, 1104, pp.89-90. 
89 Gladstone to Granville, 12 Oct 1883, ibid, pp. 98- 99, No. 1120. 
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detect 'any overflowing sympathy with freedom' in Lascelles' concise despatches on 
the situation90, he protested to Granville that he feared the agent miscomprehended 
the importance Britain attached to Alexander's sincerity,91 and went as far as saying 
that he apparently had 'no eyes except for the Prince & the Russians,' and did not see 
'that there is a Bulgarian people,' but seemed 'mechanically' to transmit what 
Granville said on the subject 'without understanding it.' He privately questioned 
Lascelles' 'value' as an agent and wanted to learn more of his 'real mind' than was 
revealed in his writings92 
Gladstone's comment is instructive not only of the Agents' minimal reporting 
style, but also in highlighting the key difference between Lascelles' approach and that 
of the Liberal leader: the latter was preoccupied with attaining the principle of the 
restoration of constitutional Government as an end in itself, while Lascelles as a 
diplomat emphasised the stabilising effect the Prince's action would have on 
Bulgarian politics and its effect in reducing dependency on Russia, and its overall 
advantage for Britain in calming down the Balkans. 
Gladstone's criticism of Lascelles certainly reflected a truth about this 
aristocratic diplomat's narrow focus on high political tactics, to the exclusion of the 
Bulgarian 'people', although in a sense both were concerned with freedom; the Prime 
Minister with personal political freedoms, Lascelles with freeing Bulgaria from 
excessive Russian interference. This latter point can be further demonstrated by the 
change which the Agent's opinions of the Liberal leader, Zankov, underwent in 1883. 
In the past he had seen Zankov as a trouble maker for colluding with Russian Agents, 
but now he recognised he was unwilling to exchange 'the domination of the Turk for 
90 Gladstone to Granville, 18 Oct 1881, Ramm, i, p. 304, No. 557. 
91 Gladstone to Granville, 4 Sept 1883, Ramm, ii, pp. 82-83, No.1 094. 
92 See Gladstone to Granville, 13 Oct 1883, Ramm, ii, p.lOO, No. 1123. Lascelles' leave was 
cancelled however. See Lascelles to Dufferin, 3 Nov 1883, FO 80017. 
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the despotism of Russia', and told Dufferin: 'As far as I can judge he is really a patriot 
and he will not allow Bulgaria to become a Russian province ifhe can possibly avoid 
it'. He noted Zankov's preparedness to co-operate with Alexander to achieve this end, 
despite having suffered much at his hands.93 Lascelles soon deemed Zankov to have 
shown 'much more statesmanlike qualities than I expected of him,' and gave him 
much of the credit,94 for having 'played his cards very cleverly' in inducing 
Alexander to dismiss the Generals and return to the Constitution.95 
Whatever Gladstone's reservations, Lascelles' views were also more representative 
of those of the professional British foreign policy elite. Edmond Fitzmaurice, the 
Liberal Parliamentary Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, and who was something of 
an Eastern specialist, privately confessed to Lascelles that he and 'many others' in the 
Foreign Office· had read his 'very able and interesting despatches' with 'great interest' 
and hoped that Zankov would 'succeed in outwitting the foreigners.'96 At 
Constantinople, meanwhile, Dufferin hoped to support the Prince's efforts to diminish 
Russian influence by urging the Sultan that by winning the confidence of both 
Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia he could create 'a far stronger barrier against Russia 
than any number of fortresses in the Balkans,'97 and together with Lascelles he also 
worked to foster more cordial personal relations between the Prince and the Sultan.98 
Lascelles also had a very distinguished ally in the person of Queen Victoria, 
who gave Alexander her unequivocal backing. Frustrated atthe Liberal Government's 
insinuations that the Prince had not acted in accordance with his subjects' wishes, she 
argued to Gr~nville that the Generals posed a far larger threat to Bulgaria's liberty 
93 . Lascelles to Dufferin, 3 Nov 1883, FO 80017 . 
. 94 Lascelles to Fitzmaurice, 17 Oct 1883, ibid. 
95 Lascelles to Dufferin, 3 Nov 1883, ibid 
96 Fitzmaurice to Lascelles, 2 Oct 1883, ibid. 
97 Dufferin to Lascelles, 7 Dec 1883, ibid. 
98 Lascelles to Dufferin, 21 Dec 1883, ibid. 
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than the Prince himself, and asserted that much of what Alexander had done accorded 
with Lascelles' advice.99 She incensed Gladstone by sending a telegram directly from 
Balmoral urging the Government to give Alexander moral support against the 
Generals, and by warning the Prince to return to the constitution in whatever form to 
thwart Russia. Her intervention also resulted in the toning down of instructions to 
Lascelles which appeared to accuse the Prince of acting without due regard to popular 
feeling, but which were sent out merely expressing the hope he would act 'in a spirit 
of reliance on the confidence & attachment' to his subjects, and promising moral 
support. 100 Gladstone was unimpressed at the Queen conducting her 'own foreign 
policy' 101. However, her views reflected a strand of foreign policy thinking which, in 
spite of Gladstone's premiership, dominated at the time and which Lascelles himself 
still fundamentally adhered to. Even Granville could appreciate the force of the 
Queen's fear that the Russians wanted to depose Alexander. 102 
Ultimately, the Prince's actions justified Lascelles' optimism that he could 
diminish Russian influence while restoring popular liberties. In September he 
reconciled with the Bulgarian political parties over the constitution in order to expel 
the Generals,103 and after limited constitutional changes in December 1883 in line 
with Alexander's thinking,104 the Prince eventually approved the re-establishment of 
99 Sir Henry Ponsonby to Granville, 25 Oct 1883, G.B. Buckle (ed.), The letters a/Queen 
Victoria, Second series, vol. iii, pp. 447-448. 
100 The telegram read: 'We must help Prince of Bulgaria with moral support. Russian conduct 
outrageous.' Queen [teL] to Granville, 1 Sept 1883; As a consequence Granville had agreed to 
despatch a telegram to Lascelles on 7 Sept, 'offering Alexander moral support'. All this is 
taken from Ramm, II, pp.82-83; For the toning down of instructions, see Granville to 
Gladstone, 31 Oct 1883, Ramm, ii, p.111, No. 1142, and ibid, p.111 for the further details of 
this dispute.For the Prince's grateful response to the Queen's support, see Lascelles to 
Granville, 13 Dec 1883, FO 80017 . 
. 101 Gladstone to Granville, 26 Dec 1883, Ramm, ii, No. 1195, p.138. 
102 Granville to the Queen, 13 Oct 1883, G.E. Buckle (ed.), The letters a/Queen Victoria, 
Second series, vol. iii, p. 446. 
103 Lascelles to Granville, 18 and 19 Sept 1883, FO 78/3529, No.'s 77-81. 
104 Crampton, pp. 74-76. 
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the old constitution in early 1884.105 Russian influence was not completely curbed, for 
Battenberg had to acquiesce in yet another Minster of War (Cantacuzene) being sent 
by Russia, but the new appointee proved co-operative.106 
IV 
After seeing his old colleague on leave in mid-1884, Wilfrid Blunt wrote in his diary 
that Lascelles was currently' superintending the growth of liberty' in Bulgaria. I 07 As 
has been illustrated, this was in fact more a reflection of Gladstone's priorities than 
Lascelles's. As in Egypt, the latter focussed little on the Bulgarians as a nation in his 
first five years there, but rather on Great Power politics and British interests, hence 
Gladstone's negative criticism of him for an unduly narrow focus on the 'Prince and 
the Russians'. However other diplomats such as Dufferin, who perceived Battenberg 
to be central to solving the Bulgarian riddle, deemed Lascelles 'to have been most 
successful in your management of affairs and in the way you have dealt with the 
Prince.' 108 Central to this successful 'management' were two factors: the maintenance 
of a peaceful status quo, and the preservation of Britain's perceived interests. In the 
period 1881-1886, given the collapse of the European Concert, the status quo was 
largely maintained by the Conservative Powers, at the expense of Britain, but within 
this framework, Lascelles was successful in maintaining British interests in Bulgaria. 
For while his traditional concentration on high politics and High Society might 
lend credence to the description of him as an adherent of an old style of personal 
diplomacy, giyen Britain's isolation in the Balkans there was something to be said for 
.105 Laseelles to Granville, 7 Jan 1884, FO 78/3638, No.1. 
106 Laseelles to Dufferin, 29 Feb 1884, FO 80017. 
107 Wilfrid Seawen Blunt, Gordon at Khartoum, (London, 1911) diary entry 14 May 1884, 
p.243. 
108 Dufferin to Laseelles, 23 Oct 1883, FO 80017. 
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cultivating influence with Bulgaria's ruler. The Prince remained hurt at Austria's and 
Germany's lack of support for him, and their complicity with Russia. l09 In'October 
1884 Bismarck personally reproached Alexander for quarrelling with Russia and told 
him he should accept that sooner or later Bulgaria would become a Russian province. 
Among those few people who sought to encourage the Prince to remain in Bulgaria 
were the Prince of Wales and Queen Victoria. I 10 Lascelles's aristocratic roots and 
upbringing, and his personable style, made him the natural instrument for this policy 
of dynastic solidarity. This contrasted with the personal stance of Gladstone, who 
maintained a lack of sympathy for the Prince. For even while acknowledging that 
Battenberg's isolation sprang from Great Power hostility, his conviction remained that 
Alexander had brought this on himself, and he continued to question whether he was 
really working-'frankly for & with his people?' III 
However, while Lascelles' decision to conduct a form of personal diplomacy 
did not always command unanimous approval, he showed himself shrewd in the short 
term by helping to preserve British influence while shoring up the rickety concern of 
the Bulgarian status quo. While Gladstone's policy of maintaining the Concert, both 
in Bulgaria and elsewhere, led to no notable success, as Russo-Bulgarian relations 
deteriorated and Russia's Dreikaiserbund partners refused to counsel the Prince, 
Lascelles' standing with Alexander increased with the Prince's gratitude for Queen 
Victoria's support. In late 1883 Alexander thanked Lascelles for England's advice 'at 
a time when both Germany and Austria were treating him with the coldest 
indifference.' ~ 12 In early 1884 the Prince even asked the Agent 'whether he could not 
109 Lascelles to Granville, 24 Sept & 9 Nov 1883, FO 78/3529, No. 's 85 & 113; also 
. Lascelles to Granville, 3 Oct 1883, FO 800/7. 
110 Lascelles to Granville, 29 Oct 1884, ibid. 
III Gladstone to Granville, 10 Nov 1884, Ramm, ii, p.282, No. 1472. 
112 Dufferin to the Queen, 13 Dec 1883, G.B. Buckle (ed.), Letters a/Queen Victoria, Second 
series, Vol. iii, p. 460. 
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become a naturalized Englishman.' 113 In the face of Prime Ministerial antipathy, 
Lascelles continued to believe that supporting Battenberg was Britain's best insurance 
in Bulgaria; this conviction, and a relish for the independent role he had built up as 
Alexander's confidant, perhaps, explains why, in March 1885, he took the bold 
professional risk ofturning down Granville's offer of the Secretaryship at 
Constantinople. He informed his chief that, although the residence would be 'much 
pleasanter' and the work 'interesting, and important', after five years of independence 
he did 'not quite like the idea of no longer being my own master,' and also thought it 
'a step backwards' financially. 114 Significantly, the Prince was the first person whom 
Lascelles told of his decision to stay - without first gaining authorisation to do so. In 
his own reasoning, this tactic was designed to cheer Alexander up, but it won him the 
chastisement of Granville. I IS It was ultimately royal support - specifically a protest 
from the Queen against Granville's attempt to remove Alexander's 'only reliable 
friend' - which determined that Lascelles remained in Bulgaria. I 16 While springing 
from a purely sentimental motive, this protest proved to be highly prescient in light of 
events which were to follow, and was ultimately propitious for Lascelles' own career. 
1\3 Lascelles to Dufferin, 4 Feb 1884, FO 80017. 
114 Lascelles to Granville [tel.], 7 March 1885, FO 80017, in response to Granville to 
Lascelles [tel.], March 1885, ibid. 
115 Granville to Lascelles [tel.], 8 March 1885, ibid. Granville to the Queen, 10 Mar 1885, 
G.E. Buckle (ed.), The letters o/Queen Victoria" Second series, Vol. iii, p. 621. Lascelles 
was upset at Granville's disapproval (Lascelles to Granville, 9 March 1885, FO 80017). 
Lascelles' old chief Paget agreed with Lascelles' reasoning though; Thornton, the new man at 
Constantinople, was likely to be 'a fixture' leaving Lascelles less opportunities of being 
. charge d'affaires, although he warned Lascelles might have hurt his chances of promotion. 
Paget to Lascelles, 2Apri11885, FO 80017. 
116 The Queen to Granville [tel.] 9 Mar 1885 in G.E. Buckle (ed.), The letters o/Queen 
Victoria, p.621. 
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'Perfectly devoted to Sandro': Lascelles and the Bulgarian crisis of 1885-1886 
I 
In the autumn of 1885 Bulgarian nationalists in Eastern Rumelia expelled their 
Governor General and proclaimed the province's union with Bulgaria, and Prince 
Alexander, anxious both to retain his own authority and to control the revolutionary 
movement from spreading elsewhere, placed himself at its head, and requested to be 
recognised as ruler of the two Bulgarias by the European Powers!. Thus a localised 
crisis quickly became an international one which threatened to re-open the Eastern 
Question, and naturally led the occupant of the British Agency at Sofia to assume a 
heightened importance. 
The event of unification came as no surprise to professional diplomats; 
Lascelles in particular had long viewed it as inevitable, and the Prince had long ago 
informed him of the action he would take when it arose in order to maintain his 
throne? The timing however was a surprise; in the summer of 1885 most agents in 
Sofia and Philippopolis were on leave (including Lascelles, who was ordered back to 
Sofia as the news broke). 3 
Equally unpredicted was the manner in which union had been carried out. 
Following Alexander's ejection of the Generals, Russia was no longer eager to see it 
1 M.S. Anderson, The Eastern Question (London, 1966), pp.230-1, E.D. Steele, Lord 
Salisbury: a political biography (London, 1999), p.181; Telegram from Prince Alexander to 
the British Government, 21 Sept 1885,in Parliamentary Papers, Turkey No.1: 
Correspondence respecting Affairs of E. Roumelia and Bulgaria (1886) rc.4612} ( hereafter 
referred to as Turkey No.1 (1886)), No.l2. . 
.2 See e.g. Lascelles to Granville, 18 May 1880, FO 78/3118, No. 84; Lascelles to Tenterden, 
18 May 1880, FO 80017. 
3 See Paget to Salisbury, 20 Sept 1885, Turkey No.1 (1886), No.9; Graves, p. 63; Lascelles 
to Salisbury, 24 August 1885, FO 78/3769, No.59; Kennedy to Lascelles, 23 Oct 1885, 
Lascelles to Major Bigge 3 Oct 1885, and Lascelles to Salisbury, 1 Oct 1885, FO 80017. 
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realised under his aegis.4 At Franzensbad in August 1885, Russia's Foreign Minister, 
Giers, had advised the Prince to maintain the territorial status quo in order to 
conciliate Russia.s Consequently after the September revolution, the Tsar withdrew all 
Russian officials in Bulgaria's army.6 By contrast Lord Salisbury, who had returned to 
the British Foreign Office in the summer, decided to support Battenberg's coup. An 
understanding of Salisbury's policy is crucial in determining Lascelles's attitude and 
role in the unfolding crisis. Though diametrically opposed to his decision in 1878 to 
oppose the creation of a 'Big Bulgaria', in essence Salisbury'S response was a 
continuation of his aim of blocking Russian influence in the Balkans. Since he had 
last been in office, Turkey had failed to garrison her Western border as she had 
pledged to do at the Congress of Berlin, and a big Bulgaria cleared of Russian 
influence would help plug the defensive gap.7 By condemning the union Salisbury 
would, conversely, only aid Russia in replacing Battenberg and re-asserting her 
influence in the Principality.s Salisbury's policy priorities therefore differed 
dramatically from those of Gladstone, even if ultimately his language had a 
-
Gladstonian hue. When in October a Conference of Ambassadors assembled at 
Constantinople to debate the question of union, Salisbury was determined there 
4 Queen Victoria to Salisbury, 6 Oct 1885, in George Earle Buckle (ed.), The Letters of Queen 
Victoria, Third Series, Vol. i, (London, 1930), p. 698. 
5 Charles Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan nationalism: Russian influence in the internal 
affairs of Bulgaria and Serbia, 1879-1886, (University of California Press, 1958), p.160. 
Nicholas de Giers (1820-1895) was Russia's Foreign Minister from 1882 to 1895. 
6 M.S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, p.231. 
7 See Salisbury to Paget, 28 Sept 1885, Turkey No.1 (1886), No. 80; W.N. Medlicott, 'The 
Powers and the Unification of the Two Bulgarias, 1885,' English Historical Review, (1939), 
part i, p. 69 & idem, part ii, p.268;. Charles Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 
1879-1886, (London, 1958), p. 218.; Lowe, The Reluctant Imperialists, Vol. i, p.100. 
Furthermore Alexander's annexation of Eastern Rumelia no longer threatened to repeat the 
'nightmare of 1878, when the bloated Bulgaria of the San Stefano boundaries had stretched to 
shores of the Aegean, and directly threatened Britain's Mediterranean interests. Salisbury to 
Walsham, 28 Sept 1886, Turkey No.1 (1886), No. 79. 
8 See Salisbury to Lyons, 16 October 1885, in Lady Gwendolen Cecil, Life Of Robert 
Marquis of Salisbury, Vol iii, 1880-1886 (London, 1931), p. 245. 
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should be no attempt to return to the status quo ante, but instead insisted that the 
wishes of the populations of the two Bulgarias should be consulted.9 
Salisbury's policy did, of course, match with Lascelles's opinions and his 
actions since the time of Alexander's coup d'etat, and the 'man on the spot' became a 
willing executor of his new chiefs Eastern policy. It was in a sense a vindication of 
his own decision to back the Prince from 1881 onwards. Appreciating Lascelles's 
influence with Alexander, Salisbury ordered his Agent to accompany him 'wherever 
His Highness may be'. \0 Initially, Lascelles was 'astonished' at this order which 
amounted to 'something very like a recognition of the Union,' and was self conscious 
that his position would be 'somewhat anomalous and rather delicate', but thought his 
presence would be an encouragement to Battenberg and a deterrent to Russia. 11 
Yet while Battenberg's action looked set to guarantee Britain's interests in the 
region, it also held potential repercussions for peace. No diplomat could ignore the 
possibility that either Turkey might challenge Bulgaria's expansion, or that other 
Balkan states might seek compensatory territorial acquisitions; 12 as Lascelles put it to 
the Bulgarian Foreign Minister, Tsanow, the Great Powers would 'scarcely ... be 
grateful to the Bulgarians' if Serbia and Greece acted to reopen the whole Eastern 
9 Salisbury to White, Turkey No.1 (1886), 25 Oct 1885. No. 340. 
10 Salisbury to Lascelles, 30 Sept 1885 Turkey No.1 (1886), No.1 02. & Lascelles to 
Salisbury [te1.] 1 Oct 1885, Salisbury to Lascelles [te1.] 2 October 1885, ibid, No. 's 110 & 
113. 
II The quotes are from Lascelles to White, 12 Oct 1885, and Lascelles to Salisbury 1 Oct 
1885, FO 80017; Austria would not send their Agent to Philippopolis as it would give implicit 
sanction to Alexander's proceedings. Enclosure in Paget to Lascelles, 30 Sept 1885, ibid. On 
the issue of Russian objections, see Grosvenor to Salisbury 13 Oct 1885, Salisbury to 
Grosvenor 13 Oct 1885, Grosvenor to Salisbury, 17 October 1885, and White to Salisbury 20 
. October 1885, Turkey No.1 (1886), No.'s 231,240,323 & 368; White to Lascelles, l3 Oct 
1885, Lascelles MSS, National Archives, Kew, FO 800/6. same to same, 27 Oct 1885, FO 
80017. 
12 See Lowe, p.l 0 1. On 5 October the Powers fonnally warned Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece to 
maintain peace. See Salisbury to Rumbold, 5 Oct 1885, Turkey No.1 (1886), No. 154. 
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Question. 13 Salisbury did not, unlike Austria and Germany, go to the lengths of 
insisting the status quo ante being restored to placate the other Balkan nat[6ns,14 but 
he worried about a possible Turco-Bulgarian or Serbo-Bulgarian war, and the wider 
implications this might have for a future map of the Balkans in which Turkey 
disappeared and was replaced by unstable minor Balkan states. Mindful of this 
potential risk - for Salisbury held few illusions about Turkey's resilience,15 - he 
warned the Bulgarians not to be 'fastidious' in conciliating the Sultan,16 and through 
Lascelles, he advised Alexander to demonstrate his worthiness to govern the two 
Bulgarias by 'prevent[ing] the conflagration from spreading,' - through which he 
would also win the gratitude of Austria. 17 
The cohesion between Salisbury's actions and Lascelles's views during the 
crisis is easily explained. Salisbury's line ofthinking in the early stages of the crisis 
was strengthened by the advice of two men; William White, the ad-interim, anti-
Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, who counselled Salisbury on the advantages 
to Turkey of a Bulgarian buffer state and had a strong impact on his policy,18 and 
Augustus Paget, Britain's ambassador at Vienna and 'one of the few Tories in the 
higher ranks of the diplomatic service', who had met Salisbury in June 1885 and 
confirmed the latter the efficacy in his intention to align with Austria against Russia in 
the threat to the Berlin settlement in the Balkans. 19 White and Paget also had an 
impact on Lascelles' s views - especially the latter, who had been his chief at Rome, 
and who accommodated Lascelles in Vienna en route to Sofia in September. 
13 Lascelles to. Salisbury, 3 Oct, FO 78/3770, No. 71. 
14 See Lowe, Reluctant Imperialists, p.l 00. 
IS For Salisbury, the Berlin Treaty had been intended merely as a 'stay of execution'; Steele, 
Lord Salisbury, p. 108.· . 
. 16 Salisbury to Lascelles 16 Oct 1885, Turkey No.1 (1886), No. 261. 
7' II S I' b Salisbury to Lascelles, 25 Sept 1885, FO 80017. See e.g. Lasce es to a IS ury, 5 Oct 
19885, FO 78/3770, No.77. 
Lowe, Reluctant Imnerialsts, p 100; Otte, '''Floating Downstream"?', p.l1 0 19 r 
E.D. Steele, Salisbury, p. 180. 
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Lascelles clearly understood and agreed with the line Salisbury had set out. 
His confidence in this policy was helped by a finn personal belief that Alexander, 
anxious to secure legitimacy for his act, constituted a force of order rather than 
instability in the Balkans. One key piece of evidence was the Prince's apparent ability 
to control the revolution. The bloodless way union had been carried out also gave 
Lascelles 'a very much more favourable opinion of the Bulgarians' than hitherto. 20 
However, he knew less - and was consequently less confident -about 
Bulgaria's neighbours, especially Serbia.21 Like Salisbury, he wanted to assist 
Alexander in securing his gains while securing the delicate new status quo. In late 
September Alexander had sketched a potential Serbo-Bulgarian entente, whereby the 
two countries might patch up their differences by dividing Macedonia into agreed 
'spheres of action' .22 No doubt he shared this idea with Lascelles, who on 5 October 
wrote privately to Salisbury proposing a very similar scheme. At its heart was the 
widespread fear that Turkey's 'weakness' provided 'an invitation' to Serbia and 
Greece to carve up Macedonia, and that the ensuing conflict could prompt Austria and 
Russia (still alliance partners) into a joint occupation of the Balkans. To prevent this 
eventuality, Lascelles thought Austria might, ifpersuaded to renounce her own 
designs on Salonika in exchange for compensation elsewhere, allow Bulgaria, Serbia 
and Greece to divide Macedonia between them, with the latter two countries taking 
'the lion's share', and Bulgaria seeking territory further East. 23 
Lascelles' willingness to envisage a division of the Balkans was contentious in 
light of Britain's Treaty obligations to Turkey- and in proposing it he confessed to 
20 Lascelles to Salisbury, 1 Oct 1885, FO 80017. See also: Lascelles to Salisbury,I,3 & 5 Oct 
1885, FO 78/3770, No's 70, 71 & 7;. Lascelles to Salisbury, 5 Oct 1885, FO 80017. 
21 Lascelles to Salisbury, 5 Oct 1885, FO 80017. 
22 Egon Caesar Corti, Alexander von Battenberg, (London, 1954), p.I72. 
23 Lascelles to Salisbury, 5 Oct 1885, FO 80017. 
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sounding 'impertinent' .24 However, he was responding to changes in the international 
situation, and to British policy. Lascelles' letter reflected Salisbury's and Paget's 
-" 
anxiety to use the Bulgarian upheaval to detach Austria from Russia and revive the 
Anglo-Austrian entente which had fallen into disuse during Gladstone's premiership. 
While a guest of Paget's at Vienna, Lascelles had talked with Austria's Foreign 
Minister, KaInoky, who was anxious 'to prevent the contagion spreading to 
Macedonia' and who had not appeared completely to oppose the idea of recognising 
personal union when Lascelles proposed it to him. Both Paget and Lascelles hoped to 
gain Austrian support hereafter. 25 Although ultimately this was not forthcoming, 
Lascelles was obviously influenced by this encounter to espouse Alexander's Balkan 
entente as his own, which had the bonus of avoiding a possible Austro-Russian 
partition of the Balkans, no distant threat to Britain's interests.26 
However the pace of events rendered such schemes purely academic. Firstly, 
the Dreikaiserbund posed a united front in rejecting union at the conference of 
ambassadors, and then King Milan of Serbia rejected the peace negotiations, which 
Alexander attempted to open with him and on 14 November found a pretext to declare 
war on Bulgaria,27 leaving diplomats like Lascelles little scope for action. 
24 Ibid. 
25 See enclosed extract of confidential despatch from Paget to Salisbury, 29 Sept 1885, in 
Paget to LascelIes, 30 Sept 1885, FO 80017, and the aforementioned letter itself. 
26 The living example of the Dreikaiserbund, and the still-recent precedents of the Austro-
Russian Reichstadt agreement (1876) and Budapest conventions (1877) were probably 
sufficient to merit concern about the two Powers coming to an agreement over mutual spheres 
of influence in the Balkans, and solving Eastern questions, to Britain's detriment. 
27 On the breakdown in negotiations see e.g. Lascelles to White, 12 Oct 1885, FO 80017; 
Lascelles to Salisbury, 13 Oct 1885, FO 78/3770, No.90; LasceIIes to Salisbury, 19 & 20 
October 1885, FO 78/3770, No.'s 97, 99 & 103; Graves to Salisbury, 3 Nov 1885, and 
Wyndham to Salisbury, 10 Nov 1885, Turkey No.1 (1886), No.' s 441 & 42 I; Lascelles to . 
Salisbury 14 Nov 1885, FO 78/3770, No. 135, and tel 63 of same day, FO 78/3772. 
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II 
Unexpectedly, war brought the gains for Bulgaria (and for Britain) which diplomacy 
"' had yet proved unable to deliver. On 19 November, Bulgaria dramatically defeated 
Serbia at Slivnitza. The danger that Alexander might go too far was prevented by a 
threat from Austria to enter on the side of her protege, Serbia, leading all Powers to 
urge an armistice on the Prince, 28 which he reluctantly accepted on 21 December 
1885. 
While Lascelles believed the peace terms, which were decided by an 
independent military commission (and which ultimately robbed Bulgaria of her 
gains), were 'rather hard upon the Bulgarians', his overall view ofthe outcome was 
positive: he told White in late December that, 'we may congratulate ourselves upon 
the Prince's v{ctories'. 2_9 For without sacrifice of money or blood - but with a great 
deal of good fortune- Salisbury's diplomatic capital was raised while Russia's 
influence was diminished, and Lascelles believed she could only now regain it by 
force. 3o At the Constantinople Conference Russia abandoned attempts to return to the 
status quo ante,31 and her Agent, Koyander, disappeared back to St Petersburg on the 
pretext that all telegraphic correspondence had been stopped during the war, a move 
which the British Agent characterised as 'another egregious blunder' on Russia's 
part.32 The Prince meanwhile was personally 'very much disgusted' with all Powers-
excepting England.33 
28 Lascelles to Salisbury, 28 Nov 1885, FO 78/3771, No. 56; Salisbury to Lascelles, 7 Dec 
1885, FO 78/3772, Tel. 53; Lascelles to Salisbury 15 Dec, FO 78/3771, No. 197. 
29 Lascelles to White, 10 Dec 1885, FO 80017. On the Prince's acceptance of the military 
commission see also Lascelles to Salisbury 18 &22 Dec 1885, FO 78/3772, draft tel's No.'s 
99 & 105 and Salisbury to Lascelles 19 Dec 1885, FO 78/3768, draft tel. No 105. 
30 ' Lascelles to Salisbury 29 Dec 1885, FO 78/3771, No. 215. 
31 Morier to Salisbury [teL], 24 Dec 1885, Turkey No.1 (1886), No. 664. 
32 Lascelles to Salisbury, 1 Dec 1885, FO 80017. . 
33 Lascelles to Salisbury, 12 Dec 1885, ibid. 
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Bulgaria's success aided Salisbury in achieving his objective of getting Turkey 
to recognise Alexander as Governor General of Eastern Rum eli a, by a direct/ 
, 
agreement between the two Powers. 34 Both White at Constantinople and Lascelles at 
Sofia played their part in attaining this goal. During the war, Tsanow actively sought 
the latter's advice over diplomatic correspondence with the Porte, who held Bulgaria 
ultimately responsible for provoking the war,35 and once the Conference abandoned 
attempts to undo the union and sanctioned direct negotiations between Turkey and 
Bulgaria, Lascelles continued unofficially to advise the Bulgarians on negotiating 
with Turkey through December and January, work he described as 'pretty hard and 
continuous' .36 He was by now increasingly conspicuous through his association with 
Alexander, and suspicion gathered around his role. Rumours circulated that he had 
accompanied Battenberg on his military campaigns, and even attended a Council of 
Ministers at Philipopolis (the capital of Eastern RumeIia) which had decided to resist 
the Porte. In late December Gadban Effendi, Turkey's new (pro-Russian) Vakoufs 
Commissioner to Sofia, arriving to urge Alexander to assume direct negotiations with 
the Sultan, lectured the British Agent on the part he was supposedly playing, advising 
him that he should best attain a satisfactory arrangement by exerting his influence 'in 
a less ostentatious manner.' 37 The extent to which he played an active role was 
doubtless exaggerated by Gadban - whom Lascelles himself later dismissed as 'an 
infernal scoundrel & utterly unreliable,38- and for much of the autumn and winter 
34 Salisbury to Lascelles 24 Dec 1885, FO 78/3772, Tel No. 63 secret. 
5' . See Graves to Salisbury, 16 Nov 1885, and Lascelles to SalIsbury 23 Nov 1885, FO 
78/3771, No.'s 143 & 152; Lascelles to Salisbury, 17 Nov 1885, FO 80017, and Lascelles to 
Salisbury, 17 Nov 1885, FO 78/3772, Tel. No. 66. 
36 Lascelles to Paget, 7 Jan 1886, FO 80017; Lascelles was shown copies of the important 
correspondence between the Sultan and the Bulgarian Government. See e.g. Lascelles to 
Salisbury, 14 Jan 1886, FO 78/3892, No. 17. 
37 Lascelles to Salisbury, 27 Dec 1885, FO 78/3771, No. 212. 
38 Lascelles to Paget, 15 June 1886, FO 800/15. 
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Lascelles seems to have executed Salisbury's instructions rather than pull wires 
himself, but in a sense it was this perception of his role which counted more: 
-, 
What Lascelles did hereafter was to provide informal counsel, urging the 
Bulgarians to 'show the greatest possible moderation' in peace, especially towards 
Austria. He 'strongly advised' Tsanow against imputing blame to Austria for goading 
Serbia on, and did his 'best to combat' the hostility felt towards her among 
Bulgarians, arguing to Tsanow and the Prince that it was in Austria's best interests to 
be on good terms with Bulgaria.39 For while Serbia's defeat had disappointed her, he 
believed the 'destruction of Russian influence' in Bulgaria was such an 'enormous 
advantage' to her that she should support the Prince over union. 40 Lascelles clearly 
hoped to bring about a reconciliation between Austria and Bulgaria, and to this end, in 
January, he asked Paget for hints of Austrian policy. The reply was discouraging: 
KaInoky was too wary of Gladstone's impending return to office in England to take a 
part against Russia in the Balkans 'openly', but he was keen that the Prince should 
negotiate directly with the Porte over Eastern Rumelia.41 
The fruit of these negotiations, the Turco-Bulgarian agreement, was finally 
signed in Constantinople on 1 February 1886 by Tsanow, who had been sent to deal 
with the Sultan directly.42 It was again a triumph for Salisbury, who hoped that 
Turkey would recognise Alexander's administrative rights in Eastern Rumelia in 
exchange for a pledge on his part to contribute towards the defence of Turkey.43 The 
Prince was to rule Eastern Rumelia for five years, a term which was automatically 
renewable a~ the end of that period. A Turco-Bulgarian Commission would determine 
39 Lascelles to Salisbury, 12 Dec 1885, FO 800/7; same to same, 1 Dec 1885, ibid. See also 
Lascelles to Salisbury, 29 Dec 1885, FO 78/3771, No. 214), and same to same, 7 Jan 1886, 
FO 800/7. 
~ / Lascelles to Paget, 7 Jan 1886, FO 800 7. 
41 Paget to Lascelles, 19 Jan 1886, FO 800/6. 
42 White to Salisbury, 1 Feb 1886, Turkey No.2 (1886), No. 118. 
43 Salisbury to Lascelles, 24 Dec 1885, FO 78/3772, Tel. No 63 secret. 
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the changes Alexander desired to Eastern Rumelia's Organic Statute. In return 
Alexander would pledge 100,000 men to Turkey's defence, and cede villages in the 
, 
Rhodope district to the SuItan.44 With his days in office coming to an end, Salisbury 
crowned his diplomatic success by moving, with German support, to make a naval 
demonstration to deter Greece from mimicking Serbia's action. 
Lascelles greeted these developments with wholehearted approval 45_ for Lord 
Salisbury's 'splendid policy', as he termed it, had resulted in a peaceful outcome46 -
and one, of course, in Britain's interests. Moreover it was a policy which had been 
conducted against Russia - but not wholly in isolation this time. Lascelles was 
pleased that Germany, who had been very 'hostile' to England in recent years, (with 
Gladstone in charge) had joined Salisbury in taking action to prevent Greece 
breaching the· peace, 47 which in the words of Lascelles left this Balkan state with 'a 
grievance which they may howl about to their heart's content without doing anybody 
any harm. ,48 
Salisbury's success up to February 1886 in championing the Bulgarian cause 
stood in stark contrast to that of his Liberal predecessors. Thus when, following 
elections in late 1885, a Liberal majority was returned to the House of Commons, 
Lascelles, Paget and White shared their disappointment at the result. Lascelles 
confessed that he would have liked a Conservative majority in spite of his own 
Liberal convictions.49 There was general relief in the diplomatic world, which 
44, White to Salisbury, 1 Feb 1886, Turkey No.2 (1886), No. 118. 
45 Lascelles to Paget, 26 Jan 1886, FO 80017. 
46 Lascelles to White, 27 Jan 1886, ibid. 
47 Lascelles to Paget, 26 Jan 1886, ibid. 
48 Lascelles to White, 27 Jan 1886, ibid. 
49 Lascelles to White, 10 Dec 1885, ibid. 
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anticipated a change of policy, that the Turco-Bulgarian agreement had been 
concluded before Salisbury left the Foreign Office. 50 
-, 
Lascelles' diplomatic colleagues recognised the part he had played in 
facilitating this 'grand result', 51 and Salisbury was determined formally to recognise 
the support his Agent had given him. 52 In January, he received the award of Knight 
Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of St Michael and St. George 
(K.C.M.G.), much to his own astonishment - the most he had expected was the lower 
Companion of the Order of Bath (C.B.), and the K.C.M.G. was more commonly 
reserved for Ambassadors. Salisbury telegraphed him to say that 'never was honour 
better earned.' 53 
III 
The Bulgarian situation remained critical as Salisbury left office, but in one sense 
Lascelles' and Paget's worst fears about his departure were not realised - for, (to the 
relief of Lascelles especially), he was replaced not by Lord Granville, but by Lord 
Rosebery, who announced his intention to continue his predecessor's line in the 
Balkans and whose appointment also satisfied Berlin.54 
However from early 1886 to the momentous events surrounding Prince 
Alexander's abdication in September of that year, Lascelles sensed a growing drift in 
50 Paget to Lascelles, 3 Feb 1886, ibid. The list of foreign policy failures notched up by 
Gladstone's second Government gave Paget in particular 'the most gloomy foreboding' for 
Britain's future - and to his Sofia colleague, he lamented the departure of 'one of the most 
able & successful Ministers we have had during the present century' and worried at the 
'mischief th~ Liberals would do in power. Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Sir John Lumley, the British ambassador to Rome (1883-1888), heard from Eric Barrington 
at the Foreign Office that such was Salisbury's intention. Lumley to Lascelles, 17 Jan 1886, 
Spring Rice MSS, C.C.A.C., CASR II, 511. 
53 Lascelles to Paget, 26 Jan 1886, FO 80017. Original telegram not traced. 
54 Paget to Lascelles, 3 Feb 1886, ibid; Lascelles to Paget, 13 Feb 1886, ibid. Lascelles hoped 
the split in parties about the Irish and land questions would lead to a coalition government 
which would return Salisbury to the Foreign Office. Ibid. . 
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Britain's Balkan policy which he was unable personally to arrest. Of initial concern to 
him was the upcoming replacement of the fervent Russophobe William White at 
" Constantinople by Sir Frank's old Washington chief (and ex-Ambassador to St 
Petersburg), Edward Thornton, who had been appointed by Salisbury's predecessor 
Granville. Lascelles personally liked Thornton but could see that he was 'not the man' 
White was. 55 He regretted that Sir William might not be left to 'finish the business' 
of gaining Great Power ratification to the Turco-Bulgarian agreement, and he worried 
when news of Thornton's forthcoming arrival was greeted with 'jubilation' by the 
Russians.56 Fortunately, the Foreign Office shared Lascelles' opinion. Salisbury also 
did not believe Thornton was strong enough for Constantinople, an opinion which his 
successor in office shared. Salisbury had already extended White's charge 
d'affaireship,.to enable him to finish negotiations over the Turco Bulgarian 
agreement, and by the autumn of 1886 Thornton had been forcibly retired and White 
was officially appointed ambassador at Constantinople. 57 
However, following the conclusion of peace between Serbia and Bulgaria in 
March, the securing of international assent to the Turco-Bulgarian agreement did 
indeed prove troublesome: naturally enough Russia enumerated many objections. 
Anxious of increasing Russian intrigue in both Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, and 
concerned that Russia might threaten to occupy Bulgaria to prevent the arrangement 
-
being carried out, 58 Lascelles suggested to Rosebery that it might be executed 
without international sanction 'as none of the other Powers seemed inclined to raise 
any objectio?s'. Unsurprisingly, the Foreign Office thought Sir Frank's idea to be a 
55 Lascelles to Paget, 15 June 1886 FO 800/7; see also White to Lascelles, 16 June 1886, FO 
800/6. 
56 Lascelles to Paget, 27 Feb 1886, FO 800/7; Chirol to Lascelles, 18 Feb 1886, ibid. 
57 For this material, I am indebted to Dr. T.G. Otte for letting me see the relevant passages of 
manuscript from his forthcoming book, The Foreign Office Mind: The Making of British 
Foreign Policy 1865-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
58Lascelles to Rosebery, 20 Feb 1886 & Lascelles to Paget, 13 Feb 1886, FO 80017. 
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'rather a rash one' ,59 but his concerns were nonetheless borne out. Due to Russian 
objections, the military assistance clause was nullified, which fundamentally 
, 
weakened the agreement.60 Rosebery's expectation that Russia would drop her further 
objections61was not wholly realised. For example, although Russia consented to let a 
Turco-Bulgarian Commission revise Eastern Rumelia's Organic Statute in line with 
Alexander's wishes, they stipulated that its deliberations must receive Great Power 
sanction.62 Lascelles cautioned that with Russia and the Prince at loggerheads over 
union, it would be 'almost impossible to revise the organic Statute' to give 
satisfaction to both - especially, he argued, because Russia wanted 'to get rid of 
Prince Alexander' and re-establish Russian supremacy. Again, he suggested the 
arrangement should be carried out without Great Power sanction;63 again his advice 
went unheeded. 
The Prince's term of appointment also involved a protracted argument. 
Increasingly frustrated by Russian objections and intrigues within Bulgaria, 
Alexander claimed not to have known that Tsanow, when signing the agreement, had 
pledged him to a five year limit,64 and, disavowing him, refused to be bound to any 
fixed term, arguing this would 'open the door to every sort of intrigue' and challenge 
59 Lascelles to Rosebery, 13 Feb 1886, FO 78/3892, No. 56, and minute by Thomas 
Sanderson. 
60 Morier to Rosebery 11 Feb 1886; Rosebery to Malet 12 Feb 1886; Rosebery to White 12 
Feb 1886; Said Pasha to Rustem Pasha 12 Feb 1886; Rosebery to White 15 Feb 1886; White 
to Rosebery 17 Feb; White to Rosebery 18 Feb 1886, Turkey No.2 (1886), No.'s 163, 
174,.177, 179, 193,204 & 221. 
61 Rosebery to Morier 19 Feb 1886, ibid, No. 222. 
62 Rosebery to Morier 20 Feb 1886, & Morier to Rosebery 21 24, & 17 Feb 1886, ibid, No.'s 
228, 233, 25Q & .278. 
63 Lascelles to Thornton, 12 March 1886, FO 80017. 
64 Tsanow at Constantinople had insisted that the Prince be appointed Governor General 
strictly under the terms of Article XVII of the Berlin Treaty, which stipulated a limited term 
of five years. (Rosebery to Malet, 4 March 1886 Turkey No.2 (1886), No. 319). The Prince 
denied he had consented to this. (LasceUes to Rosebery, 12 March 1886. ibid, No.350), which 
led to some confusion and recrimination.; See the correspondence through March and April 
1886 ibid, passim, and private correspondence between Rosebery and Lascelles in the same 
months in FO 80017. 
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his legitimacy every five years.65 After weeks of wrangling, however,66 a firman was 
issued confirming Alexander's rule over Eastern Rumelia, but mentioning no time 
limit, to the satisfaction of the Prince. 67 
Overall, the unravelling of the Turco-Bulgarian Agreement led Alexander to 
complain of the 'feeble support' that Rosebery had given him,68 and he told Lascelles 
that his position was 'considerably damaged' by the concessions he had been forced 
to make to please the Powers.69 
IV 
The concessions the Prince was forced to make sat uneasily alongside increasing 
evidence of Russian intrigues from February 1886. 70 Warnings of Russian-sponsored 
attempts on Alexander's life came from various quarters, including from Queen 
Victoria, and Lascelles did 'all in [his] power' to warn the Prince and his aide de 
Camps of the danger.7! Lascelles was also informed that Russia was gaining by the 
lack of a strong British Ambassador at Constantinople. The source of his information 
was Valentine Chirol, a journalist whom Lascelles first had come across as an 
occasional correspondent for the Standard in 1881, and who was highly critical of 
Thornton's ineffectiveness at Constantinople. Chirol would become a lifelong family 
friend of the Lascelles. In 1886, his advice made the Agent welcome a decision to 
65 Lascelles to Rosebery, 12 March 1886, FO 78/3898 tel No. 49. 
66 Lascelles had 'never seen him so firm on any point' (Lascelles to Rosebery, 4 April 1886, 
FO 800/7). . 
67 Lascelles to Thornton, 6 May 1886, FO 800/7. 
68 Memo by Lascelles on meeting with Rosebery, 5 August 1886, ibid. 
69. Lascelles to Rosebery, 19 March 1886, FO 78/3892, No.84. 
70 Lascelles to Rosebery, 20 Feb 1886, FO 800/7; Lascelles to Rosebery, 17 Apri11886, FO 
78/3893, No. 123: 
71 Lascelles to Rosebery 20 Feb 1886, FO 800/7. On these plots, see Lascelles to Rosebery, 
[tel.], 14 Feb 1886, to Rosebery, 4 Apri11886, to Captain HM Jones, 1 June 1886, to Paget 
15 June 1886, ibid, and Lascelles to Rosebery, 19 May 1886, FO 78/3898, Tel No. 86. 
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send White back to Turkey permanently in the autumn. 72 White himself criticised his 
successor for having done much 'harm' by not pursuing a sufficiently 'energetic' 
" policy at Constantinople,73 which had allowed Russian influence to take root there. 74 
At the same time, Russia's move to fortify Batum on the Black Sea, designated an 
open port under the Treaty of Berlin, also seemed to augur a more forthright policy in 
the Near East, 75 and the situation in Bulgaria was exacerbated by the fact that, as Sir 
Frank expressed it, the Bulgarian Government seemed 'at sixes and sevens,76; 
Alexander's dispute with Tsanow over the five-year term led to the latter's 
resignation.77 This was an event which left Lascelles with mixed emotions, as he 
judged Tsanow to have been 'certainly the best Minister for F[oreign] A[ffairs] that I 
have known here', but on the other hand, this was 'not saying much', and there was 
also speculation that Tsanow had been 'bought' by the Russians while at 
Constantinople. 78 
Yet by June Lascelles' optimism led him to believe that Russia's best attempts 
to stir up a revolution against Alexander had failed. In that month, Government 
supporters were returned in fifty-nine of the eighty-nine new Eastern Rumeliate seats 
and Lascelles surmised that Russia, having lost her influence inside Bulgaria through 
'the blunders of her Agents,' could only dominate Bulgaria through military 
occupation, which, with its attendant risk of' general war', he surmised she would be 
wary of doing, although he confessed to not knowing 'enough of what is going on in 
72 Lascelles to Paget, 15 June 1886, Fa 80017. 
73 White to Lascelles, 6 Sept 1886, Fa 800116. 
74 Chirol to Lascelles, 12 May 1886, Fa 80017.Chirol informed Lascelles that the Embassy at 
Constantinople was' gradually relapsing into the slough of despond out of which White had 
so successfully pulled it. Ibid. 
75 .. See for example Paget to Lascelles, 8 July 1886, Fa 800116, in which the Ambassador 
called the Russian 'blackguards.' 
76 The Prince had' told Lascelles as early as March that Karaveloff (again in power) seemed to 
be losing influence in the country. Lascelles to Rosebery, 19 March 1886, Fa 78/3892, No.84. 
77 Lascelles to Thornton, 6 May 1886, Fa 80017. . . 
78 Lascelles to Paget, 15 June, ibid. 
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other countries' to judge whether Russia would attempt such a move. However, when 
he went to London on leave in the summer, both Rosebery and the Queen se"emed to 
""\ 
share his optimism about the unlikelihood of an internal coup. 79 
Central to Lascelles' optimistic assessment of the situation -generally 
recognised as 'dangerous and unstable' by all other Agents except him-80 was his 
confidence in the Prince's martial qualities and capacity for political survival. There is 
evidence that Lascelles' admiration for the Prince had made him lose his objectivity 
and that- by his own admission - he may have been 'dazzled' by Battenberg's 
personal success.8! From late 1885 onwards he had been greatly impressed by the 
Prince's 'political wisdom' and his military 'genius,.82 Lady Walburga Paget, wife of 
the British Ambassador at Vienna, recorded that, in passing through Austria to 
England, Lasoelles was .. 'much excited and spoke of nothing but Prince Alexander of 
Battenberg, calling him a second Frederic the Great.' Arthur Ellis, another guest of 
the Pagets, had told her 'that Lascelles had kept him up to the small hours drinking B. 
and S. in that terrific heat and singing praises of his hero, the future Emperor of 
Byzantium.'83 To Rosebery he spoke of Batten berg 'the most remarkable man & not 
just a statesman - ... [but] a warrior.' 84 There was certainly a measure of personal 
affection after so long a soourn in Bulgaria. After seeing Lascelles in August, the 
Queen noted in her journal: 'Frank is perfectly devoted to Sandro.' 85 However 
79 Lascelles to Thornton, 2 July 1886, ibid; Queen's journal entry for 9 Aug 1886, in G .E. 
Buckle (ed.), The Letters o/Queen Victoria: Third Series, Vol. i, p. 175; Lascelles' memo of 
meeting with Rosebery, 5 August 1886,and Lascelles to White, 11 August 1886, FO 80017. 
80 Charles Jehwich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, p.246. 
81 Lascelles to Salisbury, 7 Jan 1886, FO 80017. 
82 Lascelles to Salisbury, 1 Dec 1885 ibid. And see also Lascelles to Paget 7 Jan 1886, and to 
Salisbury same day, ibid. . . 
. 83 Walburga Ehrengarde Helena Paget, Embassies o/Other Days: And Further Recollections 
(London, 1923) Vol. ii, pp. 412 -413. 
84 Lascelles' memo, 5 August 1886, FO 80017. 
85 Queen'sjournal entry for 9 August, in Buckle (ed.), The Letters o/Queen Victoria: Third 
Series, Vol. i, p. 175. 
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Lascelles' high estimation of Alexander was also mirrored back in England.86 
Furthermore, up to August 1886 Alexander had successfully confounded all/forecasts 
~, 
by successively challenging the party in power within his own country, expelling 
Russian influence, defying the Great Powers and Turkey and defeating Serbia, with 
minimal loss of blood. 
It is against this backdrop that Lascelles' attitude towards Battenberg should 
therefore also be judged. In his view Alexander was the best guarantee for Britain's 
interests and for maintaining peace, and, in his own words 'an important factor in the 
solution of complicated questions in this part of the world.' 87 He trusted Alexander's 
moderation, and willed for him to succeed. When rumours surfaced that Alexander 
was fomenting agitation in Macedonia,88 with the aim of proclaiming himself King 
and uniting Bulgaria with Macedonia as an act of desperation, 89 Lascelles dismissed 
this as uncharacteristic. The Prince's assertion that he could control agitation in 
Macedonia was enough to reassure him, and he credited him with too much 'political 
sagacity' to invade the country.90 
One person who disagreed with Sir Frank however was Lord Salisbury, once 
again in office from August 1886 as Prime Minister of a minority Conservative 
Government. When Lascelles met him that summer he struck the diplomat as 'very 
nervous as to the future.' Salisbury was not convinced that Alexander's 'moderation 
& wisdom,' would be sufficient to prevent the Macedonian issue being raised, and 
thought his act in Eastern Rumelia to have shown him to be amenable to popular 
pressure, an~ he worried that should the question be opened, England would be bound 
86 e.g. Iddesleigh to Lascelles, 28 Aug 1886, FO 800/16. 
87Lascelles to Salisbury, 1 Dec 1885, FO 80017, and Lascelles to White, in almost identical 
wording, 10 Dec 1885, ibid. 
88 Lascelles to Rosebery, 2 April, FO 78/3893, No.1 02 (Extending tel 66) and see the crossed 
out paragraph in Lascelles to Rosebery, 20 March 1886, FO 80017. 
89 Lascelles to Rosebery, 10 July 1886, FO 78/3893, No. 173. 
90 Lascelles to Rosebery, 4 April 1886, FO 80017. 
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'in honour' to support the Sultan of Turkey, who he was afraid might otherwise 
'throw himself entirely' into Russia's arms.91 Salisbury's sobering correctiv~ to 
Lascelles' view fittingly presaged the imminent crisis which brought Alexander's 
unbroken run of successes to an end. 
v 
On the night of 21 August 1886, Russian intrigues finally triumphed when Prince 
Alexander was kidnapped from his palace by a dozen disaffected officers in the pay of 
Russia, and escorted to Bulgaria's northern frontier. A Russophile provisional 
government was swiftly established, led by Alexander's old opponents Zankov and 
Metropolitan Kliment.92 The Government proved short-lived (it was replaced by a 
loyalist Council of Regency under the dynamic radical Stefan Stambuloft), the 
conspirators were rounded up and Alexander swiftly returned to Sofia. But on 3 
September, the Prince announced to the Powers his intention of abdicating.93 
Naturally there was dismay and alarm within Britain's foreign policy elite. Condie 
Stephen, deputising for Lascelles at Sofia, warned that Russia might use any 
disturbance as a pretext for occupation,94 and the Queen, typically, saw the plot as 
'the first step' towards a 'Russian move on Constantinople,.95 It was a sign of the 
importance attached to Lascelles' influence that both the Queen and Lord Cranbrook, 
(Lord President of the Council), thought his presence at Sofia might have averted the 
91 Lascelles to White, 11 August 1886, ibid. 
92 Lady Walburga Paget, Vol. ii, pp. 412-14; Stephen to Iddesleigh, 21 & 22 Aug 1886, FO 
78/3894, No.'s 216 & 217; Stephen to Iddesleigh, 22 and 23 August 1886, FO 78/3898, Tel 
No.'s 131 & 132. Kliment Tumovski (c.1841- 1901) was a pro-Russian Bulgarian clergyman 
and politician. . 
93 Stephen to Iddesleigh, 26 Aug 1886, FO 78/3894, No. 218; Lascelles to Iddesleigh, 3 Sept 
1886, ibid, No.'s 223 & 224. 
94 Stephen to Iddesleigh, 25 & 27 Aug 1886, FO 78/3898, Tel. No.'s 140 & 145 secret. 
95 Queen Victoria to Salisbury, 23 Aug 1886, in Buckle (ed.), The Letters o/Queen Victoria, 
Third Series, Vol. i, p. 182. 
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kidnapping,96 and he was again ordered to cut short his leave and return to accompany 
Alexander 'wherever he may be. ,97 
"' The British Government optimistically urged Alexander to reconsider his 
decision and argued that, being elected by the Powers, he could only be deposed by 
them, and would 'incur serious responsibility' by yielding to Russia 'without a 
struggle. ,98 In this policy, however, Britain again stood isolated. Crucially, Bismarck 
remained indifferent, or rather fearful of rowing with Russia, and Salisbury could only 
reassure Alexander of a 'complete change in the policy of Germany as to Russia and 
Bulgaria' after the present Kaiser had died.99 But for now Russia, Germany, Austria 
and Turkey seemed inclined to sacrifice the Prince. 100 
Lascelles used 'all the arguments' he could think of with the Prince.101 When a 
deputation of Bulgarian officers warned they would resist his departure, I 02 he even 
speculated that this danger of complications might be an argument to use with 
Bismarck. Yet he also admitted that, by announcing his departure to the Powers, the 
Prince had already compromised himself, and anyway risked his life while he 
remained. 103 With other Powers hostile, Britain's efforts were futile. By 6 September, 
96 Queen Victoria to Salisbury, 23 Aug 1886, in Buckle (ed.), The Letters o/Queen Victoria, 
Third Series, Vol. i, p. 182; Lord Cranbrook' s diary entry for 24 Aug 1886, Nancy E. Johnson 
(ed.), The Diary o/Gathorne Hardy, Later Lord Cranbrook, 1866-1892: Political Selections 
(London, 1981), p. 622. . 
97 Iddesleigh to Lascelles [tel.], 30 Aug 1886, Fa 80017. Lascelles arrived at Sofia on 2 
September. (Lascelles to Iddesleigh, 2 Sept 1886, Fa 78/3894, No. 222). 
98 Iddesleigh to Lascelles 5 Sept 1886, Fa 78/3891, No. 68 See also same to same, same date, 
bid, No. 69; Salisbury to Lascelles [tel], 4 Sept 1886, Fa 80017. 
99 Salisbury to Lascelles [tel.], 4 Sept 1886, Fa 80017. 
IO~ Stephen to Iddesleigh, 28 Aug 1886, Fa 78/3898, Tel No. 147 confidential. 
101 Lascelles to Iddesleigh, 3 Sept 1886, Fa 78/3894, No. 224 most secret. 
102 Lascelles to Iddesleigh 4 Sept, Fa 78/3894, No.229 and, same to same, same date Fa 
78/3898 tel No. 173. These officers said they would execute the conspirators and oppose the 
Regency if it was not to their way of thinking. 
103 Lascelles to Iddesleigh, 5 Sept 1886, Fa 80017. 
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the new Conservative Foreign Secretary, Lord Iddesleigh, had done what he could. 104 
Further entreaties having failed, the Officers dropped their opposition, and the next 
afternoon Alexander left Sofia. 105 
With Alexander's departure, Lascelles' days in Sofia were numbered - for as 
White, once again at Constantinople, told him, more than any other diplomat (perhaps 
besides himself) Sir Frank Lascelles had been identified with the 'cause' of the Prince 
as far as his 'official character' had allowed. l06 Significantly, on 12 September 
Zankov even visited Lascelles sarcastically to thank him for being 'instrumental' in 
'driving away' Alexander by supporting him over Eastern Rumelia.107 It was White's 
hope that Lascelles would not remain long in Sofia after the Prince's departure, and 
the Agent himself suggested to Iddesleigh that his 'intimate connection with His 
Highness' would probably necessitate his departure from Sofia. 108 The Queen 
agreed- no doubt to signal a protest against Alexander's deposition - but Iddesleigh 
wanted Lascelles to stay so long as matters were 'critical.,I09 
The reason for the prolongation of Lascelles' tenure revealed itself in late 
September, when Russia again sent General Kaulbars to Bulgaria as special envoy, to 
try and reassert their influence. He began by demanding fresh elections and the 
postponement of the trial ofthe conspirators, and when the Regency refused to fully 
satisfy his demands he began agitating around the country, trying to influence 
104 Lord Cranbrook's diary entry for 5 Sept 1886, Nancy E. Johnson (ed.), The Diary of 
Gathorne Hardy, p. 626-627. Iddesleigh's last instructions to urge Alexander to stay are: 
Iddesleigh to Lascelles [tel.], 6 Sept, FO 78/ 3898, No 116. See Iddesleigh to Lascelles 7 
Sept 1886, FO 80017, admitting defeat. Stafford Henry Northcote, 1 st Earl of Iddesleigh 
(1818 -1887), was Foreign Secretary from August 1886. 
105 Lascelles to Iddesleigh, 6 & 7 Sept 1886, FO 78/3894, Noo's 234 (extending tel 176) & 
238. 
106. White to Lascelles, 16 June 1886, FO 800/16 . 
. 107 Lascelles to Iddesleigh, 12 Sept 1886, FO 78/3894, No. 242. 
108 White to Lascelles, 6 Sept 18.86, FO 800/16; Lascelles to Iddesleigh [tel.], 7 Sept 1886, FO 
80017. 
109 See Cranbrook's entry for 8 September The Diary of Gat horne Hardy, p. 630; Iddesleigh 
to Lascelles, 20 Oct 1886, FO 800/16. 
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Bulgarians against their Government. Lascelles feared that Russia would 'stick at 
nothing to gain their ends' in Bulgaria,llo but endeavoured to counteract Ka~lbars' 
influence. When Natchovitch, Bulgaria's new Foreign Minister, appealed for outside 
help, Lascelles reassured him that in the absence of 'material assistance' Britain 
would lend her 'moral support' in maintaining Bulgaria's independence. III He 
suggested to Iddesleigh that Britain should be the first Power to recognise the 
Regency Government; 112 he further suggested, following entreaties from leading 
Bulgarian Ministers, that Iddesleigh compose a statement to the Powers deprecating 
'any foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Principality' 113 and meanwhile 
he urged every Bulgarian he met to lay aside party differences and resist Russia, 114 for 
Lascelles was convinced that the Regency would be 'unassailable', if they could 
successfully resist Kaulbars, 115 who would learn like his predecessors that Bulgaria 
had 'no wish to become a Russian province' .116 In tandem with Iddesleigh, Lascelles 
also tried to give secret financial support to the Regency and in September Condie 
Stephen was despatched to London to try raise a loan for Bulgaria through the 
Rothschilds.117 
110 Lascelles to Paget, 9 Oct 1886, FO 80017. 
III Quotes from Lascelles to Iddesleigh, 19 Sept 1886, ibid. See also Lascelles to Iddesleigh 
25,26 & 28 Sept 1886 FO 78/3894, No.'s 265, 266 & 270; same to same, 3 Oct 1886, FO 
78/3895, No.'s 273 & 274. 
ll2 See Iddesleigh to Lascelles, 21 Sept 1886, FO 78/3898, Draft Tel No. 119, asking if any 
Power had recognised the Regency; and Lascelles' reply of22 Sept 1886, FO 78/3894, 
No.263, saying they hadn't. 
113 Lascelles to Iddesleigh, 22 Sept 1886, FO 78/3894, No. 263. For the pressure placed on 
Lascelles by the Regency, see Lascelles to Iddesleigh, 5 Sept 1886, FO 78/3894, No.'s 230 & 
232. 
114 Lascelles to Iddesleigh 10, 12 & 14 Sept 1886 FO 78/3894, No.'s 241, 242 & 247. 
115 Lascelles to Paget, 28 Sept 1886, FO 80017. . 
116 Lascelles to Iddesleigh, 4 Oct 1886, FO 78/3895, No. 277. 
117.on this issue see Lascellesto Iddesleigh, 5 Sept 1886, FO 78/3894, No.231; Lascelles to 
. Iddesleigh [tel.], 7 Sept 1886 & draft private letter of 10 Sept 1886, FO 80017; Iddesleigh to 
Lascelles, 12 Sept 1886, FO 78/3898, Draft Tel No. 117; Stephen to Lascelles 18 Sept 1886, 
FO 800116; Lascelles to Iddesleigh, 19 Sept 1886, FO 80017. Lascelles' brother-in-law 
Tommy Olliffe was involved in a second (unsuccessful) attempt to raise a loan in London .. 
See Lascelles to Iddesleigh, 1 December 1886, ibid. O'Conor to Lascelles, 14 Feb 1887, 
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Salisbury's second administration was however less united over its foreign 
policy than his first, and was vulnerable to criticism from within, specifically from 
Lord Randolph Churchill, the Chancellor of the Exchequer in Salisbury's new 
Government, who could name his price for propping up a minority administration, 
and who dissented from what he viewed to be Salisbury and Iddesleigh's excessive 
concentration on Bulgaria at the expense of directly defending Egypt and India. 
Salisbury had already conceded his Chancellor's demand for a discussion of 
Iddesleigh's unilateral policy in Cabinet, 118 when Churchill became aware, through 
conversations of his own and those of his friend Natty Rothschild with the German 
Ambassador in London, that Germany's Agent at Sofia had characterised Lascelles' 
behaviour as 'continually and continuously intriguing and manoeuvring against 
Russia' . 119 He· also became aware of the loan negotiations through Natty Rothschild, 
who, when approached by Stephen, had objected to funding an anti-Russian policy in 
Bulgaria, and told Churchill the details of the plan, 120which was hitherto unknown to 
either Salisbury or to the Permanent Undersecretary at the Foreign Office, who had 
been on leave and was apparently 'horrified' at the negotiations. 121 Having protested 
Stephen to Lascelles, 9 March 1887, Chirol to Lascelles 24 April and 6 May 1887, Tommy 
Olliffe to Lascelles, 14 May 1887, FO 800/16. 
118 See C.L. Smith, The Embassy of Sir William White at Constantinople, 1886-1891, 
(Oxford, 1957) pp. 50-53. Churchill to Salisbury, 4 Sept 1886, and same to same, 6 Sept 
1886, in Winston Churchill, The Life of Randolph Churchill (London, 1906), p. 155. He was 
backed by the Secretary for War (W.H. Smith) and First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord George 
Hamilton.) Th.e Diary of Gat horne Hardy, p.630-631. 
119 Churchill to Salisbury, 19 Sept 1886; Rothschild to Churchill, 27 Sept 1886; and 
Memorandum of interview between Rothschild and Hatzfe1dt, the German Ambassador to 
London; dated 'October 1886~' Randolph Churchill MSS, viewed on microfilm at Churchill 
.0 College Archive Centre (C.C.A.C.), RCHL Vol. 15, p.l809, p. 1844 & Vol. 16, p.1884 . 
120 Churchill to Salisbury, 14 Sept 1886, C.C.A.C., RCHL, Vol. 15, p.1794; Iddesleigh to 
Churchill [tel.], 30 Sept, C.C.A.C., RCHL Vol. 16, p.l862; Iddesleigh to Lascelles, [tel.], 29 
Sept 1886, FO 80017. 
121 Rothschild to Churchill,S Oct 1886, C.C.A.C., RCHL, Vol. 16, p.l883. 
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to Salisbury about Iddesleigh's policy122, and receiving a promise that the Foreign 
Secretary's 'violent' methods would be curbed in the future,123 Churchill al~o 
~, 
mistakenly thought that he had triggered Lascelles' removal as a peace offering, 
though in fact his departure had been determined long before this. 124 When on 29 
September, Iddesleigh sent a telegram agreeing to help the Regency to resist 
Kaulbars,125 it became clear to Churchill that Lascelles' removal was no signal of a 
'modification of policy', 126 and with White's return to Constantinople in the autumn, 
it meant the continuance of what Churchill labelled as the 'old' and 'impracticable' 
anti-Russian policy. 127 
In his last few months at Sofia, Lascelles was able to carry through this 'old' 
policy with a large degree of success, to the detriment ofKaulbars's mission. 
Lascelles sought to highlight evidence of the Russian envoy's complicity in plots 
against the Bulgarian Government. 128 Kaulbars hit back with evidence that Graves of 
the British Agency had attended a pro-Government meeting, forcing Sir Frank to 
122 Churchill to Salisbury, 27 Sept 1886 enclosing Rothschild to Churchill 27 Sept 1886, ibid, 
Vol 15, p.l846 . . 
123 Churchill to Salisbury, 30 September 1886, and Salisbury to Churchill 1 October 1886, 
ibid, Vol. 15, p. 1854 & Vol. 16 p.l861 respectively. Iddesleigh took a belligerent tone 
which Salisbury had hitherto avoided, and expected a long covert battIe for influence between 
Britain and Russia in Bulgaria. (entry for 21 Oct 1886, The Diary of Gat horne Hardy, p. 633). 
Iddesleigh was by 1886 very old, hard of hearing and 'plagued' by heart disease (CL Smith, 
The Embassy of Sir William White, p. 51). Rothschild characterised him as a 'cackling ... old 
hen,' a 'nervous old gentleman and would not probably last very long' (Rothschild to 
Churchill,S Oct 1886, C.C.A.C., RCHL Vol. 16, p.1883).Churchill called for his removal. 
(Churchill to Salisbury, 14 Sept 1886, ibid, Vol. 15, p.l794) 
124 Randolph had been 'delighted' at Salisbury's decision to replace Lascelles. Churchill, p. 
158; Salisbury's written reply in fact evaded the question. (Salisbury to Churchill, 28 Sept 
1886, ibid, Vol. 15, pp.l847 -1848), but his departure was discussed before Churchill's 
protest: see White to Lascelles [teL], 23 Sept 1886; Lascelles to White [tel], Iddesleigh to 
Lascelles [teL], 28 Sept 1886, and Lascelles to Iddesleigh [tel.], 29 Sept 1886, FO 80017. 
125 Iddesleigh to Lascelles, 29 Sept 1886, FO 78/3898, draft tel No.125; and same to same 29 
Sept 1886 FO 78/3891, Draft No. 85. 
126 Churchill to Salisbury, 30 Sept 1886, in Churchill, pp. 160-161. 
127 Churchill to Salisbury, 3 Oct 1886, RCHL., Vol. 16, p. 1869. . 
128 Lascelles to Iddesleigh, 5 Oct 1886, FO 78/3895, No.'s 278 & 279. 
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defend his Secretary's conduct. 129 There remained a veneer of cordiality. Lascelles 
confessed that the envoy had never been 'wanting in incivility in any way" \~hen they 
"' 
personally met. But Lascelles refused to give ground to the tactics employed by 
Kaulbars and other Russian representatives,130 such as the official Russian Agent 
Nekludoffto influence the elections. 131 
To Lascelles' great relief fresh elections turned out Government loyalists in 
seventy of eighty six districts despite considerable Russian pressure,132 and he thought 
the Bulgarians deserved the 'greatest credit for having resisted so well.'133 Moreover, 
by mid-November Kaulbars had admitted defeat and left Bulgaria. This was due in no 
small part to a change in the attitude of Austria. Lascelles' annoyance at her 
continuing unwillingness to support Britain was evident as late as October when the 
Austrian Agent (along with all other Powers except England) insisted on sending a 
Secretary to attend the Grand National Assembly which was deliberating on 
Alexander's successor. Sir Frank feared this would send a discouraging signal to the 
increasingly despondent Bulgarian Regency. 134 When Britain too acceded to the 
practice to avoid isolation, Austria tried to trick Britain into sending Graves along 
fi 135 I . , h' b' fl d . 136 lrst ,eavmg Lascelles understandably 'rather cross at t IS It 0 eger emam. 
However within a month Britain had extracted limited diplomatic support from 
129 Lascelles to Iddesleigh 5 Oct 1886, FO 78/3895, No.280. 
130 .. Lascelles to Iddesleigh, 29 Sept 1886, FO 78/3894, No.272. 
131 Lascelles to Iddesleigh, 10& 12 Oct 1886, FO 78/3895, No.'s 295 & 299, and same to 
same, 11 Oct 1886, FO 78/3898, Tel. No. 205. See also Lascelles to Iddesleigh, 11,13 14, 15 
Oct 1886, FO 78/3895, No.'s 297, 298, 301, 302, 305, 306 & 308-310; and same to same 16 
Oct 1886, FO 78/3898, Tel No. 214. 
132 Lascelles to Iddesleigh, 10 Oct 1886, FO 78/3895, No. 296. 
133 Lascelles to Dalziel, 17 Oct 1886, FO 80017. 
134 Lascelles to Iddesleigh, 15, 16, 19, & 21 Oct 1886, FO 78/3895, No. 305, 315-317, 322 & 
325; same to same" 17 Oct 1886, FO 80017. 
135 Lascelles to Iddesleigh 24 & 28 Oct 1886, FO 78/3895, No. 331 & 342; Same to same, 16, 
22,24,28 Oct 1886, FO 78/3898, Tel no. 213 & 222 (plus minute by Sanderson), 331 & 342; 
Iddesleigh to Lascelles, 21, 23, 25 & 27 Oct 1886, ibid, draft tel. no. 148, 151, 153 & 157; 
Paget to Lascelles [tel.], 26 Oct 1886, FO 80017. 
136 Lascelles to Iddesleigh, 31 Oct 1886, ibid. 
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Austria137 and both KaInoky and Salisbury made strong speeches against Russian 
aggression. 138 Lascelles was delighted at this development and to see that th~se 
~, 
pronouncements rallied Bulgaria's courage. 139 When, on top of this, the Bulgarian 
parliament defiantly elected a successor to Alexander against Russian advice, 
Kaulbars was led to admit defeat and return to St Petersburg, and on 18 November 
Russia terminated diplomatic relations with Bulgaria. 140 Four days later Lascelles 
wrote to White: 'all's well that ends well. The Bulgarians have stood firm. Kaulbars is 
gone and as yet there is no occupation.' Bulgaria could breathe a sigh of relief, 141 and 
by December Lascelles could finally make preparations to leave. 142 
VI 
Lascelles' activities at Sofia did not immediately mark the end of his association with 
Bulgaria. On reaching Bucharest, Lascelles naturally remained preoccupied with the 
continuing international uncertainty following Alexander's departure from Sofia. 
With the Bulgarians having refused Russia's preferred candidate, the question of 
Alexander's succession remained unsolved. 143 Although by early 1887 heightened 
Franco-German tensions had decreased the probability that Russia might 'lock up' 
her forces in a military occupation of Bulgaria, 144 the Powers' continued inability to 
137 -Entry for 2 Nov 1886 The Diary of Gat horne Hardy p. 634; Buckle (ed.), The Letters of 
Queen Victoria, Third Series, Vol i, p. 220. 
138 Entry for 16 Nov 1886, The Diary of Gathorne Hardy, p. 636; Lowe, Reluctant 
Imperialists, p. 107, M.S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, p.234. 
139 Lascelles to Iddesleigh, 17 Nov 1886, FO 80017. 
140 Lascelles to Iddesleigh, 28 Nov 1886, FO 78/3896, No. 397. See Lascelles to Iddesleigh, 6 
-18 Nov 1886, FO 78/3896, no. 363, 365, 366, 369, 372, 373, 375-380, 382-386. 
141 Lascelles to White, 22 Nov 1886, FO 80017. 
14: Lascelles to Iddesleigh, 1 December 1886, ibid. 
143 A Bulgarian deputation was sent around the various Great Power capitals in an attempt to 
canvass opinion. See Lascelles to Iddesleigh, 10, 11 & 17 Nov 1886, FO 78/3896, No. 's 368, 
370 & 381. 
144 Lascelles to Salisbury, 9 March 1887, FO 800/16. See also Lascelles to Salisbury, 6 April 
1887, ibid; Paget to Lascelles 8 April 1887, FO 800/15. 
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advise the Regency on a successor to Alexander led Sir Frank and others to conclude 
that more should be done to reassure Bulgaria.145 Salisbury was also keen th~t 
-, 
Bulgaria should be strengthened by all available diplomatic and financial means. 146 
Having replaced Jddesleigh at the Foreign Office in January 1887, and with Randolph 
Churchill no longer in the Cabinet, he was able, in the words of Philip Currie, to 
pursue a foreign policy of 'strengthening in the Bulgarians the power and habit of 
resistance to Russian demands' without it being 'diluted' or 'filtered' through 
others. 147 He continued (increasingly successfully) to seek Austrian support to achieve 
this; meanwhile in the Balkans, Lascelles' attentions were again turned to playing his 
part. 
One way of strengthening Bulgaria seemed to lie in securing sympathy from 
her neighbours, among .them Serbia and Romania especially. In July 1886 Alexander 
had tried to do just this - he had entertained the idea of a 'Balkan league', which was 
brushed offby the Romanians, or, failing this, Austrian protection. 148 With Alexander 
gone, Lascelles, newly appointed as Britain's new representative at Bucharest, tried to 
revive the Prince's idea. He was encouraged, as he told White, to find that the 
Romanian Government's view on Bulgaria were 'what you and I would consider 
sound'. 149 Furthermore in March 1887 the Romanian Prime Minister acted firmly in 
expelling a band of disaffected Bulgarian generals who had sought refuge in Romania 
after a failed military uprising at Silistria, and Lascelles was satisfied at this evidence 
145 Lascelles t~ White, 9 Apri11887, FO 800/16. 
146 Salisbury to O'Conor, 9 Feb 1887, O'Conor MSS, C.C.A.C., OCON 5/5/2. Salisbury told 
O'Conor that 'I think it might be well to have a site offered you. The Treasury will not build 
on it at present: but sites will not grow less valuable.' ibid. See also O'Conor to Salisbury, 8 
Jan 1887, FO 78/4030, No.8. 
147 Currie to O'Conor, 6 Jan 1887, O'Conor MSS, C.C.A.C., OCON 5/2/3. 
148 C. Jelavich, p. 246. . 
149 Paget to Lascelles, 8 April 1887, FO 800115. 
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that Romania was 'very well disposed' towards Bulgaria.15o It was even hoped that 
this sympathy could be transformed into more formal support. While still aiSofia in 
"' December, Lascelles discussed with his successor and old friend, O'Conor, the 
feasibility of bolstering Bulgaria by inducing Romania, Serbia and Bulgaria to put 
aside their 'future aspirations for the moment' and unite 'against present dangers',151 a 
scheme identical to that first mooted by Battenberg. 152 O'Conor thought the entente 
would 'give a considerable amount of conscious force to Bulgaria' in her struggle for 
independence. Serbia's representative at Belgrade, Danitsch, seemed agreeable to 
it,153 and at an impromptu royal audience at Belgrade en route to London Lascelles 
found the idea of a Balkan 'confederation' received with equal enthusiasm by King 
Milan, though he wanted Greece included in the scheme. 154 Although O'Conor 
dismissed Milan's 'hobby' as 'impracticable for many reasons', his private soundings 
on the 'lesser' entente 155 were encouraged by Salisbury who told him 'unofficially' to 
use 'every means' in his power to encourage such an understanding, but to 'keep in 
the background.' 156 O'Conor put it to Lascelles that it fell to him to put the 
Romanians 'up to the scratch.' 157 However, when Lascelles broached the scheme at 
Bucharest in February 1887, he found both King Charles and Romania's Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Pherekyde, to be 'very much down' on the idea. 15s Pherekyde was 
ostensibly anxious that the scheme would mean being dragged on to the side of 
Austria against Russia and, alluding to Romania's disadvantageous geographical 
150 Lascelles to Salisbury, 9 March 1887, FO 800/16. White to Lascelles, 5 April 1887, FO 
800115. See also Paget to Lascelles, 8 April 1887, ibid. 
151 O'Conor spoke to Lascelles privately of 'our entente.' O'Conor to Lascelles, 20 Feb 1887, 
ibid. 
152 Lascelles to Rosebery 15, 22 and 25 July 1886, FO 78/3893, No. 177, 178 and 183. 
15~. O'Conor to Salisbury, 24 Jan 1887, FO 78/4030, No. 25. . 
154 Lascelles to Salisbury, 12 Feb 1887, FO 104/62, No.15 
155 O'Conorto Lascelles, 20 Feb 1887 FO 800115. 
156 Salisbury to O'Conor, 9 Feb 1887, OCON 5/5/2. 
157 O'Conorto Lascelles, 20 Feb 1887, FO 800115. 
158 Lascelles to Salisbury, 12 Feb 1887, FO 800116. 
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position between Austria and Russia, held that Romania desired to maintain her 
neutrality,159 and could not enter a scheme would place Rumania 'in a positi~n of the 
greatest danger without obtaining any advantage.' Lascelles, unaware of the secret 
alliance Austria and Romania had concluded in 1882, surmised that the Romanians 
were afraid of effectively 'casting in their lot' with Austria and being 'swallowed up 
by Russia' if Austria came off worse in a contest with Russia. 160 Although O'Conor 
told Lascelles not to be 'discouraged' by Romania's objections,161 there is no 
evidence that Sir Frank took up the idea again. It is possible that more cautious 
counsels prevailed upon him. Neither Wyndham, the Minister at Belgrade, nor White 
at Constantinople, were as keen on the idea, with Wyndham especially cautioning that 
Milan's idea of including Greece would 'cause trouble' when matters looked like 
becoming 'mere peaceful' .162 Furthermore, other developments, not least the election 
of a successor to Alexander by the Bulgarian parliament in July 1887, drew the 
abdication crisis to a makeshift conclusion, and Lascelles' association with Bulgaria 
gradually lessened hereafter. 
Conclusion 
Sir Frank Lascelles' approach to diplomacy in Bulgaria can be characterised as a 
pursuit of a traditional British policy of opposition to Russia in the Balkans. At 
bottom this attitude was determined by his judgement of how best to defend Britain's 
wider imper~al interests, ultimately meaning protecting Britain's maritime strength 
159 Lascelles to Salisbury, 12 Feb 1887, FO 104/62, No.15. 
160 Quotes from Lascelles to Salisbury, 12 Feb 1887, FO 800/16; Lascelles to White, 15 Feb 
1887, ibid. 
161 O'Conorto Lascelles, 18 March 1887, FO 800/15. 
162 Wyndham to Lascelles, 20 Apri11887, ibid. 
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and the route to India, which he, like Salisbury, thought to require keeping Russian 
influence out of Constantinople and away from the Mediterranean. This much is clear 
from a statement Lascelles later made (under somewhat different circumstances) in 
which he described himself as personally being an 'old Englander' (,personlich ein 
AltengHinder') in terms of maintaining a traditional policy in the Eastern Question. 163 
Sir Frank's concentration on maintaining Battenberg in power at Sofia seemed to fully 
serve these aims: in 1883, Alexander diminished Russian interference in Bulgaria and 
in 1885 he united Bulgaria in the face of Russian hostility, and set back Serbia's 
ambitions for territorial 'compensation.' 
Lascelles' identification of Battenberg as the hub around which Bulgarian 
events turned, meant that the personal relationship between diplomat and ruler 
assumed a particular importance during his tenure, and while Queen Victoria's 
personal support of Alexander certainly contributed to Lascelles' success in winning 
the ear of the Prince. His own affable nature and aristocratic upbringing also doubtless 
played a part in what was a triumph of personal diplomacy. 
Lascelles' pursuit of this policy ran against the grain of his own superiors for 
five full years. In upholding an independent line under these somewhat adverse 
circumstances he showed a shrewdness of judgement and a firmness which was to 
ultimately pay dividends under Salisbury. It was somewhat ironic that, in a sense, 
Salisbury achieved what Gladstone had failed to by supporting a united, anti-Russian 
Bulgaria, thus squaring the circle and satisfying both British interests and Liberal 
sensibilities. 
Like Salisbury though, Lascelles chose to support union not for idealistic 
reasons but for pragmatic ones, primarily, to block Russia in the Balkans. Also like 
163 See Kaiser Wilhelm II to Baron von Marschall, 27 Aug 1896, in Die Grosse PoUlik der 
europiiischen Kabinette, Band 12, part 1 (Berlin, 1924), p. 53, no. 2918. 
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Salisbury, he recognised this could not be done alone, and wished to break Britain's 
isolation in the Eastern Question and co-operate with other Powers, (above'~ll Austria 
"' 
and Gennany) to restore British influence in the region and to back up what was 
purely a 'moral' force. Thus when Salisbury came to office, detennined to break the 
unfavourable Great Power alignments which Gladstone had assisted in building up, he 
found a willing Agent (as indeed, he had in Egypt). 
Clear to both men's understanding of the Eastern Question was the extent to 
which the threads of power lay in Bismarck's hands. 164 That Lascelles recognised this 
can be gleaned from an exchange of private letters between Wilfrid Blunt and himself 
in January 1886. Writing to congratulate Lascelles on his K.C.M.G., Blunt closed by 
saying the only motto he knew in European politics was 'Stick to Bismarck!' and 
while Lascellcs replied by professing to be somewhat 'astonished' and asked whether 
Blunt's 'sentiments with regard to the Germans [had] undergone a change?' since 
1870_1,165 his sardonic language masked an unspoken recognition that Britain's 
interests were, indeed, best served by 'sticking to' the Iron Chancellor. Lascelles 
welcomed the beginning of a new phase of British co-operation with the Triple 
Alliance which the Bulgarian crisis inaugurated, and the concomitant demise of the 
Dreikaiserbund, as the best means to ensure peace (a professional bias for any 
diplomat) in the Balkans while diminishing Russian influence, upholding the status 
quo (with the modification of an enlarged Bulgaria), and securing Britain's interests. 
Perhaps inevitably, given the fraught atmosphere of 1885-6, Lascelles 
acquired a r~putation as 'an enemy of Russia.' In some ways it was testament to his 
success - indeed, General Kaulbars credited his lack of success to Lascelles 
164 Otte, ' "Floating Downstream"?', p.l 08; John Charmley, Splendid Isolation? Britain, the 
Balance of Power, and the origins of World War One (London, 1999), p. 199; Steele, p. 180. 
165 Blunt to Lascelles 5 Feb 1886 FO 800/7· Lascelles to Blunt, 23 Feb 1886, Blunt MSS, , , , . 
West Sussex Record Office, Box 33. 
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personally, which led the Russian Government to make 'preparations' for 
counteracting Lascelles when he was later appointed to Tehran. 166 .. ~ 
It is certainly true that by 1886, Lascelles had lost some of his objectivity; his 
admiration for the Prince arguably led him to ultimately overestimate Battenberg's 
strength against Russia, and led him into one of the most partisan episodes of his 
career. Nicholas O'Conor, who arrived to relieve him in December, found him 'in a 
considerable state of excitement' and thought it would be best to have 'an unbiased 
Agent who has not been here so long.' 167 Others like Chirol regretted Lascelles' 
replacement by a 'rigidly impartial' successor for just that reason. 168 With Salisbury 
once more at the helm however, his expertise was not sidelined, but utilised by 
appointing him as a successor to William White at Bucharest - a sure sign of the 
continued confidence vested in him by the Foreign Office, and once again a reflection 
of Lascelles' status as an adherent of Salisbury's foreign policy. 
166 Lascelles to Rosebery, 30 Sept 1892, FO 248/541, No. 149 Confidential. And on being 
appointed Ambassador to Russia, Chirol reminded his friend that some of his old Panslavic 
friends had painted him "'black upon black.''' to the Tsar. Chirol to Lascelles, 24 Aug 1894, 
FO 800115. 
167 O'Conor to Minna Hope Scott, 10 December 1886, O'Conor papers, C.C.A.C., misfiled in 
OCON 31114. 
168 Chirol to Lascelles, 27 Dec 1886, FO 800116. 
110 
Making bricks without straw? Lascelles in Rumania, 1887-1891. 
Lascelles' experience in Bulgaria marked him out as an ideal successor to the anti-
Russian Minister at Bucharest, William White. Romania's problems in many ways 
mirrored those of her newer Balkan sister, with whom she shared an experience of 
recent Ottoman domination, of liberation with Russian assistance, and, in tum, a 
subsequent fear of domination by the latter Power. I Furthermore, the disorder in the 
Balkans which continued throughout Lascelles' tenure at Bucharest (1887-1891), 
gave Romanian affairs an enhanced importance for British foreign policy; although an 
outright Russian occupation of Bulgaria seemed less likely after Kaulbars' departure, 
the ongoing dynastic crisis within the country made Britain anxious to try and 
counteract instability in the region. Romania's geographical position between the 
Habsburg and Romanov Empires naturally gave rise to questions about her allegiance, 
and of whether King Charles would allow Russia to repeat her action in 1877-78 of 
allowing her troops to march through his territory, and into Bulgaria in a future war 
with Austria? This concern - that a seemingly weak King might succumb to strong 
Russian influence - was a leitmotiJofLascelles' four years at Bucharest, and was 
exacerbated by the imperfect knowledge among Britain's foreign policy elite of 
1 Romania first emerged from Ottoman dominance after the Crimean war (1856). She had 
achieved full independence with Russian assistance in the Turco-Russian war of 1877-1878, 
but Russia had taken southern Bessarabia from Romania at the end of that conflict. Romania 
was anxious too not to be labelled as another 'Slav' state, and was strongly influenced in 
culture, literature, language and politics by the Western liberal model. 
2 King Charles believed, however, that Galicia and not Bulgaria would be the destination of 
any Russian troops in such a war. (See Lascelles to Salisbury, 12 Feb 1887, FO 104/62, No. 
16 confidential). In August 1887 Pherekyde asserted that Romania would resist Russian 
troops by land but was powerless to prevent them being sailed up the Danube to Bulgaria .. 
(Lascelles to Salisbury 25 & 27 Aug 1887, FO 104/63, No.'s 89 & 90). 
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Romania's effective accession to the Triple Alliance in 1883 through an agreement 
with Austria.3 As Agent in Romania Lascelles was once again cast in an anti-Russian 
role as, with minimal resources, Britain looked to combat the pernicious influence of 
Russia's Agent, Khitrovo, and support the King, a task which Salisbury likened to 
'making bricks without straw.' Yet at Bucharest, unlike at Sofia, Sir Frank used his 
judgement to arrive at different conclusions to those prescribed for him by White at 
Constantinople or Salisbury about the role he should play, which, while remaining 
focused on security of British interests and maintaining a peaceful status quo, did not 
always accept that these would be best advanced by an active policy of counter-
intrigue against Russia. His time in the post thus marked a clear break from rather 
than a continuation with his methods in Bulgaria; as will be seen, this was ultimately 
more consistent with his consensual approach to diplomacy, by which he tried to 
maintain British interests without antagonising other Powers unduly, and also 
reflected wider diplomatic developments. However it was an approach which was 
also imperfectly understood, and which was put down to Lascelles' characteristic 
-
slothfulness and an attitude of indifference.' 
I 
While, as Lascelles recognised, Bucharest was an equally good a vantage point for 
-
studying the Eastern Question as Sofia or Belgrade,4 Romania provided Sir Frank 
with a stark contrast to the excitement of Sofia. Like that city, it only kept a minimal 
3 See Michael Hurst (ed), Key Treaties/or the Great Powers, Vol 2: 1871-1914, (London, 
1972), No. 128, pp. 630-33. By the Treaty Austria-Hungary were bound to protect Romania 
in case of attack. Ibid, p. 630-31 Romania were 'frightened into appealing for Austro-
Hungarian protection' in the summer of 1883 following fears that Russia would invade 
Bulgaria after Alexander's defiance of the Generals. Germany also acceded to it. Bridge & 
Bullen, The Great Powers and the European States System, p. 224. The treaty was directed 
'above all against Russia.' Norman Rich, Great Power Diplomacy, 1814-1914 (New York, 
1992) p.230. 
4 Lascelles to Iddesleigh, 13 Dec 1886, FO 78/3897, No,429. 
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diplomatic representation; the British Minister was again served by a single Secretary, 
and one other British consul, Percy Sanderson at Galatz. 5 Unlike Bulgaria h~wever, 
this mirrored Rumania's relatively low importance to Britain. The two countries 
shared no borders; trade between them was negligible, and the British 'colony' at 
Bucharest consisted of no more than sixty souls.6 Perhaps unsurprisingly, and 
perhaps partially symptomatic of his long association with Bulgaria, Sir Frank was 
reluctant to go to Bucharest and Q'Conor, arriving to replace him, found him in 'no 
hurry to leave' Sofia.7 In 1887 Romania's politics were relatively stable compared to 
Bulgaria's, and thus correspondingly less interesting, which perhaps explains Sir 
Frank's first impressions of Romania. He soon confessed to finding it 'dull and 
uninteresting,' and told Wilfrid Blunt: 'I have very little to do which suits my 
laziness. ,8 Within weeks of arriving, he took leave to go carpet shopping at 
Constantinople, which had the added advantage of enabling him to seek the seasoned 
White's advice on the country's political parties.9 
Lascelles' first impressions neatly reflected an axiom of King Charles' that the 
affairs of his kingdom only attracted the attention ofthe Powers when foreign 
complications threatened. 10 Romania's geographical position between 'the hammer 
and the anvil' of Russia and Austria, and thus the difficulty for her of 'steer[ing] a 
middle course' in her foreign policy naturally meant she attracted the attention of 
5 The secretary, a man named Browne, described by White (Lascelles' predecessor) as 'an 
excellent fellow ... devoted & useful.' White to Lascelles, 15 Feb 1887, FO 800116. 
6 A. Hardinge to White, 17 March 1890, FO 364/1. 
7 Lascelles to White 10 Dec 1886 FO 80017· O'Conor to Currie, 15 Dec 1886, O'Conor , , , 
MSS, C.C.A.C., OCON 5/2/4. 
8 Lascelles to Blunt, 1 July 1887, Blunt MSS, West Sussex Record Office, Box 33. Lascelles' 
experience was matched by the German Agent. L. Cecil, The German Diplomatic Service, 
1871-1914 (Princeton, 1976), p.161. 
9 Lascelles to White, 9 April 1887, FO 800116; Lascelles to Barrington, 27 April 1887, FO 
104/62. and minutes by Barrington & Salisbury. 
10 Lascelles to Salisbury, 16 April 1889, FO 104176, No. 56 secret. 
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British diplomats in the period of uncertainty after the Bulgarian crisis. 1 1 Later in 
Lascelles' tenure, in a turbulent domestic political atmosphere, he would dnlw the 
~, 
then-potent comparison between Romania's precarious geographical position and that 
'shortly before the partition,' of Poland between Prussia, Austria and Russia, and 
point out the danger to Romania's survival should foreign complications occur. 12 
However, Paget for one reassured Lascelles early on that he disbelieved there 
was any 'real danger' to Romania whatever happened, and that Russia would not try 
'to invade them or to crop their territory', a view which seemed to inform Sir Frank in 
his approach at Bucharest. I3 Also, unlike Bulgaria, it was generally felt that Romania 
was 'too old and well established to be liable to "coup d'etats" and "coup de mains" 
from within. I4 
The key concern for Britain therefore was, as Paget pointed out, to ensure that 
whichever pmiy attained power in Romania did not 'sell the country to Russia' .15 In 
1887 the reigning party seemed disinclined to do this. Under the National Liberal 
Government, headed by Ion C. Bratianu, who governed for almost twelve unbroken 
years (1876-1888), Romania had, in 1883, established an alliance with Austria. 16 
Moreover, during Lascelles' tenure at Bucharest, King Charles (1881- 1918). 
'skilfully initiated all the politicians in the country, one after another ... the Liberals, 
the Conservatives and the luminists' into Rumania's alliance treaty with the Central 
11 Quotes from Kennedy to Salisbury, 24 June 1888, FO 104171, No. 89 confidential; Paget to 
Lascelles, 8 April 1887, FO 800115. 
12 Lascelles to Salisbury, 10 May 1891, ibid. See also Lascelles to Ponsonby, 20 July 1891, 
ibid. 
13 Paget to Lascelles, 8 April 1887, ibid. 
14. Kennedy to Salisbury, 15 Sept, FO 104171, No. 99 confidential. 
15 Paget to Lascelles, 6 April 1888, FO 800/15. 
16 Ion C. Bratianu (1821-1891) was a prominent Liberal leader from the overthrow of 
Alexander Cuza (1859-1866), which he had helped engineer. He governed from 1876 until 
1888 with one brief interruption, had allied his country with Russia in the Russo-Turkish war 
of 1877-1878, but also oversaw the creation of the Austro-Bulgarian alliance. . 
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Powers.' 17 Yet in common with other British diplomats, Lascelles was unaware of 
/ 
the specific nature ofthis agreement - indeed successive Romanian Governments 
"' 
consistently denied its existence. 18 To him, initially, Romania seemed 'afraid of 
casting their lot in' with Austria for fear she might be beaten in a war with Russia. He 
was also sceptical of the King and Pherekyde's assertion that Romania could choose 
to remain neutral in the face of Russian pressure. 19 This impression perhaps reflected 
something of Romania's lingering nervousness about Russia, and fear also of 
upsetting the pro-Russian party in Romania, which stopped King Charles from 
publishing the agreement with Austria.2o 
Lascelles was, however, ably assisted by the advice of William White, who 
assumed the role of a mentor over Romanian affairs and gave Sir Frank hints which 
enabled him to divine the anti-Russian direction in Romania's foreign policy. White 
told Lascelles that he could rely Bditianu and the German Minister at Bucharest, 
Busch, for an accurate view of Romanian affairs.21 He also believed that Bratianu 
was 'straightforward & patriotic', and his colleague Dimitri Stourdza (who, 
incidentally, was co-signatory to the Austro-Romanian Treaty), and the King were 
both 'strongly German' .22 Lascelles seemed to take this on board - he was pleased, 
for example, to find that Stourdza spoke to him 'very openly and unreservedly' .23 
Yet Lascelles' arrival at Bucharest also coincided with the worrying trend for 
Britain of renewed activity by Russia in the Balkans, and a fear that unstable elements 
17 BUlow, Memoirs, iv, p. 620 & p. 624 
18 See Lascelles to Salisbury, 27 Dec 1887, FO 104/63, No.1 19; Lascelles to Salisbury, 13 
Feb 1888, FO 104170, No.1 6. 
19 Lascelles to White, 15 Feb 1887, FO 800/16; Lascelles to Salisbury, 21 Feb 1887, FO 
104/62, No. 20. 
20 Fiirst Bernhard von BUlow, Memoirs a/Prince Von Billow, Vol. iv: 1849-1897, Translated 
by Fritz August Voigt & Geoffrey Dunlop, (London, 1932), p. 621 & 624. 
21 White to Lascelles, 26 Feb 1887, FO 800/15. 
22 White to Lascelles, 15 Feb 1887, ibid. 
23 Lascelles to White, 15 Feb 1887, FO 800/16. 
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in Romania could be worked up to upset the Government. Although Romania 
contained only a small pro- or 'philo' Russian faction, mainly concentrated ~t Jassy in 
Moldavia,24 the preconditions of political, s~~ial and dynastic stability deemed 
necessary to prevent the success of Russian intrigues similar to those in Bulgaria all, 
at some point between 1887 and 1891, appeared to falter, and this played into the 
hands of Russia's Agent at Bucharest, Khitrovo, the same man who had intrigued 
with Zankov against Prince Alexander in 1882, and whose 'great activity' in 
attempting to destabilise affairs in both Bulgaria and Romania transformed Bucharest 
from 1887 into a new 'focus of intrigue. ,25 In Romania he employed 'terrorist 
methods' ,26 evidence of which first emerged in an anti-Regency uprising in Silistria 
which it was rumoured had been 'fomented and encouraged, ifnot actually concocted, 
at the Russian Legation' at Bucharest. He had unsuccessfully tried to shield Russians 
implicated in these plots, which drew him into a row with the Rumanian 
Government.27 
This was merely the beginning of Khitrovo' s activities. When, in March 1888, 
Ion Bratianu resigned the Premiership, citing Russian intrigues as responsible for his 
departure, 28 concern grew about the ability of Romania's political parties to 
withstand Russian pressure. Uncertainty hung over the future direction of Romanian 
foreign policy. In opposition the Romanian Conservatives had accused Bratianu of 
24 Hardinge to White 13 May 1890, FO 36411 
25 Quotes from: Lascelles to Salisbury, 7 Aug 1887 FO 104/63, No. 84 confidential; 
Wyndham to Lascelles 11 March 1887, FO 800115. See also Lascelles to Salisbury, 23 
March 1887, FO 800/16. 
26 BUlow, Memoirs, Vol. iv, p. 625. 
27.Quote from: Lascelles to Salisbury, 7 March 1887, FO 104/62, No. 26 confidential. For the 
Silistria episode generally, see also Lascelles to Salisbury 2 & 9 March, 7, 9, 12, 17, 18,30 
April 1887 in FO 104/62, No.'s 21 & 22 confidential, 30, 42, 43, 45-48 & 53. Wyndham to 
Lascelles, 11 March 1887, FO 800/15; Lascelles to Salisbury, 6 & 9 April 1887, FO 800/16. 
28 See Lascelles to Salisbury, 13 Feb, 4 March & 2 April 1888, FO 104170, No's 17,24 & 45 
confidential. 
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moving the country too close to Austria and Gennany. 29 Ominously there had in the 
past been an anti-dynastic side to the Opposition's tactics, as the Conservatives 
indulged on attacks on King Charles to unsettle their political rivals.30 Lascelles 
privately observed to Salisbury that, 'whether Russian money was used or not' to 
unseat Bratianu, the Conservatives had been 'playing Russia's game by creating 
instability' .31 
On the whole, however, the British Minister's response was not alannist. 
Although Khitrovo reminded Sir Frank 'forcibly' ofKaulbars' relationship with the 
Bulgarian Government in 1886,32 he was cautious about blaming the Russian Agent 
for Bratianu's fall. Indeed he went so far as to label this explanation as 'utterly 
incredible', and enumerated other political factors, including a resurgence in the 
fortunes of the opposition, rows between the King and his Prime Minister over more 
than one issue, and improved relations between the King and the opposition as being 
more important causes than Russian intrigues.33 Nor was Lascelles worried about the 
anti-dynastic element to the change of Ministry. He observed that Charles seemed 
'perfectly indifferent to the abuse' which was showered on him, which he put down to 
party political opportunism.34 
Lascelles generally shared in the King's optimism. He confidently told 
Salisbury that 'all the sensible Roumanians' understood 'the necessity of supporting 
29 Lascelles to Salisbury, 1 April 1888, FO 104170, No.41. 
30 Lascelles to Salisbury, 19 April 1887 FO 104/62, No. 50; Lascelles to Salisbury 28 Nov 
1887, FO 104/63, No. 111. 
31 Quote from Lascelles to Salisbury, 3 April 1888, FO 800/16. 
32 Lascelles to Salisbury, 24 Jan 1888, FO 104170, No.7. 
33 See Lascelles to Salisbury, 11 March 1888, FO 104170, No's 25 & 26; Lascelles to 
Salisbury, 3 April 1888, FO 800/16.For example, there were rows over the release of the anti-
dynastic George Panu from prison and his election to the Chamber (Lascelles to Salisbury, 13 
Feb 1888, FO 104170, No. 17) and over the misconduct of the Minister of War, General 
Ange\esco (Lascelles to Salisbury, 27 & 28 Feb 1888, FO 104170, No.'s 22 & 23). 
34 Lascelles to Salisbury 13 Feb 1888, FO 104170, No. 17; same to same, 2 April 1888, ibid, 
No. 45 confidential. A picture corroborated by BUlow, Memoirs, iv, p. 619. 
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the present dynasty,35 Moreover, he was supported in this opinion by White, who 
confidently told him that Charles would not sell his country to Russia, whatever the 
~, 
political pressure. 36 Lascelles was right to be sanguine about the King's chances of 
success. Appearances were, indeed, deceptive. Charles was a constitutional monarch, 
sympathetic to the liberal but short-reigning Kaiser Frederick, and his determination 
to govern in 'strictly parliamentary fashion', was often perceived, wrongly, as a sign 
of weakness. However, he was also in control of domestic and foreign policy to an 
extent which downgraded the importance of the party political battles which raged 
around him37 - a King who, as Salisbury later expressed it, 'not only reigns, but 
governs' .38 
The minority Juminist (or 'Young Conservative') Government which came to 
power after Bratianu generally vindicated the calm assessments of the political 
situation made by Lascelles. The new foreign secretary, Peter Carp, continued 
Bratianu's foreign policy under the slogan of 'enlightened patriotism' .39 Although 
personally, Lascelles judged Carp to be 'very vain' and 'more theoretical than 
practical' he was satisfied he was 'completely honest and very able' and importantly 
also a 'strong advocate ofa German policy and very much opposed to the Russians', 
and tellingly, the Austrian Foreign Minister had great faith in him.4o Meanwhile Carp 
refused to bow to Khitrovo's protests at attacks on him in the Romanian Press, 
35 Lascelles to Salisbury, 3 April 1888, FO 800/16. 
36 White to Lascelles, 15 May 1888, FO 800/15. 
37 BUlow, Memoirs, iv, p. 619-620, quote from p. 620. 
38 Salisbury to Lascelles, 16 April 1889, FO 800/16. Billow also dubbed him a 'wise king' 
BUlow, Memoirs, iv, p.620. 
39 . Lascelles to Salisbury, 13 Nov 1888, FO 104171, No. 123. 
40 Lascelles to Salisbury, 3 April 1888, FO 800116. Later on, Lascelles judged Carp to have 
'perhaps more ability than anyone else'. Lascelles to Salisbury, 10 May 1891, FO 800115. 
See also Lascelles to Salisbury, 17 April 1888, FO 104170, No.54 BUlow, the new German 
Minister, also (tellingly) became 'very thick' with Carp. Hardinge to White 17 March 1890, 
FO 36411. 
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expelled a number of Russian conspirators from the country, and in a barely masked 
reference to Russia, warned foreign countries from violating Romania's 'neutrality'. 41 
Yet further evidence of Russian intrigues came in spring 1888, when a revolt 
of a 'very serious character' broke out among the peasantry, stimulated by a poor 
harvest and anger at the Government's failure to deliver on a promise to grant small 
lots ofland. 42 Further disturbances occurred in the autumn, and Lascelles warned that 
popular grievances had been stirred up by 'very busy' Russian Emissaries, who led 
the illiterate peasants to believe that the son ofthe old Prince of Romania, Cuza, had 
promised to deliver them. The riots thus took on an anti-dynastic character.43 This 
point was further proved by an isolated assassination attempt on the King in May by a 
drunken Romanian who claimed he wanted to avenge the wrongs done to the 
Romanian peasantry.44 Although there was ample force to suppress the riots, (and 
legislative measures were subsequently taken to secure the sale of state lands to the 
peasantry45), this was a significant event - as Lascelles informed the Foreign Office, 
in a 'purely agricultural' country, the peasantry were an important part of the political 
nation.46 Once again the King downplayed the peasant riots as purely a 'political' 
rather than 'popular' movement.47 Worryingly for many, both he and Carp refused 
steadfastly to see Russia's hand in the agrarian riots. For Carp, unlike Bratianu, was 
41 See respectively Lascelles to Salisbury, 25 April 1888, FO 104170, No. 59; Lascelles to 
Salisbury 20 March 1889, FO 800/16 (and Lascelles to White, 20 March 1889, ibid); 
Lascelles to Salisbury, 19 Dec 1888, FO 104171, No. 37. 
42 Lascelles to Salisbury 17 April 1888, FO 104170, No. 53. 
43 Lascelles to Salisbury, 3 Oct 1888, FO 800/16; see also e.g. Lascelles to Salisbury 14 May 
1888, FO 104171, No. 70 very confidential. 
44 Lascelles to Salisbury, 12 May 1888, FO 104171, No. 68 
45 Lascelles to Salisbury, 5 Nov, 13 Nov and 23 Nov 1888, FO 104171, No's 118, 123 & 127; 
same to same 5 March 1889, FO 104176, No. 20. 
46 Lascelles to Salisbury, 3 Oct 1888, FO 800/16. 
47 Lascelles to Salisbury, 26 May 1888, FO 104171, 82 confidential. 
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careful not to accuse Russia of anything not 'susceptible of absolute proof .48 This 
attitude was enough to drive Beldiman, Romanian Agent at Sofia and a fo~er close 
colleague of Lascelles, to resign, accusing the Government of 'wilfully shut[ting] 
their eyes to the action of Russian Agents' and the 'open treason' of the anti-dynastic 
party.49 Again, though, Lascelles was generally reassured by White, who thought the 
King strong enough and Russian tactics to be well enough known, for Russia to 'meet 
with a deception' there, and also downplayed chances of their success in Serbia. 50 
IV 
The disagreeable trends in Romanian politics - Russia's covert activity, popular 
unrest and the lack of vigorous action on the part of the king to put a stop to agitation 
or intrigues or to defend himself received little comment on the part of the British 
Foreign Office up to the spring of 1889. The unexpected abdication of Serbia's King 
Milan51 on 6 March 1889 (amidst rumoured Russian intrigues), seemed to presage a 
disturbing pattern in Balkan politics, especially when added to Battenberg's fate in 
Bulgaria, and lent importance to a rumour which reached London from the State 
Secretary of the German Foreign Office, Herbert Bismarck, that Charles, whom 
Germany felt to be 'rather feeble', might also be dethroned. 52 This anxiety was also 
fed by the fact that, since Bratianu's fall, Romania's Government and Parliament had 
assumed a more solidly Conservative shape, with the latter containing an increased 
48 Quote from Lascelles to Salisbury 15 May 1888, FO 104171, No. 74 confidential. See also 
Lascelles to Salisbury, 30 April, FO 104170, No. 60; same to same, 15 May & 26 May 1888, 
FO 104171, No's 75 secret & 83 secret. 
49 Lascelles to Salisbury, 29 Oct 1888, FO 104171, No. 113 Confidential. 
50 White to Lascelles, 15 May 1888,27 Nov 1888, FO 800115. 
.. 51 Milan Obrenovi6 (1854-1901), Prince Milan N of Serbia 1868-1882; King Milan I 1882-
1889. . 
52 Currie to Lascelles [tel.], 12 March 1889, FO 800116; From Sofia, O'Conor also gave 
Lascelles intelligence of a separate plot with the same aim. O'Conor to Lascelles, 11 April 
1889, FO 800/15 
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number of pro-Russian and anti-dynastic members. 53 In April 1889 the Juminist 
Government headed by Rosetti which had, much to Lascelles' regret, 'not been a 
-, 
great answer' to the political problems in the country,54 was replaced by a wholly 
Conservative ministry under the leadership of Lascar Catargiu, (1823-1899), who was 
widely perceived to be a reactionary,55 and whose accession was seen in Romania as 
'a triumph for Russia and a corresponding check to Austria-Hungary' and re-
awakened the old concern about continuity in Romania's foreign policy,56 and of the 
safety of the pro-German Monarchy. 
Suddenly, the British Foreign Office feared that Lascelles might have been 
asleep on the job. On 12 March, Philip Currie advised him that 'Roumanian affairs are 
rather more serious than they appear on the spot,' and asked him 'to find some excuse 
for seeing the King soon' to warn him of the anxiety abroad.57 On 10 April 1889 
Currie wired Lascelles again, instructing him to warn the King of the dangers of 
confiding in the 'Russian' party. 58 In a letter three days later he explained that Herbert 
Bismarck had 'got up a regular scare about Roumania,' and was 'pressing Lord 
Salisbury very urgently as to taking precautions against Russian influence.' Salisbury 
wanted Lascelles to show 'a little more vigour on the subject,' and Currie agreed that 
'A little fussiness on this occasion would do no harm,' and while admitting that the 
Germans probably 'exaggerated the state of affairs' advised him that 'with all the 
53 Lascellesto Salisbury, 290ct,5Nov& 23 Nov 1888,FO 104171,No's, 112, 113 
confidential, 118, 126 & 127. 
54 Lascelles to Salisbury 20 March 1889, FO 800/16. Also see Lascelles to White, 20 March 
1889, ibid. .' 
55 Lascelles to Salisbury, 11 April 1889, FO 104176, No. 43. 
56 Quote from Lascelles to Salisbury 13 April 1889, FO 104176, No. 48 See also same to 
same, same date, ibid, No. 47. 
57 Currie to Lascelles [tel.], 12 March 1889, FO 800/16; From Sofia, O'Conor also gave 
Lascelles intelligence of a separate plot with the same aim. O'Conor to Lascelles, 11 April 
1889, FO 800/15 
58 The original has not been traced but the date and contents of the telegram are described in 
Lascelles to Currie, 14 April 1889, FO 800/16. . 
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powder lying about, it is well to pay attention to the smallest spark. So wake up, my 
boy, & work the telegraph wires a bit.,59 
Anxious that Russian influence might be establishing itself 'firmly' in 
Romania against the background of increasing activity in Serbia and the completion 
of Russian warships at Sebastopol, Salisbury sent his own letter to Lascelles on 16 
April. While admitting to be 'well aware' that the British Minister had 'few 
opportunities of establishing the necessary influence' and conscious Lascelles might 
think the Foreign Office to be 'asking you to make bricks without straw' he said that: 
we are very anxious you should do all you can to establish some influence over King 
Charles. He not only reigns - but governs: & establishing influence over his Ministers is of 
very little use - they disappear too suddenly. The King himself is apparently a vain & 
wayward donkey - but he is quite convinced of his talent for govemment.60 
Lascelles duly executed his instructions; but he was also at pains to stress a 
point of view of the political situation generally, and of the character of the King in 
particular, at odds with that entertained in Berlin and London. He thought Bismarck 
had been 'very hard' on the King in thinking he lacked 'ability' and would share 
Milan's fate, and argued that in twenty three years he had clung on to his throne, 
'under circumstances which were often of extreme difficulty'. 61 Although he 
conceded that the anti-dynastic party in Romania had increased since Milan's 
dethronement, he argued that the impression ofthe King's unpopularity had been 
exacerbated by the King's toleration of 'extreme license' in the Press and the 
population of 'ignorant peasants,' who naturally blamed King Charles for their ills. 
59 Currie to Lascelles, 13 April 1889, FO 800115. 
60 Salisbury to Lascelles, 16 April 1889, FO 800116. 
61 Lascelles to Salisbury 20 March 1889, ibid. See also Lascelles to Salisbury, (18 March 
1889, FO 104176, No. 22 confidential. 
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Furthermore, King Charles' son and heir, Prince Ferdinand ofHohenzollern-
Sigmaringen, who had hitherto resided abroad, was shortly to arrive to take'up 
~, 
residence in the country, which Sir Frank argued would buttress the succession.62 
Lascelles' view was again largely supported (and to an extant influenced by) William 
White, who perhaps now more than before agreed with him that Salisbury's 
perception of the King as 'feeble' and a 'fool' (which had probably been coloured by 
Bismarck) was wrong, 63 that he would 'overcome his present difficulties' and that the 
Germans did not understand Charles as he was 'too constitutional for them' .64 The 
King himself characteristically downplayed fears for his position at an audience 
Lascelles sought with him on 25 March.65 
Lascelles was also more sanguine about the political situation. Having been 
assured by the King, he was confident Catargiu's accession did not automatically 
signal a Russian triumph - indeed, Khitrovo had already begun speaking 
disparagingly of the former Opposition in order to foster instability.66 Catargiu had 
promised to combat Panslavist agitations,67 had also personally assured Lascelles of 
his loyalty to the King, and of Romania's 'absolute neutrality,' (continuing the 
fiction) and Sir Frank was confident under these circumstances that Catargiu would 
not 'sell his country to Russia' .68 Certainly Sir Frank agreed that Catargiu's 
Government was a 'misfortune,' and privately hoped it would fall, but while 
-
recognising the danger and promising to take 'every opportunity that offers' to give 
62 Lascelles to Salisbury, 18 March 1889, Fa 104176, No. 22 confidential. 
63 White to Lascelles, 5 Jan 1889,and Lascelles to White, 26 April 1889, Fa 800116. White 
thought Biilow felt that there might also be a 'grudge' at Berlin for Charles having shared the 
liberal sentiments of Emperor Frederick. (Chirol to Lascelles, 18 May 1889, Fa 800/15) 
64 White to Lascelles, 14 April 1889, Fa 800115. 
65 Lascelles to Salisbury, 30 Mar 1889, Fa 104176, No. 30 confidential. 
66 Lascelles to Salisbury, 14 April 1889, Fa 800/16. 
67 Lascelles to Salisbury 16 April 1889, Fa 104176, No. 55 secret. 
68 Lascelles to Salisbury: 14 April 1889, Fa 800/16; see also Lascelles to Salisbury, 15 April 
Fa 104176, No.52. . 
123 
advice to the King, he warned the King was probably 'quite aware of the danger of 
the situation' but with Carp lacking in popularity, 69 and Carp and Bratianuunable to 
agree on a coalition, Lascelles informed Salisbury he had cautioned his Austrian and 
German colleagues against going 'to the length of becoming partisans of any 
particular party' and advised that the King 'thinks and probably rightly that he knows 
more about Roumanian affairs than they do; and rather resents their advice' .70 He also 
sought to 'dispel the idea' that Lascar Catargiu or any statesman could influence the 
King.7) 
Lascelles' views were backed up by those with experience of Romanian 
affairs. White professed to being 'much less gloomy' about Romanian affairs in 
general than Salisbury,72 and from Galatz, Percy Sanderson wrote to Sir Frank that the 
Catargiu Go:vemmentwas 'not likely to do much' harm.73 In the short term, events 
seemed to vindicate Lascelles' views. By mid-May even Currie admitted Britain's 
apprehensions had been 'rather needlessly exaggerated.'74 Catargiu's government 
differed little from its predecessors in office and by June Lascelles reported that 
Lahovary was 'behaving well,' and was keeping an eye on Khitrovo. 75 To the 
disappointment of the Russian Legation, Lahovary pressed ahead in expelling 
Russian, Serbian and Montenegrin conspirators under Russian protection, and King 
Charles reassured Lascelles that the Government 'had become really as anti-Russian 
69 Lascelles 'to Salisbury, 26 April 1889, FO 800/16. 
70 Lascelles to Salisbury, 14 April 1889, ibid. 
:1 Lascelles to Salisbury, 20 March 1889, ibid; same to same 18 March 1889, FO 104/76, No. 
22 confidential. 
72 Chirol to Lascelles, 18 May 1889, FO 800/15. 
73 Percy Sanderson to Lascelles, 4 May 1889, ibid. 
74 Lascelles to Salisbury, 14 May 1889, ibid. 
7S Lascelles to White, 11 June 1889, FO 800/16. 
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as their predecessors.' 76 In October Lahovary travelled to Austria to negotiate a 
commercial treaty,77 while at home the arrival of Prince Ferdinand in Romania in May 
"' did much to bolster dynastic stability. Lascelles deemed him to be a 'pleasant youth' 
who created a very favourable impression. 78 The King's popularity also improved--
in the autumn he was warmly received on a visit to Moldavia.79 
Yet although Sir Frank's calmer judgement was on this occasion vindicated, 
there remained a feeling that he was, in general, downplaying the Russian threat, 
allowing himself to 'go to sleep on his laurels.' 80 Such were the thoughts of 
Lascelles' predecessor, White, who had commended Lascelles' anti-Russian activities 
in Sofia. For White, Bucharest had served as a stepping stone to Constantinople81 ; he 
still saw Lascelles as the 'coming man', and had even credited him with a good 
chance of getting the Embassy at Washington before Pauncefote did. But, partially 
worried by Austria's apparently 'ostrich like indifference' to Russian activities in the 
Balkans, he fretted about Lascelles' laid-back approach to his second Balkan posting, 
and his lack of interest in Romanian politics. Chirol told Lascelles: 
to tell you frankly I think he would like to see you a little more active. [White has said to me:] 
" He has been very lucky so far, he has made capital use of the two great opportunities he has 
had in Egypt and in Bulgaria & now he has got just such another opportunity and he must 
make use of this too." 
76 Lascelles to Salisbury, 31 Aug, 1889, FO 104,77, No. 111 confidential. See also Lascelles 
to Salisbury,29 April 1889, FO 104176, No. 63 confidential, same to same 1 October 1889, 
FO 104177, No.'s 118 & 119 confidential. 
77 Lascelles to Salisbury, 27 Oct 1889, FO 104177, No.1 23 
7.8 Lascelles to Salisbury, 1 May 1889, FO 104177, No. 69; Lascelles to Salisbury, 6 May 
1889, FO 800/16. 
79 Lascelles to Salisbury, 27 Oct 1889, FO 104177, No.1 24 
80 Chirol to Lascelles, 18 May 1889, FO 800/15. 
81 I . ,. b d' C' In the words ofLascelles' French colleague, Cotou y, Rumama was a spnng- oar Jor 
future Ambassadors: Biilow, Memoirs, Vol. iv, p.624. . 
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White advised Lascelles to 'to work up the question of the Russian organisation in the 
Country & more especially in Moldavia,' to 'thoroughly expose' the 'means & 
~, 
Agencies & through whom Hitrovo works', and to seek the assistance of Carp, 
Beldimann & Sturdza to 'get a list of the people in the provinces to whom the anti 
Dynastic & Russian organs were distributed & get them sifted by somebody who 
knew the country thoroughly,' and to concentrate on the 'weak point' of Moldavia 
where the Russians were concentrating their efforts in the hope of provoking 
'revolution' and a 'cry for independence under Russian protection.' White's 
prescription of what Lascelles should be doing was certainly daunting. Even as he 
relayed this information to Sir Frank, Chirol admitted that it was a 'difficult' task 'for 
a foreign representative,' to undertake. It was also, in Chirol' s opinion, perhaps 
motivated by a tendency to 'pick holes' in one's successor. 82 However, Lascelles 
was quite ready to defend his conduct in refusing actively to tackle Khitrovo, and told 
White very succinctly that the Russians were growing more unpopular in Romania, 
adding that: 'My own impression is that Hitrovo is the very man we ought to wish to 
see here for he is more likely than anyone else to diminish Russian influence.' 83 
There was indeed growing evidence that Russian influence was on the wane. Once in 
power, the Conservatives had sought to distance themselves from Khitrovo. 84 They 
also continued the Austrian alliance. Catargiu's Government was replaced by a much 
broader Conservative coalition, supported by Carp, in November 1889 and Lahovary , 
who remained Foreign Minister, continued to pursue BdHianu's and Carp's external 
82 Chirol to Lascelles, 18 May 1889, FO 800115. 
83 Lascelles to White, 6 Aug 1889, ibid. 
84 Hardinge to Salisbury 12 August 1890, FO 104/83,93 confidential. 
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policy.85 To British diplomats, Lahovary's language about foreign affairs was 'all that 
could be desired'. 86 
" Lascelles also clearly foresaw Khitrovo's downfall. The French Minister had 
pointed out as early as January 1888 that Russian secret service money destined for 
intrigues in Bulgaria 'no longer passe[ d] through his hands, ,87 and in 1890 Arthur 
Hardinge, deputising for Lascelles, noted his position had 'undergone a very decided 
alteration for the worse'. 88 As in Bulgaria, Russia's Foreign Minister, Giers, and the 
Tsar were keen to distance themselves from the 'unofficial' Panslavism of their 
Agent.89 The Russian Government felt Khitrovo's activities were damaging their 
interests; 90 Hardinge, who unlike Lascelles did research Khitrovo' s activities 
extensively, concluded that its effects had been 'very barren in Roumania.' Khitrovo's 
'intimates', who visited his house every Tuesday evening to 'smoke his cigars, & 
drink his "vodka'" were none of them 'men of real position in the country,' and spies 
reported 'all that passes within his walls to the Palace.' There was nothing Russia 
could do 'in the way of getting a real Russian party' in Romania, and could only play 
one party off against another in the hope that Romania would collapse 'from her own 
anarchy' at a moment of national emergency.91 Khitrovo's continued activity, coupled 
with the fact he had run up bad debts, increasingly worked against him. 92 Finally in 
1891, following an allegation that he had sheltered a man named Bendereff, who had 
85 Lascelles to Salisbury, 6 Jan 1890, FO 104/83, No.3 
86 A. Hardinge to White, 17 March 1890, FO 36411. 
87 Lascelles to Salisbury, 24 Jan 1888, FO 104170, No.7. 
88 Hardinge to Salisbury, 12 August 1890, FO.I04/83, No. 93 confidential. 
89 Lascelles to Salisbury, 27 Nov 1888, FO 104171, No. 133 confidential. 
90 Hardinge to Salisbury, 12 August 1890, FO 104/83, No. 93 confidential. 
91 A. Hardinge to White, 13 May 1890, FO 36411 
92 A. Hardinge to Bertie, 25 July 1890, FO 104/83; also Hardinge to Salisbury 19,24, 30 July 
& 4 Aug 1890, FO 104/83, No's 82 confidential, 86, 88 secret & 91 confidential. 
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assassinated two Bulgarians, the Russian Agent was recalled, which Lascelles noted 
came as a relief to 'everybody except...his Panslavist friends.,93 / 
In July 1891 Lascelles' time in Romania drew to a close when he was asked to replace 
the now aging and ill Minister at Teheran, Sir Henry Drummond-Wolff.94 Unlike in 
Bulgaria, the plaudits for his time in Romania were less forthcoming. In writing to 
congratulate Lascelles on his new appointment, the best Chirol could say was that: 'It 
removes you from the stagnant atmosphere of Roumania and affords you once more a 
field worthy of those abilities which you will forgive me for saying so, you are by 
nature disinclined to exercise except under considerable pressure!,95 
This impression is certainly hard to dispute. In four and a half years Lascelles 
travelled little outside Bucharest or the Court's summer residence at Sinaia, and with 
one or two exceptions (notably the peasant unrest) remaining focused on high politics 
and customarily sent short weekly reports to the Foreign Office; more than once he 
had nothing to report at all. While the diplomats John Gordon Kennedy and Arthur 
Hardinge who both deputised for Lascelles in his absence sent in reviews of the state 
of Rumanian parties or of affairs in Moldavia, (which the latter visited), Lascelles 
relied heavily on Sanderson at Galatz for his view on affairs outside the capital. 
What seemed to be a relatively lacklustre performance could partially be 
explained by an apparently prolonged health scare which saw Lascelles nearly lose his 
93 Lascelles to Salisbury, 10 May 1891, FO 800115; see also Lascelles to Salisbury, 30 March 
& 8 May 1891, FO 104/87, No.'s 33 confidential & 46. 
94 Salisbury to Lascelles [tel.], 17 July 1891, FO 800115. 
95 Chirol to Lascelles, 29 Nov 1891, Spring Rice MSS, C.C.A.C., CASR 11114. 
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hearing, evidence of which is missing from the archives but was reported by papers 
on his promotion to Tehran, 96 and the effects of this on his work are hard to quantify. 
Ultimately, however, the answer to LasceIIe~' approach in Romania lies in the Great 
Power political situation and the gradual receding of regional complications 
throughout his tenure at Bucharest. In late 1886 Austria and Britain had drawn closer 
together in the Balkans; by early 1887, Churchill's resignation removed Austria's 
misgivings about Britain's Near Eastern policy, and Bismarck's reserved attitude had 
changed,97 enabling the two Powers to conclude the so-called Mediterranean 
Agreements, by which (among other things) they mutually pledged to uphold the 
status quo in the Near East. For Britain this signalled the continuation of a drift 
towards' de facto' association with the Triple Alliance - albeit only 100sel/8 and with 
Britain armed with a better guarantee of Austrian intentions, Lascelles could afford, 
while keeping a watchful eye on Rumanian affairs, to downplay fears of Russian 
intrigue. The tenor of Paget's advice to him, as early as, April 1887 was that Anglo-
Austrian relations were more 'intimate' than ever.99 Even in 1887, therefore, the 
Eastern Question was again becoming dormant; and the election of the 'spectacularly 
anti-Russian' Ferdinand of Coburg to the throne of Bulgaria in July 1887 further 
confirmed Russia's lack of success in that country. 100 By 1891 the Eastern Question 
was no longer the burning issue it had been in 1885-6. Partially therefore Lascelles' 
approach complemented the stabilising of the wider international situation. The break-
up of the Dreikaiserbund after the Bulgarian crisis, the resolution of the Bulgarian 
96 . 
97 Glasgow Herald, Thursday, August 6, 1891; Issue 187. 
C.J. Lowe, Salisbury and the Mediterranean 1886-1896 (London, 1965), pp. 7-8. 
98 0tte, ' "Floating Downstream"?', pp. 110-111; Steele, p.245. For the texts of the 
Mediterranean Agreements (12 Feb & 12 Dec 1887, and accessions), see Key Treaties for the 
Great Powers, Vol. 2, No.'s 130 & 134, pp.'s pp. 635-639 & 648-651. 
99 See Paget to Lascelles, 8 April 1887, FO 800/15. 
100 Quoted in F.R Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo the foreign policy oJ Austria-Hungary, 
1866-1914 (London,1972), p.169. 
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dynastic issue, and Britain's conclusion of a Mediterranean entente with Austria and 
Italy, all lowered the risk for British interests in the Balkans. They signified 'the 
effective containment of Russia in the Near East', 101 and meant diplomats in Eastern 
Europe could afford to relax. By contrast, there seemed little for Lascelles to gain 
diplomatically or professionally by pursuing the kind of activities which had earned 
him a reputation as an intriguer in Sofia, and he even seemed increasingly eager to 
distance himself from his previous reputation; for example he denied vigorously an 
assertion by Bratianu (no friend to Russia), that he had converted the radical politician 
Take Ionesco to Russophobe views. 102 Again, this ran in tandem with the policy 
conducted by Salisbury, who had intended through the Mediterranean Agreements to 
provide a 'buttress of peace, not a preparation for war; the last thing he wanted was to 
provoke any Russian activity.' 103 Keen not to personalise purely political disputes, 
Lascelles seemed to get on well with Madame Khitrovo (in spite of her husband), who 
was a niece of Tolstoy and with whom Lascelles shared a passion for literature. 
Biilow described her as a 'charming and cultured lady' and Sir Frank did the favour of 
procuring a copy of Wilfrid Blunt's 'Love Sonnets Protem' for her. 104 
Nevertheless, Lascelles' social circle in Bucharest was arguably representative 
of Britain's growing trend of 'leaning' towards the Triple Alliance. Among the other 
diplomats in Bucharest, he was closest to the Austrian Minister, Agenor Maria 
-
Goluchowski (appointed in March 1887), later to become Austrian Foreign 
Minister,105 and Bernhard von Biilow, the German Agent and future Reich 
Chancellor, who succeeded Dr. Klemens Busch in Spring 1888. Lascelles and 
101 I • . 
.. Otte, '''Floatmg Downstream"?', p.112. 
102 Lascelles to White, 20 March 1889, FO 800/16. 
103 Lowe, Reluctant Imperialists, i, p.l09. 
104 BUlow, Memoirs, Vol. iv, p.625; Lascelles to Blunt, 1 July 1887, Blunt MSS, West Sussex 
Record Office, Box 33. 
105 Lascelles to Salisbury, 19 March FO 104/62, No. 32. 
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Goluchowski became great friends, 106 playing billiards together almost daily. 107 
Goluchowski's Polish roots ensured his hostility to Russia and made him a 'very 
"' 
zealous partisan of the Triple Alliance' 108, while Biilow also became 'intimately 
acquainted' with the British Minister, whom in his memoirs he referred to as a 
In spite of Romania's apparent lack of importance in his career, Lascelles' 
judgements about the situation there (his choice of downplaying Khitrovo's schemes 
and the King's weakness) were in the long run right. Romania remained connected to 
the Triple Alliance until 1916, much longer than Britain's dalliance with it, while 
King Charles stayed firmly on the throne until his death in 1916. Lascelles'shrewd 
judgement was however appreciated a few years later by a journalist in the Pall Mall 
Gazette who. commented of Lascelles that: 'He was in a sense the pupil and successor 
of Sir William White, and could read the confused pages of the difficult book of the 
East with almost as much ease as his master.' 110 And in spite of one short-lived 
dispute with the Foreign Office, their continued confidence in his diplomatic ability 
was ultimately demonstrated by promotion to an important outpost on Britain's 
imperial frontier. 
106 Lascellesto Salisbury, 23 Jan 1897, Lascelles MSS, National Archives, Kew, FO 800/17. 
107 Saunders to Mackenzie Wallace, 16 Jan 1897. Saunders MSS, Archive of the Times. 
108 BUlow, Memoirs, Vol. iv, p.624. 
1~9 Lascelles to Salisbury, 1 July 1897, FO 64/1411, No. 181 Confidential; BUlow, Memoirs, 
Vol. iv, p. 624. Part of BUlow's mission in Bucharest was to renew and strengthen Romania's 
ties to the Triple Alliance. Ibid, p.623-4. Arthur Hardinge (when deputising for Lascelles) 
also found the 'soft tongued Billow very 'ready to talk' Hardinge to White, 17 March 1890, 
FO 364/1. 
110 Extract from the New York Times 24 September 1895, p.14. 
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Lascelles and the search for an Anglo-Russian understanding, 1891-1894. 
Part a) Minister at Tehran, 1891-1893. 
In stark contrast to Bucharest, Tehran again afforded Lascelles- in the words of his 
close friend Chirol- 'both the opportunity and the necessity for work which are 
requisite to induce you to do justice to yourself,' and also the opportunity for 
promotion.) The importance of the post as a stepping stone enabled Sir Frank to 
overcome initial reservations about the distance of the post and the difficulty of the 
journey for his famiIy,2 to once again serve in a post of heightened importance to 
British interests. 
Persia's importance in British foreign policy arose from its proximity to 
British India.3 Although her long naval presence in the Persian Gulf(since 1763) had 
enabled Britain to establish an influence in Southern Persia, to the North she was 
threatened by Russia's presence. Since 1858 British policy had been directed towards 
seeing Persia as 'a buffer against the moving force of Russia' ,4 for notwithstanding 
the varying and incoherent nature of Russia's Central Asian policy - often decided by 
the initiative of individual Agents and Generals on the spot,5 successive British 
Governments - especially Conservative ones -feared her seemingly relentless 
expansion6• Of all British Foreign Secretaries in the Victorian era, Lord Salisbury in 
particular was pessimistic about the capacity of Persia's Government to resist foreign 
I Chirol to Lascelles, 29 Nov 1891, CASR 11114. 2 . 
Lascelles to Ponsonby, 20 July 1891, FO 800/15. 
3 AP. Thornton, 'British Policy in Persia, 1858-1890, i' English Historical Review, (Oct. 
1954), p.554. Rose L. Greaves, Persia and the defence of India, 1884-1892: A study in the 
foreign policy of the Third Marquis of Salisbury (London, 1959), p's 11,22,24 &34. 
4 AP. Thornton, 'British Policy in Persia, 1858-1890, i', p.569. 
5 Agatha Ramm, Sir Robert M orier: envoy and ambassador in the age of imperialism, 1826-
1893 (Oxford, 1973). p.334; see also Greaves, Persia and the defence of India, p.44. 
6 Ibid, p.11, 15-16, 19-27,33-4,46-7. 
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encroachments; 'decay and inertia' seemed to dominate the impoverished and 
oppressed country 7 presided over by a Shah 8 who seemed indifferent to the fate of 
"' his country, who was surrounded by 'parasitic' advisors, and 'thoroughly cowed by 
Russian might' .9 Salisbury feared that Russia could occupy Persia as a staging post 
for an attack on India, and he was critical of the Government of India for neglecting 
this danger and concentrating too much on Afghanistan 10, a fear borne out when 
Russia moved to occupy the Merv oasis on Persia's border in 1884. 
In his third tenure as Foreign Secretary (1886-1892), Salisbury became more 
determined than ever to reverse the relative neglect of the Persian sphere by his 
Liberal predecessor in office, and attempted to arrest the country's seemingly terminal 
decline by an ambitious policy aimed at bolstering her as a strong, independence, 
'buffer state'. between Russia and India, I I capable of self defence. 12 To achieve this, in 
1888 he replaced the relatively despondent Arthur Nicolson as Minister at Tehran 
with Sir Henry Drummond-Wolff, a seasoned politician, who had twice been sent to 
Constantinople on special diplomatic missions and whom Salisbury deemed 'a great 
master in oriental diplomacy"I3 to attempt to reform Persia by sponsoring schemes to 
improve the state of Persia's Government, army and the people's quality oflife, 
through opening up Persia's trade, and by modernising her communications. 14 
Drummond-Wolffs 'dogged energy and obstinacy' and 'superhuman powers of 
pUSh,I5 creat;d a congenial atmosphere for the extension of British influence in 
Persia. Due to his efforts, in 1888 the vast (177 mile long) Karun river was opened to 
7 0 Ibid, p.158, . o-
s Naser aI-Din Shah Qajar (1831 - 1896), Shah of Persia from 17 Sept 1848 to 1 May 1896. 
9 Greaves, Persia and the defence of India, pp's.139-142. Quotes from p.139 & 140. 
10 Salisbury to Lascelles, 6 Oct 1891, SP 71194. 
II Greaves, Persia, p. 5,137. 
12 Ramm, Morier, pp. 330-31. 
13 Greaves,Persia, p.121. 
14 Ibid, p. 20 & 34. 
15 Ramm, Morier, p. 333. 
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trade under the aegis ofthe Tigris & Euphrates Steam Navigations Company, thereby 
rapidly expanding British business over the next decade. 16 On his watch, in 1890 the 
~, 
Imperial Bank of Persia was incorporated in London by a royal charter, which proved 
an unqualified success for British financial and political influence. 17 Most 
contentiously of all, a concession was won by a British entrepreneur, Major Gerald 
Talbot, to acquire a monopoly over the production, sale, and export of Persia's 
lucrative tobacco trade. 18 Key to Drummond-Wolff s success was the support of the 
Amin es-Sultan, effectively the Persian Prime Minister, whose portfolios encapsulated 
Finance, the Interior, Customs, and Foreign Affairs. In the words of one member of 
the British Legation he was the 'only Persian Statesman who can be considered a 
factor in actual or future Persian politics,' and in contrast to his venal colleagues was 
'young, energetic, and. alive to the disgraceful state of the country.' 19 He thought that 
co-operation with Britain to help reform the country was the best policy for Persia.2o 
Due to ill-health, Drummond-Wolffleft Teheran in 1891, but Salisbury saw little 
reason to alter the commercial policy he had initiated in principle, and when Lascelles 
succeeded him there, Salisbury re-iterated the importance of aiding Persia's 'internal 
development' and encouraging every enterprise which would 'do good, or at least not 
do harm, to Persia itself. ,21 
There had however been a second, less successful strand to Drummond-
-
Wolffs policy at Tehran: an attempt to reach an Anglo-Russian understanding in 
Persia. While seeking to halt Persia's decline and curb Russian influence, Salisbury 
had also desired to alleviate Anglo-Russian antagonism in the country. Believing that 
16 See Greaves, Persia, pp.l61-167; Ramm, Morier, p. 337. 
17 Greaves, Persia, pp. 175":177. . 
18 Ibid, p.l82. 
19 Memo by Cadogan, encl. in Henry Cadogan to Morier, Nov 41892, Morier MSS, Balliol 
College Oxford, Box 25BIl. 
20 Greaves, Persia, p.140. 
21 Salisbury to Lascelles, 6 Oct 1891, SP 71/94. 
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Persia would not survive the death of the current Shah, but be carved up between his 
sons, 22 he hoped by inviting Russia to commercial partnership in Persia that he could 
, 
strengthen the country, invite foreign investment, and turn Persia into an international 
question instead ofa purely Anglo-Russian one.23 In February 1888 Salisbury 
broached this idea of economic development with Giers, but Britain's refusal to allow 
Russia a free hand in Bulgaria in exchange meant the suggestion was rejected?4 Wolff 
took up the idea,25 even engaging in talks with the Tsar at St Petersburg on the 
subject. However Russia's expansionist tendencies, her unwillingness to ameliorate 
the condition of Persia, and her determination to thwart British enterprise always 
stood in way of an understanding; in 1887 Russia's Minister at Teheran, Prince 
Dolgouroki had forced the Shah into a self-denying agreement prohibiting 
commercial agreements with foreign companies. This naturally led, on Russia's side, 
to anger at Drummond-Wolff s apparent legerdemain over the 1888 Karun river 
scheme, and in 1890 Dolgouroki procured a further promise from the Shah not to 
build railways for ten years without Russia's consent, 26 once more making Russian 
influence 'ascendant' at Tehran.27 Despite the eventual replacement of Dolgouroki by 
the more conciliatory Butzow, confrontation over the Pamirs in Central Asia killed off 
the idea of Anglo-Russian co-operation and revived Anglo-Russian tension. 
Drummond-Wolffs mission had other undesired side effects. The Shah had 
. 
been rendered suspicious by his attempts to court the favour of the Zil es-Sultan, the 
Shah's second son and de/acto ruler of Southern Persia, by conferring a decoration 
22 Ramm, Morier, p. 339. 
~3 Greaves, Persia, p.l13. . 
24 Ramm, Morier, pp.331-32). 
25 Greaves, Persia, p. 122 
26 Ramm, Morier, p.335, 340, & 343-344 Greaves, Persia, pp.172, 181. A.P. Thornton, 
'British Policy in Persia, 1858-1890, ii' English Historical Review, (Jan., 1955), p .. 61 &~65. 
27 Thornton, 'British Policy in Persia, 1858-1890, ii', p. 70. 
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on him in exchange for telegraph concessions, and had responded by stripping him of 
his titles, his private army and much of his influence.28 
The growth of British influence had ~lso bred resentment among the 
disaffected Persian population. The distinction between the policy Salisbury sought to 
pursue, which aimed to 'increase the well being of the Persian people & the strength 
of the Persian Gov[ernmen]t', and one of commercial adventurism- to which 
Salisbury was 'diametrically opposed', but to which Persians were 'more 
accustomed',29 was arguably to() fine for the impoverished, illiterate and oppressed 
populace who, from the latter half of 1891, found a channel for their grievances in 
opposition to the tobacco Regie, a resentment fanned by the Persian religious 
authorities (the Mullahs), by Russian Agents and by warring provincial governors.30 
These dangers for Britain - of suspicion and resentment from Russia, the Shah, and 
the Persian population, were all coalescing as Lascelles arrived in December 1891 and 
confronted the problem of how to deal with a major challenge to Britain's Persian 
policy. 
II 
In appointing Lascelles, Salisbury had the opportunity to replace the zealous 
Drummond-Wolff with a cool-headed career diplomat who could preserve the gains 
28 Greaves, Persia, p.150-155. This made Salisbury cautious about repeating the same mistake 
and although keen to acquire the good-will of the Veliahd, the only one of the Shah's sons 
'not doing his best to destroy Persia,' (Lascelles to Salisbury, 24 Dec 1891, SP 71/52) he 
wanted to a~oid British support appearing 'too ostentatious' to prevent the Shah being 
suspicious of having his wings clipped. Salisbury to Lascelles, 6 Oct 1891, SP 71/94. When 
Lascelles proposed conferring a decoration on the Veliahd, Salisbury swiftly rejected the idea. 
Lascelles to Salisbury, 28 Jan 1892, SP 71154; same to same, 17 Feb 1892, SP 71156, and 
minutes. 
29 All the above is from Salisbury's lengthy private letter to Lascelles, 6 Oct 1891, SP 71/94. 
Salisbury wanted to avoid British commercial adventurers converting the Tehran Legation, 
'into an agency for pushing British speculation in Persia'. Ibid. 
30 Greaves, Persia, pp. 182-85. 
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made for British influence and hopefully improve Britain's troubled relations with 
Persia.31 Sir Frank was as 'different as could be' from his predecessor;3~ and his 
"' 
reputation as 'one of the most pleasant men in the diplomatic service,' 33 was no doubt 
a factor in his selection: as Salisbury explained to the new Minister, Britain had 'very 
few but moral weapons to use' in Persia and 'character' was of 'great importance. ,34 
As with Cairo in 1878, and Sofia in 1880, the Foreign Office had seen the virtue of 
appointing a calming presence, who could execute a diligent policy of patient 
diplomacy and he was sent to Tehran 'with orders to keep fairly quiet,.35 This was 
certainly more of a consideration than any previous expertise in Central Asian affairs 
-although Salisbury assumed Lascelles to be familiar with Persia's problems,36 the 
Indian official world could rightly comment that Sir Frank was an outsider lacking 
'Oriental experience' .:7 The deficiency was partially compensated for by Salisbury's 
lengthy private letter of instructions to Lascelles of6 October 1891, and by Lascelles' 
Eastern service, which was certainly a valuable asset.38 
Lascelles was clearly instructed by Salisbury to continue Drummond-Wolff s 
line where possible, and initially, Lascelles appeared to agree that Britain's policy of 
regenerating Persia could work. He was sufficiently encouraged by the prospects of 
British commercial ventures in Persia,including the Regie, and in particular by the 
31 Thornton, 'British Policy in Persia, 1858-1890, ii' p.59.The tenuous nature of Drummond-
Wolff s victories had been clear to Salisbury as early as 1890 when he had speculated they 
might 'come to nothing'. Greaves, Persia, p.182. See also.ibid, p.122. Apparently 
Drummond-Wolffhad 'disgusted' Salisbury. Spring Rice to Chirol, 30 Aug 1902, Spring 
Rice MSS, C.C.A.C., CASR 11/19. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Glasgow Herald, Thursday, 6 August, 1891. 
34 Salisbury to Lascelles, 6 Oct 1891, SP 71194. 
35 George Curzon to General Schindler, 2 Nov 1891, Schindler papers, Duke University. 
36 Salisbury to Lascelles, 6 Oct 1891, SP 71194. 
37 Glasgow Herald, 20 November 1891. The Indian Government paid the wages of the 
Minister at Tehran. 
38 The Derby Mercury, 29 July 1891. 
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'great success' of the Oriental Bank to deem the outlook 'tolerably hopeful' .39 He also 
believed that among ordinary Persians it was 'beginning to be understood now that 
England really desires the independence of Persia, and has no intention of annexing 
the Country. ,40 
Yet Lascelles was soon made to realise the limitations of Britain's commercial 
policy in Persia. No sooner had he arrived than he was forced to deal with the seismic 
event of the tobacco revolts, which abruptly ended Major Talbot's monopoly of the 
trade in Persia and signalled the triumph of popular resistance to foreign interference. 
The result was nothing less than a catastrophic reversal for British foreign policy in 
Persia, for the occurrence 'vitally and adversely affected Britain's position in 
Persia' .41 Anti-European opposition to T~lbot's company, which had begun in 
summer 189.1, rapidly.escalated in the winter, when Persia's religious authorities 
placed a fatwah on all tobacco smoking, with the aim of getting the concession 
abolished. They found 'formidable allies' both in the oppressed populace, and in the 
sons of the Shah who found common cause in trying to upset the pro-British Amin, 42 
and who were apparently encouraged by the Russian Legation.43 Lascelles urged the 
Shah to retain the Amin in power,44 but, fearing the Shah might resent his advice as 
newcomer,45 otherwise kept a low profile. 
39 Lascelles to Salisbury, 25 Nov 1891, SP 71151. 
40 Ibid; Lascelles to Lansdowne, 3 Dec 1891, Lansdowne Papers, B.L., MSS Eur D 558/21. 
41 Rose L. Greaves, 'British Policy in Persia, 1892-1903,' Bulletin of the School of Oriental 
and African Studies, Vol. 28, No.1 (1965), p. 38. 
42 Lascelles to Salisbury, 24 Dec 1891, SP 71152. 
~3See Lascelles to Lansdowne, 3 Dec 1891, MSS Eur. D558/21; Lascelles to Salisbury, 24 
Dec 1891 and 19 Jan 1892, SP 71152 & 53. Lascelles to Rosebery, 9 Nov 1892, FO 258/541, 
No. 167 very confidential. 
44 Lascelles to Salisbury, 24 Dec 1891, FO 64/1417, tel.243; Salisbury to Lascelles, 24 Dec 
1891, FO 60/553, Tel. 63. 
45 Lascelles to Salisbury 24 Dec 1891, SP 71152. 
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Within months of arriving, Lascelles realised he had been 'over-sanguine' 
over the Regie's prospects,46 and, seeing little chance of saving it, began advising the 
"' 
cancellation of the concession. His chief reason for doing so was an awareness that its 
continuation could turn Persia completely against European influence. He was 
impressed by the popularity of the anti-European movement which manifested itself 
in the abstention from smoking on the part of the population. This was, as he termed 
it, 'an expression of public opinion such as has hitherto been unknown in Persia.,47 He 
realised that the unwillingness or inability of the Shah, a man 'made up of equal parts 
of timidity and rapacity,,48 to resist either the 'growing power of the Mollahs, or the 
intrigues in which his own sons are engaged,' posed a danger to Persia itself.49 and by 
the second half of December began advising Salisbury that if the Regie continued 
nothing less than the fate of British influence, and Persia's internal stability, would be 
at stake; for it was 'evident that if the Mollahs succeed in asserting their power and 
introduce a fanatical and anti-European regime, we should have to give up all hope of 
seeing the regeneration of Persia by means of commercial enterprize.' 50 
With Britain unwilling to cling on to the unpopular concession, the Persian 
Government were quick to cancel it, and British policy was confined to extracting 
compensation for the company. 51 In executing this policy, Lascelles experienced the 
reality of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Persia, for Russia's Agent, Butzow who (in 
46 Lascelles to Lansdowne 3 Feb 1892 Lansdowne Papers, B.L., MSS Eur D 558/22. 
47 " Lascelles to Salisbury, 19 Jan 1892, SP 71/53. 
48 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 3 Dec 1891, MSS Eur D 558/21. 
49 Lascelles ~o Salisbury, 24 Dec 1891, SP 71152. Lascelles went so far as to say that he saw 
no chance of improvement unless the whole system of administration was changed, and there 
would 'not the slightest chance' ofthis under the present Shah. Lascelles to Salisbury, 19 Jan 
1892, SP 71153. 
50 Lascelles to Salisbury (private), 24 Dec 1891, Salisbury Papers, SP 71152. Lascelles further 
worried that Russia could turn any disturbances in Persia and outlying countries to their 
advantage. Ibid. 
51 On this episode, see Greaves, Persia, pp. 182-6; Nikki R. Keddie, Religion and rebellion in 
Iran: the tobacco protest of 1891-1892 (London, 1966) passim. 
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Lascelles' words) saw the abolition of the Regie as 'a diplomatic triumph for Russia 
and an opportunity of consolidating Russian influence in Persia' 52, took advantage of 
the Shah's impatience for the tobacco Com~ny to "'get their losses and go"', 53 to 
tempt him with a loan with which to payoff compensation to Talbot's company,54 
although Lascelles was able to dissuade the Shah from accepting the Russian offer 
and accept a loan from the Imperial Bank of Persia instead. 55 
The handling of the Regie cancellation revealed a key facet of Lascelles' 
approach to diplomatic problems. To contemporaries, there was a clear difference 
between him and his predecessor. One British paper criticised Britain's minister for 
not standing up the Shah, who needed a 'good shaking, and ... [who] ... would have 
got it from Sir Henry Drummond Wolff.'56 The reason for this disparity was simple 
enough: Lascelles had.seen his predecessor's forthright methods as responsible for the 
tobacco riots, and he was keen to distance himself from them.57 He told his French 
colleague in no uncertain terms that the riots were 'the heritage of the baneful policy 
of Sir Drummond Wolff,' who had thought 'only of making a noise and fame for 
himself' .58 Undoubtedly, as one historian of the tobacco agitation concluded, 
Lascelles was 'more realistic than Drummond Wolff about the dangers of too 
52 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 3 Feb 1892, MSS Eur D 558/22. 
53 Lascelles to Salisbury, 31 Jan 1892, FO 248/540, No. 21. 
54 Lascelles to Salisbury, 15 May 1892, SP 71158. See also Lascelles to Lansdowne, 3 June 
1892, MSS Eur D 558/22; Lascelles to Salisbury, 11 June 1892 SP 71159. Lascelles to 
Sanderson [tel.], 20 April 1892, MSS Eur D 558/22. 
55 See Salisbury to Lascelles [tel.], 15 March 1892, SP 71195 Lascelles to Salisbury 18 March 
1892 Salisbury Papers (folder of unbound correspondence from LasceIles);Lascelles to 
Lansdowne [tel.], 30 April & 3 May, MSS Eur D 558/22. Lascelles to Salisbury, 1 June 1892, 
FO 248/541 No. 100 secret and confidential; Lascelles to Lansdowne, 3 June 1892, MSS Eur 
D 558/22. Lansdowne wrote to congratulate Lascelles for his role in helping foil the Russian 
loan. Lansdowne to Lascelles, 4 July 1892, MSS Eur D 558/22. 56 Glasgow Herald, 21 January 1892. 
57 Greaves, Persia, p. 125. 
58,N. Keddie, Religion and rebellion in Iran, pp. 100-101. 
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aggressive a British policy in Iran', 59 and divined the revolutionary, anti-European 
forces,6o which would come to the fore in the Persian revolution of 1905-1911. 
"' Instinct as much as insight may have influenced Lascelles' view, for his typically 
Victorian laissez-faire approach to commerce was certainly reinforced by the events 
of 1891-2; in 1893 he wrote to the British consul-general at Bushire, Major Sadler, 
that he was 'inclined to believe that the more people engaged in commerce settle 
questions without the interference of their own Authorities the better they are likely to 
get on.,61 
Yet Lascelles' approach was not just predicated on an aversion to violent 
methods - it reflected recognition of the increasing impotence of Britain in Persia. 
The events of the winter of 1891-2 dramatically altered Britain's prospects in Persia, 
and correspo.ndingly affected Lascelles' views on Britain's role in the country. 
Britain's Minister slowly became convinced of the impossibility of continuing to 
pursue Salisbury's commercial policy in the face of unfavourable circumstances. As 
English companies became increasingly reluctant to invest in Persia, and the Foreign 
Office became less willing to advocate commercial schemes,62 and as religious and 
popular hostility to foreign intervention continued to grow, Lascelles concluded that, 
even without official interference, British firms should prepare themselves for the 
worst, and 'should instruct their Agents to make all possible allowances for the 
-
perpetual conflict between religious and civi1law in this country, for religious and 
anti-European prejudice, and for the un-business like way in which business is 
59 Nikki R. Keddie, Religion and rebellion in Iran, p.93. 
60 Henry Savage Landor, Across Coveted Lands - A Journey from Flushing (Holland) to 
Calcutta Overland (London, 1903), Vol. i, p. 148. 
61 Lascelles to Major Sadler, 12 July 1893, Lascelles MSS, National Archives, Kew, FO 
800114. 
62 Lascelles to Salisbury 29 Jan 1892, FO 248/540, No. 18 secret and confidential. 
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unfortunately conducted here.,63 A memorandum drawn up by the Teheran Legation's 
First Secretary Henry Cadogan 64 for the attention of the Ambassador at St Petersburg, 
Sir Robert Morier, in late 1892 shows how ;tark Britain's commercial prospects 
became almost overnight. Listing English commercial schemes, Cadogan summarized 
that, with the exception of the Bank, the other ventures were floundering; the Regie 
was 'abolished', the Karun Navigation Company had been forced to apply for an 
English State subsidy, and suffered from inadequate road links. British Mining and 
Roads Companies fared equally badly, and reports from Merchants across Persia 
showed that 'English credit and prestige were never at so Iowan ebb as they are 
now.,65 Cadogan went on to spell out in no uncertain terms his bosses' predicament 
by the autumn of 1892: 
Sir Frank's position is most difficult. Lord Salisbury, in his private letter of instructions, told 
him "to continue to counteract Russia's political activity by the furtherance of English 
Commerce in Persia." Here at once is an impasse. 
With an impotent Shah, and a rebellious and fanatical priesthood, a corrupt Ministry and an 
unpopular Prime Minister, such commercial development is not possible. 
The Bank is practically all that remains of Sir H. Wolfrs activity, and the failure of his "chef 
d'oeuvre,' the Regie, has thrown us infinitely farther back than we were before. 66 
As Cadogan highlighted, Lascelles' room for manoeuvre as British Minister 
was increasingly restricted after the tobacco strike. The loss of British influence 
63 Lascelles to Rosebery, 15 Feb 1893, FO 601542 No.27. 
64 Henry Cadogan (1859-1893), grandson of the Third Earl Cadogan, was also briefly 
engaged to Sir Frank's niece, the future archaeologist, writer and imperial administrator 
Gertrude Bell (1868-1926). Sadly, he died of cholera during a particular violent outbreak in 
l893. Julia M. Asher-Greve, 'Gertrude Bell, 1868-1926' in Getzel M. Cohen and Martha 
Sharp Joukowsky (eds.), Breaking Ground: Pioneering Women Archaeologists (Michigan, 
2006), p.151; Lascelles to Rosebery, 9 Sept 1893, FO 601543, No. 130. 
65 Memo by Cadogan, encl. in Henry Cadogan to Morier, 4 Nov 1892, Morier MSS, Box 
25B/l. 
66 Ibid. 
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seriously affected the Legation's clout with the Amin es-Sultan,67 while the Shah 
himself was disinclined to fight to save his country from decay, 68 or even to fight for 
, 
his own authority which was 'greatly diminished' after the tobacco strike 69, whereas 
the Mullahs' influence only increased.7o Lascelles saw out his first year at Tehran 
against a backdrop of continued popular discontent and anti-European outbursts, a 
situation exacerbated by an epidemic of cholera in the summer of 1892 which killed at 
least 12,000. 71 He tried to persuade the Shah that judicial reform would decrease the 
legal power of the Mullahs, and 'would do more than anything else to calm the 
discontent which certainly existed among the people"n but found him unreceptive to 
the idea. The Shah's avarice meanwhile continued to be abused by 'all classes of the 
population,' and Lascelles was prescient enough to surmise that only the lack of a 
capable leader prevented his being displaced.73 Indeed, he was led to conclude that 
only 'a complete change in the system of Government' could remedy the situation/4 
which, as he told Morier in October 1892, was 'as near a state of anarchy as may 
be.'75 It was in this context that Lascelles confronted the question of what Britain's 
policy in Persia should now be. 
67 Greaves, Persia, pp.184-85. 
68 Illustrated when he set off on a tour of Iraq, accompanied by a huge retinue which would 
'practically.ruin the Country' through which he passed: Lascelles to Salisbury, 15 May 1892 
SP 71158. 
69 Lascelles to Morier, 14 Oct 1892, Morier Papers, Balliol College Oxford, Box 25 BIl. 
:0 Lascelles to Rosebery, 1 Sept 1892, FO 248/541, No. 137. 
71 Lascelles to Rosebery, 3 Sept 1892, FO 60/532, No. 139. 
72 Lascelles to Rosebery, 4 Oct 1892, FO 248/541, No. 160. 
73 Lascelles to Morier, 14 Oct 1892, Morier Papers, Box 25 BIl. 
74Lascelles to Rosebery, 28 Sept 1892, FO 248/541, No. 148. 
75 Lascelles to Morier, 14 Oct 1892, Morier MSS, Box 25 B/t. 
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III 
By late 1892, with Britain 'powerless ... to assert her interests in Persia', 76 and 
with Salisbury himself no longer at the For~ign Office, Lascelles seriously began to 
challenge the validity of Salisbury's 'buffer state' policy and to consider whether 
Persia could continue to be defended against Russia, and playa role in India's 
defence, and if not, whether an alternative policy could be formulated. This was a 
logical thought process: in 1888, Drummond Wolffs assurances of maintaining 
Persia's territorial integrity had been crucial in paving the way for concessions to 
English Companies.77 Upon his arrival, Lascelles had re-iterated these assurances to 
the Shah and the Amin.78 After the Regie incident however, Lascelles could only 
'recognise his impotence, with the means at his disposal, to "counteract Russia's 
policy'" of preventing economic progress in Persia, and as Persia seemingly 
descended into anarchy, and anti-European agitations increased, the question of 
whether foreign powers might step in to assert their interests was one that crossed 
Lascelles' mind. And as Cadogan put it, 'If the intervention comes from Russia, will 
our "assurances" be acted on?,79 In examining the question, it was clear to Lascelles 
that Persia had only a limited capacity for self-defence. The greater part of the Shah's 
army existed 'only on paper' as that which was real had largely become a fiefdom of 
the Persian Minister of War, the Naib-es Sultaneh.8o Persia needed help to resist 
-
Russia; but Lascelles recognised that Britain would have to act 'with very 
considerable energy,' to prevent her reaching Southern Persia.8! 
76 Memo by Cadogan, encl. in Henry Cadogan to Morier, Nov 4 1892, Morier MSS, Box 
25B/1. 
77 Thornton, 'British Policy in Persia, 1858-1890, ii', pp.55-57, 60, 61. 
78 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 3 December 1891, MSS Eur D 558/21; Lascelles to Salisbury, 7 
Dec 1891, FO 60/254, No. 250. 
79 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 7 Dec 1891, FO 60/254 No. 250. 
80 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 1 Dec 1892, Lansdowne Papers, B.L., MSS Eur D 558/23. 
81 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 3 Feb 1892, MSS Eur D 558/22. 
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The evidence seemed to suggest that, militarily, Britain could do little. At the 
beginning of his tenure, Lascelles had received Salisbury's views of the enhanced role 
" India should play in defending Persia, and had passed them on to India's Foreign 
Secretary, Sir Mortimer Durand.82 But in early 1892 the then Viceroy of India, Lord 
Lansdowne, had effectively confirmed the Indian Government's continued policy of 
reserve in a private letter to Sir Frank. England had only 'unsubstantial' materials; 
Russia occupied 'infinitely superior ground' and condescended 'to methods from 
which we should shrink. ,83 The Indian Government could not spare the money to 
build railways in Southern Persia, nor did she have sufficient troops spare to justify 
the costS.84 For Lansdowne the defence of Persia was an 'Imperial' and not an 
'Indian' question,85 and he was not prepared to take the responsibility for it. With 
Britain ill-equipped militarily, and seemingly unable to fulfil her 'assurances' to the 
Shah, Sir Frank's thoughts turned naturally to a diplomatic solution, and he began to 
ponder whether it was 'in any way possible, seeing Russia's preponderating influence 
in Persia, for England to come to some terms with her?,86 
As highlighted above, the idea of a rapprochement over Persia was not new. 
Anglo-Russian rivalry in Persia had historically alternated with periods of detente. 
Drummond-Wolffhad sought to win Russian collaboration in Persia, but 
misunderstandings and mutual suspicion had proved too great. Lascelles was in a 
-
sense only picking up the second strand of Britain's old 'dual' Persian policy. As in 
all his posts, Sir Frank's reasoning stemmed from practical points rather than a firmly 
held conviction. On his arrival, he had been confronted with the reality of British 
82 Lascelles to Salisbury, 25 Nov 1891 SP 71151. 
83 Lansdowne to Lascelles, 5 Jan 1892, MSS Eur D 558/22. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Lansdowne to Kimberley, 11 Jan 1893, Lansdowne Papers, B.L., MSS Eur D 558/6. 
86 Henry Cadogan to Morier, Nov 4 1892, Morier MSS, Box 25BIl. 
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weakness - and thus the impracticality of a potentially explosive Anglo-Russian 
rivalry At the same time, he recognised a conciliatory strand in Russian policy which 
.~, 
he hoped to encourage. In early 1892, he interpreted reports that the Russian governor 
of the Transcaspia region, General Kuropatkin,87 who had notoriously attempted to 
foment Turkoman unrest in the northern province ofKhorassan in order to destabilise 
Persian rule, was being recalled from Persia,88 and rumours that Butzow had been 
ordered 'to keep things quiet in Persia', as signals that the Russian threat to Northern 
Persia was 'not immediate'. The Russians, he told Lansdowne, had 'plenty to do at 
home' and the Emperor was anxious to avoid 'foreign complications.'89 Thereafter he 
quite logically sought to remove pretexts for rivalry. In January 1892, he dissuaded 
the British authorities from sending the Legation's Military attache, General Gordon, 
on a visit to the northern border of Persia where the Russians were putting down 
disturbances among the Turcoman population,90 noting that it was 'useless to irritate 
the Russians' by doing SO.91 He also attempted to mend bridges between the two 
Legations in more tangible ways. According to Lascelles' own account of events, 
after the Regie's collapse, the wrangling over compensation for Talbot's company 
caused the Amin to become disillusioned with Britain and to 'drift' towards Russia.92 
Yet according to Cadogan of the British Legation, it was Lascelles himself that 
engineered a patch-up between the Amin and Butzow. He saw their strained relations 
-
as an obstacle in the way of improved Anglo-Russian relations, whereas he argued 
himself that reconciliation between the Amin and the Russian Legation, would give 
87 Alexei Nikolayevich Kuropatkin 1848 - 1925; later Russian Minister for War (1898-
1904). 
88 Ramm, Marier, p.345. . 
89 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 3 Feb 1892, MSS Eur D 558/22. 
90 Lascelles to Salisbury, 28 Jan 1892, SP 71154 & 55. 
91 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 3 Feb 1892, MSS Eur D 558/22; Lacelles to Salisbury, 16 April 
1892, SP 71157. 
92 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 3 Feb 1892, MSS Eur D 558/22. 
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the Amin the support of both England and Russia and would 'strengthen his position 
and enable him to effect some real improvement in the state of affairs' ,91 perhaps 
arresting decay in Persia. Having arrived in Persia to find the Russians 'at daggers 
drawn' with the Amin because of his role in facilitating Drummond Wolffs 
concessions, Lascelles encouraged the Amin to "'have it out'" with the Russians, and 
explain that 'the encouragement of English commerce on his part did not necessarily 
involve political hostility to Russia'. After the Amin acted on Lascelles's advice, 
Russian intrigue against him diminished, although the Amin's position itself never 
recovered from the tobacco incident. 94 
Lascelles' conciliatory approach marked a personal turning point. On his 
appointment, he was still viewed at St Petersburg as a 'Russophobe' for his role in 
thwarting Kaulbars in Bulgaria. The Russian Legation apparently took measures to 
'counteract' his 'influence'. But Lascelles had begun with a clean sheet in Tehran. On 
his arrival he had explained to Butzow his 'earnest desire' to maintain the most 
friendly relations with him and, notwithstanding disagreements on individual points, 
that he wanted the two countries to co-operate 'where we could.' Butzow having seen 
that Lascelles 'was inclined to be conciliatory', the Russians 'had not employed the 
tenth part of the means at their disposal' to oppose him.95 By November 1892, 
Lascelles had 'enormously improved relations' with the Russian Legation.96 
The fruit of this policy was to elicit a response from the Russian side. In 
September 1892, the Russian charge d'affaires at Tehran, de Speyer, approached the 
British Minister about his fear of an Anglo-Russian clash in Persia or Central Asia: a 
feud between the two Powers over the Pamirs on Afghanistan's border had recently 
93 Lascelles to Rosebery, 16 Jan 1893, FO 60/542, No.7 confidential. 
94 Henry Cadogan to Morier, Nov 4 1892, Morier MSS, Box 25B/l. 
95 Lascelles to Rosebery, 30 Sept 1892, FO 248/541, No. 149 Confidential. 
96 Henry Cadogan to Morier, 4 Nov 1892, Box 25B/l. 
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been narrowly averted, and he feared that if Persia's 'critical' internal situation led 
both Powers to send forces into the country to protect their own interests it 'might 
bring about a collision'. 97 To avoid this e~ntuality, he proposed reaching a 'friendly 
understanding with England all along the line.' 98 
Lascelles' response to de Speyer's surprising overture, was that he would be 
'only too delighted' to assist him in his ambition.99 His despatch reporting the 
following conversation is the most candid document to survive regarding Sir Frank's 
personal views on an Anglo-Russian entente. He told de Speyer: 'It had always been 
my private opinion that a cordial understanding between the two countries would be 
of inestimable advantage', and that both Governments 'seriously desired such an 
understanding' but strong mutual suspicion - often fostered by the two countries' 
Agents who were keen to exaggerate personal victories or setbacks- was an obstacle 
to this. 100 
Most telling as far as Persia was concerned were Lascelles's specific 
observations on Anglo-Russian rivalry in Persia, which signalled a change in direction 
from Salisbury's instructions. While he warned that England could never allow Russia 
'to have an outlet on the Persian Gulf, he revealed that he 'was far from sharing the 
opinion which was widely entertained in England that Russia was not to be trusted 
because she had failed to observe the assurances she had given on her advance 
97 Lascelles to Rosebery, 30 Sept 1892, FO 248/541, No. 149 Confidential. De Speyer had 
recently acted on his own authority in summoning Russian troops to quell disorder whipped 
up by the Mllahs in the Northern town of Astrabad, the town's governor having fled on 
account of the cholera outbreak there. He remained open to the possibility of having to 
intervene in similar cases. See Lascelles to Rosebery, 18 and 26 Aug 1892, FO 6511440, Tel 
No's 122 & 128; same to same 29 Aug 1892, FO 248/541, No. 134. Typically, far from 
.raising the alarm at Russia's incursion Lascelles chose to underline the 'good effect' the 
incident might have in 'frightening the Mollahs' Lascelles to Lansdowne, 6 Sept 1892, MSS 
Eur D 558/23.) . 
98 Lascelles to Morier, Box 14 Oct 1892 25B/l. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Lascelles to Rosebery, 30 Sept 1892, FO 248/541, No. 149 Confidential. 
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through Central Asia, that she would not go beyond certain points such as Khiva 
[occupied by Russia in 1873] or Merv.' Crucially, he concurred with de Speyer's 
observation 'that the existence of buffer states was a mistake' -as they were inclined 
to become 'a hotbed ofintrigue'-and agreed that Britain and Russia 'ought to have a 
coterminous frontier' in Persia. 101 This conclusion -amounting to a territorial 
partition of Persia - was not an entirely new one. However, it went further than 
Salisbury's proposal of an economic partition, and also went against the grain of his 
attempt to oppose Russian influence. It was however the logical conclusion to 
Lascelles's collapse of faith in the possibility of regenerating Persia. It was a logic 
shored up by the absence of military aid from India in the eventuality of a Russian 
advance -a line again confirmed to Lasc'elles by Lansdowne in autumn 1892.102 
Following his. conversation with de Speyer, Lascelles received encouragement 
from an important source. From St Petersburg, Sir Robert Morier, who had long been 
a proponent of an Anglo-Russian entente, made a 'flattering comparison' between 
Lascelles and his predecessor (whom Morier had intensely disliked), and encouraged 
h· . h' d fi b 1 . I' 103 1m m IS en eavours or etter Ang O-RUSSlan re a1Ions. 
For his part, Lascelles had watched Morier's handling of negotiations over the 
Pamirs with interest. He told Morier that 'if we can come to an understanding with 
Russia about the Pamirs it ought to be easy to do so about Persia,' and that he would 
be 'proud to help' in speeding up a general rapprochement. 104 It was with this in the 
background that Lascelles proceeded to sound out Whitehall on the idea. By the time 
de Speyer had approached Lascelles, Salisbury himself was no longer in power. For 
101 Ibid. 
',102 Lansdowne told Lascelles that India's troops were 'barely sufficient for our own 
requirements', and that Russia could dominate the Northern provinces of Persia 'at any 
moment' she chose, while Britain could only react slowly. Lascelles to Morier, 23 Nov 1892, 
Morier MSS Box 25BI1 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid; same to same 16 Feb 1893, Box 25A12, ibid. 
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Lascelles this provided an opportunity for a fresh review of British policy in Persia, 
and to write privately to Lord Rosebery, who was again at the British Foreign Office 
~, 
and explain that, given the Shah's loss of authority, the bankruptcy of the Persian 
treasury and the 'absolutely rotten' state ofthe country, it was high time Her 
Majesty's Government came up with 'a decided policy in the event of the 
disappearance of Persia as a State.' 105 
However, Rosebery, while equally pessimistic about Persia's situation, did not 
view affairs in that country to be as central to British interests as Salisbury had, and 
was unwilling to give Lascelles the clear instructions he wanted. He told him that 
England could not 'bear the burden of the whole world,' and that Persia was in the 
'second rank' of British concerns. All Britain could do was to try and 'keep the 
rickety concern going.' This was hardly encouraging and, as Lascelles, noted, did not 
make his position any easier: he pledged to 'do my best', but held out little hope in 
reality of doing much good. 106 
Yet while neither London nor India was 'prepared with a policy' in the event 
of Persia's break up or the annexation by Russia of Persia's Northern Provinces, 
Lascelles continued in his remaining time in Persia to 'live on friendly terms' with 
Butzow and tried to 'work well' with Russia for as long as possible, 107 even to the 
point of conceding Russian influence in the North of Persia. 
105 3 I . II . Lascelles to Lansdowne 1 Dec 1892 MSS Eur D55812 ; a so essentIa y same III 
Lascelles tq Morier, 23 Nov 1892, Box 25B/l 
106 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 2 March 1893, Lansdowne Papers, B.L., MSS Eur D 558/24. The 
new Liberal Secretary of State for India, the Earl of Kimberley, essentially took Rosebery's 
-.line. After the collapse of the Regie and related concessions, he too came to the conclusion 
Persia was 'perfectly moribund, but moribund Eastern States are wonderfully slow in dying, 
and the final catastrophe may be yet distant'. Should Russia choose to control Persia's 
Northern Provinces, he couldn't see 'what we can do to avert it.' Kimberley to Lansdowne, 3 
Feb 1893, MSS Eur D 558/6. ' 
107 Such was his advice to his successor. Lascelles to Durand, 30 Aug 1894, FO 800117. ' 
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This line was most clearly demonstrated by an incident which took place in 
April 1893. That month Russia applied pressure on Persia to acquire a village called 
, 
Firuzeh in Khorassan province, where they wanted to establish a sanatorium. The 
Shah was inclined to accept on condition that Russia did not press similar demands in 
the future. As far as Lascelles could judge, the arrangement seemed 'favourable to 
Persia', 108 and he failed to see how the possession of Firuzeh would give Russia' any 
increased advantage' in respect of a Russian conquest of the whole of Khorassan. 109 
(which he thought she could take possession of 'at any moment she liked' anyway). I 10 
The Acting British Consul at the northem- Persian town of Meshed, Ringler 
Thomson, disagreed, and argued that the acquisition of Firuzeh would make a Russian 
encroachment on Khorassan much easier. III However, Thomson was a known 
alarmist, and Lascelles had had past cause to criticise his 'want oft act' and 'constant 
endeavours' to 'impute blame' to the Russian Consul-General at Meshed. 112 He 
chose to dismiss Thomson's apprehensions as 'exaggerated',113 and was backed up by 
Rosebery, who respected Lascelles' judgement and who merely advised that the Shah 
should not relinquish Firuzeh without considering its effect on the retention of his 
108 Lascelles to Rosebery, 17 April 1893, FO 248/562, No. 56; Lascelles to Lansdowne [tel.], 
3 April 1893, MSS Eur D558/24. 
109 -Lascelles to Thompson, 11 April 1893, FO 800114. 
110 • Lascelles to Lansdowne, 12 Apn11893, MSS Eur D 558/24. 
III Thompson to Lascelles, 22 April 1893, FO 800114. 
112 Lascelles to Col. Yate, 19 Sept 1893, ibid. See also Lascelles to Lansdowne, 12 April 
1893, MSS Eur D558/24. Thomson had the reputation of being 'an awful fellow'. (Lascelles 
to Morier, 16 Feb 1893, Morier MSS, Box 25A12). Earlier in April Thomson had sent 
Lascelles a memorandum detailing every single clash which had arisen at Meshed between 
Russia and England in the past few years. (Lascelles to Rosebery, enclosing memorandum by 
·,Thompson, 21 April 1893 FO 60/542, No. 57). Lascelles chose to disregard this information, 
on the grounds that although the Russians 'do and probably always will intrigue', and Russia 
could probably draw up an equally strong counter-indictment. Lascelles to Col. Yate, 19 Sept 
1893, FO 800/14. 
113 Lascelles to Lansdowne, tel.'s of 8 April 1893 and letter of 12 April 1893, MSS Eur D 
558/24. Lascelles to Thompson, 11 April 1893, FO 800/14. 
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authority over the rest of Khorassan. 114 Firuzeh was transferred to Russian control on 
27 May 1893.115 However, this did not signal the beginning of an active Persian 
policy on Rosebery's part. 
IV 
If one reads purely anecdotal accounts ofLascelles' tenure at Tehran, one 
might gain the impression that Britain had sent an ineffective diplomat to serve in the 
Persian capital. In late 1892, the Persian Minister in London told Philip Currie that, 
'Lascelles was liked ·but he was apathetic & desponding,' and complained of the 
influence of the Legations' chief interpreter, Harry Churchill, who allegedly 
'misrepresented' matters to Lascelles. 116 According to Sir Frank's German colleague 
at Tehran, Friedrich von Rosen, the British Minister 'never seemed to do any work at 
all,' and would get through his Chancery business during the short interval between 
breakfast and lunch, [and] spend the afternoon riding or playing tennis, and the 
evening at whist. ,117 
Yet, as Rosen goes on to say, the benefits ofLasceIles' 'supreme' laziness 
were insufficiently appreciated, for 'nobody does more harm to international relations 
than the bustling diplomat. .. who tries to glean material for his reports from every 
conversation, and does not shrink from asking inopportune questions.' lIS The internal 
situation in Persia after the collapse ofthe Regie severely constrained Lascelles' 
freedom of action in advancing British interests. His recognition of the impossibility 
114 Lascelle·s to Lansdowne 12 April MSS Eur D 558/24, repeated in Lascelles to Thompson, 
11 April 1893, FO 800/14 . 
.. 115 Thornton, 'British Policy in Persia, 1858-1890, ii', p.70. 
116 Minute by Currie marked 'Tehran Legation,' on Lascelles to Rosebery, 22 Nov 1892, FO 
60/532, No. 179. 
117 Friedrich von Rosen, Oriental Memories of a German diplomatist (New York, 1930), pp. 
125-127. 
118 Rosen, Oriental Memories, pp. 125-127. 
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of pursuing a 'forward' policy of economic advance in Persia, coupled with the 
realisation that Britain could not assist Persia in resisting Russia, drove him down the 
path of conciliation with Russia as he tried to do his 'best' with the hand he had been 
dealt. In these straitened circumstances Lascelles' conciliatory personality, his 
willingness to concede that Britain's Imperial interests were not always best served by 
a combative policy, were a strength rather than a weakness. The difficulties of his 
position can be further highlighted by the fact that his immediate successor, Sir 
Mortimer Durand, who tried to follow his line1l9 of Anglo-Russian 
'rapprochement',120 fared little better. As Foreign Secretary of India, Durand had 
more directly relevant experience than Sir Frank at the time of his appointment. But 
he confessed to feeling like a "'jellyfish °in a whirpool'" in the postl 21 , and was unable 
to arrest the diminution of British influence. He also lacked Lascelles' personal touch; 
the Amin es-Sultan who had been 'so very friendly' with Sir Frank and his 
predecessors 'never "hit it off' with Sir Mortimer' 122, who was unable to prevent the 
Amin from falling under Russian influence, and from removing Britain's key Oriental 
expert, Churchill, from Tehran. 123 Only under Arthur Hardinge (appointed in 1901) 
did Britain's position appear to retain the heights it had enjoyed in the early 1890s.124 
In personal terms, the Tehran Legation was an apprenticeship for Lascelles' 
Embassy at St Petersburg, and Lascelles' willingness to smoothen out Anglo-Russian 
-
relations impressed his predecessor to the point that, when Morier reluctantly resigned 
due to ill-health in 1893 he advised the Permanent Under Secretary, Philip Currie;-, 
119 Durand to Lascelles, 6 Sept 1894, FO 800/15. Durand told Lascelles his and de Butzow's 
sisters were personal friends. 
"0
120 Durand to Lascelles, 22Jan 1895, FO 800/16. 
121 Quoted in Greaves, p. 101. 
122 Schindler to Lascelles 12 Aug 1901, Lascelles MSS, National Archives, Kew, FO 800/10. 
123 Spring-Rice to Lascelles, 15 Sept 1899, Spring Rice MSS, C.C.A.C., CASR 11146; same 
to Chirol, 30 Aug 1902, CASR 11/19 and Durand to Lascelles, 3 March 1896, FO 800/6. 
124 Zara Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914, p. 179. 
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'there is an ideal successor for me [:] Lascelles.' 125 This appointment gave Lascelles 
the scope he needed to continue to pursue better Anglo-Russian relations: 
125 Morier to Currie, 14 Dec 1893, Morier MSS, Box 25A12. 
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b) Ambassador to Russia, 1894-95. 
Lascelles' appointment as successor to Morier at St Petersburg was a logical 
progression for a diplomat whose career had been spent (in the words of one 
journalist) 'mainly in the East, where Russian interests are so often supposed to 
menace our own', I and a culmination of his encounters with Russian policy in Eastern 
Europe and in Central Asia. When Rosebery failed to persuade Lord Lansdowne to 
accept the embassy on his retirement from the Indian Viceroyalty, Lascelles, whose 
judgements as minister to Tehran Rosebery had deeply respected,2 and who Morier 
had tipped to succeed him, was a natural second choice. 
At St. Petersburg (as in previous postings) Lascelles learned to utilise the 
knowledge of the embassy staff, many of whom were Russian 'experts'. His 
appointment coincided with the transfer of the Counsellor of Embassy, Henry 
Howard, to Paris, and his replacement by Edward Goschen. Although Howard assured 
Lascelles that his replacement, Teddie Goschen was 'pleasant' and had an 'agreeable' 
wife,3 Goschen's inexperience led Lascelles to rely on more experienced Chancery 
staff, like Lancelot Carnegie and Hugh O'Beirne, who were both Russian speakers 
and who Lascelles recognised had 'a greater knowledge both of the place and the 
people.' 4 In ~ddition to being conscientious about Embassy work, 5 these Chancery 
members were also on good terms with leading Russian officials and other diplomats. 
Lascelles particularly valued the services ofO'Beirne, whom he dubbed 'one of the 
1 The Daily News, 10 March 1894. 
,2 Gordon Martel, Imperial diplomacy: Rosebery and the failure of foreign policy (London, 
1986), p.l20 
3 Howard to Lascelles, 14 Aug 1894, FO 800115. 
4 Lascelles to Sanderson, 22 May 1895, FO 800117. 
5 Lascelles to Kimberley, 31 Jan 1895, FO 6511490, No. 33; see Lascelles to Sanderson, 14 
March 1895, FO 800117. 
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future lights of the diplomatic service,6, and in April 1894 Lascelles protested loudly 
against O'Beime's transfer to another post, and pointed out that even his replacement 
by a Russian speaker would 'not be satisfactory, as the new man, however great his 
knowledge of the language might be, would be some time before he got to know the 
people at the different Ministries to whom I am in the habit of sending him when we 
want to get anything done.'? Likewise, Lascelles highly valued the services of the 
Embassy's military attache, Major W.H.H. Waters, whom he dubbed 'a most useful 
man,'8 who got 'on well with the Russians,'9 and who could periodically glean useful 
information. It was Waters' contacts in the Russian Intelligence Department, which 
confimed to Lascelles the Russian Government's lack of control over their military in 
the Pamirs, leading him to downplay the seriousness of Russian intrigues against 
British interests in that area. 10 Lascelles was reluctant to discourage the 'laudable zeal 
even of less able subordinates, II and his attitude inspired loyalty in his staff. Waters, 
who came to serve under Lascelles again at Berlin (1900-1903), wrote of his Chief in 
glowing terms in three volumes ofmemoirs,12 while O'Beime later attempted to get 
transferred to Berlin during Lascelles' ambassadorship there. 13 
Lascelles's time at St Petersburg represented the continuation of Morier's 
attempt to reach a broad Anglo-Russian rapprochement, in the interest ofpeacel4; and 
during his brief stay at St Petersburg, Lascelles confirmed expectations across the 
6 Lascelles to Sanderson, 22 May 1895, FO 800117. 
7 Lascelles to Wodeheouse, 24 April 1894, ibid. O'Beirne was replaced by Evelyn Grant-
Duff. See also Lascelles to Sanderson, 8 Jan 1895, ibid. 
8 Lascelles ~o Swaine, 30 Aug 1894, ibid; Lascelles to Sanderson, 14 March 1895, ibid. 
9 Lascelles to Sanderson, 14 March 1895, ibid. 
10 Lascelles to Durand, 20 Aug 1894, ibid . 
. 11 Lascelles to Sanderson, 14 March 1894, FO 800114. 
12 Waters felt the 'utmost confidence in, and the most sincere affection' for Lascelles. W.H.H. 
Waters, Secret and Confidential: The Experiences of a Military Attache (London, 1926), p. 
160. 
13 O'Beirne to Lascelles, 28 Feb 1906, Lascelles MSS, National Archives, Kew, FO 800/13. 
14 See A. Ramm, Sir Robert Marier, passim. 
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British Press as 'a man who knows the last wile of the Muscovite,' who could aim to 
'strengthen the very friendly relations which now fortunately exist between the two 
" Governments', and help, with his practical knowledge of Russian foreign policy, to 
combat the 'Russophobia' of Britain public opinion, and contribute towards 'the 
maintenance of a happy understanding between the Muscovite and the Anglo-Indian 
Empire.'15 
The reputation he had cultivated in Persia greatly eased Lascelles' transition: 
Russia's Foreign Minister, Giers, told Sir Frank at their first meeting that he was 
known to be 'very well disposed towards Russia' .16 Although Giers studiously avoided 
discussing Lascelles' s past career in Bulgaria,17 Lascelles' initial reception by both 
the Russian Court and Foreign Office pr~ved favourable. 18 The new British Foreign 
Secretary Lord Kimberley greeted this 'favourable augury for the maintenance of 
good relations through your means' 19 while Rosebery, now British Prime Minister, 
was 'indirectly vain' to hear of Lascelles's success. 20 While careful not to 'rely too 
much on civil speeches, ,21 Lascelles was gratified by his reception and impressed by 
Giers who appeared to be 'most friendly,' 22 and 'straight' with him,23 in contrast to 
the late Sir William White's warning that Giers was 'as cunning a fox as they make 
them. ,24 Lascelles was also surprised by Alexander III. Expecting to find' a shy man 
rather apt to be embarrassed by a new face,' Lascelles 'found him perfectly at his ease 
15 The Pall Mall Gazette, 12 March 1894; ibid, 10 March 1894; The Daily News, 10 March 
1894; The Leeds Mercury 13 March 1894. 
16 Lascelles to Kimberley 23 July 1894, FO 6511473, No. 163. 
17 ' Lascelles to Rosebery. 23 July 1894, FO 6511473, No. 163 
18 . 
New York Times, 25 Nov 1894, p.9. 
19 Kimberley to Lascelles, 7 Aug 1894, FO 800/15. ~o Rosebery to Lascelles, 6 Jan 1895, FO 800/16. See also Howard to Lascelles, 14 Aug 1894, 
FO 800/15. 
21 Lascelles to Kimberley, 1 Aug 1894, FO 800117. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Lascelles to Durand 30 Aug 1894, FO 800117. 
24 ' Waters, Secret and Confidential, pp.115-116. 
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and willing to talk,' an impression which he hoped would be confirmed with 
experience.25 
" 
Beneath the civil words, there were many reasons why in 1894 an Anglo-
Russian understanding seemed increasingly propitious. Under Tsar Alexander III 
(1881-1894) and Giers, his Foreign Minister, Russia had been disinclined to pursue an 
adventurous foreign policy. The collapse of the Three Emperor's League, Russia's 
diplomatic defeats in Eastern Europe and the severing of the Russo-German 
Reinsurance Treaty by Berlin in 1890 had struck blows to Russian confidence, which 
was only slowly recovering with the advent of the Dual Alliance between Russia and 
France in 1894, and had made Russia more wary of her Western border than she had 
been for a generation. The country also held few funds with which to prosecute war; 
she had embarked on industrialization later than the other Powers and was heavily 
reliant on French loans.26 Additionally, despite a series of economic reforms 
inaugurated by Alexander to try to ameliorate the plight of Russia's peasant 
population, Giers feared the revolutionary consequences of Russia's defeat in war.27 
He saw merit in working with Britain where possible, to reduce the ranks of Russia's 
potential enemies and deter Britain from adhering completely to the Triple Alliance to 
which she increasingly 'leaned'. 28 The Tsar thus encouraged Lascelles on his arrival 
to follow Morier's example of maintaining friendly relations with Russia.
29 
-
From the British perspective, there was also much to be said for an understanding. 
As Foreign Secretary (1892-4) and then Prime Minister (1894-5), Lord Rosebery was 
painfully aware of the Indian Government's military deficiencies, in the face of 
~5 Lascelles to Kimberley, 1 Aug 1894, FO 800117. 
26 Marc Ferro Nicholas II: Last a/the Tsars, trans. Brian Pearce (London, 1992), p.46. 
27 Margaret Maxwell, 'A Re-examination of the Role ofN.K. Giers as Russian Foreign 
Minister under Alexander III' European Studies Review, Vol. I, No.4 (1971), p.358. 
28 C.J. Lowe, The Reluctant Imperialists, p.189. . 
29 Lascelles to Kimberley, 29 July 1894, FO 6511473, No. 164. 
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Russian strength in Central Asia. He was however reluctant to succumb to German 
pressure to align Britain more definitely with the Triple Alliance, reluctant even to 
"~, 
confirm the Mediterranean agreements - fearing that Britain would be embroiled in 
European rivalries, - and he wished to demonstrate that equally good relations could 
be maintained with the newly forged Franco-Russian Alliance.3o Russia had also, after 
1887, abandoned a pro-active policy in Eastern Europe, leaving one less obstacle to 
harmonious relations. 31 In Central Asia, Rosebery was in 1893 been able to reach an 
amicable settlement regarding encroachments by Russian military expeditions along 
the border of Afghanistan (the so-called 'Pamirs crises') by fixing a boundary 
between Russia and Afghanistan.32 
Thus when Lascelles arrived in St. Petersburg in August 1894, he found 'no 
unpleasant question to deal with' .33 On the contrary, the potential for closer Anglo-
Russian ties soon showed itself in the accession of a new Tsar to the Imperial throne 
in late 1894. The general impression of Nicholas II, which Lascelles voiced, was that 
he was 'a man of liberal ideas and very conscientious,' although liable to 'shrink' 
from change which could be seen 'as a reproach on his father.'34 In Lascelles' view, 
Nicholas' apparent youth and inexperience were offset by his 'amiable' and 'well 
intentioned,' character, and his professed determination 'to follow the pacific policy 
30 Gordon Martel, Imperial diplomacy, p.120; idem, 'The Limits of Commitment: Rosebery 
and the Definition of the Anglo-German Understanding,' in The Historical Journal, Vol. 27, 
No.2 (Jun., 1984), pp. 387-404. 
31 Russia still refused to legally recognise Ferdinand as Prince Alexander's successor, and 
Lascelles quickly learned that Giers was reluctant to discuss the painful topic of Bulgaria, 
who he held in 'profound contempt' for her 'black ingratitude'; Lascelles to Rosebery, 23 
July 1894, FO 65/1473, No. 163, and same to same, 28 July 1894, ibid, No. 166 confidential. 
Only under Lobanoff, did Bulgaria recognise Ferdinand, (March 1896), by which point 
Lascelles had left Russia. Richard J. Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, pp.163-172. 
"32 See Lowe, The Reluctant Imperialists, pp. 187-190. 
33 Lascelles to Kimberley, 15 Aug 1894, FO 800117. See Lowe, p. 187. Th~ protracte~ 
negotiations over the Pamir question were being concluded in London, owmg to Moner's 
earlier ill-health. Ramm, Morier, p. 357; Lascelles to General Gordon, 20 Dec 1894, FO 
800117. 
34 Lascelles to Sanderson, 16 Jan 1895, FO 800117. 
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of his lamented father' . 35 He seemed to begin his reign well, and Lascelles thought 
he had 'shown much more ability than he was generally credited with.,3(i/ 
~, 
Rosebery told Lascelles he wanted to 'begin a new and clean slate with 
Russia,' and 'to work loyally with her so long as she will let me,,37 At a speech at the 
Guildhall in November 1894, he expressed a hope that the two countries would 
'march with cordiality and without suspicion in Asiatic affairs. ,38 Lascelles was 
'struck' by the friendly tone of Rosebery's speech/9 and took evident encouragement 
from it. However, there were clear practical limits to Rosebery's concept of an 
'understanding' No doubt bearing in mind recent Anglo-French confrontation over 
over Siam (1893), Lascelles went as far as to tell the French Ambassador at St 
Petersburg, the Marquis de Montebello, that in his opinion a 'clear and frank 
understanding between England and Russia upon Asiatic questions' would secure the 
'Peace of the world' for 'a very long period,' especially if France also joined in. 
Rosebery - ever cautious- approved Lascelles' language, but cautioned in his minutes 
that an Asiatic understanding 'could not be construed to imply a desire for an alliance 
antagonistic to that of Germany, Austria and Italy with whom H[is] M[ajesty's] 
Gov[ ernment] are and desire to remain on the most friendly terms. ,40 
On specific questions, however, there proved to be less scope for an 
understanding. Once the Pamir agreement was signed in March 1895, after three 
-
years of wrangling, their was little appetite for further talks over Central Asia on 
35 Lascelles to Kimberley, 10 Oct 1894, FO 800117; Lascelles to Gosselin, 25 Oct 1894, ibid; 
Lascelles to. Kimberley, 15 Nov 1894, FO 6511473, No.256; Lascelles to Kimberley, 22 Nov 
1894, FO 800117. See also Chirol to Lascelles, 31 Oct 1894, FO 800/15. 
36 Lascelles to General Gordon, 20 Dec 1894, FO 800117. 
~7 Rosebery to Lascelles, 6 Jan 1895, FO 800/16. 
38 T.G. Otte, The China Question: Great Power Rivalry and British Isolation, 1894-1905, 
p.47. 
:: Lascelles to Kimberley, 22 Nov 1894, FO 800117. . ' 
Lascelles to Kimberley, 29 Nov 1894, FO 65/1473, No. 275 confidentIal, and mmute 
thereon by Rosebery. 
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either side, while the focus of international affairs had shifted to events in the Far 
East.41 Lord Rosebery was unwilling to confront the ultimate question of the fate of 
., 
either Persia or Afghanistan, especially as he had thought it improbable that the ailing 
Tsar Alexander would 'embark in an active forward policy in Asia.' In the winter of 
1894-5 the ill health of the Amir of Afghanistan led Kimberley to worry about 
Russia's 'military party' and her Generals 'on the spot' taking advantage of the 
ensuing anarchy42, but he was not prepared to discuss a change of policy, as was 
shown by his horror at learning that the military attache at St Petersburg, Colonel 
Waters, had suggested privately to the Russian Ambassador to London, de Staal, that 
Russia and Britain should discuss the possible partitioning of Afghanistan in the 
event. Kimberley cautioned there was 'no reason for hurrying on the conclusion', and 
warned Waters off discussing such a 'delicate topic' even academically.43 A recovery 
in the Amir's health made the question less immediate, and led Lascelles to conclude 
that, while 'the question of a coterminous frontier between England and Russia' might 
(as some Russians hoped) be 'eventually inevitable and not altogether undesirable', 
meanwhile British policy in that area must remain one of 'let[ting] sleeping dogs 
lie. ,44 After leaving Tehran, Lascelles was equally reluctant to meddle in his old 
sphere of action,45 and continued to recognise the Government's reluctance to pursue 
a new policy there. 
-
Lascelles' activity was confined to giving Russia the benefit of the doubt in 
downplaying further incidents on the Afghan border. For example, when in the 
41 Lascelles·to Sanderson, 25 Oct 1894, FO 800117. Lascelles to Sanderson, 14 March 1895, 
ibid; Sanderson to Lascelles, 20 March 1895, FO 800/16. Lascelles to Sanderson, 11 April 
1895, FO 800/17. . 
42 Kimberley to Lascelles, 16 Oct 1894, FO 800/15. 
43 Sanderson to Lascelles, 9 Jan 1895, FO 800/16. Lascelles to Sanderson, 16 Jan 1895, FO 
800117. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Lascelles to Colonel H.E. Wells, c. 30 Aug 1894 [undated], FO 800/17. 
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summer of 1894 a new Russian expedition under Colonel Y onoff (who had led the 
Pamirs expedition) appeared in Shignan, on the Afghan frontier, Lascelles'defended 
" Giers' statement that Yonoffs actions were 'completely unauthorized,' characterising 
the incident as the 'old story' of an enterprising officer acting on his own 
responsibility,46 and even protested at instructions to take the question up with the 
Russian authorities, suggesting to Sanderson- the new Permanent Under Secretary at 
the Foreign Office- that 'instead of making further remonstrance' he should be 
authorized to thank the Russians for the simultaneous withdrawal of older military 
expeditions from nearby areas, and should disregard the enthusiastic young officers 
egged on by the military party at St Petersburg. Kimberley took Lascelles' view, 
despite the entrenched scepticism of others within the Foreign Office.47 
Nor did agreement with Russia ultimately offer itself in the two other areas of 
immediate international concern in 1894-5, the Far East and Near East. In the summer 
of 1894, soon after Lascelles' arrival at St Petersburg, a Sino-Japanese feud erupted 
over the issue of economic dominance in Korea. Both Russia and Britain had cause 
for intervention. Russia saw her own interests threatened in Manchuria, through 
which her Trans-Siberian railway was to pass, while Great Britain's fear was 
economic - she accounted for seventy per cent of China's foreign trade.48 Lascelles 
was greatly pleased to find Giers anxious to talk about mediation in the Far East, and 
was encourag~d enough to hope Anglo-Russian counsels might avert war. 49 
46 Lascelles to Durand, 30 Aug 1894, FO 800117. He hoped the incident 'will not give much 
trouble although I am afraid it will irritate India considerably.' Lascelles to Col. Swaine, 30 
Aug 1894, ibid. 
47 Lascelles to Sanderson, 12 Sept 1894, ibid. Both Barrington and Sanderson thought the 
. Russians were shielding their officers, with the latter wryly observing to Lascelles that Russia 
had similarly disavowed involvement in Prince Alexander's abduction in 1886. Barrington to 
Lascelles, 3 Oct 1894, and Sanderson to Lascelles, 17 Oct 1894, FO 800115. 
48 Lowe, Reluctant Imperialists, p. 192. 
49 Lascelles to Kimberley. 23 & 29 July 1894, FO 6511473, No's 163 & 164. Lascelles to 
Durand, 30 Aug 1894, FO 800117; see also Lascelles to Swaine, same date, ibid. 
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Kimberley too was pleased that, after the conclusion of the Pamirs incident, Russia's 
tone continued to be amicable. 50 However, the intervention failed, and further British 
"' 
attempts to discuss mediation with Russia were severely hampered by Giers's 
deteriorating health, and also the lack of executive approval from Alexander, who in 
the autumn of 1894 was taken ill. 51 After Giers's demise, Lascelles found his 
successor, Lobanoff, agreeable to do business with and, receiving Lobanoffs 
assurances 'of his desire to walk hand in hand with England',52 Sir Frank remained 
convinced 'that if the two Governments came to a clear understanding on the ... great 
questions we might squabble about smaller matters without doing much harm.,53 
By early 1895, it was clear to many, including LascelIes, that Japan's victory 
over China would overturn the status quo in the Far East. 'People do not quite 
realize,' Lascelles wrote to Durand in March 'that the appearance of a new Great 
Power in the East completely alters the state of things which has hitherto existed and 
may have very far reaching consequences.' 54 Initially Lascelles envisaged 
collaboration against the 'very onerous terms' of peace Japan was expected to 
impose. 55 Lascelles recognised that Russia strongly opposed Japanese acquisitions 
due to territorial aspirations of her own,56 in particular her 'notorious desire ... for a sea 
port in some part of the world which would remain open all the year round'. Sir Frank 
could thus easily understand her jealousy towards the 'energetic and well organized' 
50 Kimberley to Lascelles, 7 Aug 1894, FO 800115. 
51 Lascelles to Kimberley, 29 Aug, 7,17 & 21 Oct 1894, FO 65/1473, No.'s 185210 
Confidential, 220 & 222 Confidential; Lascelles to Kimberley, 10 & 25 Oct 1894, and to 
Sanderson,.12 Sept 1894, FO 800/17. 
52 Lascelles to Wodehouse, 28 Feb 1895, FO 800/17; Lascelles to Sanderson, 14 March 1895, 
ibid . 
.• 53 Lascelles to Kimberley, 31 Jan 1895, ibid. He had earlier speculated that 'there would be 
every hope of a good understanding' between England and Russia if Lobanoff succeeded 
Giers. Lascelles to Kimberley, 22 Nov 1894, ibid. 
54 Lascelles to Durand, 12 March 1895, ibid. 
55 Lascelles to Kimberley, 26 Feb 1895, FO 6511490, No. 45 Confidential. 
56 Lascelles to Sanderson, 11 April 1895, FO 800117. 
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Japanese nation,57 and was not without sympathy for Russia- he thought Britain 
would only have done the same in her position. 58 
.~, 
Yet while Japan's victory and her territorial demands on China, most notably 
the cession of the Liaotung peninsula, threatened Russia's Manchurian ambitions, 59 
Britain deemed her own interests in China to have been secured by a Commercial 
Treaty concluded with Japan on the eve of the war (July 1894).60 Furthermore, as 
Lascelles recognised, Britain deemed it 'unwise to make an enemy of a Power which 
was obtaining a preponderant position in the Far East. ,61 On 8 April 1895, the Cabinet 
thus voted against intervening to roll back Japan's 'onerous' gains, with Kimberley 
and Rosebery unprepared to 'purchase [Anglo-Russian co-operation] at the price of a 
confrontation with Japan. ,62 
While officially defending British policy,63 Lascelles had to contend with the 
disappointment of Lobanoff, for whom 'no amount of compensation' could make up 
for the alteration of the Far Eastern status quo to Russia's detriment. 64 He was 'sore' 
and 'angry' at Britain, whose abstention was looked on as 'a positive support of 
Japan.' Despite personally believing that Britain was right in abstaining from 
intervention, privately Lascelles presciently worried about the implications of a fresh, 
Russo-Japanese feud if the latter 'held out' against Russian demands, which 'would 
57 Lascelles to -Kimberley 10 April 1895, FO 65/1490, No. 89 secret and confidential. 
58 ' Lascelles to Sanderson, April 1895,FO 800117. 
59 Lowe, Reluctant Imperialists, p. 192. 
60 Kimberley told Lascelles that Britain's interests were insufficiently affected by Japan's 
tenns to justify' interfering.' Kimberley to Lascelles, 1 May 1895, FO 800116. 
61 Lascelle~ to Kimberley, 9 April 1895, FO 6511490, No. 88; see also Lascelles to Sanderson, 
11 April 1895, FO 800117. 
62 Ibid, p. 61, p. 63. Partially to blame was the challenge to Rosebery and Kimberley's 
. predominance in foreign policy making by Harcourt, the Chancellor, who advocated 
abstention from intervening. 
63 Lascelles to Kimberley, 24 April 1895, FO 800117; same to same, 20 April 1895, FO 
6511490, No. 102 confidential. 
64 Lascelles to Kimberley, 10 April 1895, FO 65/1490, No. 91; same to same, 22 April 1895, 
ibid, No. 107 confidential. . 
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not suit us [Britain] at all' ,65 as war in the Pacific would injur Britain's trade. 66 He 
therefore privately counselled the Japanse Minister at St Petersburg that Japan should 
.', 
be 'moderate in her demands' ,67 and urged Kimberley to advocate a similar approach 
in Tokyo, and to 'approach Japan as our friend and point out that the Russian 
objections to her possession of the Liaotung peninsula are serious and reasonable,' 
and that her chances of successfully opposing Russia, Germany and France were low. 
Such advice 'could scarcely be resented by Japan, it might do something towards 
soothing the ruffled feelings of the Russians'. 68 Kimberley however declined 
Lascelles suggestion,69 which amounted to 'pulling Russia's Chinese chestnuts out of 
the fire for her,' but did counsel the Japanese Minister in London to adhere to the 
suggestions of the other Great Powers. Despite keeping Russia informed of his action 
however, Kimberley's action counted for little in St Petersburg when on 4 May Japan 
eventually bowed to the pressure of Russia, France and Germany.70 Britain's absence 
was conspicuous, and Kimberley recognised that Lascelles' relations with Lobanoff 
must necessarily 'suffer' because of Britain's lack ofprotest.71 Despite no lack of 
energy on his own part, Lascelles thus felt the effects of the deterioration in Anglo-
Russian relations and admitted to Durand in late May that 'the Russians are general 
are very cross with us'. However he still found Lobanoff 'a delightful person to deal 
65 Lascelles to Sanderson, 11 April, 1895, FO 800117; see also Lascelles to Kimberley, 10 
April 1895, FO 6511490, No. 89 secret and confidential. 
66 Lascelles to Kimberley, 24 April 1895, FO 800117. 
67 Lascelles to Kimberley, 10 Apri11895, FO 6511490, No. 93. 
68 Lascelles to Kimberley, 24 April 1895, FO 800117: Lascelles proposed that Wei-Rai-Wei 
could be giyen to Japan instead of the peninsula, which would discourage Japan's expansion 
in Russia's direction, and Russia might get compensation elsewhere. See Lascelles to 
Kimberley 25 April 1895, FO 6511490, No. 116 confidential. 
,69 Kimberley argued that Japan's possession ofWei-Rai-Wei would be 'more dangerous to 
China than of Port Arthur' and would put the Japanese 'in inconvenient proximity to 
Shanghai' (a British possession), and the 'great trade route of the Yangtze River.' Kimberley 
to Lascelles, 1 May 1895, FO 800116. 
70 0tte, The China Question, pp. 69-70. 
71 Kimberley to Lascelles, 1 May 1895, FO 800116. 
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with,' and even hoped that 'now that that question has been settled .... we may get on 
more friendly terms again.,72 
~~, 
Yet after Britain's vacillation over the coercion of Japan, the Far Eastern 
triplice were determined on the 'exclusion of English capital' when China sought 
loans to pay off her war indemnity to Japan. Russia resented Britain's attempt to get a 
share in the loan to consolidate her influence in China,73 and when Lascelles went to 
'sound out' Lobanoff on a possible joint loan/4 he was evasive and failed to reveal 
that Russia's Finance Minister, Witte, was already actively raising a loan. 75 Lascelles 
found it difficult to believe Lobanoffknew nothing about Witte's communications 
over the loan with the Rothschilds in Paris, 76 and could only 'come to the conclusion 
that he wilfully deceived me.' 77 By July 1895, while the Ambassador still thought 
Lobanoff to be 'very able and very agreeable,' he had lost some confidence in him 
although with a lack of competent alternative, he still maintained Lobanoffwas 'far 
away the best Foreign Minister that could be found for Russia.,78 
Lascelles's opinion of the feasibility ofa Russian understanding also suffered 
a blow in the Near East. In December 1894, evidence came to light of the Sultan's 
atrocities against his own Armenian subjects, calling for an international response.79 
The matter deeply stirred public opinion in Britain, where the Government were 
n / Lascelles to Durand, 22 May 1895, FO 800 17. 
73 Dufferin to Kimberley, 25 May 1895, quoted in Otte, The China Question, p.77. 
74 Ibid, pp.87-91. 
75 See Keith Neilson Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia, 1894-1917, p. 180. 
76 ' Lascelles to Sanderson, 22 May 1895, FO 800117. 
77 Lascelles to Kimberley, 19 June 1895, ibid. See also same to same 6 June 1895, ibid. 
78 Lascelles to Kimberley, 3 July 1895, ibid. On the possible alternatives to Lobanoff, see e.g . 
. Lascelles to Kimberley, 15 Aug 1894, 31 Jan & 1 Aug 1895, ibid; Lascelles to O'Conor, 4 
Sept 1896, OCON 61117. 
79 There is a vast literature on this subject. See Roy Douglas, 'Britain and the Armenian 
Question, 1894-7' Historical Journal, Vol. 19, No.1 (Mar., 1976), pp. 113-133; the relevant 
chapters of lA.S. Grenville Lord Salisbury and foreign policy: the close of the nineteenth 
century (London, 1964), and of Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar. . 
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pressed to act on behalf of the Annenians.8o It also affected Russia as she had a large 
number of Annenians within her own borders.8l At first, the Powers were agreed that 
~, 
their interests lay in calling for an enquiry into the alleged atrocities. Nicholas II told 
Lascelles in February 1895 that there was no difference of opinion between the two 
Countries,82 and the Ambassadors of France, Russia and Britain agreed to work 
towards refonn proposals at Constantinople. 
However, after the Sultan rejected the Refonn proposals in June 1895, the two 
Powers were less united as to the next step. In May 1895, Russian Annenians, who 
were also, to a lesser degree, being oppressed by their Government, seemed ready to 
start up their own agitation, and Lascelles noted that Lobanoff went from being 
'positively lukewann' about the reforms to 'positively cold,' arousing fears that 
Britain would become isolated in the question, as France would follow the Russian 
lead. 83 Russia did not want the question of an independent Annenia raised, and looked 
with concern to the growing number of' Annenian Committees' in England and their 
influence on Liberal foreign policy.84 Lascelles explained that Lobanoff wanted to do 
'something' on the subject but dwelt 'on the difficulty of obtaining a satisfactory 
solution.,85 As Sanderson told Lascelles, Britain could not 'without dishonour allow 
the question to drop.,86 Lobanoffwas certainly against coercive measures to force the 
80 Ibid, p.l61. 
81 Lascelles to Kimberley, 18 Dec 1894, FO 6511473, No. 293. 
82 Lascelles to Kimberley 26 Feb 1894, FO 6511490, No. 45 confidential. 
83 Lascelles to Sanderson: 22 May 1895, FO 800117. Lascelles thought if an insurrection 
broke out among Ottoman Armenians Russia might even help suppress it. 
84 Lascelles to Kimberley, 13 & 28 March 1895, FO 65/1490, No.'s 59 & 81. Kimberley to 
',. Lascelles, 25 June 1895, FO 800/16; Lascelles to Kimberley, 3 July 1895, FO 800117. 
85 Laselles to Kimberley, 28 March 1895, FO 800117 .. ~espite a p;~sonal ~tip~thy.to the 
Annenian reform sheme Lobanoffwas apparently willIng not to mterfere with hiS 
Ambassador at Constantinople, Nelidoff, who was 'keen on the subject.' Lascelles to 
Sanderson, 9 May 1895, ibid. 
86 Sanderson to Lascelles, 20 March 1895, FO 800116. 
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Sultan to accept refonns.87 Indeed, Lascelles suspected the Russians of 'secretly 
helping the Sultan' in having blocked refonn at Constantinople, and the Gennan 
Ambassador, Prince Radolin, noted the British Ambassador's growing irritation 
against Russia and 'also against Prince Lobanoff, with whom he used to be rather 
friendly.'88 
This sentiment was shared by Lord Salisbury, who in May 1895 again 
returned to the Foreign Office.89 Lobanoff looked anxiously towards Salisbury's 
return. Against Salisbury's 'constant support for the integrity of Turkey,' Lobanoff 
counterbalanced his 'personal friendship' for Sir Philip Currie, now British 
Ambassador at Constantinople, who was urging action to secure refonn.90 Salisbury's 
line did little to ease the growing Angl~-Russian tension. Although he told Lascelles 
that Britain had 'no intention whatever' of supporting Annenian autonomy, and 
wanted only 'moderate security and good government,' he wanted to know whether 
Russia would use coercion against the Sultan ifhe proved 'utterly obstinate'. 91 
Lobanoff gave Lascelles to understand very clearly that she would not. ,92 The 
Armenian question remained unsolved when, in autumn 1895, fresh massacres broke 
out at Constantinople. 
By this time, however, Lascelles had once again moved posts. In August 1895, 
Lascelles was suddenly offered a transfer to the Embassy at Berlin due to the 
retirement of Sir Edwcard Malet, and wired back his acceptance.
93 
His reason for 
doing so was clear: in offering him Berlin, Salisbury confessed to Lascelles that he 
87 Lascelles to Sanderson 6 June 1895 FO 800/17. Lascelles to Kimberley, 6 June 1895, ibid. 
88' " • Prince von Radolin to Prince von Hohenlohe, 10 June 1895, GP IX.232, m E.T.S. Dugdale 
[trans.] German Diplomatic Documents 1871-1914, Volume II: From Bismarck's fall to 1898 
~~ondon, 1929), p. 232. . . 
Salisbury to Lascelles 17 Sept 1895, FO 800/16. 
90 ' Lascelles to Salisbury 3 July 1895, FO 800/17. 9) , 
Lascelles to Salisbury 27 July 1895, FO 800/16. 
92 ' Lascelles to Salisbury, 14 Aug 1895, FO 800/17. 
93 Lascelles to Salisbury [tel.], 28 Aug 1895, ibid. 
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had 'tried for a long time to fill the place without moving you, for I knew how 
valuable you were in St Petersburgh: but when it came to adjust the rival claims of the 
" two [posts], there could be no doubt that Berlin was the most important of the two. 
We may, & I hope shall, retain the friendship of Germany: but I see very little hope of 
regaining the friendship of Russia. ,94 
Lascelles confessed to his new Chief that the 'excellent impression' produced 
by England's sympathy for Alexander II's death had now 'worn off,'95 and while 
sorry to say goodbye to his Russian counterparts, some of whom he had found 'very 
pleasant and agreeable', he confessed too, 'that my hope of seeing a really satisfactory 
understanding between the two countries seems as far as ever from realisation.' 
Despite the success of the Pamirs negotiations, and a temporarily more 'satisfactory' 
tone from .Lobanoff. after the disagreements in the Far and Near East Lascelles noted 
the 'bitterly hostile' tone of the Press, which he was sure the Russian Government 
could alter if they wanted to be more friendly towards Britain.96 
An assessment of Lascelles' short career at St Petersburg has necessarily to be 
judged against the events he had to deal with. Despite establishing good personal 
relations with the Russian elite, the momentous implications of the Sino-Japanese war 
and Armenian atrocities afforded Lascelles little scope for action in Russia. As in 
Tehran however St Petersburg demonstrated Lascelles' willingness to accommodate 
and maintai~ amicable relations with those Powers seen as Britain's Imperial rivals, in 
order to reduce the strain of defending British interests . 
. Sir Frank's transfer to Berlin ended seventeen years of experience in Eastern 
posts, and he would not be called on to use his expertise again, but the realisation of 
94 Salisbury to Lascelles 17 Sept 1895, FO 800/16. 
95 ' Lascelles to Salisbury, 3 July 1895, FO 800/17. 
96 Lascelles to Salisbury, 28 Aug 1895, ibid. 
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the potential scale of Anglo-Russian - and Anglo-French feuds remained a 
background influence, as too did the possibility of detente with Britain's Imperial 
"' 
rivals. It was with this experience in mind, as well as the background of Britain's 
continued association with the Triple Alliance Powers, that he entered his new post. 
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Lascelles and the search for an Anglo-German understanding, 1895-1908. 
a) Persona grata, 1895-1902 
In the context of the vast literature on Anglo-German relations in the pre-1914 period, 
the Berlin Embassy of Sir Frank Lascelles has naturally attracted attention before 
now. I LascelIes's tenure at Berlin (1895-1908) straddles the period of what Paul 
Kennedy has termed the 'flowering' period of Anglo-German 'antagonism'. 
In contrast to Lascelles's earlier career, his embassy at Berlin has received treatment 
in two earlier D Phil theses: first by Cornelia Brooke,2 and then by Will em-Alexander 
van't Padje.3 Cornelia Brooke's thesis dealt exclusively with the first five years 
LascelIes's Embassy, but W.A. Van't Padje's work has tackled LascelIes's thirteen 
years at B€rlin in the context of the growing 'imperialist rivalry' between Great 
Britain and Germany. In deference to this fact, the following chapter will not attempt 
an exhaustive account of LascelIes's time at the Berlin embassy, but wiII rather seek 
to highlight key themes or episodes within his career which it is felt will throw light 
on LascelIes's views and diplomatic approach in Berlin. 
In his thesis Dr. Van't Padje focussed on the private correspondence between 
Ambassador and successive Foreign Secretaries. This chapter will also incorporate 
Lascelles's extensive official correspondence with the British Foreign Office, private 
1 See, e.g., Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914; idem, 
Empire and Continent: studies in British foreign policy from the 1880s to the First World War 
(London, 1987), Zara S. Steiner and Keith Neilson, Britain and the origins of the First World 
War; A.lP. Taylor The Struggle For Mastery in Europe 1848-1918; William Leonard 
Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902 (New York, 1951)John C.G. Rohl, 
Wilhelm II : the Kaiser's personal monarchy, 1888-1900, (Cambridge, 2004). G.W. Monger, 
The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900-1907. 
2 Cornelia E. Brooke, 'The Queen's Ambassador to Her Grandson Sir Frank Lascelles: A 
Study of Anglo-German Relations from 1895-1900' (D Phil thesis Vassar College, New 
York, 1971) .. 
3 Willem-Alexander Van't Padje, 'At the heart of the growing Anglo-German Imperialist 
Rivalry: Two Ambassadors at Berlin 1884-1908' (D Phil thesis, St John's College, Oxford, 
2001). . 
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correspondence with his journalist friend Valentine Chirol,4 with family members and 
also with Permanent Undersecretaries and other Foreign Office officials, -and also uses 
accounts of Lascelles' views and activities from The Times' Berlin correspondent 
George Saunders, plus extracts of a diary kept by the British naval attache in Berlin 
(1906-08), Philip Wylie Dumas.5 
Against the backdrop of the growing British estrangement from Germany after 
1902, the Anglo-German Naval rivalry and, ultimately, the defining event of 1914 it is 
hard to resist the temptation of asking why Lascelles' mission ultimately 'failed', and 
to use his Embassy to depict warning signs of the diplomatic re-alignments and 
conflagration to come. It is Van't Padje's contention that during his time in Berlin, 
Lascelles mainly pointed to one aspect of the Anglo-German antagonism which he 
mistakenly regarded as the one fundamental cause of the tension: the strained personal 
relationship between King and Kaiser. His Germanophile attitude and his close and personal 
acquaintance with the Emperor however, decisively influenced or rather blurred his views and 
opinions on Anglo-German relations. He regarded the Kaiser as a far more important figure in 
the process of political decision-making in Germany as[sic] he actually was. Thus, he neither 
understood the German political structure nor was able to give a clear analysis of the Anglo-
German friction ... .' 6 
Van't Padje argues that LasceIIes should have been more aware of the 'cultural, 
economic, military and naval elements' but instead 'had the wrong perception, 
4 The bulk of this correspondence has also been used in Linda B. Fritzinger, Diplomat without 
portfolio: Valentine Chirol, His Life and The Times, (New York, 2006). 
5 Valentine Chirol, George Saunders & Donald Mackenzie-Wallace MS~, News Int~rnational 
Archive, London; Dumas diary, Liddle Collection, University of Leeds lIbrary SpecIal 
Collections, RNMNIDUMAS. 
6 Willem-Alexander Van't Padje, 'At the heart of the growing Anglo-German Imperialist 
Rivalry: Two Ambassadors at Berlin 1884-1908' p.249. The 'Germanophile' tag is stressed 
again on pp's 93, 245, & 251. . 
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intensely concentrating on the relationship between King and Kaiser and the latter's 
complaints about Anti-German feeling in England.' 7 .,.-/ 
.~, 
Rather than seeking to overturn Van't Padje's thesis, the following chapter 
will attempt to explain Lascelles' apparent 'Germanophile' tendencies and his focus 
on the Emperor's personality. It will contend that his two constant aims while at 
Berlin":" to work for better Anglo-German relations and to retain the friendship of the 
German Emperor- were justified in the context of contemporary perceptions about 
Anglo-German relations; that the Kaiser's volatile nature and the difficult relationship 
he had with his English Royal relations meant that Lascelles' inclination to play up 
the Monarch's pro-British sentiments did not seem wholly unjustified or out of 
keeping with his role; Lascelles' social ease and aristocratic roots were the reason for 
his appointment, rather than a long experience of German affairs. But he was also 
more aware of the limits to Anglo-German co-operation and more wary of Germany's 
'pin-prick' diplomacy than has been acknowledged. Lascelles was always conscious 
that Britain would seek co-operation with other Powers to secure solutions to her 
imperial burden. However, like other British foreign policy makers until at least 1902, 
he was keen to work with Germany out of a sense of shared interests, in the context of 
the uneasy challenge to Britain's supremacy by France and Russia up until 1895, and 
this also explains why, even after the Edwardian diplomatic revolution, this Victorian 
-
diplomat continued to believe an Anglo-German understanding was the best way to 
preserve peace, and the status quo. 
l 7 Ibid, p.230. 
I 
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I 
It is Dr. Van't Padje's argument that Lascelles' appointment in 1895 signalled a 'lack 
of highly qualified British diplomats' ,8 but in many ways Lascelles was perfectly 
suited to the social and professional demands of Berlin. It is true that he was at best 
second choice owing to the fact that the Kaiser's first preference, Sir Garnet 
Wolseley, a soldier, was determined on the post of commander in chief of the army. 
Following Wolseley's refusal of the offer of Berlin, Salisbury thought that career 
diplomats should take priority over the Emperor's 'desire for a grand seigneur.' After 
having second thoughts about moving Edmund Monson9 from Vienna, and feeling 
unable to send O'Conor to a Protestant Court because of his Catholicism, Salisbury 
proposed Lascelles instead as ambassador. 10 Importantly, the Queen justified the 
choice to Wilhelm II on the grounds of Sir Frank's ability, her confidence that he 
would 'do all he could' to maintain friendly relations between Britain and Germany, 
and his family connections: he was a nephew (by marriage) to the Duke of Sutherland 
who had been a great friend of Wilhelm I, and a great-uncle to Wilhelm II's father. 
The Kaiser's social demands were thus satisfied- even though Lascelles's wife was 
not a 'Grand dame'. 11 
Lascelles' own decision to accept Berlin was partially a negative one. He had, 
by August 1895, despaired of any improvement in Anglo-Russian relations,12 and 
-
indeed the tenor of Salisbury's advice in offering him the post was that he 'could do 
8 Ibid, p.34. 
9 Sir Edmund Monson (1834-1909), British diplomat, was ambassador to Vienna (1893-1896) 
". and Paris (1896-1904). 
10 Raymond A. Jones, The British Diplomatic Service, 1815-1914, (Ontario, 1983), p. 190. 
See also John C.G. Rohl, Wilhelm II: the Kaiser's personal monarchy, 1888-1900, p. 775. 
11 G.E. Buckle (ed.), Letters of Queen Victoria, Third Series, Vol. ii (London 1931), Victoria 
to Wilhelm 11,28 Aug 1895, p.561. 
12 Lascelles to Salisbury, 28 Aug 1895, FO 800117 . 
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much more good there than at St Petersburg.' 13 Possibly, this prospect eased any 
pecuniary disadvantages. He had also fond memories of being in Berlin in the 1860s-
admittedly a less fractious time for Anglo-German relations. 
On offering Lascelles the post of Ambassador to Berlin, Salisbury had stressed 
the importance to Britain of retaining German friendship.14 Since 1887 Salisbury had 
two main aims in foreign policy, which up to 1895 proved complementary: to 
safeguard Constantinople and to align with Germany diplomatically. 15 From 1887 
Britain's adhesion to the Mediterranean Agreements had meant a loose affiliation 
with Germany's Triple Alliance partners, Austria and Italy. Germany's severing of 
the 'wire' to St Petersburg in 1890, and the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance 
(1894) had formed a further common interest between the two Powers. Germany's 
fears of this new alignment for her European position were matched by Britain's 
concerns about its implications for her own Imperial position. 16 Lascelles' suggestion 
at his pre-appointment briefing with Salisbury, which he took up in his first interview 
with the German Foreign Secretary, that Germany should be 'encouraged' to 
conciliate Russia, (and weaken her ties with France)17 reflected this concern. 18 
From the outset however, Salisbury left Lascelles in no doubt of the difficulty 
of his new mission. 19 The German Government had hoped that Salisbury would 
continue his loose affinity to the Triple Alliance by re-affirming his commitment the 
-
Mediterranean Agreements of 1887, and thus end the uncertainty caused by his 
13 Salisbury to Lascelles [tel.], 25 Aug 1895, FO 800116. 
14 Lascelles to Salisbury, 7 March 1896, FO 800117. 
15 See C.J. Lowe, Salisbury and the Mediterranean 1886-1896 (London, 1965), p.l08. 
16 See lA.S. Grenville, 'Goluchowski, Salisbury, and the Mediterranean Agreements, 1895-
. 7', The Slavonic and East European Review, xxxvi (1957-8), p.341. 
17 Memo by Lascelles on conversation with Salisbury, 4 Dec 1895, FO 800117; Lascelles to 
Salisbury, 9 Dec 1895, FO 64/1351, No.299. 
18 See also Lascelles to Salisbury, 9 Dec 1895, FO 64/1351, No.299. 
19 Hatzfeldt too warned Lascelles that his position would 'by no means' be easy. Memo by 
Lascelles on conversation with Hatzfeldt, 31 Oct 1895, FO 800117. 
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Liberal predecessor's refusal to do so. 20 However, in the Near East, Salisbury 
admitted to Lascelles that 'it might become necessary to reconsider our Mediterranean 
"' Policy.' 21 The British Admiralty's reluctance to send ships to the Mediterranean to 
force the Sultan into accepting Great Power reforms on the Armenian question in the 
summer of 1895, coupled with the British public's growing hostility to the Sultan, had 
been decisive for Salisbury in contemplating the abandonment of Britain's traditional 
policy of defending Constantinople against a Russian attack; his willingness to 
discuss a partition of Turkey had led to German fears that he would thus renege on his 
obligations to Austria in the Near East-leading the then Secretary of State of the 
German Foreign Office, Marschall,22 to warn that if Italy and Austria could no longer 
count on England, they might have to l~ok to St Petersburg.23 The German 
Government's anxiety to know what Britain was 'driving at' after five years of 
uncertainty and her attempts to 'cling to the possibility of a friendly understanding' 
with England,24 led Lascelles to receive entreaties-often repeated during his first year 
at Berlin for proof of England's fidelity to the Triple Alliance-such as permitting 
Italian troops to land at Zeila in her campaign against Abyssinia.25 It is with some 
justice that C.J. Lowe remarks that 'once England had lost interest in the Straits she 
had lost interest in the Triple Alliance' - and thus Germany's tactics reverted to 
hoping an Anglo-French or Anglo-Russian war would bring Britain closer to the 
20 See, Gordon Martel, 'The Limits of Commitment: Rosebery and the definition of the 
Anglo-German understanding.' The Historical Journal, Vol. 27 (1984), pp387-404; also 
idem, Imperial Diplomacy: Rosebery and the Failure of Foreign Policy, (Kingston, 1986). 
21 Memo by Lascelles on conversation with Salisbury, 4 Dec 1895, FO 800117. 
22 Baron Adolf FreiheIT Marschall von Bieberstein (1842-1912). 
23 Chirol to Lascelles, 9 Nov 1895, CASR 11114. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Lascelles to Salisbury, 14 Dec 1895, FO 6411352, Tel No. 55; Lascelles to Salisbury, 14 
Dec 1895; see also Lascelles to Sanderson, 28 Dec 1895, FO 800117. See also Sanderson to 
Lascelles, 23 and 26 Dec 1895, FO 800/6. 
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Triple Alliance on the tenns she wanted.26 Lascelles was soon alive to Germany's 
repeated hectoring attempts, to 'frighten' England into joining the Triple Alliance, or 
" 
at least to side with her exclusively.27 Before Lascelles departed for Berlin, the 
Gennan Ambassador in London, Paul von Hatzfeldt, warned him that Gennany would 
seek agreement with France and Russia if Britain refused to clarify her Near Eastern 
policy.28 When in December 1895 the Emperor accused Britain of collaborating with 
Russia to establish a condominium at Constantinople, based on purely academic 
discussions at St Petersburg, he sensed the Kaiser's resentment at Gennany being 
treated as a quantile negligeable which he was keen to disprove?9 In early 1896, he 
also became aware through Chirol's conversations with Friedrich von Holstein, the 
leading spirit of the Gennan Foreign Office,30 that Gennany claimed to have 
attempted to forge an anti-English continental coalition in early 1896 though-
erroneously- he regarded these threats as 'a bit ofbluff31 
From Lascelles' despatches it is clear that he did not regard an Anglo-Gennan 
alignment as the only possible solution to Britain's Imperial problems. A proposal 
from the French Ambassador, Herbette, in January 1896 at the height of Anglo-
Gennan tension over the Kriiger telegram,32 that France would give a self-denying 
ordinance over Egypt if Britain evacuated the country, induced him to counsel 
Salisbury to consider an alternative, should Gennan hostility over the Transvaal force 
26 CJ. Lowe, Salisbury and the Mediterranean, p.117. 
27 If' Lascelles to Salisbury, 29 Feb 1896, FO 641 1376, No. 49, enc copy 0 ~onversatlOn 
between Col. Swaine and Friedrich von Holstein. See also Lascelles to SalIsbury, 31 Dec 
.. 1895, FO 64/1359, No. 176 confidential. . 
28 See also Memo by Lascelles on conversation with Hatzfeldt, 31 Oct 1895, FO 800117. 
29 Lascelles to Salisbury, 20 Dec 1895 FO 800117. 
30 Baron F. von Holstein Berlin Foreign Office, 1880-1906. 
31 ' Lascelles to Salisbury, 11 Jan 1896, FO 800117. 
32 Jules Herbette French Ambassador in Berlin, 1886-1896. , 
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England into a 'change ofpolicy.,33 This advice complemented Salisbury's growing 
desire for greater freedom of movement in British policy and decreased dependency 
" 
on Germany.34 Germany's dependence on Anglo-French rivalry in Egypt was well-
known- and when in February 1896 Marschall played up rumours that Russians were 
using their influence at Constantinople to settle the Egyptian question against 
England, Lascelles had shrewdly retorted that 'many influential people in England,' 
favoured evacuation and would not be sorry to see the question settled.35 Lascelles 
took such warnings over Egypt as a sign of Germany's nervousness at a possible 
Anglo-French agreement.36 LascelIes, and many diplomats, stilI felt Britain was 
strong enough to stand alone/7 and he told Herbette that Germany's method of hitting 
Britain in the pit of the stomach to tame her, might instead 'hurt and make John Bull 
angry.'38 . 
However despite questioning Germany's hectoring methods, Lascelles was 
ultimately alive to the continued advantages of German friendship. This was in 
evidence when on 3 March 1896, the Emperor paid an impromptu visit to the Berlin 
Embassy, staying from ten in the evening until half past one in the morning,39 partly 
'to make it up and shake hands' after recent tension in South Africa.
4o 
The Kaiser 
warned Lascelles that, according to an anonymous source, France and Russia were 
planning to undermine Britain's position, Russia by acquiring territory in the Balkans 
-
and on the Red Sea, France by taking the Canary islands, thus cutting the Cape and 
33 Lascelles to Salisbury, 10 Jan 1896, FO 6411376, No.7. See J.D. Hargreaves, 'Entente 
Manquee: Anglo-French relations 1895-1896,' Cambridge Historical Journal Vol. 11, No. 1 
(1953), pp .. 65-92, especially pp. 75-77, 84. 
34 Ibid, p.69. 
35 Lascelles to Salisbury, 27 Feb 1896, FO 64/1376, No.47 . 
. 36 See e.g. Lascelles to Salisbury 29 Feb 1896, FO 6411376, No. 49. 
37 See Durand to Lascelles, 3 March 1896, FO 800/6. 
38 Lascelles to Sanderson, 1 Feb 1896, FO 800117. 
39 Spring Rice to Villiers, 14 March 1896, in Stephen Gwynn (ed.), The Letters and 
Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice: A Record (London, 1929), Vol. I, p.200. 
40 Gosselin to Barrington, 9 March 1896, SP 120/30. 
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Suez routes to England's Eastern possessions, and that the Egyptian question would 
soon be raised again. He invited Britain to join the Triple Alliance, or to assist Italian 
" troops who had just suffered a reverse at Adowa in Abyssinia, and he expressed 
anxiety that Britain seemed inclined to withdraw from the Mediterranean and 
entertain the evacuation of Egypt, suggesting Britain should renew her Mediterranean 
agreements with Austria.41 
Even though Lascelles deemed that the Kaiser's' information' about Russia 
and France was 'somewhat of the imaginative order,' (an impression confirmed by 
Marschall, and by the German Chancellor),42 and even though he also divined the 
Emperor's motives - partly (according to Lanza, the Italian Ambassador at Berlin) 
because of a rebuff by Russia, partly because Italy's recent military reverses reduced 
her value as an ally4: - he nonetheless urged Salisbury to respond to the Kaiser's 
'friendly overture. ,44 
The key point of the meeting for Lascelles was that it 'converted into a 
certainty' his belief in the Kaiser's friendliness towards England,45 something pressed 
on him by the Imperial Chancellor, and by his old Bucharest friend Goluchowski -
now Austrian Foreign Minister-46 when visiting Berlin the same month.47 As he told 
Sanderson, the 'complicated state of things in all parts of the world,' made German 
41 Lascelles to Salisbury, 4 March 1896, FO 64/1376, No.59. lA.S. Grenville, 'Goluchowski, 
Salisbury, and the Mediterranean Agreements, 1895-7', pp. 340-69; see also K.M. Wilson, 
'Constantinople or Cairo: Lord Salisbury and the Protection of the Ottoman Empire', in 
idem, (ed.), Imperialism and Nationalism in the Middle East: The Anglo-Egyptian Experience 
1882-1982 (London, 1983). 
42 Lascelles to Salisbury, 4 March & 6 March 1896, FO 64/1376, No.'s 59 & 63; Lascelles to 
. Salisbury, 7 March 1896, FO 800/17. 
43 Lascelles to Salisbury, 7 March 1896, FO 800117. 
44 Lascelles to Salisbury, 4 March 1896, FO 6411376, No.59. 
45 Lascelles to Salisbury, 6 & 7 March 1896, FO 64/1376, No.'s 63 & 65. 
46 Count A. Goluchowski Austrian Foreign Minister, 1895-1906. 
47 Lascelles to Salisbury, '11 & 13 March 1896, FO 6411376, No.'s 71 & 72. 
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friendship very 'useful' to Britain,48 regardless of Wilhelm's motives.49 Salisbury 
however remained keen to 'lean to the Triple Alliance without belonging to it,' and, 
" 
as in 1892, to 'cut free from any engagement to go to war in any contingency 
whatever'. 50 
The meeting did indeed however have the effect of encouraging Britain to 
advance to Dongola to help the Italians, which Britain had a vested interest in doing 
anyway to shore up her position in Egypt. 51 The Kaiser was delighted that the 
meeting had produced this outcome, 52 and was glad of the candidness with which he 
could speak to Lascelles,53 and arguably this reading of his early meeting with 
Lascelles influenced Wilhelm's conduct towards the British Ambassador from hereon 
In. 
II 
Quickly after his arrival in Berlin, Lascelles became persona grata with the 
German Emperor himself, who became 'exceedingly fond of him personally.'54 This 
was no small consideration - and there was a reason why, at the time, it was thought 
48 L ascelles to Sanderson, 7 March 1896, FO 800117. 
49 Lascelles to Salisbury, 7 March 1896, ibid. 
50 Salisbury to Lascelles, 10 March 1896, FO 800/8. 
51 See J.D. Hargreaves, 'Entente Manquee', pp. 84-86; Wilson, 'Constantinple or Cairo', p.48. 
See also Arthur Marsden, 'Salisbury and the Italians in 1896', Journal of Modern History, 
Vol. 40, No.f (Mar 1968), pp. 91-117; T.G. Otte, " "Floating Downstream"? Lord Salisbury 
and British Foreign Policy, 1878-1902', p.l17. 
52 Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, 12 March 1896, and minute by the Kaiser: GP XI.241 , in 
E.T.S. Dugdale (ed.), German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914, Vol. ii (London, 1929), 
pp.422-3. Also see Spring-Rice to Villiers, 21 March 1896, in Stephen Gwynn (ed.), Letters 
and Friendships, I, p.202 . 
53 Kiderlen-Waechter to Holstein, 25 March 1896, in Rich & Fisher, Holstein Papers, iii, No. 
537. The Kaiser said he had 'never said such rude things to an ambassador about his own 
. country as he had to Lascelles ... !' Lascelles also gained an impression that the British were 
primarily assisting the Italians. Lascelles to Salisbury, 20 March 1896, FO 6411376, No. 85. 
For the Kaiser's attitude to the Dongola expedition see Roderick R. McLean, 'The Kaiser's 
Diplomacy and the Reconquest of the Sudan' in Edward M. Spiers (ed.) Sudan: The 
Reconquest Reappraised (Portland, Or., 1998), pp. 146-162. 
54 New York Times, 1 June 1902, p. 4 
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Lascelles' cultivation of a good personal relationship with the Kaiser was 'the greatest 
diplomatic achievement' of the day.55 As head of the Gennan Government, Wilhelm 
wielded ultimate executive power. 56 The ~~riod 1895-1900 marked the establishment 
of the Kaiser's 'personal monarchy,;57 a period which arguably only ended after 
unwanted publication of the Kaiser's private utterances in the Daily Telegraph in 
1908- by which time Lascelles had retired. 58 The Imperial Chancellor Hohenlohe, was 
no Bismarck but merely a figurehead, and the Emperor was, in Lascelles' words 'his 
own Chancellor' ,59 while his loathing of his Foreign Secretary, von Marschall, was 
also well-known to British diplomats.6o Both Lascelles and Salisbury recognised that 
a void had been left by Bismarck's departure. As the Chancellor himself had been 
replaced by 'smaller men' ,61 the vacuu~ of authority had been filled by the Kaiser's 
personality, which was no small consideration for Britain's ambassador to Berlin. 
Coupled with his apparent ascendancy in the period after 1896, the Kaiser had 
a well-known love-hate attitude towards England, which had its roots in his stonny 
family relations. He had rebelled against his English mother, to embrace Prussian 
militarism. He deeply resented his uncle Edward VII's lack of deference towards him 
and treatment of him as an errant nephew. On the other hand, the Kaiser was fond of 
55 Lady Susan Townley, 'Indiscretions' 0/ Lady Susan (London, 1922), p.43. 
56 See John C.G. Rohl on the Kaiser's 'kingship mechanism' in The Kaiser and his court: 
Wilhelm II mid the government o/Germany (Cambridge, 1994), pp.l07-130. 
57 Idem, Wilhelm II: the Kaiser's personal monarchy, 1888-1900; idem, Germany without 
Bismarck: The Crisis o/Government in the Second Reich, 1890-1900 (London, 1967). 
58 For this episode see T.G. Orte, , "An Altogether Unfortunate Affair": Great Britain and the 
Daily Telegraph Affair', in: Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. v. No.2 (1994), pp. 296-333. 
59 Memo 1:Jy Lascelles of conversation with Salisbury, 4 Dec 1895, FO 800117. Arguably 
Hohenlohe's inability to control the Kaiser led to the sending of the KrUger telegram. N. Rich, 
Friedrich von Holstein, (Cambridge, 1965), Vol. ii, pp. 502-3 . 
. 60 Richard Acton to Lord Acton, 28 Nov 1896, Acton papers, Cambridge University Library, 
Add. MS 8 121 (9) III., No.344.0n the Kaiser's relationship with Marschall and Hohenlohe, 
see John C.G. Rohl, Wilhelm II : the Kaiser's personal monarchy, pp. 691-93, 843-45 & 
873-9. 
61 Memo by Lascelles of conversation with Salisbury, 4 Dec 1895, FO 800117; Chirol to 
LasceIIes, 9 Nov 1895, CASR I 1114. 
181 
paying regular visits to Cowes on the Isle of Wight, had a lifelong devotion to his 
grandmother, Queen Victoria - who alone gave him the respect he craved as fellow 
" 
ruler - and he identified a racial affinity between Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon 
peoples.62 The admission by John Rohl that sometimes the Kaiser's feelings towards 
England were 'well-nigh impossible to work out' show how the Kaiser's temperament 
has baffled even the most committed historian.63 The centrality of the Kaiser's 
fractious relationship with his English relations informed some of the first advice 
Lascelles received - from Sir Frank's ex-chief, the former Ambassador at Berlin 
Lord Augustus Loftus.64 
These autocratic and occasionally Anglophobe tendencies were augmented by 
the Kaiser's parlous mental condition, which made his behaviour erratic and 
unpredictable and had the potential to cause political problems- a concern raised by 
Rosebery, and especially Salisbury, who was led to distrust Wilhelm's changeable 
nature.65 Wilhelm's accession in 1888 was a new factor in Anglo-German relations 
and added a feeling of instability to a historically cordial relationship. In that year 
Malet had argued to Salisbury that to humour the Kaiser's personality would now be a 
central task of British diplomacy, as the Kaiser's personal sentiments would influence 
62 The literature on the Kaiser's tempestuous relations with his family is vast. See e.g. L. Cecil 
'Hjstory as Family Chronicle: Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Dynastic Roots of Anglo-German 
Antagonism' in: J .C.G, Rohl & Nicholaus Sombart (eds.), Kaiser Wilhelm II: new 
interpretations: The Corjupapers, (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 91-108; D Cannadine, 'Kaiser 
Wilhelm II and the British Monarchy', in T.W.C. Blanning and D. Cannadine (eds.), History 
and Biography: Essays in Honour of Derek Beales (Cambridge, 1996), pp.191-196; John 
C.G. Rohl, 'The Kaiser and England', in A.M. Birke, M. Brechtken and A. Searle (eds.),An 
Anglo-German dialogue: The Munich lectures on the history of international relations 
(2000); pp. 97-100. .-
63 John C.G. RohI, Wilhelm II: the Kaiser's personal monarchy, p.966. 
64 Lord Augustus Loftus to LasceIIes, 28 Dec 1895, Sir Frank Lascelles MSS, C.C.A.C., 
LASC 3. 
65 P.M. Kennedy, 'Gennan World Policy and the Alliance Negotiatio?~,with E?gland, 1897-
1900', Journal of Modern History, xlv, 4, (1973), p. 614; T.G. Otte, Th: ~mston o.f 
Germany": The British Foreign Policy Elite and the Last Gennan Emperor, m Canadwn 
Journal of History, 36, 3(2001):pp.471-504, passim. -
passim; John RohI, Wilhelm II: the Kaiser's personal monarchy, p. 539, 547, 549, 554, 794. 
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his policy towards Britain.66 The tactlessness of the Emperor and his meddling in 
foreign affairs was much in evidence during Lascelles' first years at Berlin, as in 1895 
" when the Kaiser apparently spontaneously sent his congratulatory telegram to 
KrUger, as in the Greco-Turkish war of 1897, when the Kaiser's meddling in Foreign 
Affairs led Lascelles to state that it 'was no joke negotiating personally with the 
Emperor,67 and Wilhelm's public tirade to Lascelles against British policy within 
earshot of other diplomats at an Opera the same year seemed to verge on insanity.68 
Lascelles - not one of those ambassadors given to 'antagonism' - and described as 
'the very incarnation of geniality and tact,69 must have seemed an ideal appointment 
to Berlin, and effectively his view of the impact of the Emperor reflected that of his 
predecessor Malet, who had also realised the efficacy of playing up whatever pro-
British sentiments Wilhelm had. By March 1896, as has been seen, Lascelles was 
convinced the Kaiser's pro-British sentiments were real enough, and that it was in 
Britain's interests and the interests of peace to pay deference to them. 
Importantly however, the Emperor deeply distrusted Salisbury, especially after 
his return to power in 1895 and his wavering over Britain's traditional Near Eastern 
policy; for by 1897, Salisbury refused to extend her 1887 Mediterranean agreements, 
effectively abandoning and alienating Austria, who instead turned towards Russia in 
1898 to patch up a Near Eastern entente. ,70 The result was a faIling away of one 
important l~g of Britain's association with the Triple Alliance - and small step in the 
66 0tte, 'The Winston of Gennany', pp. 478-79; Rohl, 'The Kaiser and England,' p.l00. 
67 Saunders to Mackenzie Wallace, 20 Feb 1897, Saunders MSS, News International Archive, 
London. See Rohl, Wilhelm II: the Kaiseris personal monarchy, pp.939-940. 
68 Lascelles to Salisbury 16 Feb 1897, SP 120/52. 
69 ' New York Times, 5 June 1898, p. 19. 
70 See E. Walters, 'Austro-Russian relations under Goluchowski, 1895-1906', The Slavonic 
and East European Review, xxxi (1950). 
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estrangement of Britain and Germany. 71 Much as Lascelles, a self-styled 'old 
Englander', might regret the collapse of Salisbury's Mediterranean policy,72 in 
practical terms his job was limited to trying to heal the breach between Wilhelm and 
Lord Salisbury. 
The final reason for Lascelles' cultivation of the Emperor was in some ways 
the most obvious one - events before his arrival in Berlin made the Ambassador 
acutely aware of the impact that the Emperor's disfavour could have on his career 
personally. Just before Malet departed for England he had openly warned the German 
Foreign Secretary of the dangers of German support of the Transvaal Government in 
their hostility towards Great Britain, who had interests in the neighbouring Cape 
Colony. These comments, intended as a friendly warning, were taken by Wilhelm II 
to signal an 'ultimatum', leading to the Kaiser launching into a tirade over British 
policy (one of many) to the Embassy military attache, Colonel Swaine, and to his non-
appearance at the British Ambassador's official departure.73 Lascelles was made 
aware of the details of the incident- and the Kaiser's personal grievance over Malet's 
remarks- by Chirol, before he reached Berlin.74 It was thus no coincidence that 
Lascelles came to tread carefully around the Emperor - and to view his ability to 
appease the Emperor's moods as a barometer of his own success as Ambassador. 
Lascelles' aristocratic roots, his prior knowledge of Germany, his lifelong 
friendship with the British Royal Family (as a friend of King Edward VII, he was 
71 Grenville, 'Goluchowski, Salisbury, and the Mediterranean Agreements, 1895-7', passim; 
T.G. Otte ' "floating downstream"?', p.114.-5; CJ Lowe, Salisbury and the Mediterranean, p. 
115. 
72 Kaiser Wilhelm II to Marschall, 27 Aug 1896, G.P. Bd 12, Nr. 52. 
73 See WiIIem-Alexander Van't Padje, 'The "Malet Incident," October 1895: A Prelude to the 
Kaiser's "KrUger Telegram" in the Context of the Anglo-German Imperialist Rivalry', Geoff 
Eley and James Retallack (eds.), Wilhelminism and Its Legacies: German Modernities, 
Imperialism, and the Meanings o/Re/orm, 1890-1930, Essays/or Hartmut Pogge Von 
Strandmann (Oxford, 2003), pp. 145-149; Rohl, Wilhelm II: The Kaiser's Personal 
Monarchy, pp.780-783. . 
74 Memo by Lascelles of conversation with Hatzfeldt, 31 Oct 1895, FO 800117. 
184 
regularly an invited guest at Royal Ascot throughout his ambassadorship75) and with 
not only the Emperor but also 'his parents and grandparents' enabled him to talk 
-, 
freely with Wilhelm without fear of' giving offence'. 76 Sir Frank modestly told Blunt 
that he had gained influence with the Kaiser 'by telling him rather stupid and coarse 
anecdotes' and making 'small jokes of the kind which royal personages like'. 77 
From early on in Lascelles' time at Berlin, The Emperor would 'pop in for tea' with 
the ambassador,78 or send for him at 'inconvenient hours'. 79 The Kaiser more than 
once paid the ambassador early morning visits, which subsequently entered 
diplomatic folklore. 80 On one occasion he burst into the Embassy and went up into 
Sir Frank's bedroom to catch the Ambassador in his pyjamas, whereupon the startled 
old man jumped out of bed, to be slapped on the back, and greeted as 'old fellow'. 
One contemporary suggested that these visits were the Kaiser's 'way of showing what 
a fine, active, early-rising person he was in contrast to the lazy lie-in-bed 
Englishman.'81 But crucially, Sir Frank took his visits as a sign of the Kaiser's 
friendliness, which, in the face of Britain's diplomatic isolation, was worth 
preserving. 
75 See Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign policy: The Close of the Nineteenth Century, 
p.I72; Duncan Stewart MacDiannid, The life of Lieut.-General Sir James Moncrieff Grierson 
(London, 1923), p. 138. 
76 Dumas autobiography, Dumas MSS, Imperial War Museum, London, p.16. 
77 Lady Gregory's diary entry for 27 March 1920, Daniel J. Murphy (ed.), Lady Gregory's 
Journals (Gerrard's Cross, 1978), I, p. 134; W.S. Blunt, My diaries, Vol. ii, p. 10. 
78 See Rumbold to Lascelles, 23 March 1897, FO 800/8. 
79 Saunders to Mackenzie Wallace, 16 Jan 1897, Saunders MSS, News International Archive. 
80 One occurred in late 1896; see Spring-Rice to Lady Helen, 26 Dec 1896, in Gwynn (ed.), 
Letters and Friendships, I, pp. 213 -14, and another during the South African war. Sanderson 
to Lascelles, 19 Feb 1902, FO 80011 O. See also Hill to Lascelles, 24 Feb 1902, FO 800/6; the 
',New York Times, 1 June 1902; Lady Susan Townley, indiscretions, pp. 66-67. In March 1900, 
The Kaiser's warning to Lascelles about France and Russia's possible intervention in the 
South African war was also delivered into Lascelles' hands 'with characteristic 
maliciousness' by the Emperor at 8.45am. Lascelles to Chirol, 3 March 1900, Spring Rice 
MSS, C.C.A.C., CASR I 1123. 
81 George Leveson-Gower, Mixed Grill, (London, 1948), p.188. 
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III 
Many years after he left Berlin, Sir Frank was criticised by an old colleagUe for 
having 'been brought up in the Victorian r~gime of giving way to Germany in 
everything, and literally [being unable to] convert himself to the growing habit in 
England of refusing them all that they asked'. 82 It was however with some justice that 
Lascelles could later say that Britain's purported opposition to German colonial 
expansion in the 1880s and '90s was a myth born of ignorance and misunderstanding, 
when in fact each German gain had been made 'with the consent, and in more than 
one instance with the active assistance of the Government of Great Britain', and stated 
that 'there was no objection to further acquisitions by Germany, if they could be 
obtained without injury to other States. ;83 
In the 1880s and 1890s Germany's overseas interests were negligible at best-
and furthermore did not clash with those of Britain, who thought it more worthwhile 
to buy German friendship.84 An Anglo-German colonial trade-off had been overseen 
in Salisbury's last Government,85 and in November 1895, Chirol (by now The Times's 
Berlin correspondent) wrote encouragingly to Lascelles that another 'general clean-
up' in Africa 'on the lines of that of 1890' would 'pave the way ... for a real 
rapprochement with Germany,' and urged his friend to 'inaugurate the Neuer Kurs at 
82 "" Dumas autobiography, p.16. 
83 Copy of The Peacemaker - vo 1 No.4, May 1912. ED Morel MSS, Library of Social and 
Political Science, London, Morel F 13/7-1; see also Goschen to Grey, 18 Feb 1912, FO 3711 
13711 7289 encl. clipping of interview with Sir Frank Lascelles from The Daily Chronicle. In 
the Daily Chronicle interview Lascelles cited the cession of Heligoland to Germany in 1890, 
Britain's acquiescence over Samoa in 1899, the recognition of Germany's acquisition of 
Kiaochau in 1897 and commercial predominance in Shantung province in 1898 plus more 
latterly recognition of Germany's territorial acquisitions in the Belgian Congo, as proof of 
". Britain's co-operation. 
84 Gordon Martel, 'The Limits of Commitment: Rosebel)' and the definition of the Anglo-
German understanding.' If only understanding had been reached, 1914 might have been 
avoided (p.387) 
85 See G.N. Sanderson, 'The Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 and the Upper Nile', English 
Historical Review (1963). 
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the British Embassy by affecting another Anglo German agreement,' and thus 'render 
one of the greatest services of which England at the present moment stands in need.'86 
When Lascelles became ambassador, the'influence of colonial pressures on official 
German policy was unclear. While there was a vocal (and anti-English) colonial party 
in Germany, comprised of intellectuals, financiers, and commercial interests,87 
Bismarck's first 'bid' for colonies had only been fleeting and opportunistic;88 his 
successor Caprivi (1890-1894) and Capri vi' s Foreign Minister, Marschall von 
Bieberstein (1890-97) had concentrated on Germany's European concerns and had 
been willing to trade German colonies for Heligoland; neither wanted an extensive 
African Empire, and both eschewed the idea of a large scale world or colonial policy, 
limiting their concerns to the protectio~ of German commerce.89 Germany's colonial 
acquisitions were negligible and sparsely settled in contrast to British possessions. 90 
Furthermore, they had, as Lascelles later alluded to, been gained with Britain's 
acquiescence at a period in which Britain was chiefly concerned with shoring up her 
Mediterranean position. 
Yet Salisbury did not hesitate to warn Lascelles on the eve of his departure for 
Berlin of Germany's 'most disagreeable' behaviour in colonial matters - in Africa, 
and also in the Far East, where Germany was 'up to every sort of intrigue asking for 
concessions and privileges of all sorts' with a view to 'cutting Britain out.' 91 
86 Chirol to Lascelles 9 Nov 1895, CASR I 1114. 
87 See Lascelles to S;lisbury, 11 Jan 1896, Fa 6411386, No. 13 [Africa], same to same 26 
March 1897, Fa 6411409, No. 88; Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism p. 
168. . 
88 Ibid, p.i 71; see A.J.P. Taylor, Germany'sfirst bidfor colonies 1884-85: a move in 
Bismarck's European diplomacy (London, 1967). . 
89 Peter Winzen 'Prince Billow's Weltmachtpolitik', Australian Journal of History and 
Politics, (1976): p.231, p. 239; Wm. Roger Louis, 'Great Brit~in and Ger:m~n Expansion in . 
Africa, 1884-1919', in Prosser Gifford & William Roger LOUIS (eds.) Bntam and Germany m 
~rica: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule.(New H.ave~, 196~) pp.17-19. 
Grierson to Stamfordham, 24 Nov 1896, III MacdIarmId, Grierson, p. 265. 
91 Lascelles' memo of conversation with Salisbury, 4 Dec 1895, Fa 800117. 
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Salisbury wanted to continue collaboration but thought Gennany, for example, had no 
rights interfering in the Transvaal and its 'gateway', Delagoa Bay. 92 As Lascelles 
later told the Italian Ambassador, for so~~ time before the KrUger telegram, Britain 
'had found that Gennan action was hostile to us, wherever she could make her 
influence felt.,93 From Britain's point of view Gennany's more forthright colonial 
policy, her co-operation in the Far Eastern triplice of 1895, the beginning of her 
incursions into the Dardanelles question and talk in Berlin of a continental league 
constituted an alanning tum of events.94 
Gennany's emerging colonial aspirations were most immediately apparent in 
South Africa. In late December 1895, a long standing grievance at the ill-treatment of 
. 
Uitlanders [foreigners] by the Boer administration in the Transvaal, led to an abortive 
British uprising followed by an equally abortive raid from Cape Colony, led by Dr. 
Jameson, with the connivance of Cape Colony'S Prime Minister, Cecil Rhodes. The 
British Government disavowed complicity in the agitations or the raid. However, the 
Gennans, who had commercial interests and a colony in South West Africa, feared a 
British attempt to annex the Transvaal would follow and insisted strongly on the 
maintenance of the status quo. 95 Upon the Boers' successful repulsion of Jameson, the 
Kaiser issued a congratulatory telegram to the Transvaal's President Paul KrUger. 
This communication drafted in consultation with Marschall, Hohenlohe and the , 
Naval Cabinet,96 was a deliberately anti-British move, stemming partially from 
Wilhelm's frustration at Salisbury'S loyalty to the Triple Alliance; and the ensuing 
92 Wm. R~ger Louis 'Great Britain and German Expansion in Africa, 1884-1919' ,p.24. 
93 ' Lascelles to Salisbury, 21 Jan 1898, FO 64/1437, No.28. 
94 Rohl, Wilhelm II: the Kaiser's personal monarchy, p.766. 
95 Lascelles to Salisbury, 28 Dec & 31 Dec 1895, FO 64/1359 No. 173 & ~o. 176 . 
confidential; Memo by Marschall, 31 Dec 1895, GP XU7, Dugdale, Vol. 11, p.371; SalIsbury 
to Lascelles, 1 Jan 1895, FO 244/542, No.1; Sanderson to Lascelles, 1 Jan 1896, FO 800/6; 
Lascelles to Salisbury 3 Jan 1896 FO 64/1386 No.2 confidential [Africa]. 
96 " Lascelles to Salisbury, 4 Jan 1896, FO 64/1386, No.3. 
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uproar in the British Press followed by retaliatory speeches by senior British Ministers 
touched off a deterioration in Anglo-German relations.97 
, 
It is Dr. Van't Padje's contention that this episode displayed Lascelles' 
tendency to be 'Germanophile' owing to his wish to conciliate Germany and prevent a 
serious breach which would have been galling to him personally and politically 
(although one must ask what the alternative would have been).98 Certainly it is hard to 
refute that Lascelles was keen not to inaugurate his ambassadorship with an Anglo-
German war, but while Van't Padje recognises that the irascible temperament of 
Germany's ruler was a problem during this episode, he arguably under-rates the 
difficulties for Lascelles of trying to retain an effective presence as ambassador, while 
having to contend with a hostile public opinion, Germany's brusque diplomatic 
methods, and the Imperial temper.99 Lascelles suspected that the Kaiser had wanted to 
teach England 'a lesson,' 100 and to revenge Salisbury's snubbing of him at Cowes. 101 
Here perhaps was fulfilment of Salisbury's warning to Lascelles that the erratic Kaiser 
might one day go 'completely off his head,' 102 a theory supported by the 
ambassador's knowledge that the Kaiser's original, even more bellicose telegram had 
only been toned down on the advice of his Ministers; 103 by information from Chirol 
that the Kaiser was 'rabid' about the raid;104 and by the Emperor's pronouncement to 
Lascelles personally on New Year's Day 1896 that he hoped the 'band of filibusters' 
97 See, for example, A.J.A. Morris, The scaremongers " the advocacy of war and rearmament 
1896-1914 (London, 1984), pp.l6-19. 
98 Van't Padje, 'At the heart of the growing Anglo-German Imperialist Rivalry', p. 93. 
99 See Willem-Alexander Van't Padje, 'The "Malet Incident," October 1895 - A Prelude to 
the Kaiser's "KrUger Telegram" in the Context of the Anglo-German Imperialist Rivalry', op 
cit. 
100 Lascelles to Salisbury 10 Jan 1896, FO 64/1386, No. 11 Africa. 
101 ' Lascelles to Salisbury, 11 Jan 1896, FO 800117. 
102 Memo by Lascelles on conversation with Salisbury, 4 Dec 1895, FO 800117. 
103 Letter from Swaine to the Editor of The Times, 16 June 1924, p.8. 
104 Lascelles to Salisbury, 4 Jan 1896, FO 800117. 
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[Jameson's men] would 'all get shot as they deserved to be.' 105 Lascelles 
acknowledged his fear that the Emperor might become actively hostile and warned 
Salisbury that he was 'so impassive and in'Ipetuous that this is a contingency which 
must be considered.' 106 
While telling Marschall not to be surprised at the outburst in the British 
Press,107 Lascelles soon saw that the Foreign Secretary was horrified by the violent 
tone of the British press and wanted to climb down, so Sir Frank urged a conciliatory 
line on Whitehall, pointing out that it seemed Marschall was purposely instructing the 
German Press not to retaliate. 108 Though slightly perturbed at the official volfe face, 
and the speed with which Marschall's language changed to be diametrically opposite 
in tone, Lascelles proposed to act as if the incident 'had never arisen.'109 The 
Ambassador also reasoned that, following Jameson's illegal raid, Britain could 
scarcely be justified in pushing the issue to war, telling Salisbury 'if such a horrible 
calamity' were to occur, 'I hope we might be able to make out a better case 
than ... would be possible for us in the present instance.' 110 
Salisbury, too, was of a calmer disposition than British public opinion at large, 
and when the Kaiser wrote a letter to the Queen apologising for his outburst against 
the raiders (who had worn Her Majesty's uniforms), the incident was terminated 
(though not before Salisbury had despatched a flying squadron). I II 
105 Lascelles to Salisbury, 2 Jan 1896, FO 64/1386, No.1 confidential [Africa]. 
106 Lascelles to Salisbury, 4 Jan 1896, FO 800117. 
107 Lascelles to Salisbury, 6 Jan 1896, FO 6411386, No.7. 
108 Lascelles to Salisbury, 6 Jan 1896, FO 64/1386, No.7 & No.8; Lascelles to Salisbury, 8 Jan 
1896, FO 800117' Lascelles to Salisbury, 10 Jan 1896, FO 6411380, Tel No.4. 
109 ' Lascelles to Sanderson and Lascelles to Salisbury, 11 Jan 1896, FO 800117. 
110 Lascelles to Salisbury, 8 Jan 1896. See also Spring Rice to his brother Stephen, 9 Jan 
1896, in Gwynn, Letters and Friendships, I, p. 186. ' 
III Lascelles to Salisbury, 10 Jan 1896, FO 64/1386 No.1 0 & No. 11 Confidential [Africa]. 
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Sir Frank's handling of the crisis won him praise on both sides. The Kaiser 
made 'flattering remarks' about the new Ambassador, 112 and Marschall apparently 
" told a colleague that the crisis, 'had shown .... what an excellent man for the post' he 
was. 113 The mutually agreed line between Salisbury and Lascelles was that Sir Frank 
should 'persuade the Emperor that the two nations are on good terms, and that he has 
never made a fool of himself. 114 However, it was clear the incident could have 
repercussions. In the aftermath, Salisbury cautioned that in England, politicians and 
officials would not hear a 'good word for the Germans.' lIS The irritation produced in 
both countries against the other deeply impressed Lascelles. 116 Eighteen years later 
he traced the 'misunderstanding' in Anglo-German relations from this point. II 7 While 
he could appreciate an outburst of anti-German opinion in the British press might 
prevent 'any further attempt to "teach" England a "lesson,'" he quickly understood 
the official German Press were bound to reply to attacks on the Emperor. I 18 This 
would inform his attitude on repeated occasions. In 1896, despite questioning 
Marschall's association with anti-British articles in the German Press, II9 Lascelles 
studiously avoided raising the issue. 120 He wanted to 'give them a chance of climbing 
down' in the hope 'that, in time, public opinion might calm down, and matters resume 
h . h' d . I h' 121 t elf normal course.' The Foreign Office, at t IS stage, agree WIt 11m. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Spring Rice to Villiers 18 Jan 1896, in Gwynn, Letters and Friendships I, p.194. 
114 ' Salisbury to Lascelles, 22 Jan 1896, FO 800/6. 
115 Ibid; Lascelles to Salisbury, 11 Jan 1896, FO 800117. 
116 Chirol told him he had feared a war from the state of public feeling. Lascelles to 
Salisbury, 4 Jan 1896, FO 800/17. 
117 Michael Balfour The Kaiser and His Times (Hannondsworth, 1975), p.l95. 
118 ' Lascelles to Salisbury, 25 Jan 1896, FO 800117. 
119 Lascelles to Salisbury· 24 Jan 1896, FO 64/1376, No.20. 
120 ' • b . G h He was tempted to respond after Marschall complamed a o~t antI- ennan speec es 
delivered by Lord Hamilton and Chamberlain. Lascelles to SalIsbury, 31 Jan 1896, FO 
64/1376, No. 25. 
121 Lascelles to Sanderson, 1 Feb 1896, FO 800/17; Lascelles to Salisbury, 31 ~an 1896, FO 
64/1376, No. 25; Salisbury to Lascelles, 10 Feb 1896, FO 64/1376 No. 31 AfrIca. . 
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Lascelles remained of the opinion that Germany wished to stay on good terms 
with England, if only because they feared the consequences of a row, and he pointed 
" to the Kaiser's renewed civility with Britain's military attache at Berlin after a period 
of coolness as evidence of his desire to regain Britain's good graces. 122 When the 
Kaiser visited the Embassy in March 1896, Lascelles took the opportunity of 
impressing on him the regrettable impression that he 'had taken advantage of our 
difficulties to strike a blow which was all the more painful as it came from one whom 
we had always considered as our friend. ,123 
After this incident, Lascelles was keen once more to take up pending colonial 
questions between Berlin and London, but Salisbury advised him 'to keep clear of 
colonial negotiations' for the present. 124 After the KrUger telegram it remained to be 
seen, as Salisbury put it, whether Germany would 'become more mad with the 
colonial idea, and will commit some patent folly: or ... drop it,' in which case Britain 
might talk about coming to 'arrangements' with her again. 125 In late 1896 the 
Emperor unexpectedly told Lascelles that Germany would henceforth 'concentrate her 
energies on a single Colony and give up the rest, as she was unable to develop all that 
she now possessed,' and hinted giving them to England in return for a coaling 
station. 126 While this spontaneous remark alarmed German Foreign Office officials, 127 
Lascelles was keen to pursue this idea, but Salisbury'S well-placed scepticism and 
122 Lascelles to Salisbury, 15 Feb 1896, FO 800117. 
123 Lascelles to Salisbury, 4 March 1896, FO 6411376, No.59. 
124 Lascelles to Salisbury; 11 Jan 1896, FO 800117; Salisbury to Lascelles, 22 Jan 1896, FO 
80016. 
125 Salisbury to LasceUes, 22 Jan 1896, FO 80016. 
126 S R"hl r:rrlh I 11 h Lascelles to Salisbury, 22 Nov 1896, FO 6411380, No.47 secret. ee 0 , rrl em: t e 
Kaiser's personal monarchy, pp, 968-9, 
127 !b'd 1 ,p. 927. 
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demand for more detailed proposals killed the idea. 128 Nonetheless, in August 1897 
Sir Frank could write with conviction to the Duke of Cambridge that the two nations' 
interests were 'identical' in most parts of the World, 'and the differences of opinion in 
Africa will not at all events for very many years be sufficiently important to lead to a 
serious quarrel,' which made a 'good understanding .... most desirable from every 
point of view.' 129 
The same month that Lascelles extolled the virtues of a good understanding 
with Germany saw the accession of Bernhard von BUlow as Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs and also ofTirpitz as naval secretary and the inauguration of a policy 
of WeltpaUtik by which Wilhelm II hoped Gennany would playa great role in world 
affairs, and actively seek her 'place in the sun' by building a great battle fleet, 
attempting to gain colonial possessions like other Empires, and direct attention from 
Germany's internal problems. However, the policy brought Germany 'ineluctably into 
adopting an anti-British posture'. Although it was the task of the Foreign Ministry to 
keep on good terms with Britain until the fleet was completed,130 this policy proved 
an important factor in the undennining of Anglo-Gennan cordiality. Germany's 
conviction of the inevitable Anglo-Russian war in some part of Asia, her desire to 
maintain a studious neutrality, and pick her way between the great land and sea 
power, side stepping quarrels until she was able to speak with authority, J3J and the 
-
importance WeltpaUtik gave to Wilhelm's sudden, impulsive and unpredictable 
128 Hatzfeldt to Holstein, 10 Dec 1896, in Norman Rich, Holstein Papers, Volume iii: 
Corerspondence 1861-1896 (Cambridge, 1961), No. 589; Sanderson to Lascelles, 2 Dec 1896, 
FO 800/8. See also Grierson to Stamfordham, 24 Nov 1896, Macdiarmid, Grierson, p. 265-6. 
129 Lascelles to the Duke of Cambridge, 12 Aug 1897, FO 800117. 
130 See P.M. Kennedy, 'German World Policy and the Alliance Negotiations with England, 
1897-1900' pp.605-607 609-10 - quote from p. 607). . 
131 Ibid, pp. '612-613; Pet~r Winzen, 'Prince Billow's Weltmachtpo1itik', pp. 232-234 .. 
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m t . fc' I' 132 II . ovemen s III oreIgn po ICY, a provIded sources of Anglo-German tension in the 
following ten years. 
Nevertheless because of the inau~ration ofa more forthright imperial policy 
by Germany, it was during 1898-1901 that the period of Anglo-German colonial 
'bartering' reached its height; for Germany, the prestige of securing colonial gains 
often outstripped their material value, for a World Power must have colonies or naval 
bases even when they were of little economic or strategic worth. 133 
Lascelles, as has been noted, had little experience in colonial affairs, and no 
direct experience of Anglo-German colonial rivalry. 134 Although he did receive a 
briefing from the Colonial Secretary before departing for Berlin, 135 and had indirect 
experience in Far Eastern affairs from his time in St Petersburg, the negotiations on 
colonial questions which occurred during his tenure at Berlin over the Portuguese 
colonies (1898), the Samoan islands (1899) and the Yangtze river (1900) were 
invariably negotiated by his opposite number in London,136 but an examination of his 
attitude towards these agreements is crucial to explain his idea of an Anglo-German 
understanding. 
For although Germany's exorbitant demands and harrying methods may have 
irked some of his less laid-back contemporaries, Lascelles' cool temperament meant 
132R6hl, Wilhelm II: the Kaiser's personal monarchy, p. 924-5, 959. 
133 Winzen, 'Prince Billow's Weltmachtpolitik' p. 236. 
134 Lascelles mentioned Anglo-German commercial and colonial rivalry in 1893 in a letter to 
Morier, explaining that the Russian minister at Teheran had referred to Germany as 'the 
enemy of England underselling her in every market, competing with her in Africa,' and had 
warned him ofEn~land's 'blind[ness]' of this fact. However the British ~iplomat offered no 
personal opinion on this analysis. Lascelles to Morier, 16 Feb 1893, Moner MSS, Box 25A/2. 
135 . The Pall Mall Gazette 3 December 1895; Issue 9576. 
136 There are no apparent 'grounds for Padje' s assertion. that Salisb~ry pre~er:ed to .negotia!e 
these agreements in London 'as he either did not trust III Lascel1es negotmtlllg SkIlls or hIS 
competence in colonial and imperialist affairs.' Van't Padje, 'At the h~art of the growing 
AnglO-German Imperialist Rivalry', p.203. By the tum of the century It had.become common 
practice to conduct 'a great deal of British diplomacy' in Lond~n, and only III rem~te post~ 
Were British diplomats given 'real freedom'. Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Polley, 
1898-1914, p.l76. . 
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that however much he found much at fault with Germany's approach, and was 
cautious about German attempts to best England or take advantage of her own 
colonial troubles, he remained convinced that England (because of the threats to her 
Empire from other Powers) should retain the friendship of Germany, and the 
sympathy of the Emperor, and his tolerance of Gemany's colonial bartering was 
always judged from this standpoint - and from that of British interests. Compared to 
the threat posed by France and Russia, Lascelles also rarely saw Germany's colonial 
aspirations as a threat to Britain. 
This was not the same as blind approval of German policy however. Despite 
BUlow's assurance in his first interview with Lascelles that he hoped Britain and 
Germany's vast 'common interests' could not admit of a 'lasting difference between 
them' and.his promise to 'remove the pebbles from the path,' in any commercial or 
colonial dispute, 137 and the Ambassador's hope he could deal with BUlow frankly, 
Lascelles had deeply regretted the abrupt and brutal removal of the apparently pro-
English and anti-colonial Marschall, to make way for BUlow, who he remembered 
from Bucharest chiefly for his 'exaggerated not to say ridiculous' opinion of himself, 
and whose 'gushing' cordiality on their first meeting made the naturally reserved 
ambassador uneasy. 138 
Lascelles' response to Germany's first display of Weltpolitik, the sudden 
seizure of the Chinese port of Kiaochow in November 1897 on the pretext of the 
murder of two German missionaries in China, also displayed a basic wariness towards 
German overseas policy, and sensitivity to Britain's world position. Germany had 
137 Lascelles to Salisbury 20 Aug 1897, FO 6411411, No. 226. 
138 Ibid; Lascelles to Salisbury, 11 Jan 1896, FO 800117. Lascelles to Sanderson, 5 Dec 1896, 
ibid; Lascelles to Bertie, 19 March 1898, ibid. Lascelles to Chirol, 3 July 1897, CASR 11123; 
Lascelles to Sanderson, 21 Aug 1897, FO 800117. 
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been known to desire a Far Eastern coaling station for some time139 but her sudden 
move was contrary to repeated assurances that Germany would consult Britain closely 
"' in the Far East, where Britain had her own commercial interests and where it was felt 
Britain and Germany should make common cause against France and Russia. 140 For 
Germany, the murder of the missionaries was a convenient pretext to create the 
feeling for a stronger Navy for which the Kaiser longed, and the seizure of Kiaochow 
bolstered the Government's position while satisfying the colonial party and 
commercial classes. 141 On an international level, it inaugurated a 'scramble' for 
China among the Powers - Russia was quick to respond to Germany's move by 
securing Port Arthur - and fears for Britain's own interests in China, which led to a 
questioning of Salisbury's handling of foreign affairs. 142 Lascelles was on leave as 
news of the Far-Eastern coup was received, and thus had little direct involvement in 
the matter. 143 According to Biilow's recollection, Lascelles did not think Britain 
would raise objections to Germany's action at the time. 144 But, having been in St 
Petersburg at the time of the Sino-Japanese war, he was aware of the need to address 
the problem of Britain's declining influence in the Far East. His reaction certainly 
139 Memo by Lascelles on conversation with Hatzfeldt, 31 Oct 1895, FO 800117; and with 
Salisbury, 4 Dec 1895, ibid. Chirol to Lascelles, 9 Nov 1895, CASR 1114; Lascelles to 
Salisbury, 13 Dec 1895, FO 64/1351 No. 311; Chirol to Lascelles, 15 Nov 1896, Lascelles 
MSS, National Archives, Kew, FO 800/9. Lascelles to Salisbury, 12 June 1897, FO 64/1410, 
No.168. 
140 On this issue see e.g. Lascelles to Salisbury, 5 & 13 Nov 1896 (plus minutes & 
enclosures), FO 64/1379, No.339 & 346; Lascelles to O'Conor, 13 Nov 1896, CON 6/117; 
O'Conor to Lascelles 19 Nov 1896, FO 800/9 and same to same 30 Nov 1896, FO 800/8; 
Lascelles to Salisbury, 23 Jan 1897, FO 6411409, No. 22 confidential, Lascelles to Salisbury, 
17 July 1897, FO 6411411, No.201. 
141 Lascelles to Salisbury, 6 Jan 1898, FO 64/1437, No.9. 
142 See A.W. Palmer, 'Lord Salisbury's Approach to Russia, 1898' Oxford Slavonic Papers, 
(1955), pp. 102- 114. 
143 See Richard Acton to Lord Acton, 15 Nov 1897, Acton MSS, Add. MS 8121 (10) I, No. 
68. This was the reason why Dr. Van't Padje was unable to find any private comment from 
Lascelles on the issue in his personal correspondence. (Van't Padje, 'At the heart of the 
growing Imperialist Rivalry', p.116.) 
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showed more irritation over German methods than over the act itself. He told BUlow, 
(who professed to have avoided encroaching on Britain's sphere ofinflm!nce) that 'it 
", 
was not so much what Germany had done in the Far East as the method which she had 
adopted in doing it' .145 By not informing England first, Germany had shown little 
consideration for her feelings. 146 The fundamental determinant in Lascelles' view of 
the Far Eastern situation was - as with most British politicians and diplomats - an 
anxiety for Salisbury to shore up Britain's position, by an agreement with another 
Power. In some ways Lascelles's uncertain reaction mirrored the lack of a clear 
strategy in Whitehall; Britain was caught by surprise at Germany's move and its 
policy was mainly reactive. 147 However Lascelles privately seems to have shared 
sentiments of those wishing for compensation against Germany's acquisition. 
Following. Germany's move in China, O'Conor (at St Petersburg) had initiated 
negotiations with her over spheres of influence in China,148 and Lascelles, recalling 
his own abortive efforts in St Petersburg, voiced his hope to both O'Conor and Count 
Osten-Sacken (the Russian ambassador at Berlin) that a close Anglo-Russian 
understanding might be reached in the East. 149 When the overtures failed, Lascelles 
became privately keen that his government should get 'some definite advantage' 150 in 
return for Russian and German acquisitions, and was relieved when she obtained a 
lease of the port Wei-hai-Wei in March 1898, although he was disappointed it was not 
145 Lascelles to Salisbury, 28 Jan 1898, FO 6411437, No. 32. 
146 Lascelles to Salisbury, 21 Jan 1898, FO 6411437, No.28. 
147 Thomas G. Otte, 'Great Britain, Germany and the Far-Eastern Crisis of 1897-8,' The 
English Historical Review, cx, no. 439, (Nov 1995),]Jp. 1160-1179. 
148 See A.W. Palmer, 'Lord Salisbury's Approach to Russia, 1898.'; T.G.Otte, The China 
Question, pp.103-111. 
149 Lascelles to O'Conor, 4 Feb 1898, O'Conor MSS, C.C.A.C., OCON 6/1115; Lascelles to 
Salisbury, 24 Feb 1898, FO 6411437 No. 63 very confidential; Lascelles to Salisbury, 26 Feb 
1898, SP 12118. 
150 Lascelles to Chirol, 2 April 1898, CASR I 1123. 
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a 'more valuable' acquisition. 151 Lascelles was also sensitive to German attempts to 
consolidate her position by claiming a monopoly in Shantung province, 152 'and was as 
dismayed as his supposedly more anti-German contemporaries, Chirol of The Times 
and Bertie of the Foreign Office that the Germans had 'lied with their customary 
awkwardness' by denying reports to this effect. 153 Lascelles warned Germany's 
Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Baron von Richthofen that such action 'might 
give rise to some discussion,' 154 and that Britain would 'oppose the admission by 
China of any sort of preferential claim'. 155 He was equally annoyed at what he termed 
Billow's 'very German and very petty' attempt to gain 'an indirect admission' of 
German commercial predominance in Shantung as a price for recognition ofWei-hai-
Wei,156 although on the other hand recognising Britain's acquisition struck a 'death 
blow' at German plans to dominate Shantung,157 which Billow talked of 'as the one 
sure lamb which Germany possessed in China,' and led to Richthofen complaining to 
Lascelles of Britain's habit of 'erecting Gibraltars against Germany' .158 It was a 
testament to Lascelles' sympathetic nature that he was willing to listen to these 
German complaints impartially. 
IV 
Lascelles' appreciation of clear, practical limits of Anglo-German co-operation was 
-
demonstrated clearly in his attitude towards Chamberlain'S famous alliance offer to 
151 Lascelles to Sanderson, 9 April 1898, FO 800117. 
152 See T. G, Otte, The China Question, p.l13. 
153 Lascelles to Bertie, 19 March 1898, FO 800117; see Bertie to Lascelles, 16 March 1898, 
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Germany of Spring 1898. There is no reason to go into detail surrounding this offer 
here about events which have been tirelessly explored elsewhere. 159 To summarise, 
the revelation of Britain's exposed position demonstrated by the 'scramble' for 
concessions in China in 1897-8, and anxiety at the slow pace of British policy had led 
several members of the Cabinet to seek a change from Salisbury's 'isolationist' policy 
and an alignment with a Power in the Far East. In interviews with the German 
Ambassador in London, Paul von Hatzfeldt in March and April 1898, the Liberal 
Unionist Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, with the cognizance of Arthur 
Balfour, Salisbury's nephew and then -in the absence of his ailing uncle- acting 
Foreign Secretary proposed a defensive alliance aimed against Russia, primarily in 
China. 160 
La.scelles w!ls not informed of Chamberlain's unofficial forays into 
diplomatic territory until Chirol told him on 3 May that Chamberlain had proposed to 
give up Britain's 'old prejudices against entangling alliances,' 161 and concert with 
Germany 'to oppose any successful resistance to a Russian advance, whether in 
Turkey, Persia or China.' Sir Frank confessed to being breathtaken by the news. But 
while he signalled his approval of an alliance from a personal and professional point 
of view, and stated his belief that the Emperor had 'always wished for' one, he could 
not follow where Chamberlain led. 162 Lascelles' analysis contrasted with 
Chamberlain's naIve diplomacy, and is worth citing, especially as Dr Van't Padje 
neglected to do so in his thesis. In fine, Lascelles' diplomatic experience enabled him 
159 In, among other works, lA.S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: The Close of 
the Nineteenth Century: H.W., Koch, 'The Anglo-German Alliance Negotiations: Missed 
Opportunity or Myth?', History, liv (1969), pp. 378-92: P.M. Kennedy, 'German World 
Policy'; G.S. Papadopoulus, 'Lord Salisbury and the projected Anglo-German alliance of 
1898', BIHR 26,1953, pp.214-218. 
160 See Otte, The China Question, pp.133-161 for the most recent exploration of the alliance 
talks. 
161 Chirol to Lascelles, 3 May 1898, CASR I 1114. . 
162 Lascelles to Chirol, 6 May 1898, CASR I 1123; copy in FO 800117. 
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more accurately to read Salisbury's reserve over an alliance and anticipate the 
reluctance of Germany in the matter. While Lascelles sympathised with the general 
disillusionment caused by Salisbury's Far Eastern policy, he failed to see how 
Salisbury's critics proposed to replace him with a competent successor who would 
also gain parliamentary assent to an alliance, unless Rosebery joined the Conservative 
frontbench as Foreign Secretary. 163 More importantly, Lascelles was dubious that 
Chamberlain could ever win German help against Russian aggression towards 
Britain's Imperial interests, due to Germany's geographical position between France 
and Russia. Like Salisbury, he correctly believed that Germany's 'abject fear of 
Russia,' was an axiom of German policy and that Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia thus 
benefited Germany. The most that Lascelles thought that Germany would wish for 
was a 'good understanding' with Britain to aid her 'colonies and her commerce'. She 
would not readily assist Britain against Russia in Turkey, Persia or China, and thus 
risk war with Russia & France, in order to prevent an occupation of British India 
which Germany was 'convinced' Russia could easily take. Not even 'expansion 
beyond the seas' or 'possession of the Baltic Provinces' would be a big enough 'quid 
pro quo' for Germany. 164 
The fate of Chamberlain's alliance proposals bore out Lascelles' private 
assessment. Biilow, alive to the dangers of provoking Russia and knowing the 
problems of parliamentary ratification and Salisbury's aversion to alliances was 
circumspect in his reception. 165 Salisbury, in addition to raising constitutional 
163 Ibid. S~e also, Lascelles to Chirol, 2 April 1898, CASR I 1123. 
164 Lascelles to Chirol, 6 May 1898, CASR I 1123; copy in FO 800117. Lascelles had been told 
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objections, already suspected the Emperor of wishing to embroil Britain in a war with 
France over the Sudan, and believed Britain would be 'blackmailed heavily' in any 
alliance. 166 On 9 May he told Hatzfeldt th~t Britain would not be able to support 
German interests in Europe, nor support Germany's partner Austria at 
Constantinople. 167 On 24 May 1898, following Chamberlain's public touting for an 
alliance in his 'long spoon' speech of the previous day, the Emperor told the British 
Ambassador that the idea of Germany driving Russia out of China was 'out of the 
question,' despite his long-standing wish for 'a good understanding with 
England ... and even for an alliance on reasonable terms.' While putting a positive 
slant on the Kaiser'S 'sincere' desire for a 'good understanding,' Lascelles stressed to 
Salisbury privately that the Emperor would not fight for Britain in China & risk 
invasion both by Russia and France. 168 On 1 June Wilhelm once again (in writing to 
his mother) denigrated Chamberlain's overtures as private and, lacking Salisbury's 
sanction, unofficial. 169 
Lascelles' subsequently famous, and apparently spontaneous proposal to the 
Kaiser of an Anglo-German alliance in the summer of 1898 must be seen against this 
backdrop. Much scholarly attention has been diverted into investigating this curious 
episode due to the lack of documentary evidence but also due to misunderstanding the 
context in which the proposal was made. 170 Arguably, however, far from being an 
-
anomalous action based on a sudden conversion to an Anglo-German alliance, 
Lascelles was motivated by other more consistent considerations: his continued desire 
to cultivate the Kaiser's pro-English sensibilities and curb his unpredictable 
1660tte, The China Question, p.l56. 
167 Grenville, Lord Salisbury and foreign policy, pp. 167-168. 
168 Lascelles to Salisbury, 27 May 1898, FO 800/17. 
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temperament, the possibility of the more limited colonial understanding he believed 
could be brought about, and the lack of need for formal alliance ties between two 
"' Powers with common interests. This argument is further reinforced by the account of 
events the Ambassador relayed to The Times' Berlin correspondent George Saunders, 
a close friend of Lascelles' , which previous studies have not used. 171 
Before departing for London on leave in June 1898, Lascelles spoke to Biilow about 
Chamberlain's overture and, while emphasising that the Colonial Secretary's star was 
in the ascendant, pointed to parliamentary obstacles to an alliance and agreed 
thoroughly with the Foreign Minister's argument that an understanding could not 
come 'overnight' and could only be worked for 'patiently and carefully'. 172 
On Saturday 18 June 1898, while on leave in London, Lascelles was invited to lunch 
by Joseph.Chamberlain at his Prince's Gardens address, where he met other members 
of the 'pro-German' grouping within the British Cabinet (Goschen, Lord George 
Hamilton, Chaplin and Selborne).173 Owing to the lack of documentation, the 
circumstances surrounding this meeting remain hazy. Lascelles did not apparently 
deem it worth a memorandum. Chamberlain wanted to canvass the Ambassador's 
opinion on the feasibility of an Anglo-German alliance 174 and Lascelles' contribution 
was, notably, to re-emphasise the Emperor's assertion that Germany would never 
fight Britain's battles in China for fear of Franco-Russian retaliation. Nonetheless, 
after lunch, Chamberlain proposed extending the alliance scheme from mutual 
assistance against Russia to mutual assistance against attack by a Second Power-
171 Saunders to Mackenzie Wallace, 15 Oct 1898, Mackenzie Wallace MSS, News 
International Archive. 
172 Memo by Biilow, 11 June 1898, G.P., Bd.l3, Nr. 253 
173 James Louis Garvin, &Julian Amery, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, Vol. iii (London, 
1932), p. 290. Garvin & Amery could only rely on the Kaiser's paraphrase of what had taken 
place. 
174. Holstein to Chirol, 3 Jan 1902, BD ii. No. 96. 
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namely, by France. 175 Lascelles later recalled his failure to impress on those 
assembled the Emperor's reluctance to enter an alliance, and their unshaken 
conviction that an Anglo-German bloc could deter any Franco-Russian attack. 176 
It is highly probable the significance of this meeting would have ended here 
had other considerations not given summer 1898 a particular significance for Anglo-
German relations. In June, secret negotiations had been taking place between Britain 
and Portugal about providing a loan to the ailing Portuguese regime, threatened by 
revolution at home and the loss of her overseas possessions, which would have given 
Britain 'practical control' over Delagoa Bay, situated near South Africa, should 
Portugal default on the loan, and thus serve British interests in the Transvaal by 
ceasing the leak of arms to KrUger through Portuguese East Africa. 177 Germany, 
wanting 'somethingto show' in return for acquiescing in British hegemony, 178 
decided to ' burst in' on the negotiations by demanding colonial concessions 
elsewhere (in the eventuality of Portugal's inability to repay the loan) as a price for 
Germany's silence, and of her abandonment of the cause of the Boers in the 
Transvaal. 179 Although Salisbury had reluctantly bowed to pressure from his Cabinet 
colleagues for joint Anglo-German negotiations, 180 the talks had made little progress 
by the time Lascelles returned to his post. Britain largely saw Germany's territorial 
demands and threats as extortionate -Germany warned of an agreement with France if 
175 Grenville, Lord Salisbury andforeign policy, pp.173-175. 
176 Lascelles to Balfour, 23 Aug 1898, BD i, No. 122. 
177 Grenville, Lord Salisbury andforeign policY, p.183. On the issue of the Portuguese 
colonies, see also Sir Raymond Beazley, 'Britain, Germany, and the Portuguese Colonies, 
1898-99', Berliner Monatshefte 14 (1936): pp. 321-43; P. R. Warhurst Anglo-Portuguese 
relations in south-central Africa, 1890-1900 (London, 1962). 
178 Wm. Roger Louis, 'Great Britain and German Expansion in Africa, 1884-1919', p. 26. 
179 See Kennedy, Antagonism, pp. 235-6. Balfour to Lascelles, 18 & 19 Aug 1898, BD i, 
No.'s 83 & 85. 
180 Grenville, Lord Salisbury" pp.l90-191. 
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she could not reach one with Britain. lSI The negotiations made quicker progress with 
Balfour again temporarily in control at the Foreign Office, but by late August were 
again reaching an impasse. Chamberlain s~ggested empowering Lascelles to ask the 
Kaiser 'once and for all, how far the latter is in earnest in his desire for an 
understanding [over the Colonies] and how far he is reasonable as to the terms on 
which it may be brought about.,IS2 Once back in Germany, Lascelles literally went 
out of his way to seek an Imperial audience, coming from his holiday cottage in 
Potsdam to Berlin, on the understanding the Emperor would be there, only to be 
disappointed on hearing the Emperor had called on him at Potsdam on the day he 
left. IS3 With Berlin deserted, Lascelles left for Homburg on 2 August to begin his 
• 184 
regular summer 'cure,' following doctor's orders. On 14 August, he saw the 
Kaiser's mother, the_ Empress Frederick, a long-standing sympathiser to the cause of 
an English alliance,ls5 who, unknown to Lascelles, was attempting to re-Iaunch 
negotiations. IS6 She mentioned that the Emperor was coming to see her. Lascelles 
responded by expressing his keenness to 'waylay' Wilhelm in Homburg after his 
disappointment in Berlin. The Empress promised to 'do her best' for him, and a week 
later she duly invited him to lunch with the Emperor at Friedrichshof. ls7 
Circumstances thus far may lend weight to the idea that Lascelles had connived at a 
meeting purposely to propose Chamberlain's scheme, but as Lascelles later told The 
181 Lascelles to Salisbury, 23 July 1898, FO 800117. 
182 Grenville Lord Salisbury, p. 192. 
183 Saunders to Mackenzie Wallace, 15 Oct 1898, Mackenzie Wallace MSS, News 
International Archive. 
184 -Lascelles to Sanderson, 2 Aug 1898 FO 800117. 
185 See Lascelles to Sanderson 19 March 1898 and to Prince of Wales 26 March 1898, ibid. 
Rohl, Wilhelm II,' the Kaiser's personal monarchy, p.l 03. 
186 Rohl, Wilhelm II,' the Kaiser's personal monarchy p. 983. 
187 Much later in 1901 Holstein informed Chirol that this form of the alliance scheme was 
'first started b~ the Em'press Frederick in July 1898.' (Lascelles cl~imed not ~o have known 
this.). Lascelles to Lansdowne, 28 Dec 1901, Lascelles MSS, NatIOnal ArchIves, Kew, FO 
800/18. 
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Times' Berlin correspondent, George Saunders, he had various reasons for wishing to 
see the Emperor- including a purely social one. It was two months since their last 
meeting, and Lascelles wished to sympathIse with the treatment recently meted out to 
his Imperial friend by Bismarck's former press secretary, who had posthumously 
published the Iron Chancellor's resignation letter to the Kaiser as a last act of revenge. 
But paramount in his mind seems to have been the fate of the negotiations over the 
Portuguese colonies. 188 
When, at Friedrichshof, the Kaiser, to the' great astonishment' of those 
present, took Lascelles aside for an hour after lunch to talk politics, it was these 
colonial negotiations which received the lengthiest treatment. While Lascelles advised 
that Balfour was more amenable to the'entente than Salisbury, he relayed 'the 
universal impressioIl' that Germany's terms were too high. The Emperor became 
excited, professed merely to be 'going about the world picking up the scraps which 
you have left!'- and said that 'Germany must have colonial expansion' either with 
British help or without, and against, Britain. 189 When Lascelles protested that 
Germany was asking Britain to give up 'territories that have been in British hands for 
years and have become profitable through our exertions', the Kaiser threatened to 
withdraw Hatzfeldt from London. 190 It was at this juncture, with the Kaiser highly 
agitated- that Lascelles sought to reassure him that a desire for a good understanding 
existed in E~gland and 'in some influential quarters,' went as far as a defensive 
alliance, operable in the event of either party being attacked by two Powers at the 
188 Saunders to Mackenzie Wallace, 15 Oct 1898, Mackenzie Wallace MSS, News 
International Archive. 
189 Ibid. 
190 See E.T.S. Dugdale (ed.), German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914, Vol. iii (London, 
1931), p.38. Lascelles was not alone in voicing this view ofG~rmany's approach to 
colonialism even among those who were otherwise sympathetIc to Germany. E.g. see 
Sanderson's minute on Hill, 11 Feb 1899, FO 2/223: 'to preserve Gen,na,n favour we are to 
pay to give way everywhere', quoted in: Wm. Roger Louis, 'Great Bntam and German 
Expansion in Africa, 1884-1919' p.27. 
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same time. 191 There is no evidence that either party considered this scheme a definite 
one; the Kaiser said he must have 'some document to go on' before seriously 
considering Chamberlain's proposal and afterwards told Biilow the scheme had not 
reached a 'definite shape'. 192 
Hence Lascelles was 'rather taken aback' when the next day the Empress 
Frederick visited him at Homburg with a telegram from the Kaiser, thanking him for 
his 'energetic intercession', which would ensure everything would 'come to a fully 
acceptable end agreeable to both sides.' Lascelles could only think he had persuaded 
the Emperor to moderate his demands over Portugal, or had convinced him 'that a real 
desire existed in England to come to terms with Germany,' and for days 'cudgelled 
his brains' trying to work out what impression the Emperor could have received, 
intensely worried th~t the Emperor - with his characteristic impulsiveness and 
imagination- had placed an 'exaggerated interpretation' on his reference to 
Chamberlain's alliance scheme. 193 The Emperor had, in fact, referred to the post-
lunch meeting at Chamberlain's house as a 'Cabinet Council' in his report. 194 (this 
idea that the meeting had been such a formal one was later vigorously contested by 
Lascelles.) 195 But at the time Lascelles was reassured by Biilow that it was indeed 
Lascelles' role in conveying the German reasons for declining to enter an alliance 
which had gratified the Emperor, rather than anything that might have been said 
191 Lascelles to Balfour, 23 Aug 1898, BD i, No. 122. 
192 Lascelles to Queen Victoria, 9 Dec 1898, SP 121118; Memo by Kaiser Wilhelm II, 22 Aug 
1898, GP XIV.338, in E.T.S. Dugdale, German diplomatic documents 1871-1914, vol iii 
(London, 1930),p.26. 
193 Lasceiles to Balfour, 26 Aug, FO 800117; Saunders to Mackenzie Wallace, 15 Oct 1898, 
Mackenzie Wallace MSS, News International Archive. According to Holstein's later account, 
the Emperor had realised the idea was impossible while Salisbury was still around. However 
he expressed surprise at Lascelles' instructions to drop the idea, and characterised this as a 
'premeditated snub,' accusing England of awaiting a continental war. Holstein to Chirol, 3 
Jan 1902, BD ii. No. 96. 
194 Grenville, Lord Salisbury, p.175. 
195 Lascelles to Balfour, 23 Aug 1898, BD i, No. 122. 
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afterwards about Chamberlain's revised alliance scheme. 196 Of course, Biilow had his 
own reasons to downplay the episode: he wished Gennany to remain a tertius 
gaudens between Russia and England and thus was keen to discourage ideas of 
binding Gennany to a concrete alliance. 197 At the same time as he received these 
assurances, Lascelles learned that Gennany had withdrawn her demands over 
Africa,198 and on 30 August 1898, a joint Anglo-Gennan understanding over the fate 
of Portugal's colonies was signed. 199 
It seems probable that, as W.L. Langer concluded decades ago, Lascelles had 
raised the alliance proposition in order to 'assuage the Emperor's indignation' and-
as Nonnan Rich later wrote - the Kaiser subsequently 'considerably exaggerated 
whatever was said on the subject.' This, as H.W. Koch argued, holds more water than 
J.A.S. Gr.enviIIe's ~heory that Lascelles was sent to Berlin on a clandestine 'last effort' 
to secure an aIliance;200 although Lascelles' anxiety to 'waylay' the Emperor could be 
interpreted this way, it is more likely that the raising of the alliance was incidental, 
and a tactic to appeal to the Kaiser's pro-English sentiments, and face off a volte face 
over a promising colonial entente which was threatened by the Kaiser's changeable 
moods. As Lascelles explained to the Queen in late 1898, he thought that the Kaiser 
'was in fact very fond of England, and anxious to be on good tenns with us, but... he 
196 Lascelles to Salisbury, 2 Sept 1898, BD i, No. 96. 
197 Kennedy, Antagonism, p.236. 
198 Saunders to Mackenzie Wallace, 15 Oct 1898, Mackenzie Wallace MSS, News 
International Archive. 
199 Mozambique, Angola and Timor were put up as guarantees for the loan - if the colonies 
couldn't be maintained, Gennany and Britain were to divide them up. Salisbury was so 
piqued by the arrangement he harangued his nephew for the only time in his life and set about 
undoing the arrangement - the result was the Windsor Treaty of 14 October 1899 which 
negated the 1898 agreement. A.L. Kennedy, Salisbury, 1830-1903: Portrait of a Statesman 
(London, 1953), pp.318- 319. 
200 See the summary of arguments in Koch, 'The Anglo-Gennan Alliance Negotiations,', 
p.385. 
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was terribly imprudent in his words and actions' .201 In a sense this feeling that the 
Kaiser was an unstable element was re-affirmed when he told the Tsar he had rejected 
-, 
an alliance offer and asked for more favourable terms from Russia?02 It was 
demonstrated again when in December 1898, at the zenith of the Anglo-French 
contest for control of the Upper Nile, Wilhelm telegraphed to the Empress Frederick 
proposing that Germany should remain neutral in any Anglo-French war but, should 
Russia intervene, she should 'act according to our arrangement made with Sir Frank 
Lascelles'. This action owed more to Wilhelm's wish to egg on Britain over the rather 
h . tl· f h A . 203 d . t an a smcere re ectIOn 0 t e ugust conversatIOn, an probably explams why 
Lascelles' repeated attempts to correct the Kaiser's apparent misunderstanding of the 
. 
academic nature of the discussions were wilfully ignored by the Emperor.204 None of 
the parties subsequently informed of the events of 1898- the Queen, Salisbury, 
Sanderson, Saunders and later Chirol, ever doubted Lascelles' version of events.20S 
The Emperor's version was on the other hand justifiably discounted as being 
characteristicallyexaggerated.206 Yet, while Lascelles' willingness to raise 
Chamberlain's overture showed the importance he attached to retaining the Emperor's 
friendship and ergo good relations with Germany, the Kaiser's wilful 
201 G.E. Buckle (ed.), Letters o/Queen Victoria, Third Series, vol iii, p. 300. 
202 Rohl, Wilhelm II: the Kaiser's personal monarchy, p.1 02. 
203 Lascelles to Salisbury, 10 Dec 1898, FO 800117. 
204 Lascelles to the Queen, 9 Dec 1898, SP 121118. 
205 Chirol to LasceIles, 4 Feb 1902, CASR 11114. 
206 When, three years later, Friedrich von Holstein conveyed the Emperor's version of events 
to Chirol (Holstein to Chirol, 3 Jan 1902, BD ii. No. 96) the latter sought enlightenment from 
the Foreign Office and was ensured by Sanderson (at Salisbury's request) that the German 
interpretation was an 'ingenious and deliberate ... perversion of the truth'. (Chirol to 
Lascelles, 4 Feb 1902, CASR I 1/14); Chirol accused the Emperor 'of gross misrepresentation 
of the facts as to the genesis of the alliance' and committing Lascelles 'unjustifiably in order 
to construe a private account of an academic discussion into official overtures'. (Chirol to 
Lascelles, 21 Jan 1902, ibid) See also; Lascelles to Chirol, 10 Jan 1902, CASR 11123; 
Lascelles to Lansdowne, 15 Jan 1902, FO 800118. 
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misinterpretation only increased the suspicions of the Emperor held by British 
statesmen.207 
The Portuguese colonies arrangement proved that such relations could be 
maintained without a formal alliance, which itself -as the Kaiser told Lascelles in 
December 1899 - could be made in twenty-four hours if necessary without need of a 
formal arrangement.208 Lascelles, whom Chirol saw in October, was 'in high good 
spirits at the entente cordiale with Berlin,' and 'very fit & pleased with himself & the 
Teutonic world in general.' 209 German friendship - even at the price of extortion -
was valuable at a time of Anglo-French tension over Fashoda, and also diverted 
Germany's aspirations from South Africa.210 Moreover Germany was still a relatively 
weak colonial rival. In late 1898, Lascelles took the Kaiser's remark that Germany 
had a lot to learn from England before she became a 'good coloniser' at face value, 
and hailed BUlow's comment to him that Germany 'could only succeed in colonising' 
with English assistance,211 as 'eminently satisfactory' language, telling Salisbury 
privately that: 'if they not only adopt English methods of Govemment but also stick to 
the Principles of free trade and the open door, the more colonies they get the 
better.'212 By late 1898 Lascelles could point to a significant improvement in Anglo-
German relations since the seizure ofKiaochow,213 and the Emperor's 'delight' that 
Anglo-German relations were 'on so satisfactory a footing,,214 symbolised by a visit 
of the Kaiser to the British Embassy early in 1899, and BUlow's assertion to Saunders, 
207 John Rohl 'The Kaiser and England', p.104. 
208' • Lascelles to Salisbury, 21 Dec 1898, BD 1, No. 124. 
209 Chirol to Spring-Rice, 18 & 27 Oct 1898, CASR I 1/18. 
210 Norman Rich Great Power Diplomacy, 1814-1914, (New York, 1992) pp. 383-384. 
211' . Lascelles to Salisbury, 23 Dec 1898, BD 1, No. 127. 
212 Lascelles to Salisbury, 24 Dec 1898, SP 121120. 
213 Lascelles to Chirol 21 Jan 1899, CASR 11123. 
214 ' Lascelles to Salisbury, 24 Dec 1898, SP 121/20. 
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'that it was to the interest of both Countries to act together all over the world,215 
stimulated the Ambassador into hopes of further collaboration. ./ 
v 
A less palatable side of Anglo-German relations revealed itself in late 1898, when the 
Kaiser tried to encourage the Anglo-French war over Africa which he thought 
imminent.216 In January 1899 he told Lascelles that he had rejected offers to join a 
continental coalition with France and Russia against England, but nevertheless 
insisted that England should settle her scores against France over Africa.217 Lascelles 
was not taken in, and became affronted at the Emperor's 'remarkable' assumption that 
Britain should wish to go to war, especially after the German press had 'maintained 
for years that under no circumstances would England go to war, that you might 
affront her, kick her, spit in her face if you liked.'2ls 
However, the same year Lascelles saw further hopes of Anglo-German 
collaboration when in March Cecil Rhodes, hoping to procure an agreement from the 
German Government to pass the Cape to Cairo Telegraph and Railway line through 
German East Africa, paid a visit to the Kaiser in Berlin,219 which helped allay the 
antagonism between Rhodes and the Kaiser dating from the KrUger telegram 
215 Lascelles to Salisbury, 10 Dec 1898, FO 800/17. 
216See: Jamie Cockfield, 'Gennany and the Fashoda Crisis, 1898-99,' Central European 
History, Vol. 16, No.3 (Sep., 1983); Roderick R. McLean, 'The Kaiser's Diplomacy and the 
Reconquest of the Sudan'; Lascelles to Salisbury, 24 Dec 1898, SP 121/20; Lascelles to Scott, 
20 Jan 1899, Scott MSS, B.L., Add MSS. 52301, f. 145; Scott to Lascelles, 12 Jan 1899, FO 
800/9; Lascelles to Salisbury, 23 Dec 1898, FO 6411439, No. 347 very confidential; same to 
same, 19 Jan 1899 FO 6411469 No. 11 very confidential. 217 . , 
Lascelles to Salisbury, FO 6411469, 20 Jan 1899, No. 13 secret. 
218 Saunders to Mackenzie-Wallace, 21 Jan 1899, Mackenzie Wallace MSS. At the Foreign 
Office, Sanderson also doubted the Emperor's claim to be like 'a man with a pail of water, 
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episode.220 The Kaiser consented to letting the railway line pass through African 
territory, 221 and the meeting was a 'triumphal success'; Rhodes confessed to having 
been' a naughty boy' over Kruger telegram, and the two men talked like people 'who 
had known each other for years' and 'mutually delighted in each other' ?22 But the 
most important outcome lay in Mesopotamia, where Rhodes (hoping to deter 
Germany from Africa) suggested Germany might develop her interests.223 Thus was 
born Germany's scheme to sponsor the building of a railway to the Persian Gulf.224 
Mesopotamia was one field where Britain had no intention of going herself. Thus over 
the next few years Lascelles enthusiastically encouraged endeavours to collaborate 
with German railway building in the Middle East, believing that the 'enthusiastic 
young' German Emperor could help "'keep the fort'" against Russia in Asia Minor.225 
Lascelles.recognised the force in Salisbury'S initial hesitation and objections that, 
with Britain increasingly embroiled in South Africa, the Germans were 'likely to be 
exacting' and would try to 'get the best' of Britain and play on her fear of Russia 
there, especially when the Germans gained a concession to expand their rail project 
down to the Persian gulf?26 But even Salisbury acquiesced in principle when he 
realised that Britain couldn't 'keep the Persian gulf all to ourselves,,227 and 
220 Lascelles to Bertie 4 March 1899, Fa 800117. 
221 Saunders to Mack~nzie Wallace 11 March 1899, Mackenzie Wallace MSS. 
222 Saunders to Chirol, 18 March 1899, Saunders MSS; Lascelles to Bertie, 15 March 1899, 
Bertie MSS National Archives, Kew, Fa 8001170. 
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Germany's ambitions were after all financial as opposed to territorial; additionally, 
Russo-German conflict in the region would help divide Britain's rivals?28 
The apparent merit of acquiescing in colonial bargains with Germany to 
secure her friendship was demonstrated once again when, in early 1899, Germany 
turned her sights on the Pacific islands of Samoa in her search for a colonial 
acquisition, 229 Although Lascelles was not empowered to negotiate over Samoa at 
Berlin,23o he deemed the German friendship more important than the ignominy of a 
diplomatic concession. 
Germany had first acquired a stake in the Samoan islands under Bismarck, 
when joint Anglo-American-German rule was established over the archipelago. Since 
1889, Salisbury had rebuffed Germany's repeated attempts to replace the tripartite 
administration of Samoa with a division of the islands. However Germany had their 
chance when, following the death of the King of Samoa, Malietoa, a civil war ensued 
(1898-1899) in which the German and American representatives on the islands 
backed rival claimants for the throne and despite the victory of Germany's preferred 
candidate, U.S. and British marines concerted to depose his provisional government 
and bombarded the German consulate in Apia. This led to an American apology and 
an agreement, reluctantly agreed to by Salisbury, for a commission to examine all 
contested matters- including the division of the isles. 231 
. 
Lascelles clearly divined that the Imperial Government wished to make the 
dispute a test-case for British friendship, that it served BUlow's political purposes to 
228 AL. Kennedy, Salisbury, pp.319-320;. see Wm. Roger Louis, 'Great Britain and German 
Expansion in Africa, 1884-1919', pp. 28-29. Richard M. Francis, 'The British Withdrawal 
from the Baghdad Railway Project in April 1903' The Historical Journal, xvi, no.l (1973) 
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229 The whole subject of Germany's interests in Samoa has received thorough treatment by 
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230 Lascelles to Sanderson, 4 Aug 1899, FO 800117. 
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whip up an already agitated Gennan opinion in order to justify an increased fleet,232 
and noted the suspicious anti-British tone of the Foreign Office and the inspired anti-
-, 
British articles in the Cologne Gazette. By 1899 however he dismissed Germany's 
attempt to plead her case as a quantile negligeable as an 'old story'. 233 When 
Gennany began in late August 1899 to take advantage of Britain's increasing South 
African difficulties to demand the best island of the group, Upolu, for themselves, in 
the words of the now increasingly anti-Gennan (and anti Salisbury) Chirol, 'even his 
optimistic X [Lascelles -short for 'His Excellency'] & our placid old Sarum 
[Salisbury]' deemed this 'monstrous'. 234 Lascelles was apparently conscious of 
Imperial attempts to capture his judgement and to 'arrange the Samoa business' for 
Gennany. 235 Yet at bottom Lascelles was disappointed that the 'miserable business' 
threatened to derail the good done by Rhodes' visit, 236 when there seemed to him the 
possibility 'of a general shake hands all round and clearing up of questions' .237 He 
was inclined to think the isles- which had little strategic significance to Britain- were 
'not worth the telegraph bill,'238 and agreed with Scott, (O'Conor's successor to St 
Petersburg), that it was worth letting Gennany have them if she wanted especially if it 
232 W.F. Bullock to Glenesk Bathurst, 13 Apri11899, G1enesk Bathurst Papers, MS Dep 
1990/1/5075; Lascelles to Sanderson, 31 March 1899, FO 800117. See Kennedy, 'German 
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enabled England and Germany to continue towards the 'really good understanding' 
which the 'real interests of both Countries' demanded?39 
A paramount consideration for Lascelles over Samoa was that the Emperor 
had 'fixed his heart' on the issue?40 The Samoan negotiations were bound up with the 
Emperor's apparent wish for proof of English friendship, and his feeling of being 
neglected by the British Royal Family. 241 Lascelles thought 'that we should have 
heard less of the Samoan question if Her Majesty had been able to visit some place in 
Germany even for a few hours' after having visited France in the spring,242 especially 
as he had not been invited to her eightieth birthday celebrations in May. Additionally, 
in April 1899, the question of succession to the throne of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha was 
settled, much to the Emperor's chagrin, without his input.243 Indeed, the reason 
Lascelles.allotted such an importance to the Kaiser's temper in his letters and 
despatches to Salisbury on the Samoan issue244 was clearly that he viewed the 
Kaiser's pro-English sentiments as a guarantee against an anti-British policy on 
Germany's part, a belief brought into its clearest focus yet when, during the 
negotiations over the Coburg succession,. Lascelles attempted, through his old 
Bulgarian associate, Condie Stephen, now Minister-resident in Saxony, to warn the 
Queen's Private Secretary how 'fatal' to Anglo-German relations it would be if the 
impulsive Kaiser 'took offence', as 'the whole German nation would hail with delight 
-
any anti-English policy especially ifit were accompanied by a rapprochement with 
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Russia. ,245 Lascelles repeated to Salisbury the dangers inherent in alienating the 
Kaiser 246 after he threatened to cancel a planned visit to England so long as Samoa 
remained unsettled,247 and appeared in a~~vile temper' at a dinner to honour the 
Queens birthday.248 
Thus when on leave in July, Sir Frank aligned himself with the Under-
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, St John Brodrick, in arranging the Kaiser's visit to 
Windsor in November 1899.249 Back at Berlin in September, he continued to urge the 
solution of the Samoan negotiations from the 'personal' point of view of the 
Emperor.25o Even so, Salisbury's eventual agreement to grant Germany the island of 
Upolu owed more to Admiralty information showing its main harbour would be 
useless for Germany, rather than to the Emperor's personal grievance251 and 
Germany:s acceptance of Upolu was down to reasons of prestige rather than material 
gain.252 Indeed, Lascelles' fear of the consequences of the Kaiser's feud with Queen 
Victoria complemented German foreign policy, which was not to impair relations 
with England before the fleet was ready.253 
The Kaiser's November visit itself provided, in Lascelles' view, an 
opportunity to clear the air. In the run up to the visit, Lascelles had agreed with 
Brodrick, that Salisbury little understood the importance of 'personal converse with 
245 A.C. Stephen to Lascelles, 12 April 1899, FO 800/9. 
246 Lascelles to Salisbury, 26 May 1899, BD I, No. 141 
247 Lascelles to Salisbury, 5 May 1899, FO 800117. 
248 Lascelles to Chirol, 27 May 1899, CASR 11/23. 
249 Brodrick to Lascelles, 1 Sept 1899, FO 800/8; Lascelles to Salisbry, 26 July 1899, FO 
800117. Entry in Queen's Journal for 23 Nov 1899, Buckle (ed.), Letters of Queen Victoria, 
Third Series, Vol. iii, pp. 423-4. 
250 Lascelles to Sanderson, 14 Oct 1899, FO 800117; see also Lascelles to Brodrick, 16 Sept 
1899, ibid. On the Kaiser's attitude towards Samoa and the efforts of Lascelles to save the 
negotiations, see Kennedy, Samoan Tangle, pp. 223-4, 234-6. 
25\ Paul Kennedy, 'Anglo-German Relations in the Pacific and the Partition of Samoa: 1885-
1899,' Australian Journal of Politics and History, (1971), pp. 66-69. 
252 Kennedy, 'Gennany's World Policy', pp. 616-617. 
253 Thid, p. 618. 
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the Emperor' - and he hoped a personal meeting would 'lead the Emperor to a better 
understanding of Lord Salisbury', 254 especially important in the light of past 
disagreements. While the Emperor was unable to meet Lord Salisbury due to Lady 
Salisbury'S illness, Lascelles proudly facilitated the Emperor's meeting with two 'pro-
German' Ministers, Chamberlain and Balfour.255 
Yet while Lascelles saw the visit as a chance to strengthen Anglo-German 
relations, he did not, unlike some, dare to hope that it was a fresh opportunity for an 
alliance. He was careful, in reading a letter from Salisbury to Biilow prior to their 
meeting, to emphasise that Chamberlain spoke only for himself,256 and he emphasised 
to the Kaiser after his visit; 'You have heard from two English ministers (Balfour and 
Chamberlain) what I have often told you - that, while we can conclude no alliance, 
we recognise that German & British interests must run parallel along the line'.257 
While Lascelles had high hopes of an understanding, he had lower expectations than 
Chamberlain of what Britain could ask of Germany. The Secretary of State for the 
Colonies was bitterly disappointed when, in late 1899, encouraged by his private 
meeting with Biilow on the visit and the latter's apparent reference to a desire for an 
understanding with the U.K. and the U.S., he again publicly advocated an alliance in 
his famous Leicester speech.258 Biilow had wished to keep Chamberlain interested in 
the scheme in order to continue to extract concessions from him and curb England's 
. 
hostility while Germany's fleet remained weak, but did not plan to respond in kind, 
254 Lasceiles to Brodrick, 16 Sept 1899, FO 800117; Brodrick to Lascelles, 1 Sept 1899, FO 
800/8. 
255 Chirol to Spring Rice; 2 Oct 1906, Spring-Rice MSS, C.C.A.C., CASR I 1111; Lascelles to 
daughter, 22 Nov 1899, ibid, CASR II 112; Lascelles to Chamberlain, 9 Dec 1899, FO 800117. 
256 Biilow, Memoirs, Vol. i, p.312. 
257 Saunders to Chirol, 8 Dec 1899, Chirol MSS, News International Archive. 
258 See Lascelles to Lansdowne, 2 Jan 1903, Lansdowne MSS, National Archives, Kew, FO 
800/129; Chamberlain to Lascelles, 12 Dec 1899, FO 800/8. 
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wishing to maintain her 'free hand,.259 Lascelles evidently appreciated some of this. 
Chamberlain had unfortunately 'blurted out the very thing the Germans longed for 
"' 
and that they would chuckle over it,' he told Saunders,26o and he was not surprised 
that BUlow's response, in which he referred to the Triple Alliance in more friendly 
terms than to England, and did not mention any project for a general understanding -
failed to 'correspond with his private utterances' to Chamberlain.261 As Lanza, who 
was on good terms with Biilow and very keen on good Anglo-German relations, 
advised the ambassador in December, Germany wished to cooperate with England in 
the 'great commercial and colonial questions' but this did not mean that Germany 
would in any way alter her 'continental policy,' of sticking to the Triple Alliance 
while cultivating Russia.262 The exact extent to which Lascelles realised the role 
played by Biilow's.wish to pander to the growing pro-Boer sentiment in Germany, 
and garner votes for the passing of Germany's Second Naval Bill, 263 remains 
doubtful. But while Chamberlain was disappointed in Biilow, 264 and his expectations 
had further to fall, Lascelles' appreciation of the fixed limits to an Anglo-German . 
alliance meant his beliefs in an understanding would take longer to shatter. 
VI 
A fresh testing ground for Anglo-German relations came with Britain's involvement 
-
in the South African war of 1899-1902. Britain's involvement in a major colonial war 
substantially weakened her diplomatically, militarily and financially. It enabled 
France and Russia to advance their interests elsewhere around the globe at Britain's 
259 Kennedy, 'Gennan World policy', p. 618. 
260 Saunders to Chirol, 8 Dec 1899, Chirol MSS, News International Archive. 
261 Lascelles to Chamberlain, 9 Dec 1899, FO 800117. 
262 Lascelles to Salisbury, 8 Dec 1899, ibid. 
263 Koch, 'The Anglo-German alliance negotiations', p. 386; Kennedy, 'Gennan world 
ft0licy', p. 619. . 
64 Chamberlain to Lascelles, 12 Dec 1899, FO 800/8 
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expense, and put a premium on Germany's attitude. 265 Germany was to show herself 
as an unknown quantity. On the one hand, the Boer War presented her\vith 
opportunities to extract fresh concessions, and Biilow was able to exploit the very real 
pro-Boer and anti-British feeling in Germany to justify an increased Navy and thus 
further the aims of German Weltpolitik. On the other hand too much antagonism could 
not be afforded while Germany's fleet was still under construction, and too close an 
alignment with Britain threatened Germany's desire to maintain a free hand. The 
ambivalent attitude assumed by Germany and the pro-Boer and anti-British sentiment 
of German public opinion surprised many in Britain however, ensuring that Anglo-
German relations soured and alienating many erstwhile Germanophile British 
statesmen, like Chamberlain. 266 In the words of one historian the conflict 'more than 
any other colonial event ... poisoned the relations between the two countries'. 267 
Lascelles was slower to take offence at the German Government's sphinx-like· 
attitude, and reluctant to believe the rumours of German intrigues against Britain's 
Imperial interests which came to his ears?68 Arguably, this showed the generational 
gap between the mid-Victorian diplomat and the late-Victorian New Imperialists. 
Although like many British aristocrats, Sir Frank had relatives fighting in South 
Africa - his son, Billy, and his nephew Claud Grenfell who was killed in action in 
early 1900- and loyally supported his country - he was proud when Ladysmith was 
relieved by British forces, and wished he could have seen the 'enthusiasm in London' 
265 See G.W. Monger, The End of Isolation, pp.5, 12-13; K.M. Wilson, 'The Boer War in the 
Context of Britain's Imperial Problems', in idem (ed.) The International Impact of the Boer 
War (Chesham, 2001), pp. 158-167; Zara S. Steiner, 'Great Britain and the Creation ofthe 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance', Journal of Modern History, xxxi, no.2 (1959) p. 27. 
266 Kennedy, 'German world policy', pp. 619-20. Winzen, 'Prince BUlow's 
Weltmachtpolitik', pp. 235-40; E.L. Woodward, Great Britain and the German Navy 
(Oxford, 1935), pp. 55-60. 
267 Wm. Roger Louis, 'Great Britain and German Expansion in Africa, 1884-1919' p.29; See 
also Townley, Indiscretions, p.62. 
268 Lascelles to Chirol, 27 Jan 1900, CASR I 1123. 
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as the news was received. 269 His views on the war were well to the left of many in the 
British elite. Lascelles was rumoured privately not to support the war; and he 
certainly disliked the idea of annexing the Boer republics in the event of a British 
victory which was preached by The Times .. 270 
Lascelles did share some of the general misgivings about Germany's attitude 
over the Boer war, agreeing that there was little love lost between the two countries 
and that Britain should not forget Germany's attitude, but crucially his conviction that 
the two countries' interests demanded 'mutual cooperation,' meant he thought it 
unwise, as he told Chirol, to stir up 'hatred and malice between us.' 271 Crucially 
Lascelles remained confident of Germany's essentially benign intentions, grounded in 
a continued belief that while German public opinion was 'dead against' Britain, the 
interests of both countries required 'that they should live on friendly terms however 
much they may dislike each other'. 272 This conviction was reinforced by BUlow's and 
Wilhelm's private assertions to Lascelles that the weakening of Britain's power would 
affect the Balance of Power in Europe to Germany's detriment- true enough, in 
itself73 - by BUlow's stated hope that a decisive British victory would enable her to 
'reacquire her former influence both in China and Turkey,,274 and by the Kaiser's 
269 Lascelles to Queen Victoria, 3 Feb 1900, FO 800117; Florence Lascelles to Maud 
Wyndham, 9 Feb 1900, Petworth House Archives, consulted at West Sussex Record Office, 
PHA 13847; Saunders to Chirol, 2 June 1900, Chirol MSS; Lascelles to Salisbury, 9 Feb 
1900, BD i, p.249, No. 311. 
270 Gerard to Delcasse, 13 Feb 1900, Documents Diplomatiques Fran9ais, 2e serie; Lascelles 
to Chirol; 3 March 1900, CASR 11/14. 
271 Chirol to Lascelles, 6 March 1900, ibid; Lascelles to Chirol, 15 March 1900, CASR 11123. 
272 Lascelles to Sanderson, 23 Feb 1900, FO 800/17. 
273 Lascelles to Salisbury, FO 64/1492, 8 Feb 1900, No. 31 confidential; Lascelles to Scott, 2 
March 1900, Scott MSS, B.L., Add MSS 52302, f.13; see also Lascelles to Salisbury, 10 
March 1900, FO 800117. 
274 Lascelles to Salisbury, 3 March 1900, FO 800/9, enc1 Kaiser Wilhelm to Lascelles [te1.]; 
Lascelles to Sanderson, 9 March 1900, ibid. 
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statement that Germany's financial and commercial classes 'desired the success of 
England for their own interests' .275 
, 
Decisive for the ambassador's perception of German intentions was the 
Kaiser's apparently genuine pro-British stance during the conflict. Many English 
officers who died in South Africa were known to Wilhelm personally.276 When, on 3 
March 1900, Wilhelm sent the ambassador a telegram claiming to have rejected an 
invitation from France and Russia to intervene in the conflict on behalf of the 
Boers,277 and eight days later, claimed to have declined an unexpected appeal for 
intervention from the Boers,278 Lascelles was profoundly impressed that despite 
having a golden opportunity to take advantage of Britain's ill-fortune, Wilhelm had 
not done so. 279 Arguably, more than ~ny other single act, this influenced Sir Frank's 
view of Wilhelm, and consequently of German intentions, up to 1914. Although 
others within the Foreign Office were more dubious of the Kaiser's professed non-
intervention in the Boer war,Lascelles would maintain five years after the conflict that 
the Kaiser's attitude - his decision not to receive President KrUger during his tour of 
Europe, or the Boer Generals after their defeat- all pointed towards his pro-English 
sentiments. The Kaiser's visit to England and his grandmother's deathbed at the peak 
275 Lascelles to the Prince of Wales, 10 March 1900, FO 800117. 
276 Lascelles to Salisbury, FO 6411492,8 Feb 1900, No. 31 confidentia1. The Kaiser claimed 
to have fought anti-British sentiment even among his own entourage, and to have resisted 
French and Russian attempts to bribe the German Press - although Lascelles thought the 
Kaiser's claims on the latter point to be 'a good deal exaggerated'. Lascelles to Salisbury 2 
March 1900, B.D. i, No. 313; Lascelles to Salisbury, 2 March 1900, FO 800117. 
277 Lascelles to Salisbury, 3 March 1900, FO 800/9, encl Kaiser Wilhelm to Lascelles [te1.]; 
Lascelles to Sanderson, 9 March 1900, ibid. 
278 Wilhelm II to the Queen [ te1.], 11 March 1900, FO 800117. 
279 On the subject of Wilhelm II's non-intervention, see Edward T. Corp, 'Charles Hardinge 
and the Question of Intervention in the Boer War: An Episode in the Rise of Anti German 
feeling in the British Foreign Office', The Journal of Modern History, Vo1. 51, No.2, On 
Demand Supplement (Jun., 1979), pp. DI071-DI084, especially D1071-72; lA.S. Grenville, 
Lord Salisbury, pp. 270-74. As Florence Lascelles put it early on in the conflict: 'The feeling 
here is pretty strong against us except in the All Highest quarters,' Florence Lascellesto 
Maud Wyndham, 9 Feb 1900, PHA 13847. 
220 
of the conflict in early 1901 - risking pro-Boer feeling at home - added further 
evidence of the Kaiser's pro English sentiments?80 
, 
From the outset of the Boer war, Lascelles always strove to 'put the German 
point of view' before the British Foreign Office,281 even when struggling to do so 
against his own personal irritation at German actions- as when Biilow purposely 
stirred up public opinion over the British seizure of two German mail steamers, the 
Bundesrath and General, on suspicion of their supplying contraband to the Boers in 
early 1900. He argued that Btilow had 'on the one hand ... to consider his Imperial 
Master who certainly does not wish to quarrel with us,' on the other 'an indignant 
Reichstag,' and he recognised that the new Chancellor's public speeches 'had to adopt 
a tone in harmony' with German public opinion. 282 This approach may have been 
unpopular but, as Chirol recognised, it was Lascelles' job as Ambassador to conciliate 
Germany.283 
This task became increasingly difficult as he struggled to manoeuvre amidst 
'shoals and quicksands' of a mutually hostile public opinion?84 While aware of the 
anti-German feeling in his own home country, he refused steadfastly to use"his 
position unduly to influence public opinion on either side. Lascelles' apparent 
'helplessness' over the Press tone on this and other occasions has garnered some 
criticism by Dr Van't Padje, who argues that 'instead of demanding action by the 
British government to gain that influence over the press or encouraging the British 
press-correspondents at Berlin to appeal to their editors and colleagues in London, he 
280 Cannadine, 'Kaiser Wilhelm II and the British Monarchy' pp.l93- 194; C.D. Penner, 'The 
Buelow-Chamberlain Recriminations of 1901-1902', The Historian V (1943), p. 98-99; 
Monger, The End of Isolation, pp. 22-23; See extract from Lascelles' Annual Report on 
Germany for 1906, 24 May 1907, BD III, Appendix C. 
281 Lascelles to Salisbury, 9 Feb 1900, FO 64/1492, No.34. 
282 Lascelles to Chirol, 27 Jan 1900, CASR 11123; Lascelles to Salisbury, 12 Jan 1900, FO 
800117. 
283 Chirol to Lascelles, 6 March 1900, CASR I 1114. 
284 Ethel Smyth, Streaks of Life, (London, 1921), p. 157. 
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simply lamented and capitulated. ,285 For Lascelles was well aware the Auswartiges 
Amt could and did orchestrate the official and semi-official Press tone, 286 while two 
of the main anti-German journalists on the British side, Chirol and Saunders of The 
Times, were known personal friends of Lascelles.287 The British ambassador was 
certainly riled at times by what he termed 'the vile and calumnious 
campaign[ ... ] conducted by the German press against England' .288 But at the same 
time he could not endorse the British response: he thought that Saunders' tactics of 
making the Germans 'squirm' were useless 'unless we mean to go to war.' 289 
Professional aloofness, and a belief in not discouraging Germany's official 
appearances of friendliness, influenced Lascelles' decision not to unduly interfere in 
matters of public opinion. This partly explained his refusal for example- despite 
pressure from the highest quarters in Britain- to remonstrate with Biilow or the Kaiser 
when offensive depictions of the Queen started appearing in the Berlin popular 
Press?90 On the other hand, despite Lascelles' indignation when, in March 1900 The 
Times went off 'with a loud explosion,' about Germany's hostile attitude, at exactly 
the same time as the Emperor's friendly warning had been delivered to England,291 he 
remained immune to the Auswartiges Amt's attempts to use his conflicting loyalties to 
285 Van't Padie 'At the heart of the growing Anglo-German Imperialist Rivalry', p.196. 
286 ~ , . Lascelles to Salisbury, 7 Jan 1898, FO 6411437, No. 13. See also Lascelles to SalIsbury, 8 
& 22 Jan 1898, SP 12112 & 3. On this subject see Chapter 18, 'The Impulse and 
Orchestration of Patriotism, p. 361-285 in Kennedy, Antagonism; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, 
'Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in Wilhelmian Germany, 1897-1914' in Central 
European History 24 (1991), pp. 381-401. 
287 On Saunders in Berlin, see History of the Times, Vol. III: the twentieth century test, 1884-
1912 (London 1947) pp 304-320' AJ.A. Morris, The Scaremongers, pp. 24-36. 
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the Kaiser and to his journalist friends to pressurise The Times into recalling 
Saunders,292 arguing to Billow that Saunders was 'not so bad as the Gennan press 
made him out to be', 293 and answering ;Personal complaint from the Emperor about 
a Times article in mid-March 1900, 294 with the reply that the British Government had 
'no sort of control over the Press,' and any attempt to intervene risked making them 
'even more violent.,295 Lascelles did privately warn Chirol that Saunders should 
moderate his tone because of the German Government's attempts to replace him/96 
and revealed this fact to the Kaiser in an attempt to calm Imperial nerves,297 but 
personal influence was a tool Lascelles used sparingly, and its effects were uncertain. 
In the event, Chirol steadfastly ignored even this private appeal from his friend, and 
attempts by the British Foreign Office to influence Chirol by hinting at the Kaiser's 
friendly intervention and to Chirol and Lascelles' longstanding friendship, 298 were 
equally ineffective in affecting the tone of The Times.299 When, two years later, the 
German Government once again sought to use the ambassador's resentment of 
Saunders's tactics into leaving Berlin after attacks on Biilow's economic policy, 300 
Lascelles refused to act at all to weaken his position in Berlin and warned the 
Auswartiges Amt, at Chirol's request, that any attempt to calm The Times would have 
292 Holstein's minute on Metternich to Foreign Office, 7 March 1900, GP XV.521, in 
Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents, Vol. iii, p.124. 
293 Lascelles to Chirol, 3 March 1900, CASR I 1114. 
294 Wilhelm II to Lascelles, 16 March 1900, FO 800/9. 
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No. 316. 
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Journal, vi (1963), p. 66. 
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Saunders' . (Lascelles to Sanderson, 30 May 1902, FO 800/8) over some recent articles in 
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pg 5). 
223 
the opposite result, with the result that the Gennans eventually abandoned their 
attempts to remove him. 301 
While the atmosphere of the Boer war proved uncongenial to Lascelles' quest 
for better Anglo-Gennan relations, the sudden re-emergence of the China Question in 
June 1900 following the so called 'Boxer' uprising, an indigenous revolt against 
foreign influence in the country, and the subsequent sending of an international 
expedition by the Great Powers to quell dissent and secure their interests, provided 
Britain's Ambassador with a fresh opportunity for urging joint Anglo-Gennan co-
operation, and he tried to overcome some of Salisbury's reluctance to do SO,302 openly 
supporting the appointment of the Gennan General Count Waldersee as Commander 
in Chief of the Western Powers' expedition. 303 At the back of this new collaboration 
however was a fear that Russia might take advantage of the situation in China to 
Britain's detriment.304 For, having quelled the insurrection at Peking on 21 August 
1900, Russia suddenly retreated north, to consolidate her sphere of influence in 
Manchuria. 305 When at a meeting with Edward VII at Wilhelms16he in August 1900, 
the Kaiser unexpectedly proposed ajoint Anglo-Gennan guarantee of the open door 
in China, to head off Russian incursions in Manchuria, 306 this was gladly seized on 
by the same section of the Cabinet which since 1898 had been anxious about pace of 
301 Chirol to Sanderson, 2 May 1902 (enclosed in Sanderson to Lascelles, 4 June 1902), 
Lascelles MSS, National Archives, Kew, FO 800111; Chirol to Lascelles, 29 May & 26 June 
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Salisbury's China policy and now forced Salisbury and the Foreign Office into 
agreeing to negotiations with Gennany.307 
"' Lascelles responded wannly when infonned by Brodrick of the plans to 
induce Salisbury into an Anglo-Gennan understanding and 'to get some assurances in 
Yangtze', 308 repeating his belief that the 'interests of the two countries' made an 
Anglo-Gennan understanding logica1.309 While again not charged with the 
negotiations, 310 he was enthused by BUlow's favourable attitude towards the scheme. 
Indeed, despite Anglo-Gennan commercial rivalry, he hoped co-operation in China 
might lead to an understanding in 'other places besides China. ,311 This was certainly a 
contrast to the scepticism at the Foreign Office which some like Bertie, and even 
Sanderson, showed.312 However Lascelles' enthusiasm was tempered by caution. On 
being infonned of the proposals by Sanderson,313 the ambassador realised Salisbury 
had excluded Germany's sphere of influence, Shantung, from the mutual guarantee, 
and warned him that Britain would 'get the worst of the bargain' if Gennany could 
exclude her from the province while claiming equal trading rights elsewhere in 
China.'314 
By November 1900, partly as a consequence of Cabinet disagreeme,nts over 
China, Salisbury had been ousted from the Foreign Office and replaced by Lord 
Lansdowne. At the back of Lansdowne's diplomatic thinking was a wariness of the 
307 Chirol to Lascelles, 1 Oct 1900,CASR 11114. See John D. Hargreaves, 'Lord Salisbury, 
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threat of Russia to Britain's Empire315 for, like Lascelles, he had experience of this 
from his time as Viceroy of India. As a member of the pro-German Cabinet group, 
~, 
Lansdowne's one 'preconceived idea' on coming to office was to strengthen Anglo-
German relations, especially in the Far East. 316 Encouraged by the Kaiser's visit to 
England in 1901, he hoped that the two Powers could continue to combine to 
safeguard their mutual interests in China. 317 
Lascelles welcomed his new Chief s approach and offered his assistance in 
seeking any good understanding which was' guided rather by interests than by 
sentiment', but he warned his new Chief to be wary of Germany's bargaining methods 
in future, and of securing adequate compensation in any agreement; the Germans 
would 'always try to get... the better of us in a bargain,' but would 'always come to 
terms if they see we intend to hold our own,' he wrote. 318 
However, it was not long before Lansdowne felt that Germany had already 
'bested' Britain over China. The vague wording of the joint guarantee of the open 
door - concluded on 16 October 1900- made it easy for Germany to shrink from 
confronting Russia in China in the eventuality of further incursions into Manchuria.319 
Lascelles had warned Lansdowne in November 1900 that despite assurances 'on all 
sides' of the German Government's desire to co-operate in China, they would not 
315 Sneh Mahajan, 'The Defence oflndia and the End oflsolation. A Study in the Foreign 
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'd t f~ dR' ,320 d G' . . are 00 len ussla , an ermany s response to eVIdence of RUSSIan 'land 
grabbing' in Manchuria early in 1901 confirmed this to the British Foreign Office. 321 
~, 
Billow's public denial on 15 March 1901 that the Anglo-German Agreement applied 
to Manchuria)22 in the wake of the revelation that Russia had already reached an 
. h Ch' h 323 agreement WIt ma over t at area - rendered the Anglo-German entente in the 
Far East 'completely emasculated and valueless' .324 
VII 
For Lansdowne the Manchurian episode - and the inadequacy of the 
Manchurian agreement - showed the limits of Anglo-German co-operation in the Far 
East.325 Lansdowne's ultimately fruitless attempts to secure German assistance in 
supporting Japan inNorthem China in the event of conflict, foiled by Germany's 
desire to cut and run in China as soon as feasible, ended his notion that England and 
Germany might 'keep a ring' for Russia and Japan in the Far East, and drove him 
increasingly to see the virtues of a purely Anglo-Japanese alignment which would 
assist with Britain's imperial burden. 326 Lascelles meanwhile continued to recognise 
Germany's attempts to set Britain at loggerheads with her Imperial rivals. When in 
April the Emperor termed the British Cabinet 'unmitigated noodles' for not taking 
'advantage' of their opportunities in the Far East, Lascelles saw through this fresh 
320 Lascelles to Lansdowne,S Jan 1901, FO 800/129. 
321 Bertie to Lascelles, 15 Jan 1901, FO 800/6. See on this whole issue Grenville, 'Lord 
Lansdowne's abortive project of 12 March 1901 for a secret agreement with Germany' 
r:assim; also Monger, The End 0/ Isolation, p.22. 
22 W. L. Langer The DIp' lomacy o/Imperialism, p. 722. 
323 . , Lascelles to Lansdowne, 10 March 1901, BD ii, No. 52. 
324 Langer, The Diplomacy 0/ Imperialism, p. 722. 
325 Zara S. Steiner, 'Great Britain and the Creation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance', pp. 28-
29,36. 
326 See Lansdowne to Lascelles, 8 March 1901, Lascelles to Lansdowne, 10 March 1901, 
Lansdowne to Lascelles, 13 March 1901, BD ii, No.'s 50, 52 & 55; Lansdowne to Lascelles, 
18 March 1901 FO 800/10' Lascelles to Lansdowne, 16 March 1901, FO 8001128. 
, ' . 
Lansdowne to Lascelles, 18 March 1901, BD ii No. 77 
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attempt to encourage Britain into war with Russia, or at least to 'egg on Japan,' and 
advised Lansdowne to effectively ignore his remarks as a "'tale of little meaning, 
" 
though the words be strong"', 327 and drew a parallel with the Kaiser's language at the 
end of 1898, when he had tried to foment an Anglo-French war.328 
Lascelles' reaction to the last concrete German alliance overture during his 
time at Berlin demonstrates his continued scepticism towards the project. When in 
March 1901 Eckardstein of the German Embassy in London approached Lansdowne 
with the proposal of an Anglo-German defensive alliance against Russia and 
France,329 Lascelles, along with Sanderson, spotted the similarities with 
Chamberlain's 'scheme' of August 1898, leading him to suspect that the Kaiser was at 
the back of the renewed proposals and to advise Lansdowne that Eckardstein be 
reminded of the Emperor's assertion in December 1898 that 'no formal alliance ... was 
necessary' .330 Lansdowne was in actuality exceedingly reluctant to have to conduct an 
'Anglo-German' foreign policy, but still keen to outwardly pay due deference to the 
wishes of the Emperor whom he, like Lascelles, thought to be a 'very serious factorin 
all our calculations.'33l Salisbury's caution, his habitual reluctance to join the Triple 
Alliance and enter an obligation to defend Germany and Austria's borders against 
Russian and French attack, and the difficulties of gaining parliamentary consent to an 
alliance especially in the heightened atmosphere of tension of the Boer war, killed the 
327 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 11 April 1901, BD ii, No. 72; Lascelles to Lansdowne, 13 April 
1901, FO 800/129. 
328 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 12 April 1901, BD ii, No. 74. 
329 Lansdowne to Lascelles, 18 March 1901, FO 800/1 O. 
330 Sanderson to Lascelles, 27 Mar 1901, FO 800/10; Lascelles to Lansdowne [tel.], 23 Mar 
1901, BD ii, No. 78; see also Richard Acton to Lord Acton, 22 March 1901, Acton MSS, 
Add. MS 8121 (9) III, No. 363, Lascelles to Lansdowne, 22 March 1901, FO 800118. 
331 Lansdowne to Lascelles, 18 March 1901, FO 800/1 0; see also same to same, 1 April 1901, 
ibid.-See Koch, 'The Anglo-German Alliance Negotiations', p. 388. 
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alliance scheme. 332 By December 1901, Lansdowne had informed the new 
ambassador, Mettemich, of Britain's inability to accept an alliance, although he 
remained committed to working towards a limited entente in areas of mutual 
interest. 333 
While the ambassador again took no role in the negotiations, and was 
requested by both Sanderson and BUlow not to mention the subject to the Emperor,334 
he again appreciated the obstacles to an alliance. Lascelles' attitude to the renewed 
overtures can be gauged by Alfred Rothschild's comment to Eckardstein at the time 
that he laughed 'at the clumsiness with which Berlin handles the business.,335 Iri July 
1901, while in London, Lascelles, knowing of Salisbury's objections to an alliance, 
told Eckardstein that he personally thought an accession to the Triple Alliance 
impossible; at most,. a loose association was feasible. Meanwhile, according to 
Eckardstein, while in London he did 'his best' to help settle 'pending questions' 
between the two countries.336 This tone was repeated when he met the Kaiser in 
August 1901, at a meeting with the Prince ofWales.337 BUlow had also told Lascelles 
there was no haste, for German policy pivoted on the Triple Alliance, and improved 
relations with France and Russia.338 The Kaiser's claim in mid-1901 that a Franco-
German rapprochement had been reached and England must choose which side they 
were on led Lascelles flippantly to tell Sanderson he had been 'strongly tempted to 
332 Sanderson to Lascelles, 10 April 1901, encl. Memo 29 March 1901, FO 800/10. Also see 
Lansdowne to Lascelles, 7 April 1901, Lansdowne to Salisbury, 24 May 1901, Memo by 
Sanderson, 27 May 1901, Memo by Salisbury, 29 May 1901, BD ii, No's 80, 82, 85 & 86; 
Koch, 'The Anglo-German Alliance Negotiations', pp.389-90. 
333 Draft Lansdowne to Lascelles, secret 19 Dec 1901, FO 6411519, No.393A, and King's 
minutes; Lascelles to Lansdowne, and same to King, both 27 Dec 1901, FO 800/18. See also 
. Lascelles to Lansdowne, 27 Dec 1901, ibid. 
·334 Sanderson to Lascelles, 29 May 1901, FO 800/10. 
335 Baron von Eckardstein, Ten Years at the Court ofSt James, (London, 1921), p. 221. 
336 Ibid, p. 225. 
337 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 24 Aug 1901, FO 800/17. 
338 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 25 Aug 1901, BD ii, No. 90. 
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reply that as he, and consequently the Triple Alliance, had joined the Dual Alliance, 
Europe had become a happy family, and there was 'no "other side" for u~ to join,339 
For Lascelles, it was Germany's outward intentions and the appearance of Anglo-
German cordiality which mattered more; thus when in December 1901 BUlow 
signalled his disinterest in immediate talks, the Ambassador noted it was 'satisfactory 
that he is still in favour of an eventual alliance' between Britain and the Triple 
Alliance.34o 
Yet the consequences of the recriminations which greeted the end of alliance 
negotiations were much greater for Lascelles. In a speech at Edinburgh on 25 October 
1901, Joseph Chamberlain responded to German criticism of the barbarous treatment 
of Boer civilians by English troops in South Africa by arguing that their actions went 
no further.than those of the German Army in 1870. This produced a backlash in 
Germany, but a demand from the German ambassador in London that Chamberlain 
withdraw his remarks was unsuccessful, and on 6 January 1902 Chamberlain publicly 
'bade adieu' to an Anglo-German alliance by announcing that England would stick to 
'splendid isolation'. Speaking in the Reichstag on 8 January 1902, BUlow 
reprimanded Chamberlain by telling him to leave foreign nations alone, and that he 
was 'biting on granite' in criticising the German Army.341 In Chirol's view, these 
events, through which Chamberlain was 'cured of his pro-German sympathies,' and 
. 
gained in popularity, had a 'more permanent' effect on Anglo-German relations, than 
the KrUger telegram.342 
339 Lascelles to Sanderson, 1 June 1901, FO 800118. 
340 Lascelles to Lansdowne, PS 28 Dec 1901, ibid; See also Lascelles to Lansdowne, 3 Jan 
1902, BD ii, No. 95, in which Lascelles reports BUlow of having said an alliance would 
secure peace for the next 25 years. 
341 See C.D. Penner, 'The Buelow-Chamberlain Recriminations'. 
342 Chirol to Lascelles, 4 Feb 1902, CASR 11114. 
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Lascelles was guilty of some inconsistency over the Chamberlain-BUlow 
affair. He had greeted Chamberlain's outburst with regret because of his belief in 
BUlow's friendly attitude in the Boer war, and apparently initially understood the 
Chancellor's point of view when he tried to get Chamberlain to retract his statement 
about the German Army in order to avoid having to make a public reply.343 
Yet when BUlow warned of making an anti-English Reichstag statement, Lascelles 
told Chirol privately that such a retort would be 'a proof of his weakness and inability 
to resist popular clamour,' and contrary to BUlow's professed belief 'that the interests 
of our two countries require that we should not quarrel seriously.' If BUlow did speak 
out, he argued, 'he should be clearly given to understand that public abuse was no 
longer to be explained away by private assurances,' or even by the friendly gestures 
of the Emperor (such as his warning about Great Power intervention), as these could 
not be publicised. Meanwhile public irritation made 'a friendly understanding 
between the two Governments almost impossible', and Lascelles also warned 
Miihlberg that a German response risked inflaming it further.344 
Yet when it came to it, Lascelles's despatch on the subject explained away 
BUlow's action on the grounds that the Chancellor had to 'conciliate public opinion' 
to maintain a precarious political position, and pose as champion of the German 
Army.345 Furthermore, Lascelles saw BUlow's second speech, rebuking a member of 
the Reichstag for an attack on Chamberlain and the British Army, as compensation for 
his first speech, and was astonished when The Times responded unfavourably to it. 346 
", 343 Biilow, Memoirs, Vol. i, 1897-1903, pp. 545-6. 
344 Lacelles to Chirol, 24 Nov 1901, CASR 11123; Lascelles to Lansdowne, 27 Dec 1901, FO 
800118. 
345 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 9 Jan 1902, B.D.F.A, Series F, Vol 19, Doc. 97, p. 99. 
346 Lascelles to Lansdowne [tel.], 11 Jan 1902, FO 800/129; same to same, 16 Jan 1902, BD i, 
No. 332. 
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The fallout from the affair led Lascelles into an unenviable predicament. Before the 
Reichstag speeches the German Chancellor had also been invited to dine at the 
Embassy in January 1902, the public announcement of which generated unpleasant 
comment.347 As Lascelles explained to Chirol, he could hardly withdraw the invitation 
'without at the same time asking for my passports', but this created the misconception 
that Lascelles had 'run after' Biilow.348 
More significantly, not for the first or last time Lascelles had to act as referee 
between the monarchs of both countries, who sought to defend their own statesmen's 
positions. The King made an illustration of his annoyance by writing the Kaiser a stiff 
letter and postponing a scheduled visit of the Prince of Wales to Berlin in January 
1902, an already unpopular engagement. Lascelles saw it as his ambassadorial duty to 
rescue the, visit, but his efforts made him deeply unpopular. 349 While arguing to the 
King that the outburst in the English press against Germany had certainly 'done some 
good' by showing Germans thatthere were 'limits' to British endurance which were 
'not safe to pass', he argued that the Kaiser and Biilow really wanted 'to be friends' 
with England, pointed out that the German press 'either from official pressure or from 
fear of offending England' had not replied to Chamberlain's last speech,350 and he 
explained how disappointed the Kaiser had been at the reception of Biilow' s second 
speech, which was intended to be friendly. Lascelles was also distressed that the King, 
-
whom he considered a personal friend, had been disappointed by his line over the 
Reichstag speeches. He pointed out the extraordinary difficulty of his position amidst 
347 Chirollhought the public announcement of the visit in a German newspaper to be a 
'perfidious' act. Chirol to LasceIles, 21 Jan 1902, CASR 11114. 
348 Lascelles to Chirol, 25 Jan 1902, CASR I 1123. 
", 349 Knollys to Lansdowne; 11 Jan 1902, FO 8001129; Lascelles to Lansdowne [tel.], 11 Jan 
1902, ibid; Lascelles to Knollys [tel.], 17 Jan 1902 ibid; Lansdowne to Lascelles, 17 Jan 
1902 FO 80011 O' Chirol to Lascelles, 14 Jan 1902, CASR I 1114. Chirol told Sanderson he , , 
had suppressed angry letters to The Times on the subject. Sanderson to Lascelles, 22 Jan 
1902, FO 800110. 
350 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 11 & 25 Jan 1902, FO 8001129. 
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the abnonnally excited state of public opinion, but maintained that Billow's second 
speech was satisfactorl51 and warned of' a period of strained relations' which will not 
be of advantage to either country. ,352 
The King eventually relented, and the Prince's visit did much to clear the 
air.353 The aversion of a major diplomatic incident caused relief at the embassy and at 
the Foreign Office, where there was sympathy for Lascelles's unenviable 
predicament. 354 Yet it was clear by 1902 that British attitudes towards Gennany had 
shifted significantly. Chirol noted a 'profound alteration' in Lansdowne's tone when, 
on 25 January, he apparently told the journalist that he could no longer trust the 
Emperor's friendly professions, 'if even they were genuine,' as a 'dominant factor in 
Anglo-Gennan relations,' nor would he treat Germany differently to any other Power. 
The Chamberlain-Billow recriminations had an undoubted effect on the position of 
Lascelles at Berlin. Chirol openly warned him that there was a growing feeling in the 
Foreign Office that he was coming to be regarded 'as the Ambassador of the Emperor 
rather than of the King,' and too 'disposed to lend exclusive weight to the soft words 
of the Emperor and the friendly private assurances of officials and to wave aside or 
minimize unpalatable facts which happen to be at variance with them'. Chirol feared 
lest Lascelles despite his great experience be successfully 'bamboozled' by the 'lavish 
efforts that would naturally be made to capture your judgement.' 355 While Lascelles 
-
professed to be aware of this perception of him, he thought it 'a little hard upon me as 
351 Lascelles to Knollys, 17 Jan 1902, FO 800117; Lascelles to Chirol, 25 Jan 1902, CASR 
1123. See also Lascelles to Lansdowne, 18 Jan 1902, FO 800117. 
352 Lascelies to Knollys, 17 Jan 1902, FO 800117. 
353 Even after this, the visit nearly did not take place; the Kaiser claimed not to have received 
". the King's letter authorising the visit to go ahead, and only after a successful last-minute 
search was the letter found -much to the Ambassador's relief. See Grenville, Lord Salisbury 
and Foreign Policy, pp. 366-69 
354 See G.W. Buchanan to Glenesk Bathurst, 1 Feb 1902, MS Dep 19901111789; Villiers to 
Lascelles, 5 Feb 1902, FO 80011 O. 
355 Chirol to Lascelles, 4 Feb 1902, CASR 11114. 
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I believe that the Emperor has heard more home truths from me than he has from any 
one else.,356 However, as Chirol wrote to O'Conor, the incident led Lascelles's 
'" 
'optimism' and 'to some extent' his credit suffer in 'high places' both in Germany and 
Britain.357 
356 Lascelles to Chirol, 8 Feb 1902, CASR I 1123. 
357 Chirol to O'Conor, 9 Feb 1902, OCON 5/3. 
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b) Lascelles and the turn against Germany, 1902-1908. 
I 
In mid-1902 the South African war ended with the annexation of the Boer republics 
by Britain. With Lord Salisbury's retirement from public life in late 1902 Holstein, 
for one, hoped that Lascelles would become less 'pessimistic' now that he no longer 
had to 'adapt himself to Salisbury's rudeness'. 1 Yet despite both Lascelles and 
Lansdowne hoping that the 'bitter' feeling against Germany would subside2 and a 
superficially successful imperial visit to Sandringham in November 1902,3 'small 
incidents' kept arising to bar the way to an understanding even though there was (in 
Lascelles's mind) no longer any important difference between England and 
Germany.4 Although Lascelles found his own position more comfortable,S by 1903 
opportunities for an entente lessened. Anglo-German attempts to settle their 
outstanding financial claims in Venezuela faltered due to an anti-German newspaper 
campaign in Britain, 6 and hostile public opinion also deterred British financiers from 
participating in the Baghdad railway project. 7 While Lascelles attempted to minimize 
the seriousness of these developments by reasoning it might do some good for the 
I Holstein to Billow, 29 July 1902, in Rich and Fisher (eds.) Holstein Papers, Vol. iv 
(Cambridge, 1963), No. 803. 
2 Lansdowne doubted the Germans would have contemplated an alliance if Anglophobia was 
'inherent in the sentiments of the German people.' Lansdowne to Lascelles, 22 April 1902, 
FO 800/129. 
3 The Kaiser enjoyed the visit; the King was glad when Wilhelm left! Sir Sidney Lee, King 
Edward VII: a biography, v. 2 (London, 1927) p.153 . 
. 4 Lascelles to Lansdowne,4 Nov 1902, FO 64/1552, No.220 confidential. 
• 5 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 2 Jan 1903, FO 800/129. 
6 G.W. Monger, The End o/Isolation, pp.l04-7; Lascelles to Sanderson, 27 Dec 1902, FO 
800/18. 
7 Lascelles to Sanderson, 17 & 25 April 1903, FO 800/18; Sanderson to Lascelles, 5 Aug 
1903, FO 800/15. 
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Germans to 'understand that we shall not go out of our way to please them' ,8 and 
brushed off a remark by the Kaiser that he was being badly treated in England with 
the comment 'only the newspapers, Sir' ,9 others felt the anti-German feeling was 
more permanentlO and Sir Frank recognised there was 'nothing to be done' until 
British public opinion calmed down. I I He especially regretted the collapse of the 
railway negotiations from the standpoint of British interests: Britain would be the 
main customer of the railway and would have benefited from a controlling share in 
't 12 1 • 
1903 also saw the resurgence of commercial tension between Germany and 
England, an aspect of the Anglo-German antagonism which had hitherto merited little 
attention from Britain's Ambassador. As early as 1895 Salisbury had warned 
Lascelles of Germany's awkwardness in commercial matters. 13 As an ambassador 
still immersed in the traditions of Victorian diplomacy which was relatively ignorant 
of commercial matters, trade rivalry was not a subject upon which Lascelles felt he 
was 'called upon to express an opinion.' 14 Furthermore, the Berlin Embassy had 
benefited from the services of its own commercial attache, Harriss-Gastrell, since 
1897. Nonetheless, when in 1903 the commercial debate turned political after 
Biilow's acceding to pressure for an increase in Germany's general tariff, which 
seemed to threaten Britain's economic supremacy and to extend a tariff war which 
-
had been raging between Germany and Canada since 1897, Lascelles was instructed 
to take a stiffer tone. German threats against Canada were seen as hugely unjust and 
prompted Chamberlain's to resign from the British Cabinet in order to embark on a 
8 Lascelles to Knollys, 9 Jan 1903, FO 800/18 . 
. 9 Lascelles to Knollys, 30 Jan 1903, ibid. 
10 Knollys to Lascelles, 3 Feb 1903, FO 800/15. 
\) Lascelles to Lansdowne, 15 May 1903, FO 800/129. 
12 Lascelles to Chirol, 23 Oct 1903, CASR I 1123. 
13 Memo by Lascelles on interview with Salisbury, 4 Dec 1895, FO 800/17. 
14 Lascelles to Sanderson, 19 Sept 1903, FO 800/18. 
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campaign for British Tariff Reform, which went 'hand in hand' with the increasing 
Germanophobia in Britain. Berlin, fearing the effects of a tariff war, dId all in their 
power to deflect one by extending 'most favoured nation status' to the whole of the 
British Empire, and assembling statistics to demonstrate that the new German tariff 
did not damage British trade. 15 Despite BUlow's efforts to calm the press so as not to 
antagonise Britain on this issue,16 at Reichstag elections in 1900 'doctrinaire' free 
traders failed to win a single seat. 17 
In addition to professional reasons for not wishing to antagonise Germany, 
Lascelles also had ideological reasons not to emphasise the trade rivalry between the 
two countries. Sir Frank was a fairly typical Victorian free trader, and as a 'good 
Liberal,' did not 'share the enthusiasm of Society for J[oseph] C[hamberlain]'s 
schemes' .!8 He reasoned that Britain should not force on a tariff war against 
Germany, which he thought Britain would lose. 19 As he argued later in his life, the 
'enormous trade' between the two countries, who were each others' 'best customers,' 
made it highly desirable that the two sides should not fight, if only to ensure mutual. 
prosperity.20 Conversely, he was not convinced that 'retaliation' in the form of a 
British tariff would open fresh markets for British exports?1 
15 Kennedy, Antagonism, pp. 261-64. 
16 Lascelles to Kennedy, 29 May 1903, FO 800118. 
I7 Buchanan to Lansdowne, 24 June 1903, FO 6411573, No.l47. 
18 Almeric Fitzroy, Memoirs, Vol, I (London, 1925), entry for 23 Nov 1903, p. 170. Four 
years later, the Naval attache at Berlin, Dumas, after playing golf with Lascelles, his son 
Bill, and daughter-in-law Sybil, noted that: 'On the way Lady Sybil said she was a 
protectionist & so was Bill & then she asked Sir Frank what he was. He answered 'Oh I'm a 
free trader but then you see I've had the advantage of two hours' talk with Mr Chamberlain 
.. on the subject,' which for cutting sarcasm it would be hard to beat." Dumas diary, 25 Oct 
1907. 
19 Lascelles to Kennedy, 29 May 1903, FO 800118. 
20 The Daily News, 5 Oct 1911, ED Morel MSS, F 15/3-1; copy of The Peacemaker - vo 1 
No.4, May 1912, ED Morel MSS, F 1317-1. . 
21 Lascelles to Sanderson, 19 Sept 1903, FO 800118. 
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Despite an apparent inability to arrest the deterioration in Anglo-German 
relations, however, Lascelles's good personal standing with the Emperor enabled him 
to survive successive shuffles of the diplomatic pack. In 1902 he was touted as a 
possible successor first to Pauncefote in Washington, and then to Currie at Rome. Yet, 
so long as he retained the Emperor's favour, Lascelles remained 'indispensable' at 
Berlin as he himself recognised. 22 For this reason he was kept in Berlin despite being 
put up as the 'Foreign Office' candidate for Paris in December 1903 pending Edmund 
Monson's retirement. By this point, Lascelles' fate was sealed by the manoeuvres of 
two anti-German British diplomats - Francis Bertie and Charles Hardinge, who 
respectively coveted the Paris and St Petersburg Embassies, and were warmly 
supported by the King. Hardinge knew that the King wanted to keep Lascelles in 
Berlin,23 and made full play of his position with the Emperor, reassuring Bertie that 
the French would not want an Ambassador who was "'persona gratissima'" with the 
Kaiser, and that there was 'nobody who can properly fill his place at Berlin. ,24 With 
his path to Paris blocked, Lascelles was, in the words of Chirol, condemned to Berlin 
'in perpetui ty. ,25 
II 
From 1904 onwards, Lascelles' continued wish to conciliate Germany became 
increasingly at odds with a more reserved attitude taking hold within the British 
Foreign Office and diplomatic service, which corresponded with Britain's realignment 
22 Bertie t() Lascelles, 31 Dec 1902, FO 800111; see also Nicolson to Villiers, 30 Nov 1902, 
Villiers MSS, National Archives, Kew, FO 800/22; W.F. Bullock to Oliver Andrew 
Borthwick, 12 Nov 1903, Glenesk-Bathurst Papers, MS Dep 1990/1/1792. 
". 23 Hardinge to Bertie, 24 Dec 1903, Bertie MSS, National Archives, Kew, FO 800/163. 
24 Hardinge to Bertie, 2 Jan 1904, ibid, FO 800/183. See also Hardinge to Bertie, 14 Feb 
1904, ibid, FO 8001176. 
25 Chirol to O'Conor, 9 Feb 1904, OCON. Lascelles was again refused Paris in 1908 'for 
being too German in his sentiments' and for not being married. Blunt, My diarie" Vol ii, 
p.213. 
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towards France (and eventually Russia) culminating in the Anglo-French colonial 
/ 
agreement of 1904, whereby France recognised Britain's preponderant position in 
Egypt and Britain recognised France's claim on Morocc026• Lascelles did not resent 
Britain's new policy and he did not see it as inimical to an Anglo-German entente, for 
the Anglo-French agreement was not primarily anti-German; Lansdowne had 
Britain's Mediterranean interests, better relations with France and (by implication) 
with Russia in mind27 and told Lascelles Germany could earn Britain's 'lasting 
gratitude' by showing her 'good will' towards the Agreement. 28 Furthermore Sir 
Frank recognised the need for such an agreement in the context of the long-awaited 
Russo-Japanese war (1904-05), to prevent what he termed the 'calamity' of Britain or 
France being dragged into conflict on the side of their allies. 29 His congratulation to 
Lansdowne on having speedily concluded 'the very best bit of diplomatic work that 
has been accomplished for many a long year,' and thus having 'largely contributed 
towards the maintenance of the Peace of the world,3o appears to have been heartfele 1 
and was consistent with his favourable reaction to Herbette's offer of an Anglo-
French entente in 1896, and his attempts at working with France in Egypt in 1878-9. 
However Lascelles knew Germany well enough to forewarn Lansdowne that 
she rarely gave anything up without asking for 'compensation' and to prepare himself 
26 Text communicated to Lascelles privately by Gorst, 11 May 1904, FO 800112. 
27 See C. Andrew, 'The Entente Cordiale from its origins to 1914' in: Waites, Neville (ed.), 
Troubled Neighbours: Franco-British Relations in the Twentieth Century (1971), pp. 17-22. 
28 Lansdowne to Lascelles, 23 March 1904, FO 800111. 
29 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 8 April 1904, FO 64/1593, No. 98 conf. He was even reproved by 
Lansdowne for warning BUlow that Britain would not allow Japan to be 'crushed', and allow 
". the diminution of Britain's Far Eastern position. Same to same, 8 Jan 1904, FO 64/1593, 
No.5, and minute by Lansdowne. 
30 Lascelles to Lansdowne 15 April 1904 
31 Van't Padje gives no evidence to support his curious idea that, had Edward Monson signed 
the treaty in London instead of Paul Cam bon in London, Lascelles wouldn't have been as 
keen to congratulate Lansdowne. Van't Padje, 'Imperialist Rivalry', p.240. 
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for 'a certain amount of bargaining.' 32 Germany had reason to resent the entente in 
general, and the settlement in particular of Anglo-French differences in Morocco, 
where she had commercial interests, and in recent years had co-operated with Britain 
against France.33 BUlow was attacked in the Reichstag for having allowed Germany to 
become isolated,34 and Sir Frank incisively noted that many Germans lamented they 
could no longer 'playoff one country against the other.,35 
When Britain sought Great Power consent to make changes to Egypt's 
administration through the so-called 'Khedival Decree', Germany made her approval 
dependent on a separate settlement on outstanding issues between the two countries. 36 
Richthofen certainly played on Lascelles' hopes by openly hinting that such an 
arrangement might pave the way for a formal Anglo-German entente and, partially 
for these reasons, partly from personal sympathy for the criticism Richtofen had 
suffered since the Anglo-French entente, Sir Frank advocated that Lansdowne 
. . h' d d 37 acqUIesce III IS eman s. 
Despite having been primed for a round of bartering, Lansdowne was 
surprised at this development. 38 He saw 'no particular object' in gratifying 
32 Ibid. 
33 See Christopher Andew, 'The Entente Cordiale from its Origins to 1914', in Neville Wates 
(ed.), Troubled Neighbours: Franco-British Relations in the Twentieth Century (1971), p.l5; 
A.lP. Taylor; 'British policy in Morocco, 1886-1902' English Historical Review (1951), p. 
364,374. 
34Lascelles to Lansdowne, 16 Apri11904, FO 6411593, No. 108 
35 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 15 April1904, FO 8001129. See also Lascelles to Lansdowne, 19 
March 1904, ibid. 
36 Richtofen's demands ranged from settling financial claims for Germans who had suffered 
from the bombardment of Samoa and in the South African war, to the huge headache of 
regulating German commercial relations with British colonies, which stretched back to the 
. long standing commercial dispute between Germany and Canada -Lascelles to Lansdowne, 26 
April 1904, FO 64/1593, No.114 very confidential. 
37 See Lascelles to Lansdowne 22 April & 7 May 1904, FO 64/1593 - idem, 23 & 30 April 
1904, FO 800/129; Mettemich to FO, 9 June 1904, in Dugdale, German Diplomatic 
Documents, Vol. iii, p.l95. 
38 Lansdowne to Lascelles, 18 April 1904, PO 8001129. 
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Richthofen,39 and termed his conditions - especially the 'immensely difficult' ones 
like regulating commercial relations between Germany and the British ~olonies- a 
'great piece of effrontery' ,40 insisting on confining discussion to Germany's Egyptian 
interests.41 Despite Richthofen's lack of success Lascelles was criticised in private for 
having been 'unnecessarily alarmed' and falling under the Baron's spell.42 Bertie, 
Louis Mallet (Lansdowne's private secretary), and the King himself, all criticised him 
for landing the British Government 'in a hole' by being too anxious to please the 
Germans. 43 
Such criticisms also surrounded Lascelles' refusal to believe reports 
circulating in 1904 that against the backdrop of the continuing Russo-Japanese war in 
the Far East, Russia and Germany had entered into some form of secret agreement. 
These rumours were believed by many, including Valentine Chirol, George Saunders, 
Eric Barrington of the Foreign Office, Charles Hardinge (Scott's successor at St 
Petersburg), and Cecil Spring Rice (Secretary at the St Petersburg Embassy) and 
Edward VII, 44 but Lascelles had faith in BUlow's denial of any such arrangement.45 
He thought Germany would remain benevolently neutral in the war, albeit more so 
towards Russia 'on account of her geographical position'. 46 His logic was sound 
enough. He could not see how Germany could help Russia in the Far East or the 
39 Lansdowne to Balfour, 11 May 1904, FO 800/129. 
40 Lansdown~ to Lascelles, 6 May 1904, ibid. 
41 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 13 May 1904, FO 6411593, No. 126 secret; Lansdowne to 
Lascelles, 24 May 1904, FO 64/1592, No. 114. 
42 Lascelles to Lansdowne 22 April 1904, FO 64/1593. 
43 Quote from Bertie to Mallet, 11 June 1904, FO 8001170; see also Mallet to Bertie, 20 May 
& 2 June 1904, ibid. . 
44 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 4 Aug 1904, FO 8001129; Barrington to Lascelles, 2 March 1904, 
Chirol to Lascelles, 7 Sept & 5 Oct 1904, and. Spring-Rice to Lascelles, 27 Sept 1904, FO 
., 800112. See Roderick R. McLean, Royalty and diplomacy in Europe, 1890-1914 (Cambridge, 
2001), p.lli. 
45 Lascelles to Lansdowne 8 Jan 1904, BD ii, No. 273; Lascelles to Lansdowne, 9 January 
1904, Lascelles MSS, National Archives, Kew, FO 800/19. . 
46 Lascelles to Knollys, 25 Dec 1903, FO 8001129. On this subject see Jonathan Steinberg, 
'Germany and the Russo-Japanese War', American Historical Review, Vol. 75, No.7 (1970). 
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Persian Gulf or defend the Russo-Gennan border, or what Gennany could get in 
return.47 The Reichstag was against a 'policy of adventure,' and RussI~ was oflittle 
'value' to any other Power after her defeats in the Far East. He took especial issue 
with Saunders' suspicions of 'what Gennany will or will not do' and the 'undignified 
fear of Gennany' which The Times' 'constant attacks' on Gennany betrayed.48 
Lascelles also lamented the 'profound distrust of Gennany,49 displayed after 
the Dogger Bank incident of October 1904, when the passing Russian Baltic Fleet 
fired on shipping vessels at Hull. On the British side, there were suspicions of Gennan 
connivance, but the ambassador readily accepted Gennan protestations of 
innocence. 50 His willingness to swallow the assurances of Biilow was disliked, among 
others, by Lansdowne's private secretary, who accused Lascelles of having forgotten 
Gennany's attempts to set Russia and Britain 'at loggerheads' in the Far East in 
1902.51 
Evidence of Lascelles' apparent myopia was perhaps nowhere more 
pronounced than over Gennan naval policy. While Lascelles had since 1896 worked 
to cultivate the Kaiser's pro-British sentiments, John Rohl has argued that British 
politicians remained unable successfully to do so because essentially he was the 
architect of the battleship programme designed to prise Britain out of her predominant 
international position, while in the meantime lulling Britain into a false sense of 
security. 52 The Navy which Wilhelm had longed for since at least 1894 was being 
47 Lascelles to Barrington, 4 March 1904, FO 800118. 
48 Lascelles to Chirol, 17 Sept 1904, CASR I 1123. Albeit by the time he sent his official 
despatch, further conversations with colleagues had persuaded him that Germany might have 
assured Russia against attacking her), Lascelles to Lansdowne, 22 Sept 1904, FO 64/1593, 
. No. 219. 
49 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 4 Nov 1904, FO 6411593, No. 242 Conf. 
50 Chirol to Lascelles, 2 Nov 1904, FO 800112. See McLean, Royalty and diplomacy, pp.ll1-
12. 
51 Mallet to Sandars, 11 Nov 1904, Balfour MSS, RL., Add MSS 49747. 
52 Rohl, 'The Kaiser and England', p.98, 102, 107. 
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built for use against Britain as a power political factor, a 'lever and deterrent'53 as part 
of Wilhelm's desire to earn the respect of other Powers for Germany and solve 
Germany's domestic and international problems. 54 
Although the relative calm55 with which the Navy Bills of 1898 and 1900 were 
greeted in Britain meant the Navy played no obvious role in Britain's attitude towards 
Germany before 1902,56 the atmosphere of suspicion produced by the Chamberlain-
BUlow recriminations in tum produced a growing consciousness of Germany's 
potential as a naval threat among the British elite. 57 This concern, however, was 
apparently not reflected by the ambassador, who devoted disproportionately scant 
attention to the topic, lending weight to Van't Padje's assertion that he 
'underestimated the significance of Germany's naval policy for Anglo-German 
relations' .. 58 
The ambassador's lack of interest in the topic is partly explained by 
professional self-interest, and partially by a factor which has received little attention 
hitherto. Naval reporting was ajob delegated to a naval attache rather than an 
ambassador - a position first held permanently by Commander Arthur Ewart from 
1900 (from shortly after the passing of the second German Naval Law), then by 
Captain R.W. Allenby from 1903-05 (the years when the naval issue was coming to 
53 Jonathan Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent (London, 1965), p.21; also ibid, pp. 18-22, 126-7 
& 201-2; See also E.L. Woodward, Great Britain and the German Navy; Kennedy, 
'Germany's world policy', pp.608 & 623; Winzen, 'Prince BOlow's Weltmachtpolitik', p. 
234. 
54 Kennedy, 'Germany's world policy', pp. 614-15; Winzen, p.232. 
55 There were exceptions: Saunders, for example, wrote as early as early as 1899 that 
Germany sought, not permanent co-operation with England, but 'a breathing space until they 
can get their naval septenate carried out.' Saunders to Mackenzie-Wallace, 4 Feb 1899, 
". Saunders MSS. " 
56 Koch, 'The Anglo-German Alliance Negotiations' p. 390. 
57 Keith Wilson, 'Directions of Travel: The Earl ofSelbome, the Cabinet, and the Threat from 
Germany, 1900-1904', in The International History Review, Vol. XXX Number 2 June 2008, 
pp. 259-272. 
58 Van't Padje, 'Imperialist Rivalry', p.234. See also ibid, pp.223-224. 
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the forefront of Anglo German relations), and by Captain Philip Wylie Dumas from 
1906-1908, (years when the naval tension was reaching its zenith) - all'd thus was not 
an issue Lascelles was often called upon to deal with. 59 
Yet Lascelles mainly denigrated the German naval threat due to his conviction 
of Germany's dependence on British friendship. When in 1902 the First Lord of the 
Admiralty, Selbome, requested the British ambassador's opinion on whether the 
German Fleet was aimed against Britain, 60 Lascelles reasoned that, while 
Anglophobe sentiments had been useful in gaining support for the Naval Bills in the 
Reichstag, it was not in Germany's interests (despite her jealousy of Britain's 
Imperial power and resentment of Britain's treatment of her as a quantile 
negligeable), for Germany to see England to go under, as she 'would have to fight for 
her very existence' against France and Russia and would probably instead wish to 
remain aloof in the hope of making an 'an excellent bargain for herself, by dictating 
terms to an exceptionally weakened (and by implication defeated) France and Russia. 
Secondly, Lascelles also argued that the Two-Power-Standard made the British fleet 
strong enough against any other Power. The strength of Lascelles's conviction is 
demonstrated by the fact that his opinions survived a corrective from his own naval 
attache, Ewart, who asserted that the repeated statements in the Reichstag Naval 
debates, and the preamble to the Navy Bill which aimed at parity with the British 
fleet, were sufficient evidence of the Fleet's anti-British nature, and who sent his own 
information to the Naval Intelligence department, pointing out that by 1909 'the 
59 Van't Padje's assertion (ibid, p.224) that Lascelles was only assisted by a naval attache 
from 1905 is factually wrong. Ewart had become the first 'permanent man on the spot' in 
Berlin in Novermber 1900, himself replacing a system of 'roaming' attaches which had 
existed prior to this. Matthew S. Seligmann, Spies in Uniform: British Military & Naval 
Intelligence on the Eve of the First World War, p.l6. 
60 Lansdowne to Lascelles, 22 Apri11902, FO 800/129. 
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Gennan Navy will be a fonnidable one which we must take into consideration,61. It 
was Ewart's opinion that Selborne decided to take on board, but it is \\r~rth pointing 
out that Lansdowne shared Lascelles's attitudes towards the Gennan Navy.62 
From 1904, Lascelles was fully sensitive to the growing suspicion that a more 
powerful Gennan Navy would attack England. When, following the British 
Admiralty's decision to reorganise her Home Fleet by late 1904 and concentrate more 
ships in the North Sea,63 Gennany took fright at a rum our that the British Fleet was 
planned to destroy the Gennan Navy in port,64 Lascelles (while downplaying the 
story) warned that Britain's reorganisation might have been unnecessary 'ifthe 
Gennan fleet had not been built,' and that the anti-British tone of the Navy Bill and 
the concentration of the Gennan fleet in home waters justified British fears. 65 
However, as ambassador it was naturally to Lascelles' advantage to calm public 
opinion and thus, as during the Boer war, he admitted to conveying private hints to 
'personal friends connected with the Press' to moderate their attacks on Gennany.66 
In late 1904, Lascelles' failure to rise to Biilow's complaining tone about the 
naval question and his apparent indifference to the Chancellor's threat that Gennany 
might reach a rapprochement with Russia67 was greeted with grave concern by 
Austen Chamberlain, the new Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer, who 
61 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 25 April 1902, ibid. 
62 As recent research has shown, Selborne later deliberately misrepresented Lascelles' opinion 
in crediting him in a memorandum of late 1903 as having said the fleet was aimed at Britain, 
in order to justify ad post hoc his own conversion to the German Naval Threat and get the 
1903-04 estimates approved by Cabinet. See Keith Wilson, 'Directions of Travel', op cit. See 
Lansdowne to Lascelles, 22 April 1902, FO 8001129. 
63 Chirol heralded the news by writing to Lascelles, 'The Admiralty have at last come to 
recognize that the German fleet is a potentially hostile factor.' Chirol to Lascelles, 26 Oct 
1904, FO 800112. 
64 On the Gennan fear of a British attack, see: Jonathan Steinberg, 'The Copenhagen 
Complex', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 1, No.3, (Jul., 1966), pp. 23-46. 
65 Lansdowne to Lascelles, 27 December 1904, FO 800112. 
66 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 30 Dec 1904, ibid, No.303. 
67 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 28 Dec 1904, FO 64/1594, No.299. 
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accused Lascelles of listening to BUlow's threats 'without serious remonstrance'. Sir 
Frank's 'patient humble attitude,' was not to his liking and he feared the German 
Government would see in it a sign of weakness. 68 
Yet while Chamberlain's concerns mirrored those privately expressed by 
Bertie and Mallet,69 and embodied the impatience of the new, 'Edwardian' generation, 
Lansdowne defended Lascelles, arguing that he was 'used to the querulous tone of the 
German Government' and 'more inclined to meet it with ridicule than with violent 
indignation,' an important differentiation. He argued that 
He is never addicted to the use of strong language, and perhaps it would be better if 
he were sometimes a little more emphatic; but he has, I think upon the whole held his own 
well, and obtained a position of considerable influence with the extraordinary personage to 
whom he is accredited. 
Lansdowne himself was 'less inclined than Austen to take "au grand serieux'" 
Biilow's observation. He also had some residual tolerance for Germany: while 
-
admitting Germans had 'behaved shabbily' on a 'good many occasions,' he 
acknowledged their efforts to 'cultivate good relations' over Egypt and Venezuela.7o 
The King also thought Lascelles' language, on this occasion, was 'admirable,'71 
leading Lansdowne to commend his 'plain speaking,.72 
As Zara Steiner has argued, Lascelles was by now increasingly out oftouch 
with those in the Foreign Office, like Francis Bertie, who felt that Anglo-German 
68 Memo by A. Chamberlain, 14 Jan 1905, Balfour MSS, B.L., Add. MSS 49729. 
69 See Monger, The End of Isolation, pp. 226-8 . 
• 70 Lansdowne to Balfour, 18 Jan 1905, B.L.; Add MSS 49729. Lansdowne had, indeed, been 
enraged at the opposition of British public opinion to Anglo-German co-operation in 1903. 
Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 256; Monger, The End of Isolation, p.l06. 
71 Lansdowne to Lascelles, 13 Jan 1905, Lansdowne MSS, NationalArchives, Kew, FO 
800/130. 
72 Lansdowne to Lascelles, 5 Jan 1905, FO 800112. 
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interests were not identical in China, Turkey, Morocco and Kuwait, 73 and who 
/ 
mistrusted Germany's naval plans and diplomatic methods. Lascelles was more 
representative ofthe 'old Salisbury persuasion' /4 like Sanderson who sympathised 
with Lascelles. Sanderson recognised Germany's need to cultivate Russia and her 
desire to strengthen her navy, as she proceeded from a position of naval inferiority 
and was confronted with a Russo-French Alliance, a weakened Triple Alliance and a 
burgeoning Anglo-French entente. In such circumstances, the 'possible antagonism of 
Great Britain' provided 'a very convenient pretext for the increase of the German 
fleet.' He realised that unless Germany could be 'sure' Britain would not suddenly 
ally with France, she must take the 'precaution' of keeping on good terms with 
Russia/5 and bewailed the 'the lunatics ... who denounce Germany in such 
unmeasured temlS and howl for an agreement with Russia,' which might naturally 
'drive Germany into the Russian camp' and thus prevent an Anglo-Russian entente.76 
.. III 
Lascelles' hopes for an Anglo-German understanding were further undermined when, 
in April 1905, the Kaiser while on a visit to Tangier made a speech in which he 
upheld the Sultan's independence and said that he recognised no Anglo-French 
Agreement over Morocco, which was a transparent and fresh attempt to thwart the 
Anglo-French entente/7 and a reversal of Germany's line in 1904.78 
73 Z Steiner, 'The Last Years Of The Old Foreign Office', pp.75-6. 
74 Ibid, p. 85. . 
.• 75 Sanderson to Lansdowne, 20 Jan 1905, Lansdowne MSS, National Archives, Kew, FO 
800/145. 
76 Sanderson to Lascelles, 3 Jan 1905, FO 800112. 
77 C. Andrew, 'The Entente Cordiale', p. 22. 
78 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 22 April 1904, FO 6411593; Lansdowne to Lascelles, 15 Aug 
1904; FO 6411592, No. 170. 
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Lascelles saw Germany's action as an apparent attempt to 'break up' the 
entente.79 He saw the visit as further evidence of the Kaiser's attemPt~ to 'sow 
distrust' between Britain and other nations,80 rather than a sign that Germany wanted 
war or a coaling station, 81 and that the Emperor's wished again to 'prove that 
Germany ... was not to be treated as a "quantite negligeable.'" Yet he also recognised 
that a key role in the crisis had been played by BUlow, who was on a personal crusade 
to remove Theophile Delcasse, co-architect of the Anglo-French entente, from office. 
Lascelles thought Germany's case a 'bad one' which would fail to win sympathy, and 
drew a parallel with the KrUger Telegam.82 He went so far as dubbing the Tangier 
visit 'the clumsiest bit of diplomacy I ever heard of and an egregious blunder which it 
will require all BUlow's cleverness to retrieve.'83 By July 1905, Delcasse had been 
overthrown, with German connivance. Germany believed Delcasse's claim that 
England had promised to back France in a war with Germany,84 and Lascelles found 
this suspicion 'very sad and very difficult to deal with. ,85 
Lascelles saw the Moroccan crisis as a temporary more than permanent source 
of estrangement, eventually thinking the Germans had realised the error of their ways 
and wished 'to climb down, without having the appearance of doing so'. An 
international Conference on Morocco at Algeciras (held from January to April 1906) 
resulted in embarrassment for Germany and her Austrian ally and a victory for French 
79 Lascelles to Knollys; 28 Sept 1905, FO 800118. 
80 Lascelles to Knollys, 24 Mar 1905, ibid. 
81 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 5 May 1905, FO 800/130. 
82 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 7 April 1905, ibid. 
83 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 27 April 1905, ibid. 
84 Sanderson to Lascelles, 10 Oct 1905, FO 800112. Luckily Sanderson seemed to have more 
success in a second interview with Mettemich where he pointed to similar attacks by the 
German Press in the South Africa war. Sanderson to Lascelles, 24 Oct 1905, FO 800112. 
85 La-scelles to Sanderson, 20 Oct 1905, FO 800/18. 
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and Spanish influence in Morocco'. 86 Hereafter, however, Lascelles remained highly 
critical of Germany diplomacy's 'blustering methods,.87 Although he-knew that 
Holstein had been partially to blame for the direction in German diplomacy, he 
chiefly pointed the finger at BUlow, whom he termed 'really a most stupid & clumsy 
man' who 'only shows cleverness when engaged in getting himself out of difficulties 
of his own making,88 and privately he characterised BUlow's foreign policy since 
1897 as 'a succession of clumsy blunders', from which Germany was only just 
waking up to the consequences. 89 In the event it was not BUlow but Holstein, who 
had survived three German Chancellors, who was made a scapegoat and who resigned 
on 3 April, much to the relief of even his own Foreign Office, 90 but Lascelles 
resented that BUlow had not gone instead. Holstein's 'undoubted ability and almost 
unrivalled knowledge,' made his loss 'great' 91 and Lascelles despaired of obtaining 
any improvement in Anglo-German relations so long as BUlow remained as 
Chancellor. BUlow seemed increasingly pre- occupied with writing speeches for the 
Reichstag, and tended to leave important matters to subordinates. In the absence of 
Holstein, chaos reigned in the Auswiirtiges Amt, 92 leading Lascelles to draw analogies 
with the period after Bismarck's fall. 93 Lascelles's 'profound contempt' ofBtilow 
86 Lascelles to O'Conor, 31 Dec 1906, OCON 6/2/32. See further Lascelles to Grey, 11 Jan 
1906, BD iii~ No. 237, Lascelles to Grey, 4 Jan 1906, FO 800119. 
87 Lascelles to Hardinge, 30 March 1906, FO 800119; see also Lascelles to Grey, 16 Aug 
1906, BD iii, No. 424; Lascelles to Hardinge, 9 March 1906, FO 800119. 
88 Dumas diary, 3 March 1906. 
89 Lascelles to Hardinge, 9 March 1906, FO 800/19. 
90 Lascelles to Grey, 6 April, ibid. 
91 Lascelles to Hardinge, 30 March 1906, ibid. 
92 Dumas diary, 7 April 1906; Lascelles to Hardinge; 4 & 31 May 1907, FO 800/19; Towers 
'. to Strachey 16 June 1907, John St Loe Strachey MSS, Parliamentary Archives, S/16/1/1O. 
93 Lascelles to Tyrell, 31 Jan 1908, FO 800119. BUlow found it hard to co-operate with either 
of the Foreign Ministers who succeeded Richtofen (d.1906).See Katherine Anne Lerman, The 
Chancellor as Courtier: Bernhard von Billow and the Governance of Germany 1900-1909, 
(Cambridge, 1990), p. 188-195. Lascelles to Grey, 4 October 1907, FO 800/19; Lascelles to 
Grey; 7 Oct 1907, BD vi, No. 38, Hardinge to Lascelles, 8 Oct 1907, FO 800/13. . 
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stemmed mainly from his lack ofhonesty;94 as he complained to Tyrell, 'Biilow tries 
to please everyone with the inevitable result of satisfying nobody'. 95/· 
Yet though he grudged BUlow his election victory in early 1907 96 he 
welcomed 'the soothing effect upon the all-highest nerves.' Indeed Chirol found it 
curious that Lascelles was now 'down on die ganze Bande' but 'always excepting 
William'. 97 Despite conceding criticism of Germany, Lascelles continued to believe 
in the Kaiser's good intentions. 
IV 
Lascelles continued to identify good Anglo-German relations with the friendly 
attitude of the Emperor. Evidence of how far he judged his own position to be 
dependent on the good graces of the latter came when in June 1905 the Ambassador 
was present at the station alongside the Kaiser to greet Prince Arthur of Connaught 
(Britain's royal representative) prior to the wedding of the German Crown Prince and 
asked if the Emperor had any orders for him to convey when he went on leave. The 
Kaiser's unexpected outburst of: "'Orders for England? No I shall have nothing to say 
to you until you learn how to behave'" mortified Lascelles, who viewed the 
Emperor's comments as a sign that his ten years attempting to mend Anglo-German 
relations had been a 'complete failure' .98 Despite a personal apology from the 
Emperor, Sir Frank remained 'very much hurt' by the Emperor's remark and 
threatened his resignation. Although the Foreign Office did not meet his request to 
94 Dumas diary, 24 Oct 1906. 
95 Lascelles to Tyrell, 31 Jan 1908, FO 800/19. 
96 Dumas diary, 25 Feb 1907. 
97 Chirol to Florence Spring Rice, 10 Feb, & 2 July 1907, Spring-Rice MSS, C.C.A.C., CASR 
11/15. 
98 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 7 June 1905, FO 800/130. 
250 
transfer to another Embassy, he remained downcast for months afterwards. There 
were clear echoes ofMalet's predicament ten years earlier. 
By 1905, however, Lascelles' ability to convince others of the diplomatic 
worth of his remaining as a persona grata to the Court had visibly declined. There 
were clear reasons for this. By 1900, Btilow's increasing control over German policy 
had enabled him to realise his goal of limiting 'direct communication between the 
Emperors and the Ambassadors' ,99 in order to limit the damage of 'the Emperor's 
growing irritation against England,' on Anglo-German relations, 1 00 and, crucially, to 
prevent the Kaiser making hasty foreign policy pronouncements, such as his 
invention of Lascelles' alliance proposal in 1898, his spontaneous proposal of an 
agreement over China in 1900, and his repeated overture in 1901 for an Anglo-
German alliance. ." 
The British foreign policy elite, too, had ceased to see the utility of the 
ambassador's chats with the Kaiser, which only brought abuse of England. In 1905 
Lansdowne perhaps shrewdly declined Lascelles' suggestion that he should raise the 
topic of Morocco with the Emperor. 101 Iricreasingly Lansdowne and his officials were 
averse to treating the Kaiser as a governing factor in Anglo-German relations. With 
the passing of the Boer War and the advent of new men at the Foreign Office, the 
image of the Kaiser as pro-English was no longer recognised. Much as Lascelles 
might wish for the Emperor to be 'judged rather by his acts than by his words,' for 
having 'kept the Peace,' since coming to the throne despite opportunities to disturb 
99 Lascelles to Bertie, 17 bee 1898, FO 800117. 
100 Lascelles noted BUlow's personal friendliness, and also that of Holstein, who partly 
attributed the Emperor's irritation to repOlts that 'important Personages in England' had been 
openly hostile to him and to Germany. Lascelles to Lansdowne, 12 June 1905, FO 800/130. 
101 Lansdowne to Lascelles, 23 April 1905, BD iii, p. 67. Lascelles to Lansdowne, 27 April 
1905 FO 800/130; Lansdowne to Lascelles, 1 May 1905. 
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it,102 his colleagues tended to focus on more alarming indicators of Germany's 
intentions, such as Biilow's speeches during the Boer War, the anti-British tone of the 
Naval Bills, and the worrying Imperialist tendency among Germany's intellectuals, 103 
rather than the Monarch who had declined to intervene in the Boer war. 104 T.G. 
Otte's argument that the British policy elite suffered 'Kaiser-fatigue' by the time of 
Grey's Foreign Secretaryship, and that Wilhelm's repeated 'bedside chats' took on the 
air of a tiresome joke, had its consequences for Lascelles, inevitably diminishing the 
seriousness with which Lascelles' reports were received- put bluntly, nobody was 
interested anymore. lOS 
Indicative of this was the derision with which Lascelles' annual report for 
1906 was received at the Foreign Office. Lascelles' argument that the Kaiser was an 
impulsive, flamboyant individual who, much as he might be given to sabre rattling, 
nonetheless was also peaceable and merely had attracted attention for his actions 
because of his blustering methods, was summarily rejected in countless annotations 
by anti-German members of the Foreign Office. 106 
Yet, amidst rising naval tensions and against the backdrop of emerging 
German hostility to Britain's burgeoning entente, Lascelles increasingly, and 
reluctantly, fell back on improving the notoriously difficult personal relations between 
102 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 30 Dec 1904, FO 800/18. 
103 Balfour to LasceIIes, Jan 1905, B.L., Add MSS. 49747. 
104 Hardinge- much to Lascelles' chagrin- challenged the idea of~he Emperor's ~ene~olence 
in the Boer war. See E.T. Corp, 'Charles Hardinge and the QuestIOn ofInterventIOn m the 
Boer War' op cit. . , . 
. lOS Otte 'The Winston of Germany', p.496; see also hereon, Jonathan Stemberg, The KaIser 
and the' British: the state visit to Windsor, November 1907', in: J .C.G, Rohl & Nicholaus 
Sombart (eds.), Kaiser Wilhelm II: new interpretations: The COifu papers, pp.121 -124, 129-
130. 
106 See extract from Lascelles' Annual Report on Germany for 1906,24 May 1907, BDIII, 
Appendix C; see also Lascelles' argument to Fitzmaurice, 2 June 1906, FO 800/19. 
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the Kaiser and King Edward. 107 Even before King Edward's accession Lascelles had 
experienced the potentially explosive consequences of 'family matters', on Anglo-
German diplomacy,108 and Lansdowne had recognised the potential of this 'barely 
concealed antipathy' to be a diplomatic problem. l09 The row over the Prince of 
Wales's visit in early 1902 had been in a sense the inauguration ofa period of intense 
bitterness between both monarchs, and after the Tangier episode in 1905 Edward saw 
Wilhelm as the bitterest enemy England had. llo 
However, while Lascelles' intimacy with both the Emperor and Kaiser put him 
in a unique position to intervene in Royal spats, III he was unable to exert much 
influence on the underlying antagonism. After the King's 1903 visit to Paris, during 
which Edward had encouraged the Anglo-French entente, Lascelles had tried 
unsuccessfully to secure a visit of Edward VII to Berlin. I 12 Although both monarchs 
met in 1904 for the opening of the Kaiser Wilhelm canal at Kiel, Lascelles was 
reduced to what Chirol termed a 'lightning conductor to the two All Highests!' 113 The 
visit did however demonstrate some need for an intermediary. I 14 A row took place. 
regarding the action of Gleichen, Britain's military attache at Berlin, in sending home 
a copy of a military textbook written by an Anglophobe German guards officer 
containing stories of British atrocities committed against Boer civilians in South 
Africa, which had enraged the King but led Wilhelm to threaten Gleichen's recall. 
107 Cannadine, 'Kaiser Wilhelm II and the British Monarchy' pp. 194-197; L. Cecil, 'History 
as Family Chronicle', pp. 102-108. 
108 R6hl, Wilhelm II: the Kaiser's personal monarchy, p.973. 
109 Otte 'The Winston of Germany', p. 492. , . 
110 Cecil, 'History as Family Chronicle', p.l06 -09. 
III Sidney Lee, King Edward VII, Vol. 2, p. 612. 
112 • . IbId, p.243. . 
113 Chirol to Florence Spring-Rice, 15 June 1904, CASR 11115. 
114 For details of the incident see M. Seligmann, 'Military diplomacy in a military monarchy? 
Wilhelm II's relations with the British service attaches in Berlin, 1903-1914,' in A. 
Mombauer and W. Deist (eds.), The Kaiser: New Research on Wilhelm II's role in Imperial 
Germany, (Cambridge, 2003), p.182. 
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Inevitably, Lascelles was called in to make the peace, but resented the experience and 
its impact on the Royal meeting. I IS 
This theme of deteriorating relations and Lascelles' inability to arrest them 
continued through 1905. In March the ambassador was unable to dissuade Edward 
from cancelling the visit of the Prince of Wales to Germany on the pretext that the 
King of Spain was in England, and in August he failed to convince the King, who (in 
the heightened tension over Morocco) had neglected to visit the Kaiser during his 
summer cure at Marienbad, to pay a visit to Homburg in early September, as the King 
was increasingly mindful of upsetting France. 116 When the Kaiser retaliated by 
cancelling the German Crown Prince's scheduled November visit to Windsor on the 
pretext of a prior engagement to meet the King of Spain, Lascelles was put in the 
awkward ,position of intervening. The Kaiser let Edward know his grievance over 
Marienbad, 117 and in an interview with Lascelles used language so violent that the 
Ambassador felt unable, in his 'very difficult and delicate position,' to report it, and 
only after the Emperor dissuaded Sir Frank from contemplating resignation did he 
agree, with much pain, to do so with the stipulation that Wilhelm acknowledge his 
personal regret at the sourness of dynastic relations. I IS In replying the King (like his 
nephew) failed to accept responsibility for the rift, and his reference to the Kaiser's 
'touchiness' and 'intrigues against England,' 119 meant again Lascelles felt in an 
115 Chirol to Florence Spring-Rice, 23 Aug 1904, CASR I 1115; Chirol to O'Conor, 8 Aug 
1904, OCON 5/3. 
116 Lee, King Edward VIL 2, pp.335-6 & pp. 346-353. See Knollys to Lascelles, 8 Aug 1905, 
14 Aug 1905, FO 800/12. Lascelles to Sanderson, 22 Aug 1905, and enclosed letter to 
Edward VII, FO 800/18, Lascelles to Knollys, 22 Aug 1905 FO 800112; Knollys to Lascelles, 
", 27 Aug 1905, ibid. " 
117 Lascelles to Sanderson, 22 Aug 1905, and enclosed letter to Edward VII, FO 800/18. 
Lascelles to Edward VII, 26 Aug 1905, ibid; Ponsonby to Lascelles, 27 Aug 1905, FO 
800/12. 
118 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 13 Sept 1905, FO 800/18. 
119 Knollys to Lascelles, 23 Sept 1905, FO 800/12. 
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unenviable predicamentl20; only the King's sympathy for Lascelles' position led him 
to state that he had no wish to quarrel with the Emperor, and would assent to meet the 
c. 11' 121 10 owmg year. 
The incident did, however, underline the importance of tact in handling the 
two Sovereigns, with Lansdowne admitting that the fault was not all on the Emperor's 
side. 122 Chirol sympathised with the 'unpleasant passages' Lascelles had undergone 
in dealing with the 'irrelevant complication' of 'personal friction' between the two 
Monarchs. 123 Sanderson, for one, thought it underlined Lascelles' continued utility as 
ambassador,124 and there is evidence that Lascelles believed this too. In January 1906, 
he told the British naval attache the mutual monarchical antagonism was 'the only 
danger' to Anglo-German relations; both monarchs were 'too much like one another 
ever to get on really well' .125 Yet despite Lascelles' pleasure at having overseen a 
cordial meeting between the two Sovereigns at Cronberg in August 1906, after the 
dust of the Moroccan crisis had settled126 the meeting was purely non-political and 
thus rather superficial. 127 Indeed, according to one historian, increasingly these royal 
visits were used not to patch up differences, but to use periods of detente to cover up 
hostile policy manoeuvres elsewhere. In 1905, while Wilhelm enumerated the 
grievances against his Uncle's failure to visit him, he himself had just signed a secret 
mutual defence accord with the Russian Tsar at Bjerke and in 1907, the meeting of 
-
monarchs at Windsor came against the backdrop of Tirpitz's increase in the rate of 
120 Lascelles to Knollys, 28 Sept 1905, FO 800118. 
121 Knollys to Lascelles, 2 Oct 1905, FO 800/12. 
122 Lansdowne to Lascelles, 25 Sept 1905, FO 8001130; Knollys to Lascelles, 23 Sept 1905, 
FO 800/12. 
123 Chirol to Lascelles, 26 Sept 1905, CASR 11114. 
124 Sanderson to Lascelles, 19 Sept 1905, FO 800/12. 
125 Dumas diary, 5 Jan 1906. 
126 See Hardinge to Lascelles, 26 Feb & 8 May 1906, FO 800113; Ponsonby to Lascelles 17 
Aug 1906, & Oppenheimer to Lascelles, 28 June 1906, ibid; Dumas diary, 2, 15 & 16 Aug 
1906; 
127 Lee, King Edward VIL 2, pp.528-529. 
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Gennan shipbuilding, and Britain's conclusion of the Anglo-Russian convention. 128 
While Lascelles was 'delighted' with the Kaiser's invitation to Winds~r that year, his 
naval attache (focussed as he was on Gennany's quest for maritime power) noted that 
the visit could only 'improve matters outwardly,' and criticised Lascelles for living 
'wholly in the present.' 129 
v 
The main reason Lascelles' job was rendered increasingly awkward after 1906 was 
because of the anti-Gennan tendencies in Sir Edward Grey's foreign policy. This 
proved a rude awakening to Lascelles who initially had been confident that Grey and 
the Liberals would continue Lansdowne's policy of the entente without damaging 
Anglo-Gennan relations, 130 Grey had shown misgivings about Gennany in the 
past,131 but Lascelles, while regretting Lansdowne's departure was persuaded after 
talking with Grey in late 1905 that there would be 'no change in our Foreign Policy' 
and was 'delighted' at his appointment. 132 
Lascelles was aware of Gennan sensitivities to Grey's finn support of France 
at the Algeciras Conference. 133 However, in January 1906 Grey emphasised to 
Lascelles that England's engagements with France and Japan were not directed 
against other countries, that Britain did not resent Gennan commercial rivalry, nor, 
-
importantly, did she resent Gennany's shipbuilding, which stemmed from her 
128J. Steinberg, 'The Kaiser and the British: the state visit to Windsor, November 1907', and 
idem, 'The novelle of 1908: Necessities and choices in the Anglo-German Naval Arms Race' 
in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, (Fifth Series) 21 (1971), pp. 25-43 See also 
Hardinge to Lascelles, 7 Apri11907, BD vi, No. 33. 
'. 129 Dumas diary, 19 June 1907. 
130 Lascelles to O'Conor, 31 Jan 1906, C.C.A.C. OCON 6/2/32. 
131 In 1902-following Biilow's Reichstag speech -Sanderson found Grey 'very sore against 
Germany.' Sanderson to Lascelles, 12 March 1902, FO 800/10. 
132 Lascelles to O'Conor, 20 Dec 1905, C.C.A.C., OCON. 
133 Lascelles to Grey, 4 Jan 1906, FO 800/19. 
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'natural. .. desire to protect an Empire'. 134 After the Algeciras conference, he 
professed his anxiety to give Germany 'practical proof that Britain wa.s not 'working 
against German interests' or wishing to 'treat them in a specially frigid or distant 
way',135 and he was encouraged in this by Charles Hardinge, who had replaced 
Sanderson as Permanent Under Secretary in 1906.136 
Yet Grey and Hardinge's condition that better relations with Germany should 
not be at France's expense. Grey's anxiety 'that nothing should occur which would 
lend any colour to the idea that we are wavering by a hair's breadth from our loyalty 
to the Entente ... ' 137 effectively constrained the potential scope for Anglo-German 
rapprochement. In 1906-07 trips to Germany by Liberal politicians like Haldane, and 
even perfectly innocuous exchange visits of civic dignitaries, were sufficient to make 
the Foreign Office jittery. 138 Lascelles' argument that the Foreign Office showed a 
tendency to be 'utmecessarily alam1ed' on these occasions, further accentuated 
differences between the ambassador and the Foreign Office and, in Chirol's words, 
caused 'a certain amount of irritation and counter irritation.' 139 By September 1907 at 
the latest Lascelles had become convinced that Grey's dislike of Germany and fear of 
134 Grey to Lascelles, 1 & 8 Jan 1906, FO 800111; also Grey to Lascelles [tel.], 13 Jan 1906, 
ibid. 
135 Grey to Lascelles, 1 May 1906, FO 800111; see also Hardinge to Lascelles, 8 May 1906, 
FO 800/13. 
136 Lascelles to Hardinge, 11 May 1906, FO 800119. 
137 Quote from Grey to Lascelles, 18 Sept 1907, Grey MSS, National Archives, Kew, FO 
800/61. See Lascelles to Grey, 4 Jan 1906, FO 800/19; K.M. Wilson, The policy of the 
entente, p. 103. 
138 Lascelles to Grey, 24 May 1906, BD iii, No. 415; minute by Crowe, 26 June 1906, ibid, 
No. 419; (]rey to Lascelles 30 Aug 1906, Granville to Grey, same date, and Lascelles to Grey 
31 Aug & 1 Sept 1906, BD iii, No. 's 427, 429, 431,433-5.; Ponsonby to Lascelles, 2 Sept 
1906, FO 800/13; Granville to Lascelles, 5 Oct 1906, ibid; Gough to Lascelles, 3 June 1907, 
". ibid; Hardinge to Lascelles, 14 & 15 May,2 &4 June 1907, ibid; J.A. Spender to Lascelles, 4 
June 1907, ibid; Lascelles to Haldane, 27 Sept 1906, FO 800/19; Lascelles to Hardinge, 17, 
29 & 31 May 1907, ibid. Fitzmaurice to Lascelles, 23 May 1908, FO 800/15; Hardinge to 
Lascelles, 5 Sept 1906, FO 800/61; Dumas diary, 4 & 14 June 1907. 
139 Lascelles to Hardinge, 9 Sept 1906, FO 800/19; Chirol to Florence Spring-Rice, 17 Nov 
1906; CASR 11115 
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'offending France' was a 'stumbling block' to an Anglo-German entente,140 and he 
made no secret of his disagreement with this approach. When Harding~ and Grey 
attempted to block BUlow's attendance on the Kaiser's 1907 state visit to Windsor 
due to the bitter memory caused by the Chancellor's conduct in the Boer war, 
Lascelles would play no part in giving hints to him to stay away. 141 
For Hardinge especially, good relations with France and Russia implied 
hostility to Germany and a checking of the German fleet. 142 In 1907, Britain's 
completion of an Anglo-Russian entente, and a Mediterranean entente with France 
and Spain, increased Germany's complaints that she was being encircled - and upset 
her calculations about an Anglo-Russian war being inevitable.143 By contrast, 
Lascelles did not share the belief that better Anglo-German relations were necessarily 
inimical to the burgeoning Anglo-French entente but on the contrary thought that until 
Anglo-German relations improved, there could be no corresponding improvement in 
Franco-German relations. 144 By 1907 he was encouraged by what he termed the 
'laudable' stance of the new French ambassador at Berlin, Jules Cambon, who hoped 
to bring about a Franco-German rapprochement, to believe that a detente was possible 
between all three countries. 145 Lascelles's inability to define the contents of an 
140 Selby to mother, 25 April 1907, Selby MSS, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Add. MSS 6615. 
p.277. 
141 Hardinge to Lascelles, 9 Sept, 11 Sept [teL] and 2 Oct 1907, Fa 800/13; Grey to 
Lascelles, 18 Sept 1907, Fa 800/61; Lascelles to Grey, 4 Oct 1907, Fa 800/19; Lascelles to 
Hardinge, 4 Oct 1907, ibid. 
142 Z. Steiner 'Grey, Hardinge and the Foreign Office 1906-10,' The Historical Journal, x 
(1967) pp. 417-22. Although, ironically, it was Hardinge himself who sanctioned the 
Cronberg meeting between the King and Emperor in 1906 (ibid, p 422 & p. 426). 
143 Winzen, 'Prince BUlow's Weltmachtpolitik', pp.240 -2 
144 Dumas diary, 31 Aug 1906; see also Lascelles to Grey, 2 Sept 1906, BD iii, No. 436. 
'. Barrington -another old Foreign Office hand -was apparently of the same opinion. Minute by 
Barrington, 26 June 1906, BD iii, No. 419. 
145 Lascelles to Grey, 20 Sept 1907, Fa 800/19. Dumas confirms Lascelles was 'loud in his 
praise' of Cam bon's 'schemes.' Dumas diary, 30 March 1908. On this subject, see John 
Keiger, 'Jules Cam bon and Franco-German Detente, 1907-1914', Historical Journal Vol. 26, 
No.3 (Sep., 1983), pp. 641-659. By contrast, Crowe at the Foreign Office was constantly 
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Anglo-German detente, however, were a weapon in the hands of his sharpest critics. 
Crowe argued that Lascelles's talk of an understanding had 'an air oftmreality', for 
while with Russia and France there was 'a common ground of action or negotiation' 
there were 'no differences whatever' with Germany. Importantly, Grey agreed with 
him. 146 
Lascelles did however find a natural ally in the Liberal Parliamentary 
Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, Lord E. Fitzmaurice, whom he had known in the 
1890s, and who also detested the 'anti-German current' in the Foreign Office and 
encouraged Lascelles' endeavours to cultivate better personal relationships between 
the political leaders of the two countries. 147 Both men thought Grey was too focused 
on improving Anglo-Russian relations, and disputed majority Foreign Office opinion 
that Russia's inability to prosecute her aims in Asia due to war with Japan and 
revolution at home meant Britain could afford to make concessions there in the 
interests of an understanding 'in Europe' without weakening her own Imperial 
position. 148 Although Lascelles had long believed in the utility of an Anglo-Russian 
entente, he disagreed with the timing. 149 He shared with Fitzmaurice a memory of the 
bad faith ofthe Russian Government and her agents during the Penjdeh crisis of 1885, 
of Russian intrigue in Asia,150 and a feeling that any Anglo-Russian rapprochement 
would be impermanent and could undermine Anglo-German co-operation. 151 
Fitzmaurice's reason for being suspicious of Russia rather than Germany was 
summed up in a letter he sent to the journalist J.A. Spender in 1908. 'The fact 
exaggerating the dangers of a Franco-German rapprochement. See Z. Steiner, 'Grey, 
Hardinge and the Foreign Office 1906-10,' p.435. 
". 146 Minute by Crowe (29 May) and Grey, on Lascelles to Grey, 24 May 1906, BD iii, No. 416. 
147 Fitzmaurice to Lascelles, 21 Sept 1906, FO 800/13. 
148 See Steiner, 'Grey, Hardinge and the Foreign Office', p. 428 & 431. 
149 Lascelles to Grey, 29 Oct 1906, BD iv, No. 234. 
150 Fitzmaurice to Lascelles, 21 Sept 1906, FO 800113. 
151 Fitzmaurice to Lascelles, 31 May 1906, ibid. 
259 
remains,' he wrote, 'that I was born in 1846.' Lascelles, born five years prior to this, 
was part ofthis earlier generation which did not share the anti-German: views of the 
Edwardian Foreign Office. 152 
In 1906 the increasing animosity between Lascelles and Whitehall led to the 
appointment of Count De Salis as Counsellor at the Berlin Embassy, as successor to 
(James) Beetham Whitehead (1903-1906). Instead of having regard for the 
ambassador's 'idiosyncrasies', however, 153 de Salis was apparently sent to Berlin 
chiefly 'to supplement Sir Frank's despatches by his views expressed in private 
letters', 154 reinforcing the mutual mistrust between the ambassador and the Foreign 
Office. In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that by mid 1906 there was a 
'very general impression' (shared by Crowe among othersl55) that Lascelles' work 
h d ' d' h" 156 a cease to mterest 1m 
VI 
Between 1906 and 1908, something little short of a cold war raged between the 
British ambassador at the Berlin Embassy, and his superiors about the intentions of 
German foreign policy, which revolved chiefly around the purpose of the German 
fleet. Despite growing naval tension, Lacelles professed to believe that the Kaiser 
viewed the fleet 'purely as an appanage oflmperialism' .157 In August 1908, he 
responded to the Emperor's fresh complaint about Germanophobia in Britain, by 
expressing confidence in Wilhelm's pacific intentions, and complaining: 
152 Z. Steiner, The Foreign Office andforeign policy, p. 108 
• 153 Chirol to O'Conor, 20 June & 7 June 1906, OCON 5/3. 
154 Dumas diary, 18 Jan 1907. This is difficult to verify as few ofthese private letters seem to 
have survived in either Hardinge or Grey's papers. 
155 Dumas diary, 7 June 1906. 
156 Chirol to O'Conor, 7 June 1906, OCON 5/3. 
157 Dumas diary, 8 March 1906. 
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that I had found it impossible to persuade many of my countrymen with whom I spoken that 
the German Fleet did not constitute a menace to England. When I argued that Germany 
having become a great commercial and colo_~ial Power, naturally desired a Fleet to protect her 
commercial and colonial interests, I was met by the reply that her Fleet, which had now 
become a powerful one, was always kept in home waters, "ready to pounce." 158 
Yet many in the Foreign Office and at the Berlin Embassy disagreed with this 
reading. Increasingly, younger members of the Embassy staff such as De Salis, the 
naval attache Captain Dumas and Walford Selby (third Secretary 1907-08) became 
frustrated that their optimistic Chief would not listen to their own more critical views 
of German foreign policy and they could 'only state facts' without being' supposed to 
deduce anything there from.' 159 De Salis wrung his hands over his chief's 
'blindness',16o Selby thought Lascelles had 'no very decided views on any subject: 161 
-
and Dumas became quietly exasperated by Sir Frank's reluctance officially to 
sanction his alarmist despatches on the German fleet. Instead Lascelles, 'the voice of 
the Old Diplomacy', would write covering letters saying 'let well alone'. 162 Dumas 
identified in Lascelles an overriding conviction that Germany and England would 
'never fight', which while serving as a 'tower of strength' in some ways, left his 
d 163 colleagues frustrate . 
Lascelles was well aware that less attention was paid to his own reports than to 
those by mell like the British minister at Munich, Fairfax Cartwright, who argued that 
the German shipbuilding programme was an obstacle to any Anglo-German 
rapprochement, and by Dumas, who was now sating the Foreign Office's demand for 
naval information, and meeting the desire among the anti-Germans for proof that 
'. 158 Lascelles to Grey, 12 Aug 1908, BD Vi, No. 112. 
159 Dumas diary, 1 & 26 April 1907 . 
160 Ibid, 26 April 1907 . 
161 Selby to mother, 11 March 1907, Selby MSS, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Add MSS 6615. 
162 Dumas diary, 4 Mar 1907. 
163 Ibid, 24 Oct 1906. 
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Germany was building ships against Britain, much to Lascelles' chagrin. 164 The 
Foreign Office rejected Lascelles' attempts to rebut even the wilder fears about 
Germany's intentions, such as a German invasion, which even Dumas refused to 
believe. 165 
Yet in fact, Lascelles' approach was more nuanced than has been credited. 
Although Dumas noted that it was an 'obsession' ofLascelles 'to preserve the peace 
between England & Germany' (a policy which, in his eyes, would only lead to 
complications ten years hence when Britain would have to 'fight' for her position),166 
privately, on at least one occasion, Lascelles admitted that Germany's naval policy 
might lead to war.167 Where he differed was clearly in his attitude of 'wait and see'. 
As Dumas remarked years later: 'he fully realised the mad policy of the Emperor in 
the manufacture of annaments and duly deprecated it; but when one pointed it out, as 
I often used to do, the inevitable result of this, he would say, "oh, my dear Dumas, 
these matters can always be arranged when the time comes.'" 168 There was also a 
realistic chance that Germany's Naval Programme was too costly to sustain. 169 With 
his Liberal background Lascelles was 'scathing of the German method ofspend[ing] 
everything desired & consider[ing the] means later' and by 1908 he thought the 
164 Ibid, 1 Apn11907. Minutes on despatch 3, Cartwright to Grey, 8 Jan 1908, FO 3711457. 
1308/08/18C, Ed note, .BD vi, p. 108. Walford Selby to mother, 24 March 1907, Selby 
MSS; Bodleian Library, Oxford, Add. MSS6615. pp.l88-189; Lascelles to Florence Spring 
Rice, 15 Aug 1908 Spring Rice MSS, C.C.A.C., CASR I 1/2. On Dumas' role see Matthew S. 
Seligmann, Spies in Uniform; idem: 'While I am in it I am not of it: A Naval Attache's 
Reflections on the Conduct of British Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, 1906-1908,' in Markus 
Mosslang and Torsten Riotte, The Diplomats' World: A Cultural History of Diplomacy 
(Oxford, 2008), pp. 433-460. 
". 165 Minutes on Lascelles to Grey, Feb 1908, BD vi No. 80; Lascelles to Grey 1 May 1908, 
(EncI Trench to Lascelles, No. 95 secret), and minutes by Crowe & Langley, ibid, No. 94. 
166 Dumas diary, 29 Jan 1907, 10 Jan 1908. 
167 Ibid, 9 June 1908. 
168 Dumas autobiography, pp.l6-17. 
169 Dumas diary, 27 April 1907. See also Hardinge to Lascelles, 7 May 1907, FO 800/13. 
262 
German Government were 'living from hand to mouth and merely go floundering 
on' .170 
Lascelles also deprecated the naval antagonism between the two Powers 
because of its effect on the Kaiser's nerves. When in January 1908 the Kaiser used a 
court ball as the occasion to protest that 'even Brazil' built ships and that the British 
Press focussed unfairly on Germany, Lascelles characteristically deflected the 
Emperor's wrath by alluding to his recent visit to England, which made the Emperor 
apparently 'forget his grievance,' and set him on 'a very long description of his life at 
Highc1iffe and the people he met whilst he was staying there' 171. The Foreign Office 
staff, who were less willing to let the Kaiser's exaggerated utterances go unanswered, 
drafted instructions for Lascelles to reply that the German press concentrated 
unnecessarily on France's army, whereas Brazil and Austria also had armies- a 
response which Lascelles (tactfully) refused to read out. 172 
The ambassador sympathised with the German viewpoint, and thought it a tall 
order that Germany should accept British advice to curtail her Fleet programme 
simply to enable Britain to maintain maritime supremacy.173 He was thus perturbed 
when on a visit to Cronberg in August 1908 Charles Hardinge 'rubbed [The Emperor] 
up the wrong way' by telling him 'to stop building ships' /74 and Lascelles cautioned 
Grey that 'No great Power would consent to interference on the part of a foreign 
country, and so sensitive a people as the Germans would certainly resent anything 
which could by any possibility be regarded as a semblance of dictation on the part of 
170 Dumas diary, 21 Feb 1908; Lascelles to Grey, 31 Jan 1908, FO 800/19. See also Lascelles 
to Florence Spring Rice, 14 Feb 1908, CASR II 112. 
171Lascelles to Grey, 30 Jan 1908, BD vi; Lascelles to Florence Spring-Rice, 31 Jan 1908, 
. CASR II 112. . 
I72 Lascelles to Grey, 30 Jan & 21 Feb 1908. BD vi; Grey to Lascelles, 19 Feb 1908 FO 
3711458, No 49 conf; Hardinge to Lascelles, 25 Feb 1908, FO 800111; Lascelles to Grey, 28 
Feb 1908, FO 800119; Dumas diary, 21 Feb 1908. 
173 Lascelles to Grey, 31 July 1908, BD vi, No. 99. 
174 Lascelles to Florence, 15 & 23 Aug 1908, CASR II 1112. 
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England.' 175 When it emerged that Hardinge had read erroneous information over-
exaggerating the growth rate of the German Fleet, Lascelles was thus privately 
-, 
'delighted' to learn that Hardinge was 'very ignorant of his work.' 176 This however 
was Lascelles' last small victory. By late 1907 he had become firmly out of favour in 
England. For the first time since 1896, he was not invited to Ascot, which was a 'very 
great' blow to him,177 as was his non-invitation to Wilhelmslohe in August 1907 and 
to Windsor in November. 178 Dumas noted this was a sign that Hardinge was 'working 
against Sir Frank' and that sadly, 'his day is finished.'179 In December 1907, the King 
let it be known to Metternich that Lascelles' tenure was at an end. 180 As Dumas noted: 
'there is so much feeling against him at the FO that it is really just as well.' 18l 
VII 
Despite the retirement of Lascelles from Berlin, the 'long chorus of regrets' at his 
departure, not least from his Italian, French and Austrian colleagues,182 was a 
testimony to his social success. The Emperor and Biilow were naturally regretful of 
his departure, with the Chancellor saying the principle of only appointing 
ambassadors for 5 years, while an 'excellent' rule, should be open to exceptions, 183 
and the Kaiser, at his farewell audience with Lascelles, still seeking the ambassador's 
175 Lascelles to Grey, 14 Aug 1908, BD vi, No. 115. 
176 Dumas diary, 13 Aug 1908. 
177 Dumas diary, 14 June 1907. 
178 Ibid, 2,une 1907. 
179 Dumas diary, 9 Aug 1907. 
180 Lee, King Edward VIL v. 2, pp. 612-613 
'. 181 Dumas diary, 26 Dec 1907. 
182 Cecil Spring-Rice to Florence Spring-Rice, 6 Oct 1908, in Stephen Gwynn, (ed.), The 
Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil-Spring Rice: A Record, (London, 1929), Vol. 
II, p.127. , 
183 Lascelles to Florence Spring Rice, 10 Jan 1908, CASR II 112; Lascelles to Grey, 30 Jan 
1908; FO 3711458, No. 40 conf; Lascelles to Tyrell, 24 Jan 1908, FO 800119. 
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assistance in combating the popular fear of anti-Germanism in England, this time on 
the subject of rumoured German spies. 184 Even erstwhile critics of sf~ Frank poured 
warm praise on him publicly and privately, most notably for maintaining a dignified 
lack of bias despite his personal feelings towards both the tide of events and towards 
certain individuals. Dumas, who felt his own reports of the naval threat had partially 
contributed to Lascelles' dismissal, noted that despite Sir Frank's opposition to his 
views, he was a 'truly noble man' who had never uttered an 'unkind word of anyone' 
and 'shows to the world every attribute which we generally attribute to the English 
gentleman.' 185Cecil Spring-Rice hoped Lascelles would receive a peerage, for having 
'sought peace' having 'never suffered an insult and never given one' and for his 
promotion of 'charity, kindness and peace,' whilst also noting that this was a good 
record given his 'personal dislike for BUlow', which he had 'never once was allowed 
to interfere in the dispassionate transaction of business.' 186 
The difficulty with which the Foreign Office staff were confronted in finding a 
successor to Lascelles at Berlin, despite much glibness in ridding themselves of an 
ambassador whose views no longer chimed with theirs, also attested to Sir Frank's 
attributes as a diplomat who was well-liked in Germany and amenable to the German 
Government. 187 Gerald Lowther's lack of 'polish' and Arthur Nicolson's 'reputation 
[as] an "intriguer" and foe to Germany' ,188 led to the appointment of Edward 
-
Goschen, who had been Secretary and charge d'affaires at St Petersburg during 
Lascelles's brief embassy, and most recently ambassador to Vienna. 
184 Lascelles to Grey, 23 Oct 1908, BD vi, No. 102 . 
. 185 Dumas diary, 31 Aug 1908. See also ibid, 24 Oct 1906. 
186 Cecil Spring-Rice to Florence Spring Rice, 26 Oct 1908, in Gwynn, Letters and 
Friendships, II, p.129. 
187 Dumas diary, 9 June 1908. , 
188 Almeric Fitzroy, Memoirs, I, p. 337. On the succession question see also Lascelles to 
Tyrell, 31 Jan 1908, FO 800/19; Dumas diary, 22 Feb 1908. 
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Sir Frank's official connection with Germany ended in 1908, but such was his 
disagreement with the anti-German tone of Grey's policy, and his conviction that 
Britain and Germany should remain steadfast friends, that up to the outbreak of war in 
1914 he publicly campaigned for a better understanding with Germany. After settling 
down into retirement in 1908 at 14 Chester Square, London with his son Billy and 
daughter-in-law, Lady Sybil,189 Lascelles maintained his connection with the British 
and German foreign policy making elite. He became a regular guest of King Edward 
VII at Sandringham where he was often invited to dine and play bridge. 190 He mixed 
socially with such individuals as Lansdowne, Rosebery, Joseph Chamberlain, and 
Lord Cromer,191 kept up his connections with German diplomats like Count 
Mettemich, 192 stayed with Baron Eckardstein at his house in Woodhall Spa,193 and 
resumed his personal acquaintance with Von Marschall during the latter's brief spell 
as Mettemich's successor in London. 194 
Although Lascelles had occasionally been engaged in Anglo-German relations 
after leaving Berlin, most notably campaigning in 1909 for the appointment of a 
Professor of German at the University of Cambridge, 195 it was in the wake of the 
Agadir crisis of 1911, when he feared that Britain and Germany were moving close to 
war over a colonial matter, that he determined to use his influence in the cause of 
peace. 196 In 1911 he became President of the Anglo-German Friendship Committee. 
189 Florence Spring-Rice to Maud Wyndham, 16 Mar 1909, PHA 13847. 
190 Blunt, My diaries, ii, p.243. 
191 Fitzroy, i, p.375; Blunt, My diaries, ii, p.243 & 294. 
192 Almeric fitzroy, ii, pp. 413-14. 
193 Lascelles to Florence Spring-Rice, 16 Sept 1909, CASR II 112. 
194 Lascelles to Florence Spring-Rice, 17 July 1912, ibid. 
1.95 The Economist, 10 July 1909, p. 76. 
196 He was greatly influenced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer Lloyd George's famous 
Mansion House speech, which he thought had considerably irritated the Germans, as an 
unwanted intervention in what had been a Franco-German dispute. Goschen to Grey, 18 Feb 
1912, FO 3711137117289, encl. clipping of interview with Sir Frank Lascelles from The 
Daily Chronicle. 
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The organisation was committed to encouraging more frequent opportunities for 
/'/ 
meeting between Germans and Englishmen, such as had been exchanged between 
municipal authorities, representatives of the churches and of the press, in the hope that 
this would lead to greater mutual understanding. 197 His work with the Committee 
entailed him making many public speeches in the course of 1911 and 1912 on the 
desirability of good Anglo-German relations. He was interviewed by C.P. Scott of the 
Guardian and by the Daily Chronicle, and succumbed to pressure from the editor of 
the Contemporary Review to pen an article, entitled 'Thoughts on the Anglo-German 
problem', in late 1911.198 Lascelles greatly approved of Lord Haldane's trip to 
Germany in 1912 which he thought did much to clear the air and improve re1ations,199 
and also applauded and encouraged the efforts of Marschall, after his arrival as 
ambassador to London in 1912, to 'meet some of the Germanophobes, and convince 
them that they need not be afraid of Germany.'200 
Sir Frank's decision to publicly air his long-held views on the desirability of 
an ongoing concern at Anglo-German estrangement reflected a growing concern at 
the drift of Liberal policy. Lascelles admitted to Blunt that he thought Grey had 'made 
a terrible hash of his policy abroad', from Constantinople to Cairo to the Persian Gulf, 
and that reiterated his disapproval of the partition of Persia, which the Russians would 
'never leave.201 And importantly, whereas he had supported the original Anglo-French 
entente, he thought that Grey had gone too far in strengthening ties with France into a 
virtual alliance. He thought 'the first thing needful was to go back to the original 
meaning of the Entente,' and waS fully -aware that, after the Agadir crisis, an 
197 'The Anglo-German Friendship Society, report of the inaugural meeting', 1 May 1911, ED 
Morel MSS, F 1317; The Times, 29 June 1912, p. 4; ibid, 31 Oct 1912, p. 5. 
198 See Lascelles to Florence Spring Rice, 21 Nov 1911, CASR II 112. 
199 The Times, 23 Mar 1912, p.5; Goschen to Grey, 18 Feb 1912 FO 37111371/7289 encl. 
clipping of interview with Sir Frank Lascelles from The Daily Chronicle. 
200 Lascelles to Florence Spring-Rice, 17 July 1912, CASR II 112. 
201 Blunt, My diaries, ii, p.344. 
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increasing section of the Cabinet supported this idea. 202 Holding firm to Salisbury's 
characterization of Britain as a 'polygamous' nation and Germany as a 'jealous lover,' 
Lascelles still believed that friendship with France need not preclude friendship with 
Germany?03 
Sir Frank's activism was a clear source of irritation to his ex-colleagues 
within the Foreign Office like the Russophile Arthur Nicolson (who succeeded 
Hardinge as Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office), and his successor as 
ambassador at Berlin. The ire ofthese men first showed itself when Sir Frank visited 
Berlin in spring 1911, although as it transpired he engaged in little political talk whilst 
there. 204 After Lascelles broadened the scope of his activities, even his immediate 
family became anxious and wondered ifhe remembered he was in receipt of a Foreign 
Of:C: • 205 lIce pensIOn. .. 
However, it is questionable whether, as the excitable Leo Maxse of the 
National Review thought, Lascelles became 'engaged in an active intrigue against 
British foreign policy,' and wanted to 'get his knife into the policy with which Grey is 
identified,' because of a 'personal grievance,' at not having his tenure at Berlin 
renewed over three years earlier.206 Sir Frank's analyses at this time simply reflected 
the views he had held whilst at Berlin. He deprecated British nervousness towards 
Germany as 'uncalled for and undignified,' especially where naval rivalry was 
202 Trevor Wilson (ed.) The political diaries o/C.P. Scott, 1911-1928 (London, 1970), 7 Nov 
1911, p.55. 
203 The Anglo-German Friendship Society, report of the inaugural meeting, 1 May 1911, ED 
Morel MSS, F 1317. 
204 Nicolson to Goschen, 14 March 1911, FO 800/347; Goschen to Nicolson, 17 March 1911, 
FO 371/1123/11855; Nicolson to Goschen, 3 April 1911, FO 800/348. 
205 Gertrude Bell to mother, 7 Feb 1912, Gertrude Bell Archive, http://www.gerty.nc1.ac.uk. 
accessed 23/03/09. 
206 Leo Maxse to Bonar Law, 1 March 1912, Law MSS, Parliamentary Archives, 25/3/3. 
268 
concerned?07 There was, he said, no ground of quarrel between Britain and Germany, 
who had never fought each other and had indeed often fought on the same side as 
each other, which was not capable of peaceful resolution, and the atmosphere of 
suspicion had been artificially created, chiefly from a mistaken belief that one navy 
intended to attack the other?08 The interests of both countries were, he continued to 
maintain, identical in most parts ofthe world.209 Lascelles characteristically displayed 
sympathy with Germany, who he argued had not waged war since her creation despite 
opportunities to do so, and whose strong position in Europe entitled her to be treated 
with consideration in international affairs.2lo 
To Sir Frank, the invented Anglo-German menace also distracted attention 
from Italy's invasion of Tripoli in 1911 which seemed to him to be far more pregnant 
with possibilities of general war than the Moroccan debacle. As he put it to his 
audience, 'the peace of Europe is threatened, by other and, to my mind, far more 
serious dangers than those to which I have referred', namely, the re-opening of the 
Eastern Question, which he termed 'the bugbear of European statesmen for 
• ,211 generatIOns. 
The Committee was ultimately a failure in tenns of amassing public or official 
support. The most ambitious idea put forward, which was strongly advocated by 
Lascelles, to hold an Anglo-German exhibition which might give the two nations 
-
opportunities of meeting each other, fell through due to Government opposition and 
207 Lasceiles cited the example of the tone created by a scare in October 1911 of an imminent 
attack by Germany 'which had no better foundation than that the Admiralty had lost sight of 
two German gunboats ... ' Trevor Wilson (ed.) The political diaries o/C.P. Scott, p.55. 
208 'The Anglo-German Friendship Society, report of the inaugural meeting', 1 May 1911, ED 
Morel MSS, F 13/7; The Daily News, 5 Oct 1911. 
209 The Times, 29 June 1912, pA. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Lascelles to Florence Spring-Rice, 6 Oct 1911, CASR 11/2; Daily News, 5 Oct 1911. 
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hostile public opinion?12 Predictably the British Government scuppered the idea on 
the grounds of political sensitivities (that there had been no prior Anglo-Japanese or 
-" 
Anglo-French Exhibition),213 and while the German press poured cold water on the 
idea that mutual exchange visits could foster political agreement, British papers 
waxed lyrical about the dangers to Britain of German expansion. By December 1911 
the scheme, originally scheduled for 1913, was delayed by the Committee until at 
least 1914.214 
Politically, there was little sympathy for the ex-ambassador's arguments on 
the British side. Eyre Crowe of the Foreign Office was characteristically disparaging 
about Sir Frank's arguments, found the assumption that the ill-feeling had arisen 
'from a mere misunderstanding between the two peoples' was 'difficult to take 
seriously'.; and also belittled Lascelles's continued enthusiasm over the Baghdad 
Railway project.215 In December 1914, four months after the outbreak of war in 
Europe and the clash of Gennan and British armies, the ill-starred British-German 
Friendship Society (as it was by then renamed) was finally wound up and its funds 
distributed for the relief of British subjects in Germany and German subjects in 
B 't' 216 n am. 
The outbreak of the Great War had the effect that the previous nineteen years 
had failed to in altering Lascelles' views of the Kaiser and of Germany. Up until the 
-
war Sir Frank had continued to be sensitive to the attitude of the Emperor towards 
212 Report of a meeting held at the Mansion House on November 2 1911, ED Morel MSS, F 
1317. 
2I3 Goschen to Grey, 3 Nov 1911, FO 37111127/44081; same to same, 4 Nov 1911, and 
minutes thereon, FO 371/11281 44197. 
214 Trans.of Lakal Anzeiger, 16 Dec 1911, encl. in Granville to Grey, 18 Dec 1911, FO 
37111128/50938. 
215 Minute by Crowe, 2 Jan 1912, on Granville to Grey, 29 Dec 1911, FO 3711 1370/66. 
Goschen, too, was 'rather astonished' that Lascelles, in speaking to him about the Railway, 
had thought 'that it didn't matter a scrap whether Gennany had the control of the southern 
section and Koweit or not.'Goschen to Nicolson, 17 March 1911, FO 371/1123/11855. 
216 Poverty Bay Herald, 14 Dec 1914, p. 6. 
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England. Wilhelm II's anger about Britain's attempt to muscle in on the 1911 Agadir 
crisis (blame for which, incidentally, Lascelles threw squarely on the tradition of 
blundering German foreign policy inaugurated by BUlow) had arguably been a key 
factor in swaying the ex-ambassador into peace activism. 217 However at a dinner with 
Mary Belloc-Lowndes in the autumn of 1914 Sir Frank admitted 'he had liked the 
Germans, and had believed in their good intentions towards England,' but regarded 
the Kaiser as 'largely, ifnot entirely, responsible for the outbreak of the war.' 
Lascelles admitted that he had 'gradually become convinced that from boyhood, 
William the Second had been secretly and passionately anxious to repeat what he 
regarded as the glorious triumphs of 1870-1871,' against France, although not 
England. However, even in 1914 he would not accuse the Kaiser of harbouring anti-
English intentions. The Kaiser, he argued, had been 'surrounded by men who only 
told him what he wished to be told,' had believed the situation in Ireland would keep 
Britain out of the war, that England would only fight to defend her own country, and 
that the British 'had become at once so soft and so over-civilized that they would have 
no stomach for fighting in Europe. ,218 As the war progressed, Lascelles became 'more 
and more keen about smashing the Kaiser.'219 
Sir Frank was apparently almost alone in thinking from early on that the war 
would be a long one.220 The conflict left him little to dO,221 although after having 
suffered with gout for much of his time at Berlin, he was 'all the better for having 
thinned out' with the war rations. 222 Especially after 1913, 'increasing age and 
',217 Trevor Wilson, The Poiiticai Diaries o/CP. Scott, p,55. 
218 Mrs. Belloc Lowndes, A Passing World, (London, 1948), pp.28-9. 
219 Chirol to Florence Spring-Rice, 10 Dec 1914, C.C.A.C., CASR 11/16. 
220 Belloc Lowndes, A Passing World, pp. 28-9. 
221 Chirol to Florence Spring-Rice, 29 Jan 1918, C.C.A.C., CASR 11117. 
222 Chirol to Florence Spring-Rice, 4 April 1918, ibid. 
271 
infirmity' had by his own admission caught up with Sir Frank,223 and he was 
increasingly housebound, no longer 'able to take things very much to heart,' but 
continuing to view life 'with his usual equanimity. ,224 In January 1920, after a brief 
bout of pneumonia, Sir Frank Lascelles passed away. His funeral was attended by 
Philip Wylie Dumas, who had done so much to warn the Foreign Office of the threat 
from Germany,225 and he was buried in Brompton cemetery, London. Gertrude Bell 
lamented her uncle's passing, by saying that 'People like him are like the redoubts 
that fortify one's life and when one falls one feels that the enemy has made a 
significant advance. ,226 
Conclusion 
One simple route to evaluating the success of Lascelles in Berlin is to look at 
how his successor fared. If Sir Frank's tenure, as Van't Padje has asserted, represents 
'the vague success or rather the failure of British diplomacy' in halting the 
deterioration of Anglo-German relations227, the endeavours of Lascelles to reach an 
Anglo-German understanding nonetheless stand up well in contrast to the new British 
ambassador. T.G. Otte has written that the inability of Goschen 'to "read" Germany 
accurately' damaged the effectiveness of British foreign policy: 'by temperament and 
inclination, [Goschen] was neither willing nor capable to cultivate closer contacts 
within the ruling circles at Berlin. The quality of diplomatic reporting declined, and 
223 Lascelles to Blunt, 13 Dec 1916, Blunt MSS, West Sussex R.O, Box 33. 
224 Emma Cavendish to Maud Wyndham, 5 July 1918, Petworth House Archives, consulted 
at West Sussex Record Office, PHA 13853; Chirol to Florence Spring-Rice, 21 May 1915 & 
21 Nov 1917. CCAC CASR 11117. 
225 Dumas diary; 5 Jan 1920. 
226 Gertrude Bell to mother, 4 Feb 1920, Gertrude Bell Archive, www.gerty.ncl.ac.uk. 
accessed 22/03/09. 
227 Van't Padje, 'Imperialist Rivalry', p.299. 
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with that the quality of policy-making towards Germany' .228 Zara Steiner has 
emphasised that (by contrast with Lascelles), Goschen was 'convinced of the hostile 
intentions of the German Government', never saw an Anglo-German agreement as 
'feasible or desirable', was not seen as able by his colleagues and worked to dampen 
any pro-German currents. He 'failed to make any real contact with the members of the 
German Government', with the Emperor only visiting the embassy once during his 
tenure, upon Edward VII's death. Goschen thought that Grey's later hopes for a 
detente with Berlin were 'illusory' and 'did not really attempt to guide his superiors 
through the labyrinth' of Anglo-German affairs.229 
Goschen himself admitted that in one area Lascelles was able to operate far 
more effectively as a diplomat. This was in the latter's more cordial relations with the 
German court. On visiting Berlin in 1911 Sir Frank apparently 'ran things' with 
regard to Royal relations, without consulting Goschen much, slipping back into his 
old role.23o Wilfrid Blunt even ruminated that Lascelles' personal position with the 
Kaiser might make him an excellent candidate to carryon negotiations about the 
Baghdad Railway,231 and on a visit of the Kaiser to England in May 1911, Sir Frank 
was greatly preoccupied with playing host to his august friend?32 
The relative importance allotted by Lascelles to both royal relations in general 
and the royal personage of the Kaiser in particular has been justly questioned, with 
some suggesting that the ambassador became 'dazzled' by Wilhelm II during his time 
in Berlin.233 There is certainly evidence to support the theory that, just as in 1886 
Lascelles had been swayed by the spectacle of Alexander von Battenberg's sudden 
228 T.O. Otte, 'Old Diplomacy: Reflections on the Foreign Office before 1914,' p.46. 
_.229 Zara Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, p.l82-83. 
230 Diary entry for 13 Dec 1911, C.H.D. Howard (ed.) The Diary of Sir Edward Goschen, 
1900-1914 (London, 1980), p.253; entry for 12 Aug 1911, ibid, p. 242. 
231 Blunt's entry for 18 Mar 1911, My diaries, ii, p.358. 
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reversal of his fortunes on the battlefield, a fact which blinded him to the Prince's 
political weaknesses, so his friendship with the Kaiser blinded Lascelles to his faults. 
From Chirol's warnings to his friend in 1902 it appears concern was even then 
becoming widespread in Foreign Office circles that Lascelles had lost his objectivity 
about Wilhelm II. Lascelles also believed that Kaiser Wilhelm II was a man of peace. 
To invert an expression by Walford Selby, who after a year in the Berlin Embassy had 
'come to the conclusion that I am not Anti German, I am merely Anti-Emperor,' Sir 
Frank was less pro-German than he was pro_Emperor.234 His defensiveness over the 
Kaiser's behaviour during the Boer war, his willingness to exculpate the Kaiser from 
blame and allot responsibility for Germany's foreign policy blunders to BUlow, and 
his concentration on dynastic feuds all seem to indicate this. 
However, this is both to oversimplify Lascelles's approach to Anglo-German 
relations and to take the ambassador's role out of context. In the eyes of Wilhelm II's 
courtier Philip Eulenberg, writing shortly after the Great War, two things had been to 
blame for the deterioration of Anglo-German relations: one was Wilhelm II's desire 
for a grand fleet, and the other was 'the unbridgeable conflict between the latter and 
his uncle, King Edward VII. ,235 As one historian has recently argued, 'the often petty 
disputes between the Kaiser and King Edward cannot be dismissed as trivial or 
irrelevant. They contributed to an atmosphere of ill-feeling, which encouraged the two 
-
monarchs to support policies which fuelled the Anglo-German antagonism. ,236 The 
dramatic change from the relatively cordial dynastic relations between Queen Victoria 
and the'German Emperor would have challenged any ambassador. Sir Frank viewed 
his role of disentangling complex dynastic feuds as an unpleasant necessity, though he 
234 Walford Selby to mother, 17 Feb 1907, Selby MSS, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Add. MSS 
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doubtless held a very high opinion both of the Kaiser and his Royal uncle, and 
perhaps exaggerated the importance ofboth,z37 Yet as a persona grata fo the British 
and German courts he was in a unique position to potentially influence the personal 
relationship, which may seem trivial to twenty-first century eyes, but was of greater 
importance in an age where European monarchs were 'not decorative non-entities ... 
but individuals who retained a prominent role in diplomacy.,238 
Furthermore, Lascelles's concentration on the ruling elite emphasised the 
Kaiser's unique and potentially dangerous role. As the ultimate executive authority in 
the Kaiserreich he ultimately controlled all appointments and thus the direction of 
policy, but he was uniquely unfitted for the role of ruler. His brusque treatment of 
foreign diplomats, such as Malet, of his own Ministers (for example, von Marschall), 
and his sudden mood. swings between Anglophilia and Anglophobia to Lascelles 
highlighted the importance of trying to dampen down his bellicose moods and 
accentuate the more positive, sentimental aspects of his personality, a task which Sir 
Frank was painfully aware of. In trying to convey conversations with the Emperor to 
his superiors, Lascelles was consciously attempting to bridge the gulf between the 
Kasier's verbal exaggerations and the necessities of diplomatic reporting. Lascelles's 
appreciation of the Kaiser's mental instability comes across strongly in the aftermath 
of the Daily Telegraph affair of 1908 when, now retired, he wrote of the Kaiser in 
almost childlike terms to Leo Maxse of the National Review, arguing that BUlow 
'ought to have protected the Emperor instead of saying as he practically did "The 
Emperor has been very naughty but was now promised to be a good boy.",239 
237 On Sir Frank's view of the King's role in foreign decision making, see Blunt's entry for 5 
March 1909, Blunt, My diaries, ii, p. 243. 
238 McLean, Royalty and diplomacy, p.214. . 
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It has however been argued that Lascelles concentrated on royal relations to 
the detriment of other factors which were more important in the course of the 
deterioration of Anglo-German relations. Of these, the important issue of naval rivalry 
between the two Powers has already been highlighted. As has been seen, from 1906 
onwards, authorities in Whitehall paid increasing attention to the reports ofthe Berlin 
naval attache and less so to those of their diplomatic representative. But this does not 
mean Lascelles was necessarily wrong in his muted response. As Steiner and Neilson 
have written, there was a 'curious myopia' about the whole subject of naval rivalry on 
both sides of the North Sea.240 In meeting the perceived German challenge, Britain 
arguably over-exaggerated the threat of invasion from Germany, and Germany's 
ability to keep up with her in the naval race, which by 1914 had been won by 
Britain.241 .Despite the criticism of Lascelles for downplaying the naval question, there 
has been little attempt to comprehensively examine his views. A summary of the 
evidence would conclude that although he was less alarmed about the German threat 
than his colleagues, this stemmed from a confidence in British superiority and her 
ability to maintain the Two Power Standard, which is what Britain strove to do up to 
1914. It is true that he ridiculed the idea that Germany would attempt to invade 
Britain, but this assessment proved sound. What dismayed him was that the world's 
chief maritime power should show an undignified fear of another Power, which was 
perfectly entitled (in his eyes) to build a strong Navy; in his own words it naturally 
became a 'great industrial, commercial, and colonial Power ... to protect not only her 
own shores, but also those industrial, commercial, and colonial interests which 
240 Zara Steiner and Keith Neilson (eds.), Britain and the origins of the First World War, p.S3. 
241 Ibid, pp.S2-S4, 61, 10S. 
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otherwise would be left to the tender mercies of any powerful maritime Power.'242 As 
/' 
Britain was more than able to compete with Germany's building programme, which 
Lascelles realised Germany could ill afford, there was nothing to fear from it. This 
was why he so denigrated the political pressure on Germany, and British attempts to 
deprive another Power of the same benefits that Britain already enjoyed. 
A more just criticism which can be levelled at Lascelles is that, given the 
importance subsequently attached by historians to domestic political pressures in the 
formulation of German foreign policy,243 he focussed surprisingly little on, for 
example, the electoral fortunes of the Social Democrat Party or political pressures 
from right wing groups in German society on the German Government. Indeed 
Lascelles shared in the flaws of his contemporaries in offering little comment on 
'domestic political, economic or social factors, and their relevance to foreign policy' 
and lacking from the pen of Britain's ambassador in Berlin is any great sweeping 
analysis of Anglo-German affairs beyond his annual reports for 1906 and 1907.244 By 
the early years of the twentieth century, popular opinion and popular nationalism were 
becoming increasingly important forces in international relations. This was a tendency 
which Lascelles was uncertain how to report. Partially this was put down to 
disposition: Dumas, the naval attache, reported that 'the universal hatred of England' 
common in many sections of society in Germany was 'quite incompatible with Sir 
242 Frank Lascelles, 'Thoughts on the Anglo-German Problem', The Contemporary Review, ci 
(1912), p.5. 
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Frank's statements & views. ,245 Lascelles' young relative, Leveson-Gower, thought 
him to be a 'mediocre diplomatist' because he 'persistently declined to notice the 
repeated warnings of ... the far more astute' staff around him?46 At its most unkind, 
Lascelles was accused of taking no trouble 'to get in touch with Germans nor 
understand the trend of German policy, confining his energies to licking the boots of 
the German Emperor.' 247 It is reasonable to conclude that Lascelles, a typical 
aristocratic diplomat, was too aloof from the currents of German public opinion to 
divine their impact on foreign policy. His social environment was extremely 
restricted. In Dumas' words, he moved in a 'small a circle of society' and had 'little 
chance ... of obtaining any but the Court & official views. ,248 Another explanation is 
that Lascelles simply did not view popular pressures as a threat to or influence upon 
the existing order in the Kaiserreich. He seemed to pay little attention to trends like 
popular navalism and Pan Germanism, and certainly downplayed the threat of the 
latter?49 This view is at least suggested by one piece of evidence never used before. 
Writing in an article for The Sunday Times in 1917, the ex-ambassador to Berlin 
discussed the possibility of a revolution breaking out in Germany, following the 
summer mutinies in the German navy, which he owned had 'greatly surprised' him. 
Lascelles asserted that until a short time ago he had thought that a revolution was 
'next door to impossible in Germany'. He still believed that it would have 'little 
-
chance of success' as the revolutionaries would be 'overpowered by the army at 
once', unless the army joined in and the revolution was 'carefully prepared'. The 
245 Dumas diary, 2 Aug 1908. 
246 George Leveson Gower, Mixed Grill, p.187 . 
. 247 Leo Maxse to Bonar Law, 1 March 1912, Law papers, Parliamentary Archives, 25/3/3. 
248 Dumas diary, 16 Aug 1908. 
249 Dumas, for example, simply noted in 1906 that: 'Sir Frank does not seem to fear the Pan 
Germanic movement' Dumas diary, 8 March 1906. Moreover many of the forces, such as 
Socialism, which came to be increasingly dominant in the years immediately up to 1914, were 
still amassing during Lascelles's tenure at Berlin. 
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Prussians were 'proud of the Hohenzollems', the Emperor would never 'compromise 
with any revolutionary leaders' and would probably move to suppres(the movement. 
The discipline of the Germany army in the field meant that they would be disciplined 
enough to 'fire on their own people in the event of a rising'. Despite the undeniable 
strength of the Socialists in the Reichstag, he emphasised, Ministers were still 
ultimately responsible to the Kaiser, not to parliament. Sir Frank's emphasis on the 
executive authority of the Kaiser, on the weakness of the Reichstag, on the limited 
scope for the success of Socialism versus the forces of order and monarchism, 
certainly illustrates the limitations of an approach which concentrated overtly on the 
rulers rather than the ruled. It is also a reminder of some of the limitations of late 
nineteenth century diplomacy.25o 
250 Sir Frank Lascelles, 'Gennany and revolution', The Sunday Times, 28 Oct 1917, p.6. 
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Conclusion: the voice of the Old Diplomacy? 
It was suggested in the introduction that an approach concentrating overtly on the 
period 1895-1908 can only reveal so much about the attitudes of diplomats during this 
era, who were shaped by their environment and 'unspoken assumptions', 1 and that 
one must look further back into the formative experiences and earlier lives of 
individual actors to investigate, in essence, what angle these diplomats approached 
their senior postings from. This study has attempted to solve that problem by placing 
Lascelles, and with him British diplomacy in this era, within the context of longer 
term developments and to analyse his diplomatic career prior to 1895. The view of Sir 
Frank Lascelles as a relic of the old diplomacy, whose views were outmoded by 1908, 
has long dominated historiography, 2 but little attempt had hitherto been made to 
examine his career in the Victorian era which shaped his outlook. For, while Lascelles 
may have played out the final chapter of his professional life in what has been termed 
an 'insecure and fragile' Edwardian age,3 he himself was the product of a different 
era. 
The impact of' generational factors' in shaping outlooks among the British 
foreign-policy making elite has been greatly emphasised in recent works on British 
foreign policy before 1914.4 Lascelles himself can be seen as part of a "Victorian" or 
IOn this s~bject, see the defining work: Jo11, James, 1914: the unspoken assumptions: an 
inaugural lecture delivered 25 April 1968. (London: London School of Economics and 
'. Political Science; Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968) 
2 See for example the character sketch in Zara Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign 
Policy, pp.177-8. 
3 Samuel Hynes, The Edwardian Turn of Mind (Princeton,1968), p.6. 
4 Zara Steiner, 'On Writing International History: Chaps, Maps and Much More', p.537. See 
also Otte, 'Old Diplomacy: Reflections on the Foreign Office before 1914,' pp. 40-1. 
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"Mid-Victorian" generation, or what one historian has termed 'almost a psychological 
category,.5 Most recently Keith Neilson and T.G. Otte have distinguished between 
what they identify as two distinct generations among the British foreign policy elite in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: 'the "Victorians" ... born mainly in 
the 1830s and early 1840s' and the '''Edwardians'' ... born mainly in the 1850s and 
early 1860s', who attained influence 'roughly contemporaneously with Edward VII's 
accession to power ... ' According to Keith Neilson, the Victorian generation, which 
included Salisbury (born 1830), Charles Scott (b. 1838), Sanderson and Lascelles 
(both b.1841) and O'Conor (b. 1843), 'reached their political maturity before the 
unifications of Italy and Germany, at a time when German unification was regarded 
favourably by Britain', when it was hoped that Germany, a 'natural ally', would 
'balance the French and Russian threat to Europe'. By contrast, 'Russia was the 
enemy for the "Victorians". For them the Crimean War was a vivid memory, together 
with the mutiny, and the Russian expansion into Central Asia a fact of everyday 
political life.' For men like Sanderson, Lascelles, Fitzmaurice and Salisbury, Russia's 
strength was an important factor in weighing up the relative importance to be 
accorded to the new phenomenon of Anglo-German rivalry. Indeed many if not all 
Victorian diplomats were unified by their experience ofIndia or Persia in the 1880s 
and 1890s.6 The Edwardians meanwhile, men like Nicolson (b.1849), Charles 
-
Hardinge (b.1858), Spring Rice and Grey (both b.1862), 'had their formative political 
experiences much later', observed the scramble for Africa and saw the Germany of 
the 'erratic' Wilhelm II as the new enemy, with Russia a potential partner 6fBritain. 
The Victorian attitude, argues Neilson, was typified by a 'more detached, less 
interventionist attitude towards foreign policy,' exemplified by Salisbury and 
5 K.T. Hoppen, The Mid-Victorian Generation, p. 2. 
6 Neilson, Last Tsar, pp. 47-8. 
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Sanderson, who were sceptical that Britain could either attempt to pursue a consistent 
long term policy on the one hand, or react too violently against every change in 
international relations. 7 
Lascelles's career is a classic study of the diplomacy of the mid-Victorian 
mindset. Often, his approach reflected the foreign policy priorities enshrined by Lord 
Salisbury. Like Salisbury, Lascelles thought in the immediate term, and in terms of 
'practical co-operation' with other Powers, rather than alliances.8 
In Cairo, he served as an obedient agent of his political chief, executing orders 
faithfully, and working to maintain good relations with France, albeit having a 
modicum of influence on policy himself by joining with his diplomatic colleagues in 
pressing for the Khedive's departure. 
Doubtless, self-interest, with an eye to advancement played an important role 
in his decision to work hard and say little in Cairo, but to a considerable extent 
Lascelles remained independent and in Bulgaria sought to continue Salisbury's 
Eastern policy under the far less sympathetic eye of Gladstone's Government, which 
brought considerable ire from Whitehall, although Granville respected Lascelles's 
views on the unfeasibility of Bulgaria's constitution, and the Queen was impressed by 
his support of Alexander von Battenberg. Lascelles's intransigence can be explained 
in terms of his value system. Like most of his generation, it was the Eastern Question 
. 
which provided for Lascelles the benchmark against which all other foreign policy 
considerations had to be judged. The age at which he reached his political 
consciousness and maturity (c.1857-1862) was, as Neilson has alluded to, the age of 
the Indian mutiny (in which Sir Frank's brother served), of the post Crimean system 
7 Ibid, pp. 48-9. 
8 Lillian M. Penson, 'The New Course in British Foreign Policy, 1892-1902', Transactions of 
the Royal Historical Society, Fourth Series, Vol. 25, (1943), pp. 121-138, p. 125; see also 
H.W.-Koch 'Missed opportunity or myth?', p.380. 
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by which Britain guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire against 
Russia, as well as an age of burgeoning nationalism in Italy and Germa~y. 
In the Eastern crisis of 1885-6 Lascelles became useful again when Salisbury 
returned to office, and he displayed a typically Victorian anti-Russian bias, especially 
in his firm resistance to the mission of Kaulbars in the aftermath of Battenberg's 
abdication, which arguably played a not insignificant part in the thwarting of Russian 
plans for occupying Bulgaria. This was the period in which Lascelles's star was in its 
ascendant. He felt in harmony with men like William White at Constantinople and 
Augustus Paget at Vienna, and agreed with the British policy of alignment with the 
German powers in Europe against Russia, while the effective continuity (allowing for 
differences of style) of Salisbury's policy by Rosebery meant that he felt comfortable 
with offering advice to both freely. 
Lascelles's effectiveness in Romania was limited by an unwillingness to play 
the part of intriguer against his Russian colleague but this reflected both the effective 
ending of the Eastern crisis after Salisbury's securing of the Mediterranean entente in 
1887, and the flexibility of approach seen as the hallmark of Salisburian diplomacy. 
Lascelles's obstinacy in Romania reflected a growing independence which he had 
first exhibited in Bulgaria, and his Government came to agree with him about the 
Romanian political situation. His time at Teheran again exhibited what might with 
-
caution be termed 'masterly inactivity' and a basic pragmatism in approaching the 
question of alignment with other Powers, for with limited tools at his disposal for 
opposing Russia, and aware ofthe common interest of both Government in 
dampening down their rivalry, he was able in the aftermath of the partial collapse of 
Drummond-Wolffs policy to at least limit some of the damage done to British 
interests by the tobacco Regie's demise, if not actually pave the way for a 
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rapprochement. His time at St Petersburg was too brief to be effective, and arguably 
he was overwhelmed by the pace of events there, but he showed the same willingness 
to accommodate Russia which was beginning to increasingly find favour at the top of 
the British Government. 
Thus for the first half of his career Lascelles was not a dogmatic imperialist, or 
an ardent partisan of one country or another, although he believed Britain's natural 
loyalties lay with the Triple Alliance because of the Franco-Russian challenge to 
Britain's Mediterranean, Asian and African interests. Yet his time in Egypt had been 
marked by collaboration with France and despite being hostile to Russia in Bulgaria 
because of his conviction that she threatened Britain's Mediterranean system, he had 
seen the efficacy of coming to terms with her in Asia, where there was nothing to be 
lost through detent~ only everything risked through obstinacy. 
Towards the end ofthe nineteenth century Lascelles was able to increasingly 
sympathise with those, like Lansdowne, who sought to decrease the ranks of Britain's 
Imperial rivals. Those recorded at having been at the famous gathering at 
Chamberlain's house in June 1898 can all be classed as 'mid Victorians', conscious of 
the range of Britain's rivals; Lord George Hamilton (b.1845), Brodrick (b.1856), 
Henry Chaplin (b.1840), George Goschen (b.1831) Lord Lansdowne (b.1845) 
Chamberlain (b.1836) Arthur Balfour (b.1848) and Lascelles himself (b.1841). 
-
Incidentally, Lascelles, Hamilton and Lansdowne all had experience of Russian policy 
in Asia, and Goschen had experience of Russian intrigues at Constantinople and 
French rivalry at Cairo. Although Lascelles was in many senses similar to Salisbury, 
who one historian has described as 'essentially a mid-Victorian optimist, confident in 
Britain's strength and conscious of the weaknesses and disunity of her potential 
enemies', and did not share the outlook of Chamberlain and the 'fin de siecle 
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pessimists' who accepted the coming of the next big war with a certainty creeping 
fatalism, 9 he was convinced that an understanding with Germany was a good way to 
reduce the ranks of Britain's enemies, and tirelessly worked towards this cause. 
Lascelles did not, contrary to myth, advocate an alliance, but an entente with 
Germany, and he also agreed with the conclusions of Eyre Crowe's famous 
memorandum on Anglo-German relations about not entering into one sided bargains 
with Germany (a point Lascelles had stressed himself before Crowe), while admitting 
there were 'one or two things to say on the other side' on some points. lo 
Why was Lascelles so willing to tolerate the apparent antagonism between England 
and Germany between 1895-1914, in its colonial, commercial and power-political 
aspects? Certainly there was an element of professional bias which Lascelles was 
aware of: as an ambassador, it was in his interest 'that his country should be on the 
best possible terms with the Court to which he was accredited.' II But mainly 
Lascelles's tolerance can again be attributed to generational factors. 
As Keith Wilson concluded in a 1983 article, the difference between the newer 
set of personnel in the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service from 1906 and the 
diplomats of the Victorian era like Lascelles was the apparently willing acquiescence 
in the concessionary policy of the 1895-1900 period, of the former type, who could 
not see why Britain, in her paramount position, should 'complain about the desires of 
other Powers to emulate her career', who were 'able to see themselves as others saw 
them' to see German fears of 'insecurity', and even to see that if the 'fall from 
9 T.G. Otte, 'A Question of Leadership: Lord Salisbury, the Unionist Cabinet and Foreign 
Policy Making, 1895-1900,' Contemporary British History 14, no. 4 (2000), pp. 1-26; p. 4. 
1.0 Lascelles to Hardinge, 1 Feb 1907, FO 800119; Mr Eyre Crowe, Memorandum on the 
Present State o/British Relations with France and Germany, 1 Jan 1907, BD iii, Appendix A; 
Lascelles warning to Lansdowne in late 1900 had been on the same lines; see Lascelles to 
Lansdowne, 17 Nov 1900, FO 800/128. . 
JI The Times, 21 Oct 1908, p. 13; see also 'The Anglo-German Friendship Society, report of 
the inaugural meeting', 1 May 1911, ED Morel MSS, Morel/F13/7. 
285 
greatness' came, they would exit gracefully and 'go gentle into that good night' , 
whereas their successors' did not like being spoken of as if they were dead' , and 
instead 'utter[ed] screams at every approach to the gouty sprawling giant of the 
British Empire' .12 
In tenns of outlook, Lascelles closely resembled his colleague and non-
political Foreign Office chief, the Pennanent Under Secretary Thomas Sanderson, 
born just ten weeks before Sir Frank, and who entered the Foreign Office two years 
prior to him. According to his most recent biographers, Sanderson's 'outlook was 
representative of the mid-Victorian generation at large'. He 'acknowledged the 
importance of the Empire, but looked askance at the rising tide of popular 
imperialism' and in the 1880s had seen colonies as an "'incubus". He held Liberal or 
Whiggish sympathies~ and was a pragmatist and moderate who fought shy of 
unnecessary wars, was flexible in dealing with other Powers and 'accepted that there 
could be no gains without concessions' Like Salisbury, he saw British foreign policy 
as 'reactive', and also Russia as a central concern during his tenure. 13 
Gennany had acquired her new colonies in the 1880s as a result of her sudden 
interest in Africa while Lascel1es had been immersed in the Eastern Question and 
convinced of the need to 'stick to Bismarck' in European affairs, when Russia's 
apparent plans to dominate Bulgaria, or skinnishes by her generals on the Afghan 
border seemed to threaten an Anglo-Russian war. It is telling that the very period in 
which Lascelles was in Bulgaria was the period in which colonial fervour reached its 
height. Salisbury, who had been out of office from 1880-85, famously commented 
that when he left the Foreign Office 'nobody thought much about Africa' but that 
12 Keith M. Wilson, 'The Question of Anti-Germanism at the British Foreign Office before 
the First World War' Canadian Journal of History, xviii (1983), ppAO-42. 
I3 T.G. Otte & Keith Neilson, The permanent Under-Secretary for foreign affairs, pp. 104-
05. 
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when he returned, European nations were 'almost quarrelling over the various 
portions' of sub-Saharan Africa which they could obtain. 14 It is in this context that 
Dumas's criticism of Lascelles having 'been brought up in the Victorian regime of 
giving way to Germany in everything, and literally [being unable to] convert himself 
to the growing habit in England of refusing them all that they asked', 15 needs to be 
seen. This is why, writing in 1912, Lascelles could argue that 'up to 1890 there had 
been no indication of any opposition on our part to colonial expansion on the part of 
Germany', and could argue that Germany's desire to have a profitable Colonial 
Empire was a 'not unnatural' one. 16 
For similar reasons of outlook, Lascelles was able to tolerate German 
commercial rivalry. Partially, his laissez faire economic views and social position 
meant that (as was typical at the time) the aristocratic ambassador couldn't interest 
himself in the' details of finance or trade, or know people engaged in commerce' , an 
attitude which was becoming increasingly criticized in England, especially under the 
Liberal Government in power. I? Lascelles's generation had been closer to the self-
assurance of an 'age of equipoise' symbolised by the Great Exhibition of 1851, and 
the doctrines of Cobden and Bright, than to anxieties about economic decline and 
arguments for protectionism. In his 1912 article on Anglo-German relations, Lascelles 
dismissed commercial rivalry as a serious factor impeding good relations; in place of 
-
anxiety about the displacement of the 'monopoly' British traders had hitherto enjoyed 
in countries like China he espoused a Victorian free trade mantra. Consciously 
echoing the Salisburian dictum that in China there is 'room for all', Lascelles 
14 Lady Gwendolen Cecil, Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury, Vol iv (London, 1932), 
p.310. 
15 Dumas autobiography, p.16. 
16 Frank Lascelles, 'Thoughts on the Anglo-German problem', pp. 7-8. 
17 Dumas autobiography, p.16. 
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advocated thc maintcnance of the open door. and healthy commercial competition 
between the two countries. who as he pointed out were each other's ·best. or nearly its 
best. customer'. a j~lctor \\h ich should' tend to peace rather than war'. 1 X 
llnlike (Irey. to Lascc11cs Germany's European dominance was also no 
overarching concern for Britain. primarily an imperial power herself. In 1912 he 
wrotc that: 'I do not for a moment bc1icyc that anyone in this country. or indeed in 
any other. eyer dreamt of questioning the preponderating position in Europe which 
her successes had sccured for Germany' .1<) This was a fundamental and dramatic 
difference bct\\"een the diplomat and his Edwardian political masters. For Grey. 
European concerns were at least as important as imperial concerns. and he saw the 
European balance of po\\cr and the maintenance of British power as inextricably 
linked. 211 Lascelles. whate\er his resenations towards Prussian militarism in 1870-1. 
had by 1895 probably come to share the \iew of his Victorian contemporaries that a 
strong Germany was a useful countcrwcight and uetelTent to Russian and French 
ambitions, and would probably not ha\e credited the architects of German unitieation 
with Napoleonic design 21 : his constant argument that Germany had not waged war 
since her creation is e\idence of this. 
There is also the not unimportant nlCtor that for Lascclles Britain's historical 
and intellectual ties with Germany were within recent memory. whether it be Prince 
Eugene and Marlborough. Wellington and BlUcher or the more recent examples of 
Ranke and Carlyle. Darwin and Heltnholtz. 22 
I ~ Lascelles. 'Thoughts on the Anglo German problem', p.:::. 
1'1 II 'd C )( . p .. 1. 
ell See e.g. Keith Neilson. "'Control the \Vhirh\ ind": Sir Edward Grey as Foreign Secretary .. 
Il)06-16', in T.( i. ( Hte (ed) The :\lillicrs olHri( i.11I Forcigll Po/icyji'OIII Pi (( (0 7li(/(chcr, pp. 
140-49. 
cl Sec W.E Mosse. 7lic FlImlh'lIl1 POllers IIl1d the Gcr/l/illl Qllcs(ioll. 111411-71. lri(1I .Ipceiill 
rc/ercllcc (0 Fllgllllld (///(1 RlIssia (Cambridge. 195X). p.35l). 
cc Lascelles, 'Thoughts on the Anglo (ierJnan problem'. p.6. 
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Lascelles's temperament - what could be termed amused detachment and 
optimism- also certainly complemented the need for tolerance in the face of German 
~, 
methods of diplomacy. 23 He was temperamentally suited by upbringing, wealth, 
education and social status and personal characteristics of patience, tact and charm to 
face the sometimes brusque methods of Wilhelmine Germany with equanimity. He 
was also able to shed any unhelpful ideological baggage: while essentially a mid-
Victorian liberal, he amazed friends and contemporaries by his ability to put aside his 
convictions when dealing with the autocratic Kaiserreich.24 
It was suggested in the introduction that Lascelles was a useful 'prism' 
through which British foreign policy priorities could be glimpsed, especially with 
regard to the change in Britain's orientation towards other Powers which took place 
from 1900 . .In examining the changes around the tum of the century, this prism risks 
appearing like a kaleidoscope - one begins to glimpse different patterns depending on 
how the evidence has been manipulated by different historical actors and historians. 
For the first half of his career and for the duration of the first half of Sir 
Frank's embassy at Berlin his views on the necessity of good Anglo-Gennan relations 
generally reflected the analyses of successive Foreign Secretaries; Salisbury viewed 
the Kaiser as a minor irritant but begrudgingly accepted the need for co-operation 
with Germany in the face of Britain's imperial problems; Lansdowne was more 
-
enthusiastic initially about both the need to court Germany and the importance of 
Wilhelm II in this process, although he became increasingly disillusioned after the 
Manchurian crisis of 1901 both of the scale of British dependency on Germany and 
subsequently the importance of Wilhelm II. Yet that the Foreign Secretary generally 
23 Dumas credited Lascelles with possessing 'shrewd cynical sense of humour', Dumas diary, 
24 Oct 1906. Ethel Smyth, the famous musician, and a personal friend of the ambassador's, 
termed him, 'the most absolutely disinterested of men,' Ethel Smyth,Streaks o/Life, p.155. 
24 See Chirol to Florence Spring-Rice, 2 July 1907, CASR 11115. 
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regarded as bringing Britain out of isolation continued to defend his ambassador's 
essential approach to Cabinet colleagues even into 1905 is significant in terms of 
tackling the concept of an ambassador who was too 'pro-German' against more 
sceptical political masters, in indicating the essential unity of the mid-Victorian 
generation, and in delivering a corrective to views of the scale, pace and inevitability 
of Britain's abandonment of traditional policies. 
Recent historical work has suggested that 'end' of Salisbury's policy of 
isolation was not really as pronounced as has been asserted previously. Common to 
Lascelles, Salisbury and Lansdowne was a flexibility in choosing partners to align 
with among the Powers, according to the needs of the situation. Salisbury himself 
attempted to reach a modus Vivendi with Russia over the Far East in 1898. In this 
respect, Lansdowne was carrying on his work and differed in degree rather than in 
direction in concluding an alliance with Japan in 1902 which had more in common 
with a regional pact like Salisbury's 1887 Mediterranean agreements than it did with 
any alliance in the formal sense of the word - it was meant, T.G. Otte has argued, to 
bolster Britain's position of 'isolation', not to radically alter it.25 Lascelles's 
approach, which throughout his career was frequently alive to trends in Foreign 
Office thinking, reflected and in some senses anticipated Lansdowne's approach. For 
although a scion ofSalisburian diplomacy, who recognised that Britain's 
'polygamous' relations were necessary because of the extent of her Empire, he had 
much in common with Lansdowne and his counterparts. His search for an Anglo-
German understanding was part of a broad ranging effort at securing safeguards for 
Britain's empire, and was not a sign of an anomalous pro-Germanism or a wish for an 
entrenched alliance which would bind Britain continentally, but a reflection of beliefs 
25 The thrust ofT.G. Dtte, The China question, passim but cf especially pp. 5-6, and pp. 326-
337 .. , 
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held among his Victorian colleagues. An examination of Lascelles's career supports 
Otte's ideas that the end of isolation, the march towards hard and binding alliances, 
and moreover the extent to which diplomats were carried along with this idea, has 
been over-determined. 
However it is a fact that with the passing of a political generation, which had 
been marked by Lord Salisbury's tenure in power and lingered on through individuals 
like Lansdowne and Balfour who bridged the divide and saw through to conclusion an 
Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian entente, and with the advent of Grey's term as 
foreign secretary, a more aggressive approach to Empire and Imperialism started to 
dominate British foreign policy, symbolised by a more uncompromising and 
aggressive approach to Germany and the naval threat she apparently presented. Where 
Grey led, Lascelles <;ould not follow. 
Lascelles's career also serves as an interesting comment on how those in the 
late Victorian and Edwardian era saw the inevitability of war, and the inevitability of 
a collision between England and Germany especially, a subject which has received so 
much attention in historical literature. Recent historical work has disputed the notion 
that a general European war was seen as inevitable by military, diplomatic, political 
personnel and by shapers of public opinion. Holger Afflerbach has convincingly 
shown that far from being a 'topos' of inevitable war before 1914 there was a 
'somnambulistic belief in progress' and that 'nobody seemed to believe in the 
possibility of a great war' which everyone agreed would be calamitous?6 It can be 
asserted fully that Lascelles did join the ranks of those who disagreed with inevitable 
war. His confidence in the links rather than the divides between foreign Powers and in 
26 Holger Afflerbach, 'The topos of improbable war in Europe before 1914', in idem & David 
Stevenson, (eds.), An improbable war? : the outbreak of World Warl and European political 
culture before 1914 (Oxford, 2007), pp. 162-3. 
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the growing trends towards internationalism and economic co-dependence is evident 
during the three years prior to the Great War. To one audience he stated an 
~, 
'optimistic' belief in the growing authority of international arbitration in disputes,27 
and to another, he publicly praised Norman Angell's groundbreaking book, The Great 
Illusion, which argued that economic interdependence made war increasingly less 
likely. While Sir Frank thought the book was 'not practical politics at present' he was 
'convinced that it will change the thought of the world in the future.,28 
Arguably the most important formative experience for Lascelles in this respect 
had been that of the Franco-Prussian war and Paris Commune 1870-1, for the 
experience of bloodshed in this period reinforced Lascelles's revulsion against 
violence and strengthened his determination to contribute to the avoidance of conflict. 
During 191.1-1914 Lascelles constantly warned his audiences that his own experience 
of war at close quarters had convinced him of the calamity that it entailed, and the 
Anglo-German tension made him aware of the danger of war. He argued that war 
would be a catastrophe to both countries, that each side would suffer 'incalculable 
loss,' and that even if Britain destroyed Germany's fleet and grabbed her colonies, she 
would only win a temporary advantage.29 To Lascelles, a war over the Eastern 
Question always seemed more likely than one over colonial rivalry,30 but such was his 
growing faith in the decreasing likelihood of a major conflagration that as late as 
April 1914 Lascelles, at a dinner of the now renamed British-German Friendship 
Society, while entertaining the idea that Britain and Germany could find themselves at 
loggerheads in a 'general war' from which British interests made it impossible to 
27 The Daily News, 5 Oct 1911, ED Morel MSS, F 15/3-1. 
28 Lucia True Ames Mead, Swords and ploughshares: or, The supplanting of the system of 
war by the system of war (London, 1912), p.143. 
29 The Daily News, 5 Oct 1911, ED Morel MSS, F 15/3-1. 
30 See above, p.268. 
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abstain, dismissed this as 'a very unlikely contingency' and moreover, one which was 
becoming 'more unlikely by the day' .31 
The British military attache at Berlin, Waters, once remarked that his chiefs 
great services to peace had never been recognised,32 and Dumas, who also served 
with Lascelles under more strained circumstances, put this in similar terms: 'He had, 
happily and unhappily, so often seen troublesome affairs between nations arranged by 
diplomacy that he could not credit that affairs between Germany, France and England 
were approaching an impasse that could only be bridged by war. ,33 This was the 
outcome which Sir Frank Lascelles strove his entire career to avoid. Walford Selby, 
who could be a harsh critic of Lascelles, termed his chief 'an ardent friend ofpeace,34 
It was therefore a tragedy that Lascelles, who strove to conciliate Germany for 
thirteen years, lived to see the outbreak in 1914 of 'The Kaiser's war', and the death 
of the Victorian age he was at home in, on the fields of France. 
,.31 The Times, 29 April 1914, p. 7. 
32 W.H.H. Waters, Potsdam and Doorn: Reminiscences of William II, as Emperor of 
Germany, and in exile, (London, 1935) p.l5. 
33 Dumas autobiography, p.16. 
34 This is how Walford Selby described Lascelles. Selby to mother, 13 April 1907, Selby 
MSS;Bodleian Library, Oxford, Add. MSS6615. p.268. 
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